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New Political Thinking on Nationality Question Outlined

18000009 Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 13, 1988 (signed to press 16 Aug 88) pp 84-92

[Article by Prof E. Tadevosyan, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] Restructuring and the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society signify a radical transformation of all spheres of the life of society, including ethnic relations. Here as in other areas, new problems and new tasks cannot be dealt with effectively if outdated approaches and methods are followed and reliance is placed on the old way of thinking. They have proven their unsoundness in the actual experience of our multinational country's development. Qualitative improvement of ethnic relations in the USSR, then, requires the shaping, establishment, and creative development of a new political way of thinking on the nationality question which can serve as the basis for building a new and consistently internationalist practice in socialist interethnic relations.

The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU paid close attention to the extremely important and crucial problem of the development of interethnic relations in our country. Having appraised creation of a union of equal nations and nationalities that has stood the test of time as one of the greatest achievements of socialism, it took note that only consistent conduct of Leninist nationality policy can be the sound foundation of our development in the future. At the same time, the conference noted that quite a few serious difficulties and acute problems in need of thorough study and urgent solution have accumulated in this area in our country. The report of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the resolution adopted by the conference "On Interethnic Relations," and the speeches of the delegates reflected the new way of thinking and the new approaches, and it is in their light that the general and fundamental lines of party policy in this area have been defined in the present stage.

The session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet held 18 July 1988, in which the question of the decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets on Nagornyy Karabakh was taken up, can serve as a vivid example of the new thinking and the new practical approach to the most complicated ethnic problems.

The aims of the 19th All-Union Party Conference were put in specific form in the documents of the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It emphasized that nationality policy is a most complicated policy for our Communist Party and Soviet state; in it both economic and social problems, and indeed spiritual problems as well, are bound together in a tight knot. Once it had analyzed the causes of the current aggravation of interethnic relations in a number of the country's regions

and had outlined the first steps toward further development and strengthening of our Union, the July Plenum ordered that the necessary material be prepared by the beginning of 1989 on the question of improving interethnic relations in the USSR to be taken up in a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The task was set of gathering ideas and proposals.

In that context the present article makes an attempt to examine the essence and main content of the new political thinking on the nationality question and also certain conclusions following from it that are important to the practical restructuring of the guidance and management of the sphere of ethnic relations.

What Is This New Way of Thinking on the Nationality Question?

In the field of methodology, just as in other spheres of the life of society, new political thinking on the nationality question presupposes first of all the complete reestablishment of truly Leninist views of theory and practice—in this case, those related to solving nationality problems. This is because Leninist principles of nationality policy were distorted and violated for a lengthy period of time. Restructuring, democratization, and glasnost, the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference stated, have laid bare the things which are wrong in interethnic relations and at the same time have brought about the conditions necessary to overcome them democratically.

It is well-known that in the years before and immediately after the revolution I.V. Stalin had a definite role in developing and popularizing Marxist-Leninist theory and the program of the Bolshevik party on the nationality question and in the evolution of the Soviet multinational state. But even before the USSR was formed he committed serious mistakes which were manifested in the administrative and command approach in the guidance of ethnic affairs and in deprecation of the rights of the nationalities. Now, Lenin's criticism of those mistakes is also widely known. Following the death of V.I. Lenin, especially in the period between the thirties and the fifties, these negative aspects of the Stalinist approach to solving nationality problems became ever more clearly evident and resulted in arbitrariness and repressions toward entire peoples. All of this resulted in serious deformations of socialist ethnic relations.

In the years of the stagnation such flagrant distortions of nationality policy were not committed. But those years were typified by a glossing over of reality, reliance on spontaneity and letting things take their course, and a desire not to note, much less solve, the nationality problems that did actually exist and were even becoming more acute, which drove them deeper. At the same time, there was no lack of declarations about loyalty to Leninist principles of nationality policy.

Thus, the burdensome legacy in the domain of interethnic relations which the past has left to the period of restructuring is related to the consequences not only of the cult of Stalin's personality, but also to the ideology and psychology of the stagnation. For too long a time we failed to move forward in this important area of domestic policy.

But the new way of thinking does not come down merely to a simple revival of Leninist views on the nationality question. It would be dogmatic and simplistic to seek in V.I. Lenin's writings ready-made answers to all those questions which reality confronts us with today. We do not find in those writings formulas that can be directly applied to our present practical activity, but rather basic elements of general theory and methodology that have unsurpassed importance as we seek answers on our own to the new question under the new conditions. An indispensable component of the new way of thinking on the nationality question then, must be not a simple repetition of Leninist formulas and propositions, but their creative and authentically innovative application to the qualitatively new conditions, to solving the new problems of the present stage of development of ethnic relations in the USSR. This is what is particularly complicated and at the same time particularly valuable in the business of shaping that way of thinking, and it leaves ample room for a nonstandard and realistic approach that is bold and thoughtful.

Finally, establishment of the new way of thinking is inseparable from the conquest of notions and stereotypes that became established long ago, but are divorced from reality. The new way of thinking on the nationality question is called upon to provide a clear and straightforward answer to the question of what kind of legacy we have been left in this area. In its resolution the 19th All-Union Party Conference defined it as a task of historic importance to establish and creatively develop Leninist norms and principles of nationality policy and to resolutely purge them of artificial encrustations and deformations.

What is the specific content of the new way of thinking on the nationality question? What are its most typical features? What is really new about the present approach of our party to the study and solution of the problems that have accumulated in this area?

The new thinking on the nationality question presupposes above all overcoming the underestimation that has occurred in the past of the place and role of this question, of the nationality factor in the life of our country, and a clear and straightforward recognition that any decisions which are at all essential in practically any area always affect both ethnic and interethnic interests, and these must be dealt with seriously. Even when it is a question of solving problems which are not ethnic in themselves, these interests have to be sensitively and carefully taken into account and combined harmoniously from positions of socialist internationalism. It was stated at the

January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "There is not a single fundamental issue which we could solve, either in the past or at present, without taking into account the fact that we live in a multinational country." In his speech concerning the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution M.S. Gorbachev said that in our multinational state "all socioeconomic, cultural, and legal decisions always directly and immediately touch upon the nationality question as well."

The position encountered with some frequency in the past, whereby the attitude of not speaking and not writing about difficulties and contradictions in ethnic relations, of giving the appearance that they do not exist at all, was taken as the highest manifestation of internationalism, is pseudointernationalist, then. Underestimation of the nationality question in our country could become a serious brake on restructuring not only in one of the most important areas of the life of society, but indeed in society as a whole. It is incompatible with authentic democratization of Soviet society.

The need for correct and realistic evaluation of what we have achieved in dealing with the nationality question is directly related here. It has to be admitted that in the past there was an unwarranted absolutization of results in our dealing with this question, and the idea was firmly planted of there being no problems in ethnic relations. The usual representation was that there is supposedly no nationality question in our country now because it has been completely dealt with, once and for all, without qualification, in all senses and aspects. There can be no doubt that such a one-sided and undialectical interpretation of the situation has not been helpful, to put it mildly, in mobilizing the attention of theory and practice to this complicated and vitally important area of social relations, and it resulted in its being underestimated.

Finally, in the process of building socialism the nationalities and ethnic minorities and also relations among them have undergone a qualitative socialist transformation. On this plane the nationality question that has come down from the past, the nationality question in what we might say as the narrow sense of the word, as the question of elimination of ethnic oppression and inequality of nationalities, their actual inequality, which were bound up with social antagonism, has been effectively dealt with in our country. The 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee clearly enumerated once again the outstanding and truly unique achievements of socialism in this area, of which we are justly proud. But it is equally obvious that in the various stages of its development socialism has achieved only a certain level of resolution of the nationality question taken in the broad sense of the word as a question of the entire totality of essential social problems in development of the nationalities and ethnic relations. What is more, as has already been noted, we have not been altogether successful or completely consistent in implementing Leninist principles of nationality policy,

and this has in turn led to serious deformations of ethnic relations. In our view, then, it would be unwarranted and premature to assert without qualification that the nationality question has been altogether resolved in the USSR and that the term "nationality question" is absolutely inapplicable as a description of the present stage of development of ethnic relations in our country.

It is correct to say that the nationality question has been resolved in principle in the USSR. But this does not preclude an admission that even in the society of developing socialism this question, in its definite concrete historical content, has not been removed from the agenda and that in this society new aspects of it are inevitably arising and being dealt with. M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech in the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July 1988: "No issue can be considered resolved once and for all. Every question has its dynamics, its development, and this also applies to the question of ethnic relations."

The restructuring of our thinking on the nationality question is inseparable from the establishment of historical truth in this area as well. The truth is that along the lengthy, complicated, ramified, and contradictory road of solving the nationality question in the USSR there have been not only historic victories and achievements, but also serious difficulties, shortcomings, distortions, and mistakes. These negative things were left in the shadow for a long time and it was not customary to speak about them, and this had adverse consequences which have to be dealt with today. Meanwhile, an objective analysis of these shortcomings and mistakes is indispensable—in order to eliminate the "blank spots" in elucidation of our history; and to restore justice both toward entire nationalities and also toward their individual representatives; and in the interest of preventing repetitions of the past; and for further improvement of present-day ethnic relations in the country; and also so that Soviet experience is used abroad correctly.

In the light of the lessons in truth of the 27th CPSU Congress, the material of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution, in the context of democratization and glasnost we must refer straightforwardly and unambiguously to those things in our history which have nothing in common with Leninism and have caused serious harm to the formation and strengthening of the friendship and brotherhood of the nationalities of the USSR. They include the unwarranted elimination of the national statehood of a number of nationalities and their forced resettlement in the war years. They include the large-scale unlawful repressions from the latter half of the thirties to the beginning of the fifties, which broadly affected the best personnel of the nationalities as well. They include the unjustifiably rigid and largely bureaucratic centralization, which was organically bound up with establishing the command-administrative

system of management and which suppressed the independence, initiative, and activity of the republics. They include the manifestly inadequate attention to development of some of the small nationalities and especially the national groups (ethnic minorities), beginning in the thirties. They include the loud campaigns from the late forties up to the 1st half of the fifties—the "fight against cosmopolitanism" and the "doctors' affair," which also had a manifest nationalistic aspect. They include the groundless charges of nationalism lodged from the latter half of the forties up through the early fifties and later against many well-known figures in literature and art solely because they expressed sentiments of natural national pride. They include the nationalistic distortions of personnel policy in a number of republics during the years of the stagnation and manifestations of national egoism and arrogance, parasitical attitudes and narrow-mindedness.

In the framework of the new way of thinking on the nationality question it is fundamentally important to guarantee a Leninist attitude toward what is truly national and authentically internationalist conception of what actually is international. V.I. Lenin taught that international does not mean anational. The national is not in turn the antipode of the international, which does not exist apart from the national and loses its meaning in the absence of the national. The international grows on the basis of development of the national, on the basis of exposure of its internal potential capabilities and its interaction and mutual enrichment with the other-national, on the basis of the rise of national values to the level of interethnic values.

Unfortunately, however, in the past the erroneous notion was widespread that the less of the national there is, the better it is for the international, that the road toward ever greater internationalization of the life of society runs through the mechanical displacement of the national by the international, through the "curtailment" of the national. Under such conditions, of course, international unity was quite often seen in practice as virtually nothing other than interethnic uniformity, and the natural and real ethnic diversity of our life and culture was perceived by some as an obstacle to strengthening the international unity of Soviet society, as something to be gotten away from as quickly as possible. Need we be surprised after all that in many republics young people have a poor knowledge of the history of their own nationality, of their own republic, of the language of their nationality and its cultural values. In the context of the tumultuous growth of ethnic self-consciousness this situation could not but offend people's ethnic sentiments and, as we have been able to realize, it sooner or later results in undesirable collisions and even conflicts on an ethnic basis.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference unambiguously emphasized that "the socialist ideal is not a deadening standardization, but a full-fledged and dynamic unity within ethnic diversity," that "we have to learn to

distinguish truly national interests from their nationalistic distortions." The party believes that spiritual progress must take place through reliance on the cultural identity of the nationalities and ethnic minorities, that Soviet socialist culture, developing as a multinational culture, must continue even in the future to be a powerful factor for the ideological and ethical consolidation of our society. The conference set the tasks of bringing about the conditions for the harmonious and natural development of bilingualism of the Russian language with the languages of the respective nationalities, of showing more concern for the vigorous functioning of the languages of the nationalities, of stimulating the study of the language of the nationality whose name the republic bears by citizens of other nationalities living on its territory.

It was noted in the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July 1988 that our nationalities will be brought closer together and their efforts harmonized on the basis of a further prosperity of each nationality, of each culture, and on the basis of development of each language. This is a rich resource which we have, not a deficiency.

The question of the decisive role of democratization of Soviet society in the further strengthening of its interethnic unity should be singled out in particular. Leninism has always taken the point of departure that the character and level of the resolution of the nationality question are directly and decisively dependent mainly on the nature and degree of democratization of sociopolitical life in the country.

Unfortunately, even this methodologically important Leninist principle, which has to be acknowledged if there is to be consistently internationalist thinking on the nationality question, was essentially committed to oblivion for a long time and even ignored. After all, it is a fact that practically all the conflict situations in the recent past—in Kazakhstan, the Baltic republics, etc.—have to a considerable degree been the result of serious departures from internationalist principles of socialist democracy or even of their distortion. Could the events in and concerning Nagorny Karabakh have occurred and become so acute if democratic norms in the sphere of interethnic relations had not been violated there, if the oblast's autonomous status had been honored and implemented and practiced, not just declaratively, if the past leadership of the NKAO, Azerbaijan, and Armenia had seen that ethnic peculiarities were truly taken into account and the national and interethnic interests combined?

Summarizing the 5-year experience in building the Soviet multinational state, V.I. Lenin wrote at the end of 1922 that "the only correct attitude toward the interests of nationalities...will be to serve those interests to the maximum and to create conditions which preclude any possibility of conflicts on that basis"; that "only

immense care as to the interests of the various nationalities eliminates the grounds for conflicts, removes the mutual distrust, removes the fear of any intrigues, and creates that trust, in particular of the workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which it is absolutely impossible to have peaceful relations among nationalities or any successful development of everything that is valuable in contemporary civilization" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Vol 45, p 240). It has to be frankly admitted that in the years of the personality cult and stagnation we by no means always, by no means in all respects, and by no means everywhere followed that most important Leninist precept, and that is what we are paying for so bitterly today.

It is extremely important to the new thinking about the nationality question to conceptualize the thesis of the 27th CPSU Congress concerning the contradictoriness of ethnic processes under the conditions of developing socialism. We have to overcome the idea that became deep-rooted in the past that under socialism there are no contradictions between the ethnic and interethnic, between the ethnic and the social, between the prosperity and rapprochement of the nationalities, between all-union and republic interests, between centralism and democracy, and so on. All of this has been seriously impeding the emergence of the aspects and facets of these contradictions that have actually been occurring and the effort to find optimum ways of resolving them in good time.

An analysis of both the constructive and also the adverse processes is more and more making us realize that the state of ethnic relations in a particular region or republic is dependent above all, both directly and ever increasingly, on how the socioeconomic and other tasks of restructuring are performed. But however organic the relationship and to whatever extent ethnic relations are merged with economic, political, social, and spiritual relations, one cannot fail to see that they do preserve their specific nature and relative independence and develop according to their own particular patterns. It is important to take this into account both in theory and also in practice.

It is also important to understand that under present conditions, now that the economic, cultural, and personnel potential of all the Soviet republics and autonomies has grown immeasurably, now that there is a natural rise in ethnic self-consciousness taking place, performing the strategic task of strengthening interethnic unity of Soviet society is by no means an easy or simple problem, and in a certain sense it is even more difficult and complicated than those which had to be dealt with in the past. All of this demands constant and growing attention and new and flexible approaches from party and Soviet authorities, public organizations, and work collectives concerning the scientific management of ethnic processes, an improvement in the Marxist-Leninist training of personnel taking part in the practical implementation of nationality policy, and a rise in the level of sophistication of interethnic relations and cooperation.

From the New Thinking to a New Policy and Practice

New thinking is an indispensable prerequisite and indispensable condition of radical improvement of ethnic relations. But it is not sufficient by itself, for, as is well-known, ideas, thoughts, cannot by themselves change anything except other ideas. Unless an effective mechanism is developed for the practical implementation of the new conceptions, they cannot be given embodiment in reality. We have no right to forget that even in the years of the stagnation quite a few good ideas and tasks were proclaimed, though they were largely left undone, precisely because the working out of the concrete strategies, forms, and methods of their implementation was left in the shadows.

The reform of the political system, in particular democratization of ethnic relations in our country, is a decisive factor to practical implementation of the new thinking on the nationality question. It is democratization of Soviet society that is called upon to bring about the optimum conditions for a sensitive and careful appreciation and maximum possible satisfaction of the interests of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities and thereby to bring about a strengthening of their mutual trust, their concern for one another, the desire for still closer fraternal cooperation. It is democratization that is called upon to guarantee a situation in which the forms of Soviet national statehood would realistically reflect and strictly protect both the common and also the specific interests of the nationalities; in which there would be fair representation of the working people of all the nationalities in party, Soviet, and other bodies at all levels; in which there would be consistent appreciation at the local level of the needs of representatives of not only the indigenous nationality, but also of other nationalities, especially in the areas of education, communications, the creativity of the nationality, and also the creation of centers of the national culture, the use of the mass media, and the satisfaction of religious needs.

Only consistent democratization is able to create a situation in which people of any nationality in any republic would feel themselves to be at least not worse off than they would be if they lived in their own republic. It is a direct and paramount debt to internationalism of party and Soviet authorities of all republics to see that the Soviet citizen of any nationality never has an occasion to feel himself to be infringed upon. Then the complicated questions will not even arise of changing the borders of the national territories or of moving from one republic to another on ethnic grounds. This is especially important to emphasize at present when in our country approximately 55 million persons are living outside their own republic, and about 6 million persons belong to those nationalities which do not have in the country their own national-state and national-administrative structures. As pointed out by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "a social atmosphere has to be created in which a person of any nationality would feel himself to be at home in any part of our socialist homeland."

M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference that our society is distinguished by high mobility of the population, that many people live outside the structures of their nationality, and also that there are nationalities which do not have territorial autonomy. These are all realities of our multinational state. Certain collisions may occur in this connection, and we have only one way to resolve them: within the limits of the existing structure of the union state to see that the interests of every nationality and ethnic minority and of the entire community of Soviet peoples are taken into account to the maximum. Under our particular conditions there simply is no other possible approach, and any attempt to set out on another road would be disastrous.

The principles set forth in the resolution of the conference entitled "On Interethnic Relations" have fundamental importance: "All ethnic problems require a judicious and comprehensive approach on the basis of a thorough analysis and objective evaluations of each concrete situation. They must be resolved calmly and with exceptional responsibility, within a framework of socialist democracy and lawfulness, above all by means of steps to accommodate one another, in view of the processes of revolutionary renewal which are developing, and without harm to the interethnic solidarity of the Soviet people." These principles were the basis of discussion in the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning Nagornyy Karabakh on 18 July 1988. The statements made by M.S. Gorbachev and also a number of others who took part in the session and the decree adopted contain provisions which relate not only to this particular matter, but which also have an aspect of general policy.

To be specific, it was noted that relations among nationalities and ethnic minorities constitute an extremely sensitive sphere of human relations, and in examining the problems that arise here one must display exceptional care and the highest degree of responsibility. We all have the greatest motivation to resolve the largest and most complicated issues calmly, soundly, in our common interests. At the same time, we cannot resolve any matter nor solve any problem if we neglect the interests of even one small nationality. This follows from Lenin's conception of nationality policy.

If in relations among nationalities and republics collisions arise, including collisions that have to do with territory, the thing that needs to be done is not to carve up the country differently, not to erect one wall after another, but to seek a reasonable compromise, to meet each other halfway, guided by higher interests, and to reach out hands to one another. Our party is interethnic, our revolution is interethnic, our country is interethnic, and we must see that all the families in our common home live amicably regardless of their nationality.

The decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet emphasized that issues of interethnic relations that arise should be resolved in good time, with maximum consideration given to the interests of both each

nationality and ethnic minority and also those of our entire socialist fatherland. In this connection we need to guarantee unswerving adherence to the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, resolutely interdicting any activity aimed at inflaming ethnic enmity and attempts to use democratic rights for antidemocratic purposes.

The reform of the political system in a spirit of democratization presupposes a further improvement of Soviet federalism. In the past, the fact that the Soviet federation and Soviet autonomy have justified themselves and have continued to play an important role in safeguarding the necessary political conditions for the development and convergence of the Soviet nationalities and ethnic minorities has quite often been one-sidedly interpreted. There has been a lack of understanding of the need to improve them further. It is no accident that for decades there have been no essential changes in this area whatsoever.

The democratization of the political system raises first of all the question of consistent implementation of Leninist principles of democratic centralism and socialist federalism in the national-state construction so as to take into account the present conditions, tasks, and needs of our multinational society. For a long time, the opinion that prevailed in our country was that a strengthening of the unified union-level Soviet multinational state must take place through ever greater and ever more comprehensive centralization, while expansion of the rights of the republics, autonomies, and local level was represented as something secondary, unnatural, something lying outside the mainstream of development, indeed even as an obstacle on the road to strengthening the interethnic unity of Soviet society, a threat to it, and even as a road to nationalism and narrow-mindedness. This approach was bound up with the shaping, establishment, and development of the command-administrative system of management, and it led toward bureaucratic centralization, toward a fettering of the independence of the republics, violations of the constitutional status of the autonomous structures, and an unjustified limitation on opportunities for expression and satisfaction of the needs of the nationalities.

The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference decided that in the framework of restructuring of the political system measures for which the time is right should be carried out to further develop and strengthen the Soviet federation on the basis of democratic principles. It is above all a question of broadening the rights of the union republics and autonomous structures by delineation of the jurisdiction of the Union and the Soviet republics, through decentralization and the transfer to the local level of a number of managerial functions, a strengthening of independence and responsibility in the sphere of the economy, social and cultural development, and environmental protection. This is fully consistent with the requirements of the radical economic reform being carried out, with the transition from administrative to economic methods of economic activity, to cost accounting, self-financing, and self-management.

The key directions of restructuring—the radical economic reform and the process of democratization—open up ample room for optimum combination of the interests of both the national-state structures and also the country as a whole. Matters need to be arranged, the party conference pointed out, so that the workers are well aware how much the republic or oblast is producing, what its contribution is to the country's economy, and how much it is receiving. The conference and then also the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee supported the idea of the transition of the republics and regions to the principles of cost accounting in which there would be a clear determination of their contribution to the performance of all-union programs.

As for practical implementation of the new thinking on the nationality question, a very important role goes to the creation and invigoration of government and public institutions in the political system that operate on a permanent basis and would concern themselves with the entire range of interethnic problems.

Taking this into account, the 19th All-Union Party Conference deemed it advisable to create standing committees on matters of interethnic relations in the USSR Supreme Soviet, the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics, and in local soviets, wherever necessary. It was proposed that consideration be given to the question of creating a specific government body that would deal with the affairs of the nationalities and ethnic relations and also to creating at the union government level a scientific center for comprehensive study of the urgent problems of ethnic relations, and that scientific research and the information effort be broadened in this area.

The party conference paid particular attention to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which even by its very name is called upon above all to concern itself with ethnic problems at the level of the supreme government authority. It has to be regretfully acknowledged that up to now it has not concerned itself with those problems as it should have and that a functional lack of definite responsibility and mere duplication of the work of the Council of the Union have become deep-seated in its work. It is not just that in meetings of the Council of Nationalities there has been no specific discussion of the issues of ethnic relations, nor even that in its structure there has not even been a commission of deputies concerned with these problems, but that during discussion of all-union problems their ethnic and interethnic aspects were very little examined and taken into account. No real and effective mechanism has been worked out for the active participation of the deputies in the drafting and practical implementation of nationality policy, in overseeing that it is correctly enforced in the republics, at the local level, in solving the complicated and acute issues that arise, and so on. Would it have been impossible, say, for an authoritative commission of deputies specifically to look into the events in and concerning Nagornyy Karabakh (and still

better, before those events) consisting of representatives of all the union republics, to send it both to the NKAO and also to Azerbaijan and Armenia to meet with the workers, to speak to them, to help in discussing and solving the specific problems that have been arising, and in resolving the contradictions? It is indicative that in the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July 1988 the decision was made to order a specially created commission of the Council of Nationalities to study the matters related to the problems of Nagorny Karabakh. That commission has already undertaken its effort.

Soviet democracy is even today guaranteeing broad representation of the working people of various nationalities in government bodies at all levels. The membership of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, which was elected in 1984, includes representatives of 63 nationalities, including 40 nationalities in the Council of the Union and 59 nationalities in the Council of Nationalities. The deputies in the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics elected in 1985 include deputies of 78 nationalities, while local soviets of people's deputies elected in 1987 include representatives of 120 nationalities.

The creation of a new supreme representative body of government—the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, envisaged by the reform of the political system, will make it possible to expand even more the representation of all the nationalities. The Council of Nationalities will be preserved as one of the two chambers of the new USSR Supreme Soviet elected by that congress. Representing all the national-state and national-administrative structures in the country, it will take up affairs related to their economic and social development, to interethnic relations, to the enforcement of legislation in this area, to monitoring the activity of union ministries and departments concerning the interests of the republics, autonomous structures, and so on. All of this will make it possible to improve the discovery and harmonization of ethnic and interethnic interests.

One of the basic problems of the major reform of the political system in the USSR is to bring about the conditions for future free development of every nationality and ethnic minority, for a strengthening of their friendship and equal cooperation on principles of internationalism. Here, the CPSU takes as its point of departure that the development of the Soviet federal multinational state and the interethnic relations and fraternity of our peoples are dynamic living processes requiring the constant close attention both of republic authorities and also authorities at the union level. The political course of the CPSU, which combines satisfaction of the interests of all the nationalities with the common interests and needs of the country, internationalist ideology, which is incompatible with any varieties of chauvinism and nationalism, are the basis for solving the problems that arise in this area.

It is the civic duty of every Soviet citizen to combat ethnic restrictiveness and chauvinistic presumptuousness and to eliminate the causes that engender them. All actions which move the nationalities and ethnic minorities apart from one another, all attempts to infringe on the rights of citizens of any nationality were seen by the 19th All-Union Party Conference as ethically unacceptable and counter to the interests of the Soviet state. It pointed out that in the spirit of the Leninist tradition one should fight first against "his own" nationalism and chauvinism, and representatives of the respective nationality must do this first of all.

The decree of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Practical Effort To Carry Out the Decisions of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU" formulated the paramount tasks of this effort in the domain of interethnic relations: to concentrate attention on eliminating the manifestations of the stagnation in the development of particular regions, of the underestimation of the socioeconomic and spiritual needs of the nationalities and ethnic minorities; to resolutely counteract forces opposed to restructuring that inflame nationalistic and chauvinistic passions; to carry out measures to strengthen the legal basis of interethnic relations envisaged by the 19th party conference; and to strengthen the ideological and political effort and to persistently assert socialist internationalism.

All party organizations, all our ideological personnel, and every party member are called upon to take an active part in performing these tasks.

Editor's Note

This article may be used in studying the materials of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU and also in the course entitled "Current Problems in the Development of Ethnic Relations and in Inculcating Internationalism and Patriotism."

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Party's Role in Admissions to Moscow Institutes, University

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[Article by V. A. Nikitin: "Party Leadership in Student Admissions to Moscow Institutions of Higher Education (1971-1981)"]

[Text] The higher school has important significance to reaching the objectives of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development. "It must react sensitively and promptly to the needs of production, science and culture and satisfy the national economy's demand for

specialists characterized by a combination of high professional training, ideological and political maturity and the skills of organization and administration."¹ Institutions of higher education nurture and shape the future intellectual potential of the society, which is responsible in many ways for fundamental acceleration of scientific and technical progress—a basic issue of the party's economic strategy. "Real accomplishments are defined here by the status of scientific knowledge, by advancement of original ideas which can be embodied in fundamentally new machines and production procedures that create a possibility for taking the lead in the principal directions of science and technology. Such is the strategic objective posed before science. In its attainment, everything is important—from VUZ student admissions and the quality of specialist training, to filling the USSR Academy of Sciences with talented scientists..."² emphasized M. S. Gorbachev.

The effectiveness of the work of institutions of higher education depends to a significant degree on the qualitative composition of the student body, and on how well matriculants select the VUZes in which they would realize their capabilities to the fullest, and in which they would provide maximum benefit to society. Great responsibility is borne by the collectives of institutions of higher education, industrial enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, other institutions and secondary schools. "Selecting students for the higher school is a matter of great social significance,"³ a lead article in the newspaper PRAVDA noted.

The problems of developing the higher school, training specialists in institutions of higher education and subjecting students to communist indoctrination are constantly in the center of attention of philosophers, economists and party historians. But it is only in a few publications that the authors examine the problems of occupational orientation, and as a rule they do so on the basis of nationwide or republic materials.⁴ Analysis of the activities of the Moscow city party organization aimed at attracting the ablest young people to the capital's VUZes is an example of something that has remained outside the vision of researchers. The objective of this article is to analyze the activities of the capital's party organization aimed at improving the social composition of the student body and improving occupational orientation, and to examine the effectiveness of measures implemented by party organs and VUZ administrations to attract talented young men and women to institutions of higher education.

That V. I. Lenin concerned himself with these problems on several occasions is an indication of their fundamental importance. Describing the place of students in the social structure of society and their revolutionary possibilities, Lenin noted: "...the student body is not cut off from the rest of society, and therefore it necessarily reflects within itself the entire political grouping of society,"⁵ and "a student body cannot be an exception to

the whole society."⁶ Following the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin showed extremely great interest in the problems of selecting students for institutions of higher education. He turned attention to the need for unfailing observance of the class principle in VUZ admissions: "Admission should doubtlessly be granted on priority to persons from among the proletariat and the poorest peasantry, who will be provided with ample scholarships."⁷

The Communist Party and the Soviet state have done much to implement Lenin's commandments in the development of the higher school. The importance of selecting high quality students for the VUZes was noted in a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on the basic directions of restructuring higher and secondary special education in the country, adopted in March 1987. Party organizations and VUZ rectors were asked "to switch to long-range forms of occupational orientation of young people, and to make wider use of the methods of psychological and pedagogical science making it possible to reveal and develop the interests and capabilities of young people. To constantly improve admissions rules, and to increase the objectivity of competitive selection in the VUZes, while complying with the principle of social justice."⁸

A tendency for a decrease in the ratio of applicants to space available in institutions of higher education clearly revealed itself in the 1970s and early 1980s. The average nationwide VUZ applicant ratio in 1981 was 2.03 persons per desk.⁹ In Moscow's VUZes, the applicant ratio was 3.2 in 1976¹⁰ and 2.7 in 1979.¹¹ At the same time, a large number of VUZes had a traditionally high applicant ratio: Historical Archives—6.1, MGU [Moscow State University]—5.1, Institute of the National Economy imeni V. G. Plekhanov and the Technological Institute of the RSFSR Ministry of Personal Public Services—5.0, Oblast Pedagogical Institute imeni N. K. Krupskaya—4.9, Institute of Foreign Languages imeni Moris Torez—4.4, Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin and Cooperative Institute—3.8 applicants per desk.¹²

As a whole, the applicant ratio was 3.7 in VUZes with a humanities profile, and 2.2 in VUZes with a technical profile.¹³

While the VUZes listed above have enjoyed a high applicant ratio, a number of institutions of higher education with long-standing traditions of training highly qualified specialists and many fabulous scientific schools have experienced serious difficulties in attracting applicants. Thus the applicant ratio for the Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman dropped from 1.98 applicants in 1972¹⁴ to 1.57 applicants per desk in 1984.¹⁵ The applicant ratio in the Institute of Chemical Technology imeni D. I. Mendeleyev dropped in 1980 to 1.5 applicants per desk.¹⁶ The Institute of Steel and Alloys has been suffering a shortfall of applicants in some specialties from one year to the next.¹⁷ Technical VUZes

have become less popular among matriculants, though there have been exceptions as well. Thus in the 1970s the applicant ratio for the Physico-Technical Institute remained at 4.5-5.¹⁸

Sociological research conducted in the 1970s revealed noticeable changes in the social and occupational orientation of young people. While according to data from research conducted in the mid-1960s 80-90 percent of graduates of schools of general education intended to enroll in institutions of higher education and viewed this option as the sole desirable one, research conducted by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1973-1975 revealed that less than half of the school graduates were oriented on higher education.¹⁹ The decrease in the VUZ applicant ratio was associated with many factors. The impending crisis which our state found itself facing in the late 1970s and early 1980s doubtlessly could not but have an effect on the activities of the higher school, which is intimately associated with the national economy and with the spiritual life of Soviet society. "Devaluation" of the higher education diploma, difficulties in job placement, a drop in the prestige of engineering, low wages and other factors had an unfavorable effect on the choice made by young people for their life's path. Thus while in the 1950s an engineer's wages exceeded a laborer's wages by an average of 1.8 times, in 1985 they did so by 1.1 times.²⁰ A significant proportion of secondary school graduates who decided to enter VUZes did not necessarily do so by their own choice: They made their decision under the influence of their social environment—parents, relatives, acquaintances.²¹

All of this made it necessary for party organizations to improve forms of occupational orientation that have proven themselves and seek new ones. Preparatory departments were given an important place in selecting students for VUZes in accordance with the principle of social justice. On 27 May 1970 the bureau of the Moscow City CPSU Committee adopted the decree "On the Work of VUZes to Create Preparatory Departments." It emphasized: "The 20 August 1969 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, which required that preparatory departments be created to prepare young people for admission to the higher school from among the best workers and kolkhoz farmers with a work history of at least a year, and from among outstanding soldiers of combat and political training demobilized from the Soviet Army, must be followed strictly when selecting students for preparatory departments."²²

Preparatory departments were created in practically all Moscow VUZes in the first half of the 1970s. The plant trade school under the AvtoZIL Production Association, the State Institute of Physical Culture and all art, culture and motion picture VUZes were an exception²³ owing to the specific requirements imposed on students of these VUZes. Preparatory departments were organized under 40 VUZes by the beginning of the 1977-1978 school year

(there were about 30 of them in the 1970-1971 school year). Department students included 480 laborers (93 percent in the Textile Institute, 86 percent in the Technological Institute of Light Industry, 80 percent in the Institute of Petrochemical and Gas Industry and 79 percent in the Mining Institute). Two percent of the students were kolkhoz farmers, and 50 percent were demobilized soldiers.²⁴ By 1983, preparatory departments were operating in 45 out of 76 of Moscow's institutions of higher education, and the number of students they enrolled was about 10,000 (approximately 20 percent of the first-year admissions plan).²⁵

VUZ party organizations kept the problems of selecting students for preparatory departments under their constant control. Thus in 1977 the party committee of the Institute of Steel and Alloys examined the problem "On the Results of Admitting Students to the Preparatory Department and the Tasks of Upgrading the Quality of Their Preparation." The applicant ratio for this VUZ's department was 1.4 applicants per desk. Twelve percent of those enrolled were CPSU members and candidate members.²⁶ The party committee drew up measures promoting greater effectiveness in the work of admitting the best workers to the preparatory department, turning special attention to admission of CPSU members and candidate members and to holding applicant interviews right at the enterprises.²⁷

Students of preparatory departments were the main source of new members for VUZ student party organizations. Thus over a 5-year period (1972-1977), each year around 30 percent of the students admitted to the preparatory department of MGU were CPSU members and candidate members,²⁸ while in the mining institute they represented 15 percent of those accepted in 1977.²⁹ As of the beginning of the 1971-1972 school year 2.9 percent of the students in Moscow VUZes were party affiliates³⁰ (0.8 percent in the physical engineering and chemical technology institutes, 1.6 percent in the Machine Tool Building Institute and so on). In the meantime 17.2 percent of the students in preparatory departments of the capital's VUZes were party affiliates.³¹

VUZ party organizations and rector's offices did a significant amount of work to publicize preparatory departments among laborers. In 1979 the Scientific Council of the Motor Highway Institute examined the problem "On the Work of the Preparatory Department and the Work of the Dean's Office with Former Graduates of the Preparatory Department." In order to acquaint laborers with the rules of admission to the preparatory department, the institute rector's office broadcast announcements on radio and television and published them in the newspapers MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA and the journals ZA BEZOPASNOST DVIZHENIYA and STROITELSTVO DOROG. Leaflets discussing admission to this department were also published and sent to a number of Moscow's industrial and transportation

enterprises and to all rayon military commissariats. Seven hundred announcements were posted in rolling stock of the Moscow City Transportation System, and 250 announcements and 200 leaflets were sent to former SSO soldier-students, addressed to the locations of their detachments.³²

At the same time many problems have existed in selecting students for preparatory departments. Thus in the 1976-1977 school year the plan for admissions to preparatory departments was only 97 percent completed. Five of the city's VUZes failed the plan.³³ Having examined the problem "On the Work of the Institute's Preparatory Department," the party committee of the Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin asserted that not a single application had been submitted to the mathematics faculty, and only one was received by the physics faculty.³⁴ In the MGU, over 25 percent of the communists left the preparatory department in 1978 for one reason or another.³⁵

Party organizations have managed to increase the effectiveness of the work done by the departments. However, they were able to solve far from all of the problems. The principal indicators of the work of preparatory departments are the ratio between the number of students admitted and the number that graduate successfully, the academic record of the students, and the ratio between the number of students that enroll in these departments and the number that graduate from the VUZ. Thus in the 1976-1977 school year 1,200 persons (16 percent of the students) left the preparatory departments of Moscow VUZes; of them, 334 persons, or 28 percent, were dropped prior to the end of the school year due to poor grades. The largest numbers of students were dismissed from the Institute of Statistical Economics (26 percent), the Institute of Geological Exploration, the Institute of Geodetic Engineers, Aerial Photography and Cartography and the Construction Engineering Institute (25 percent), the Engineering Physics Institute (24 percent) and the Textile Institute.³⁶ The admissions plan for the preparatory department of the MGU was 750 persons. In 1978 only 603 persons from this department were enrolled in MGU's first-year class,³⁷ which was an indication that mistakes had been made in admissions to the preparatory department and that work with the students in the course of the training process was weak (only 80.4 percent of those who enrolled in the department became first-year students). At the same time the academic performance of students in some VUZes was very high. Thus 99.8 percent of the students in the preparatory department of the Institute of the National Economy imeni G. V. Plekhanov graduated successfully.³⁸ The academic performance of students who came to the Institute of Chemical Machine Building from its preparatory department was significantly below the general institute indicators: 78.4 percent of the students had passing grades, and the average grade point was 3.34. A little more than half of such students made it as far as defending dissertations.³⁹ In 1977, out of 214 students enrolled in the preparatory department of the

Institute of Steel and Alloys in 1972, only 135 persons (63.1 percent) managed to graduate. Not one of them received a diploma with honors.⁴⁰

A total of over 450,000 young men and women had undergone schooling in preparatory departments of the country's VUZes as of 1979. The number of students entering Moscow's VUZes from these departments each year increased from 1,500 to 7,700. The competition for admission to preparatory departments was rather high in a number of VUZes. Thus the applicant ratio was 2-3.5 in the Medical Institute imeni I. M. Sechenov No 1, the Stomatological Institute imeni N. A. Semashko, and the Institute of Administration imeni S. Ordzhonikidze.⁴¹

In addition to this, some growth did occur in the success rate of graduates of preparatory departments during their VUZ career. For example in the Geological Exploration Institute, 85 percent of the graduates of the preparatory department successfully completed the 1971-1972 school year, and 95.3 percent did so in the 1975-1976 school year. In the Institute of Geodetic Engineers, Aerial Photography and Cartography the figures were 77 and 94 percent, and in the Polygraphic Institute the figures were 67.3 and 92 percent respectively.⁴²

Reinforcing interaction between VUZes and industrial enterprises was another important direction in improving occupational orientation by party organizations and improving the social composition of the students. The Moscow City CPSU Committee conducted a plenum on 17 October 1973 to discuss the problem "On the Work of the City Party Organization to Upgrade the Quality of Preparation and Education of Future Specialists." It obligated the rayon party committees and the party organizations of the educational institutions to improve admissions work in institutions of higher education, and to promote extensive recruitment of young people working in the material production sphere, and chiefly the best workers of industry and agriculture, to VUZes and tekhnikums. It was deemed suitable for every enterprise to maintain a long-range plan for preparation of specialists with a higher and secondary special education.⁴³

Contracts between VUZes and industrial enterprises became a widespread phenomenon in the second half of the 1970s. The Institute of Steel and Alloys signed comprehensive 15-20 year contracts with sector ministries; the contracts have sections spelling out the institute's responsibilities of preparing specialists for the given ministry, and reciprocal obligations of the ministry for referring students.⁴⁴ The institute organized preparatory courses for young workers in five of the country's industrial centers, including the capital; in 1972, 1,697 persons studied in these courses, of which 82 percent were laborers and children of laborers.⁴⁵ Young laborers were selected for preparatory departments of the Institute of the National Economy imeni G. V. Plekhanov from enterprises of the ministries of radio, electrical engineering, machine tool and tool building, light and

other sectors of industry in accordance with the contracts. Wide use was made of a system of contract relationships with trade and public food services enterprises.⁴⁶ However, the enterprises did not fulfill their obligations as a rule. Even enterprises and VUZes located within the same rayon were unable to coordinate and implement a joint policy in this area. Thus in 1973 20 persons entered the Power Engineering Institute on the basis of referrals from enterprises, but not one came from Kalininskiy Rayon.⁴⁷ In that same year, 1973, not one of the 5,000 applicants to the Engineering Physics Institute was referred by enterprises. Twenty-nine persons submitted applications to the institute's preparatory department from Moscow enterprises, and of them, only three were from Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon.⁴⁸ Speaking at the 22d Election Conference of the Kalininskiy Rayon CPSU organization, the rector of the Institute of Electronic Machine Building said: "The entire paradox is that our enterprises lack engineers specializing in areas for which our VUZes train specialists. The bureau of the rayon party committee adopted a special decree on referring young workers to VUZes and preparatory departments, but for practical purposes it has not been implemented. For example, not one person has been referred to our VUZ from the enterprises in recent years."⁴⁹

The Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman prepared specialists in 41 specialties, including in 29 Moscow is sorely lacking. But in the 1975-1976 school year, only 5 persons were referred to the school to study in these specialties from Moscow enterprises.⁵⁰

A similar situation evolved in many of Moscow's VUZes. They enrolled only 1 percent of their students on the basis of referrals from the capital's enterprises.⁵¹ This is why the following was noted in a resolution adopted on 31 August 1979 at a meeting of the active members of the Moscow city party organization concerning fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on developing the higher school and upgrading the quality of specialist training: "Party organizations, business executives, industrial, construction, transportation, communications and urban management enterprises, and scientific research and design institutes need to work jointly with the VUZes within the framework of the plans for socioeconomic development to develop long-range programs for preparing personnel with a higher education—programs foreseeing a significant increase in the number of young people referred by enterprises both to the VUZes themselves and to their preparatory departments."⁵²

The efforts of party organizations to attract young workers to VUZes have produced positive results. This was expressed as an increase in the proportion of laborers, kolkhoz farmers and children of laborers and kolkhoz farmers among the students of Moscow VUZes. In 1979 this category of students represented 46.6 percent of the student body. They represented over half the student body in 18 VUZes, and over 60 percent in the Institute

of Agricultural Production Engineers imeni V. P. Goryachkin, in the Textile Institute and the Institute of Fine Chemical Technology imeni M. V. Lomonosov, and in the Agricultural Academy imeni K. A. Timiryazev. The number of CPSU members and candidate members among first-year students enrolled in day departments increased to 2.4 percent. Thirty percent of the first-year students had accumulated over 2 years of practical work experience.⁵³

Rayon party committees devoted considerable attention to observing the principle of social justice in VUZ enrollment. It was noted in the 6 January 1977 decree of the bureau of the Moskvoretskiy Rayon CPSU Committee titled "On the Report on the Work of the Party Committee of the Moscow Institute of the National Economy imeni G. V. Plekhanov" that noticeable changes occurred in the 1970s in enrollment of students for the first year: The proportion of young laborers and agricultural workers among students enrolled in the day departments of the rayon's VUZes increased from 49 percent in 1970 to 55 percent in 1976. The proportion of residents of Moscow and Moscow Oblast among the enrollees increased significantly. The Institute of the National Economy imeni G. V. Plekhanov was oriented on satisfying the demand for young specialists precisely in this region.⁵⁴

During the 8th Five-Year Plan, around 30 percent of the persons admitted to the first year in MGU were laborers, kolkhoz farmers and their children, while during the 9th Five-Year Plan the figure was around 45 percent. The number of communists doubled, climbing to 9 percent of those enrolled in the first year in 1975. Muskovites and Moscow's suburban residents began making up almost half of the students in the first-year class.⁵⁵

This trend was typical of the activities of all of Moscow's VUZes except those in the arts.

In 1979, 18 percent of first-year students were persons who had accumulated over 2 years of practical work experience; of them, 5.5 percent were admitted on the basis of referrals from industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Only 708 persons were enrolled on the basis of referrals from Moscow enterprises, and 34 of the city's VUZes did not have a single matriculant recruited for training by the capital's production organizations. An especially weak effort was made to fill the student ranks of cultural VUZes, the Architectural Institute, the Aviation Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze and the Institute of Electronic Engineering with young laborers.⁵⁶ The situation also changed for the worse in the Construction Engineering Institute. While in the 1960s 80 percent of the matriculants of this institute had come from the work force, in the late 1970s 90 percent came from secondary schools.⁵⁷

Secondary schools have remained the principal source of students, which is why significant attention was devoted to finding capable young men and women in them. Many

institutes created preparatory courses in which instructors acquainted future matriculants with the requirements of the VUZ and gave lecture courses with the purpose of better preparing the applicants for entrance examinations. A Komsomol VUZ working detachment was created for the first time in the capital in the Engineering Physics Institute in August 1974. It consisted of matriculants who failed the competition for enrollment in the MIFI but who were firmly resolved to study precisely in this VUZ. In the fall of each year, from 40 to 60 matriculants received Komsomol passes and, joining together into a Komsomol working detachment, they went to work at one of Moscow's plants. The party committee, the rector's office and the Komsomol committee responded to all of the detachment's needs, and helped the young people to solve their problems. The Komsomol committee regularly conducted general meetings of the detachment members.⁵⁸ The detachment members studied mathematics, physics, Russian language and literature right at the plant under the guidance of the institute's experienced instructors. As a result 99 of the detachment's members entered the MIFI in just 3 years.⁵⁹ A department of the Young Doctors Club began operating in March 1972 at the Medical Institute imeni I. M. Sechenov No 1.⁶⁰

Occupational orientation was also organized well in the Physico-Technical Institute. A correspondence school in physics and mathematics began functioning under the institute in the late 1960s. The most gifted students from all corners of the Soviet Union were admitted to it on a competitive basis. The school had a special 3-year program, and each year it sent around 50,000 pieces of mail containing assignments in physics and mathematics, reviews of answers sent back by students, various developments and so on. By the late 1970s there were a total of 4,000 students in the school. Their studies were guided by over 700 of the institute's graduate and undergraduate students. The school had affiliates in Leningrad and Krasnoyarsk. Besides the correspondence school, "physico-technical" night schools were created in Moscow and the oblast.⁶¹ A chemical school for secondary school students in their 9th and 10th years was created in 1972 in the Institute of Chemical Technology on the initiative of the Komsomol organization.⁶²

Experience has shown that this form of work of VUZes with secondary schools is rather effective. Graduates of the school of physics and mathematics demonstrated the deepest and most persistent knowledge among matriculants of the Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman, and they earned a higher overall grade-point average than persons who had undergone any other kind of preparation. They were the most successful in combining VUZ training with scientific and public work, and 40 percent of this school's graduates entered other VUZes.⁶³

However, the effectiveness of the work done by VUZ instructors in many secondary schools was low. Thus a little more than 50 persons in 280 schools in which

instructors of the Institute of Steel and Alloys worked became matriculants. Not a single application was submitted to this VUZ from 13 schools assigned to the departments of metallurgy of light nonferrous metals and automation of the production of rare and nonferrous metals.⁶⁴ Besides the principal causes responsible for the drop in the applicant ratio in technical VUZes, mentioned above, the lack of interest of instructors and unsuccessful selection of schools that are not oriented very strongly toward the technical VUZ have something to do with the weak payoff.

Generally by the early 1980s, a certain system of occupational orientation had evolved in most Moscow VUZes. Thus it was provided in the Institute of Foreign Languages imeni M. Torez through paid preparatory courses attended by 1,170 persons, and through publicly supported workers' high schools attended by 213 persons.⁶⁵ In 1973, 75 percent of those who enrolled in the institute's first year had undergone special preparation.⁶⁶ At the same time, the effectiveness of this system was low. Thus while the admissions plan of this institute totaled 400 students, in 4 years 348 persons were dismissed—that is, for practical purposes the institute lost one class every 5 years;⁶⁷ moreover as a rule the persons who remained with the institute and who had participated in this system found themselves incapable of competing with students from special secondary schools.

A coordinating council was created under the guidance of the prorector in the Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman on the initiative of the party committee. It included commissions for work with young students and laborers, and commissions for sponsorship work in vocational-technical schools.⁶⁸

A special commission was created under MGU's party committee to deal with the problems of admitting young laborers and peasants to the university. It organized an instructor training conference and drew up a number of important recommendations.⁶⁹ A scientific-practical center of occupational orientation and occupational consultation was placed into operation under the psychology faculty. The faculty's scholars and students drew up 600 occupational charts for those specialties in relation to which personnel were being trained in the educational institutions of Moscow and the oblast. The course "Principles of Selecting Occupations" was given and mass and individual consultation was provided by psychologists within the framework of an agreement for cooperation with an intermural training and production combine of the capital's Leninskiy Rayon.⁷⁰

The time of the entrance examinations is the most critical period in selection of students for VUZes. A plenum of the Moscow City CPSU Committee held in October 1973 obligated the rayon party committees and the VUZ party organizations to intensify control over the work of admissions and examination commissions, and it recommended staffing the commissions with more

experienced communist instructors as well as with workers of rayon CPSU committees and deputies of rayon soviets,⁷¹ since the effectiveness of the work of VUZ collectives depends in many ways on the efficiency and responsibility of admissions and examination commissions. In their meetings the party committees have approved the composition of these commissions, the responsible secretaries of admissions commissions and the senior examiners for specific subjects each year. Measures to improve admissions rules were implemented by a number of VUZes in the 1970s. Thus in order to raise the objectivity with which matriculants are selected, a creative examination was introduced and 50 percent of the plan for admission to the first year in MGU's journalism faculty began to be made up of graduates of its preparatory department in compliance with the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Training and Retraining Journalists."⁷² In the absence of a passing grade point, the final decision to enroll students in the Physico-Technical Institute was left with commissions consisting of the most experienced and qualified instructors.⁷³ However, serious mistakes were made by a number of VUZes in organizing admissions. Thus the party committee of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin examined the issue "On Organizing Admission to the First Year in Connection with Representations by the Procurator's Office of Leninskiy Rayon, Moscow." The party committee noted that significant omissions and shortcomings existed in efforts to organize and conduct a new student selection program in 1974. The rector's office and the dean's offices of a number of faculties made serious mistakes in staffing examination commissions in certain subjects. Thus out of 78 persons of the permanent staff of the Russian language and literature faculty, only 13 were included in the work of the examination commissions. The party bureaus of a number of faculties have weakened their control over the staffing of specific examination commissions, and their composition was not discussed at meetings of the party bureau. Shortcomings were also revealed in indoctrination work; a case of bribery was discovered as well. The party committee adopted a resolution obligating the party bureaus of the faculties to intensify control over staffing the admissions and specific examination commissions, and to raise the level of ideological indoctrination work in the faculty collectives.⁷⁴

Besides the occupational orientation work of VUZes and efficient organization of admissions, a firm guarantee that graduates would be assigned jobs by the state in accordance with their specialty, the presence of prospects for career advancement and existence of a close relationship between occupational orientation and the attitude of graduates toward work upon graduating from the VUZ have important significance to the choice made by matriculants in regard to institutions of higher education satisfying their interests. The effectiveness of the work of party organizations and rector's offices in selecting students for institutions of higher education is determined in many ways by the attitude of the students

toward training and toward job placement by the state. That occupations are being selected correctly can be deduced from the fact that in 1971, all 1,032 graduates of the Institute of Petrochemical and Gas Industry imeni Academician I. M. Gubkin went to work strictly in accordance with job placement policy.⁷⁵ Over 90 percent of the graduates of the Physico-Technical Institute worked directly in their specialty.⁷⁶ However, there were also many shortcomings in occupational orientation and indoctrination work with students. A significant proportion of Moscow's students received poor grades and were reluctant to work where they were placed. Thus in the early 1970s the city's VUZes lost around 6,000 persons each year.⁷⁷ The Higher Technical School imeni N. E. Bauman dismissed 3,780 students, to include 1,320 students in their senior year, in 1976-1980.⁷⁸ The Institute of Steel and Alloys, which admitted 1,100 students to the first-year class each year, graduated only 900 persons.⁷⁹ This was the result of errors in selecting students for VUZes and of weak training and indoctrination work with students.

Serious problems existed in the planning of the training of highly skilled specialists. On one hand the graduates of VUZes providing specific training to specialists required by specific organizations and institutions refused to work in these organizations, while on the other hand young specialists often experienced difficulties with job placement. Things were especially bad with placement of graduates of pedagogical VUZes. Thus according to data of the RSFSR Ministry of Education, which analyzed information on job placement and appearance of young specialists at their assigned locations during the 9th Five-Year Plan, an average of 16-18 percent of the graduates of pedagogical VUZes turned down their job assignments each year.⁸⁰ In 1980 only 5 percent of the graduates of MGU's philological faculty were sent to work in secondary schools.⁸¹ In 1981 only 13 out of 31 graduates of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin went to work in schools of Moscow's Leninskiy Rayon.⁸² In 1979 133 graduates of MGU's philological faculty were assigned jobs not in accordance with the plan.⁸³ According to data from sociological research, 40 percent of the matriculants of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin were not intending to work in secondary schools.⁸⁴

The issue of making sensible use of VUZ graduates became acute in the 1970s. Thus in the mid-1970s, there were 115 diploma-bearing specialists for every 1,000 workers at enterprises of Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon. At the same time many important sections were headed by people without the required technical and economic training. Analysis of executives of all categories in industry, construction, transportation, communication, trade, public food services, personal services and rayon public services revealed that practical workers occupy over half of the positions. The proportion of practical workers was especially high among foremen (40 percent) and shop chiefs (31 percent) in industry, and among directors (60 percent) in transportation, communication, trade and public food services organizations.

An unfavorable situation evolved in the rayon in regard to the executives of economic services. Only 36 percent of the chiefs of planning and economic divisions and divisions of labor and wages had a higher education in economics, while one out of every two economists and engineer-economists did not have a higher and secondary economic education, which had an unfavorable effect on labor productivity.

Many enterprises suffered serious shortcomings in placement and utilization of engineers and technicians. A large quantity of engineers and technicians were used in administrative and clerical work. Thus machine tool building enterprises of Oktyabrskiy Rayon employed 42 percent practical workers holding engineering positions and 70 percent practical workers holding foreman positions. At the same time the Krasnyy Proletariy, Stankokonstruksiya and Stankonormal plants sent only 42 persons for training. One hundred young specialists joined the enterprises in 2 years, but only 27 of them were put to work in the production sphere.

Given the high percentage of practical workers in engineer positions, around 600 diploma-bearing specialists had to work in positions normally filled by practical workers. Many of them, seeing no prospects for growth after graduating from a VUZ or tekhnikum, left for other enterprises in the city. Just in 1974-1975 around 900 communists with a higher and secondary education left the enterprises.⁸⁵

These problems were discussed at a meeting of the bureau of the Moscow City CPSU Committee on 11 April 1979. The bureau's resolution noted that significant shortcomings existed in the planning of personnel training and in the use of personnel with a higher education. The level of personnel training did not correspond fully to the needs of the capital's enterprises and organizations. Requests for young specialists by the latter were left unfilled each year in relation to a significant number of specialties, especially ones in the new directions of science and technology.

Students were frequently selected for Moscow's VUZes without adequate consideration for the possibilities of the existing material and equipment base. Many of the city's enterprises and organizations did not have long-range plans for training personnel with a higher education, they made little use of the possibilities available to them for sending young workers to school, they did not show the needed concern for widening personnel training by utilizing training and consultation offices and of affiliates providing night and correspondence school training right at the plant, and they allowed graduates to be utilized in ways not in keeping with their training profile.

The bureau of the Moscow City CPSU Central Committee drew up measures to organize training of personnel with a higher education in accordance with the demand of the country's national economy and with the prospects for

Moscow's socioeconomic development.⁸⁶ As a result of greater attention to these issues, over 70 percent of the graduates of institutions of higher education in the capital's Leninskiy Rayon were placed in the city's enterprises and organizations by as early as 1979; this was 20 percent more than in 1978.⁸⁷

However, the problem of making sensible use of personnel with a higher education continued to be an acute one both in Moscow and in the country as a whole. Thus in 1985 over 200,000 specialists with a higher education worked as laborers in USSR industry; of them, two-thirds had an engineering education.⁸⁸ The same situation was also typical of Moscow. The possibilities for sending the best workers to VUZes and tekhnikums were poorly utilized. Because a purposeful effort to train a personnel reserve was not being made, over 50 percent of the positions of middle-level executives in Moscow's Kalininskiy Rayon came to be occupied by practical workers.⁸⁹ Concurrently some young specialists expressed a desire to find jobs not associated with production, while 11,000 young specialists were employed in the capital in positions not requiring a higher education.⁹⁰

The resolution of the bureau of the Moscow City CPSU Committee "On Organizing Personnel Training in Moscow VUZes" was not fulfilled. For many years Moscow has been experiencing a shortage of instructors in a large number of occupations. Thus the number of physicians graduating each year from the day and night departments of three Moscow medical VUZes exceeds 3,000 (almost 7 percent of the nationwide figure). Nonetheless the city experienced a chronic shortage of practical medical workers. Secondary schools experienced a serious shortage of teachers. And besides this, the number of specialists graduating from Moscow's VUZes exceeds the region's demand by a factor of 10 in law, by a factor of 6 in winemaking processes, and by a factor of 4 in economics and organization of rail transport.

Departmental isolation of Moscow VUZes brought on dispersal and redundancy in specialist training. Thus around a fourth of the graduates were economists, trained in 38 VUZes subordinated to 11 ministries. In only 16 out of 39 economic specialties was training conducted in VUZes with an economic profile. Thus the bookkeeping specialty was offered in five VUZes providing day school instruction and nine providing night school instruction. And in all of Moscow's VUZes taken together, redundancy was observed in training in 40 specialties,⁹¹ which meant an enormous material loss to the state.

As was noted at the October 1986 plenum of the Moscow City CPSU Committee by City Party Committee Secretary O. A. Korolev, the problem of utilizing specialists with a higher and secondary special education existed in the city in the mid-1980s. There were over 2 million of them in Moscow. However, sociological research conducted in over 500 enterprises and organizations of the

city revealed that they were utilized extremely ineffectively. Two-thirds of them did not have specific responsibilities. One out of every three felt that a higher education was not required by the work they were doing.

As of the end of 1986 over 100,000 engineers, technicians and scientists in the capital were employed in positions not requiring a special education. In comparison with 1980 the number of such workers in construction almost doubled, it increased by a factor of 3-3.5 in transportation and industry, and by a factor of over 10 in trade and public food services. A large number of diploma-bearing specialists—more than 132,000—were employed as laborers. At the same time the number of specialists requested in 1986 was 1.5 times more than all of the city's higher schools could graduate.⁹²

This situation is associated with the failure of ministries and departments to study the long-range demand for specialists with high qualifications, which has a negative effect on selection of students for VUZes.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that a certain system of occupational orientation work directed at selecting young men and women for VUZes capable of carrying out the complex tasks of scientific and technical progress evolved in the first half of the 1970s. This system included preparatory departments under most of Moscow's VUZes, which have fully justified themselves. In many ways owing to the preparatory departments, party organizations have been able to achieve a significant increase in the number of laborers and kolkhoz farmers among students of the capital's VUZes, and to increase the number of students with party membership. Another effective means of solving the problems associated with observing the principle of social justice was the Komsomol working detachments of matriculants. An attempt was made in the 1970s to tie solution of the problem of selecting students for VUZes in with solving the personnel problems of Moscow's enterprises on a long-term basis, which was reflected in the signing of comprehensive contracts between a number of VUZes and enterprises. Contacts between the higher and secondary school were strengthened. Schools of physics and mathematics operated successfully under institutions of higher education.

At the same time the city's VUZes, which are closely associated with the country's national economy, were affected by the near-crisis phenomena of the late 1970s and early 1980s. They began to accumulate serious problems requiring fundamental solution. Numerous measures to improve occupational orientation and the categorical demands of the city and rayon party committees to send the best workers to the VUZes were left practically unfulfilled. Party organs lacked persistence and consistency in implementing them, which led to serious disproportions in the training, job placement and utilization of VUZ graduates. These problems were aggravated even more in the 1980s. "We can see," noted M. S. Gorbachev in a report at a joint solemn meeting of

the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "that in many ways the system of education has ceased to satisfy today's needs. The quality of training in secondary schools and VUZes and of the training of laborers and specialists far from completely satisfies the requirements of life."⁹³

To eliminate the noted shortcomings and improve party leadership of the effort to select students for VUZes, in my opinion the USSR and RSFSR ministries of higher and secondary special education and other ministries, departments and party organs must implement the following measures:

- analyze the long-range demand of the country and Moscow for specialists with a higher education, determine the admissions plans of the city's VUZes in accordance with this demand, and exclude cases of redundancy in the training of specialists of the same profile in different VUZes of the city;
- exercise constant control over fulfillment of contracts signed by industrial enterprises and institutions of higher education to send the best workers to Moscow's VUZes;
- reinforce ties maintained by VUZes with troop units and rayon military commissariats;
- improve interaction of institutions of higher education, tekhnikum, secondary schools and vocational-technical and technical schools;
- use VUZ boarding schools more widely to prepare matriculants;
- initiate wide publicity on preparatory departments and courses, especially in industrial enterprises;
- grant VUZes greater freedom in determining the list of disciplines that matriculants must complete for admission to institutions of higher education.

In many ways, implementation of these measures will make it possible to solve the problems associated with selecting students for Moscow VUZes.

Footnotes

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4. See Rubina, L. Ya., "Sovetskoye studenchestvo. Sotsiologicheskii ocherk" [The Soviet Student Body. A Sociological Essay], Moscow, 1981; "Professionalnaya oriyentatsiya molodezhi i organizatsiya priyema v vysshiye uchebnyye zavedeniya" [Occupational Orientation of Young People and Organization of Admissions to Institutions of Higher Education], Moscow, 1982; Shmeleva, T. L., "Partiynoye rukovodstvo kommunisticheskim vospitaniyem studencheskoy molodezhi v usloviyakh razvitiya sotsializma" [Party Leadership of Communist Indoctrination of Young Students in the Conditions of Developed Socialism], Moscow, 1985; "Sotsialno-demograficheskiy portret studenta" [A Social-Demographic Portrait of the Student], Moscow, 1986; Titma, M. Kh. and Saar, E. A., "Molodoye pokoleniye" [The Young Generation], Moscow, 1986; Zhuganov, A. V., "Molodoy spetsialist: put k tvorcheskoy zrelosti" [The Young Specialist: The Path to Creative Maturity], Moscow, 1987, and others.
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12. MViSSO SSSR Archives, f. 9606, op. 1, d. 7023, l. 111-112.
13. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 1 September 1979.
14. BAUMANETS, 21 February 1973.
15. BAUMANETS, 9 October 1984.
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18. ZA NAUKU, 6 February 1981.
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20. See Yagodin, G. A., "The Prestige and Nature of Engineer Labor," EKO, No 12, 1985, p 39.
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27. Ibid., l. 5.
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35. MPA, f. 4, op. 9, d. 1186, l. 126.
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43. "Vo glave kulturnogo stroitelstva...", p 204.
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Resolutions of Estonian Popular Front Founding Congress

18000092 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 12 Oct 88 p 2

[Text of "Resolutions of the Estonian Popular Front Founding Congress]

[Text]

On Unity of Estonia

The course of political development in Estonia during the past year has created the prerequisites for uniting the activeness of the people and the efforts of the republic's political leadership to make a breakthrough in directions of political, economic, and social and cultural development most important for the future of Estonia. The will of the people, expressed in the masses' spontaneous support of the idea of IME cost-accounting of Estonia and the decisions of the joint plenum of creative unions, the political manifestation of which has become the emergence of the Popular Front, has also now been recognized by the 11th Central Committee Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party.

The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front supports the steps taken at the 11th Central Committee Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party to overcome the crisis of trust between the republic's political leadership and its people. These steps created the prerequisites for the emergence of a broader united front in the struggle to implement IME and exercise the sovereignty of Estonia.

The ideas of economic and political renovation of Estonia are now taking the form of specific programs of development. These programs must be protected and implemented in the next few years. This is a difficult task which requires of all our people, of all residents of Estonia, extraordinary moral and spiritual efforts, creative energy and a willingness to overcome the opposition of forces impeding perestroika and steadfastly to endure the difficulties which inevitably accompany changes. The secret and open opponents of these changes, both in Estonia and in the union departments, are using every opportunity to discredit the aspirations of Estonia, delay the changes, and distort their purpose. They are interested in our disunity and instigate internal discord in order to drive the rapidly developing process of democratization into an impasse of contradictions between the various political forces, group interests, and nationality groups. They do not disdain deliberate lies, political demagoguery and slander, and make maximum use of our every mistake.

Now, when we have to take extremely important political and economic steps toward turning Estonia into a truly sovereign national republic, the Popular Front sees its main mission as uniting all the efforts and all the will of the people in the name of resolving Estonia's main problems. To this end, the Popular Front is striving to

achieve democratic unity with the participation of all political forces significantly influencing the development of Estonia. We welcome all initiatives which other movements and organizations will demonstrate in this direction.

The future of Estonia is in our unity!

On Supporting the CPSU Policy of Perestroika

The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front considers it necessary to emphasize that achievement of all the goals most important for Estonia depends on the success of perestroika. Therefore, we call upon all support groups of the Popular Front to support the decisive and consistent implementation of the CPSU policy of perestroika in every city, in every rayon, in every labor collective, and in the Estonian SSR as a whole. Now, during the reports and election campaign in the party, the congress considers it particularly important for communists who have joined the Popular Front to be firm in deeds and decisions aimed at forming a democratic situation in party organizations so that people who actually support perestroika end up in the party bodies of Estonia as a result of the elections.

On Additions to the ESSR Constitution

1. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front proposes to the ESSR Supreme Soviet to include on the agenda of the next session the introduction of additions to the ESSR Constitution.

2. Switching the Estonian SSR to full cost-accounting [khozraschet] and ensuring the existence of the Estonian people and the free development of all population of Estonia require that additions to the Constitution clearly define the rights of the Estonian SSR to organize its own economic and domestic political affairs, culture, and public education.

3. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front considers it necessary that the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet form a Constitutional Commission for drawing up a new Basic Law of the Estonian SSR and prepare a Union Treaty.

On Changes in the Political System

1. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front believes that any changes in the political system being planned in the USSR must be aimed at ensuring the sovereignty of the union republics. Reform of the state structure of the USSR must be developed taking into account the specific interests of every union republic, proceeding from the expediency of forming relations of the union republics based on a Union Treaty.

2. Based on the democratic traditions which have developed in the Estonian SSR, the level of political culture, and taking into account the increase in the authority of

local soviets, the congress of the Estonian Popular Front does not consider the planned combining of the positions of first secretary of the rayon or city party committee and chairman of the local soviet to be justified in Estonia's conditions.

3. Based on the principles of a legal state, elections to all soviets should be general, equal, and direct.

On Democratization of the Electoral System

The Estonian Popular Front considers it necessary:

1. To pass new laws on elections in the republic (both to the Supreme Soviet and to local soviets of the Estonian SSR), which must be preceded by popular discussion of draft laws.

2. To expand the range of subjects nominating candidates for election and to make it legal for the Popular Front and other mass movements and associations of the Estonian SSR as well as the voters to nominate candidates.

3. To make it mandatory to record legally nominated candidates for election on voting ballots and to guarantee candidates for election equal opportunities for pre-election propaganda.

4. To ensure public monitoring of the course of election and the counting of votes, as well as complete publicity of election results.

On Relations Between Nationalities

The Estonian Popular Front believes that democratization of relations between nationalities, protection of the rights and interests of all Soviet peoples as subjects of history against the monopoly aspirations of the great-power administrative system is an inevitable prerequisite for successful continuation of the process of perestroika taking place in our country and implementation of political and economic reforms. This means decolonization of economic relations, the right to organize economic and cultural life ourselves, equitable relations both between the union republic and with the union level of power. The inevitable effect of all this on the relations between nationalities in Estonia can result in their aggravation if the objective nature of the processes taking place is not realized and if nationality problems continue to be approached from positions of ideological stereotyped patterns and political prejudices of the times of Stalinism. The Estonian Popular Front sees true internationalism in mutual understanding and consideration of the historical destiny and objective interests of the various peoples and respecting the rights of each people to shape sovereignly their own historical destiny, to protect the surroundings in which they live, and to preserve their way of life on the territory which is their historical homeland. The Popular Front believes that only on this basis is it possible to solve the nationality

problems in Estonia and achieve trust and cooperation between the different nationality groups. The Popular Front considers its top-priority task to be to familiarize the non-Estonians living in Estonia with the history, culture, language, and development of the cultural autonomy of the minority nationalities as the only way of achieving mutual understanding and overcoming contradictions.

The Congress of the Popular Front believes that the platform of the Estonian Popular Front on questions of the nationalities policy must continue to be elaborated and refined and that it is necessary to revive under a council of commissioners a commission engaged in relations between nationalities.

On Estonian SSR Cost-Accounting

The Congress of the Popular Front approves of the coordinated principles of republic cost-accounting adopted at the meeting of experts of the Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, and Estonian SSR on 21-23 September 1988 in Riga.

The Congress of the Popular Front expresses gratitude to the problem council of the IME and the working group of the Institute of Economics of the ESSR Academy of Sciences, which set as a goal to guarantee our people absolute values:

—an increase in the quality of life of all population of Estonia;

—preservation of the nation and development of national culture;

—creation of a viable economy as the basis for developing the nation and culture;

—creation of a healthy environment.

The IME is the economic basis of the Popular Front's social program.

On Social Justice

1. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front demands the immediate cancellation of social privileges accompanying position held and status, and the elimination of special stores, hospitals, and rest areas. All citizens must equally bear the burden of Estonia's poverty and also receive a share of its riches. Any privileges when using public consumption funds are legitimate only within the framework of social security, and their use must be under control of the public.

2. The congress demands radical improvement in providing the rural population with food products and consumer goods. Put food on the table of its producer!

3. The congress does not consider it proper for Tallinn to have a privileged status among the other cities of Estonia in the supply of food products and consumer goods, in the distribution of possibilities for development of the service sector, trade and city economy, in the accessibility of cultural values, and so forth. The congress supports creation of regional development programs and sees the top-priority task of local councils of commissioners of the Popular Front as participation in these programs and involvement of the local population in implementing them.

4. The congress insists upon ensuring all citizens of Estonia a socially necessary minimum wage and demands that this goal be taken into account when planning changes in wage and price policy.

5. The congress seeks to eliminate the informational inequality among the different sections of the population and different regions of Estonia. The Estonian Popular Front does not consider it proper that accessibility to television broadcasts is different for Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking audiences and for northern and southern Estonia. The congress demands the leadership of Estonian television take decisive actions to eliminate this inequality and begin negotiations with the Finnish Yuleysradio on conditions for rebroadcasting Finnish television programs to southern Estonia.

On Putting a Stop to Migration

1. The Estonian Popular Front considers the decisive struggle against migration from beyond the borders of the republic and taking other steps to halt the decline in the proportion of people of the native nationality among the residents of Estonia to be an inevitability.

2. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front demands that local soviets take an uncompromising stand toward applications by enterprises and farms for importing new manpower and publish in the local press on a regular basis all residency permits issued by them to new arrivals from outside the republic.

3. The Congress of the Popular Front supports the explicit position of the 11th Central Committee Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party on questions of migration and demands that steps be taken without delay to eliminate the privileges for certain categories of residences upon their migration to Estonia.

4. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front demands that the path to Estonia from outside its borders be immediately closed to the criminal element.

5. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front considers it necessary that the ESSR State Committee for Public Education bring the range of the industrial specialties being taught in VUZes and vocational and technical institutions in conformity with the realistic personnel

needs of Estonia's industrial enterprises in order to put an end to attempts by enterprises to import skilled workers and specialists without grounds.

6. The congress considers putting a stop to migration to be a basic means for the economically justified changing of the profile of labor-intensive enterprises and demands that the ESSR State Committee for Labor urgently develop the appropriate plans for public discussion and implementation.

7. The congress obliges the local councils of commissioners of the Popular Front to establish public monitoring of migration in their regions and also the issuance of residency permits and distribution of housing. It obliges support groups in institutions and at enterprises to fight against the use of manpower arriving from outside Estonia.

8. The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front demands that the legislative acts and directive documents promoting migration be identified and repealed.

9. The congress demands complete publicity and regular informing of the public about all statistical data on questions of migration and the demographic situation in the republic (including upcoming census data on the nationality composition of all age groups of residents of all cities and rayons of the republic).

10. The congress considers it necessary to develop cooperation between the Estonian SSR and the Leningrad, Pskov, and Novgorod oblasts to improve the demographic situation and resolve the problem of labor resources.

11. The congress proposes to promote the return to Estonia of Estonians living outside the Estonian SSR.

On Protecting Public Order

The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front believes that creation of a legal state assumes trust between the people and the state, unconditional respect of human rights and the sovereignty of union republics. It is impossible to build a legal state on fear and coercive methods.

Proceeding from this, the congress of the Popular Front believes that measures for protecting public order stipulated by the 28 July 1988 decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Meetings, Rallies, Street Marches and Demonstrations in the USSR," "On the Duties and Rights of Security Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs," and "On Making Changes to Certain USSR Legislative Acts" cannot be considered as meeting the goals of democratic renovation of the society. These decrees were drawn up without the involvement of the

people, and they ignore the differences in political culture in the various union republics and the constitutional rights of republic soviet bodies.

We demand nationwide discussion of the decrees before approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

We propose to the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet to develop and submit for public discussion a draft law on the procedure for conducting meetings, rallies and demonstrations which corresponds to the traditions and democratic principles of the political culture which has developed in Estonia.

On the Attitude Towards the Crimes of Stalinism

1. The Estonian Popular Front demands that the ESSR Supreme Soviet completely and unconditionally condemn the extrajudicial repressions carried out in Soviet Estonia in the 1940's and 1950's and acknowledge them as crimes against humanity.

2. The Estonian Popular Front believes that all the people who were victims of these crimes should be rehabilitated with all the ensuing legal consequences. We believe it necessary that the victims be fully compensated for damages.

3. The Estonian Popular Front believes it necessary to publish lists of those repressed and to perpetuate the memory of the victims of the repressions.

4. The Estonian Popular Front demands that the names of the individuals who were organizers of the crimes against humanity in Estonia be established and made public, and that legal proceedings be instituted against those directly responsible for the mass murders.

5. The Estonian Popular Front demands a review of the court cases of all those convicted in the Estonian SSR between 1940 and 1954 in order to determine their validity and the rehabilitation of those who unjustly suffered.

On Those Convicted During the Period of Stagnation on Political Grounds and for So-Called Economic Crimes

The Estonian Popular Front considers it necessary that the appropriate bodies determine their stand on court cases of individuals convicted during the period of stagnation on political grounds and in connection with so-called economic crimes (particularly under articles 68 and 194 of the ESSR Criminal Code) and rehabilitate innocent victims.

On the Situation at Union Enterprises

The Congress of the Estonian Popular Front calls upon the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, the government of the Estonian SSR and the public of the republic to pay attention to some of top managers of union enterprises whose activities are

directed against the political policy of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party and at setting workers of Estonian and Russian nationalities against one another on the basis of nationality. The goal of such splitting activities is to preserve the independence of union-subordinated industry from the republic and also to preserve at any price their personal privileges.

In order to avoid a further split of the economy of the Estonian SSR and opposition of Estonian and non-Estonian workers, the Congress of the Estonian Popular Front categorically demands a commitment to glasnost and a halt to the political activities of such managers.

On the Status of Tartu

The Popular Front demands that the government of the Estonian SSR take decisive steps before the USSR Ministry of Defense in order to open Tartu, one of the most important cultural centers of Estonia, for foreign contacts and to ensure the safety of the Estonian people's priceless cultural values located in Tartu.

On the Situation in Northeastern Estonia

In order to stop the destructive and largely already irreversible processes taking place in northeastern Estonia, the Popular Front demands the following:

1. Declare northeastern Estonia a republic-wide disaster area.

2. Take radical steps to improve the environment in northeastern Estonia, including shutting down enterprises. Require the departments, enterprises and their managers to pay compensation for the damage inflicted.

3. Put an end to the foolish wasteful mining of shale.

4. Establish benefits (including subsidies and additions to wages and salaries) for Estonian families who settle in northeastern Estonia. Give preference in the apartment policy to native residents of Estonia who have relocated to northeastern Estonia.

5. Create Estonian cultural centers in northeastern Estonia for the study and popularization of the Estonian language, history, national culture and customs, and also for researching relations between nationalities.

On Supporting the Idea of Reviving the National Olympic Committee of Estonia

Today, when the Popular Front is being created throughout Estonia, the XXIV Olympic Games have concluded in Seoul. Athletes from Estonia were represented at the games, but not Estonia. We participants of the Congress of the Popular Front support the proposal of athletic circles of Estonia: The time has come to revive the National Olympic Committee of Estonia.

Rostov Obkom Chief Volodin Discusses Party Apparatus Restructuring

18000001 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 30 Aug 88 pp 1,2

[Interview by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent V. Ogurtsov with B. Volodin, first secretary of the CPSU Rostov obkom: "The Path to Leadership." First three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The current structure of the party apparatus is far from perfect. And, while prior to the 19th Party Conference the Rostov oblast party committees waited for the customary instructional directives "from above", at first the party forum itself, and then the delegates who returned home confirmed the fact that each party committee will have to resolve its structural-staff questions independently. The July Central Committee Plenum also stressed this quite synonymously.

So, when at a recent meeting of the Rostov obkom buro after discussion of the question on whether cities with population under 300,000 persons need party rayon committees along with the gorkoms, the decision was made not to rush into any categorical resolution, but to study the opinion of the communists through the aid of the means of mass information. This was fully in the spirit of the times.

Our correspondent met with Obkom First Secretary B. M. Volodin several days after the buro meeting. The conversation began with a comment by the first secretary on this fact.

[Volodin] I must say that at first the mood was traditional, and the discussion at the buro proceeded as if about a question which had already been resolved: to eliminate the raykoms in all the designated cities. It seemed there were ample justifications for this. Is it expedient to have duplicate party committees, for example, in Taganrog and Shakhty, where aside from the city committees there are also three rayon committees in each one? Or in Novocherkassk—where there are two raykoms? Moreover, Millerovo and Azov are not only large cities, but are also major agricultural centers for the oblast.

The buro members, apparatus workers, and even I myself have recently had occasion to meet repeatedly with communists from primary organizations and with the party workers in these cities. I remember, for example, how Yuriy Alekseyevich Lazarev, first secretary of the Leninskiy raykom in Taganrog, admitted that he personally was not too pleased with the possibility of losing his job. The everyday complications of life alone are significant. Yet as a communist he was voting "for" in the name of clear public benefit. In Millerovo they generally scolded me for the red tape. They said that they had long ago expressed their positive opinion to the obkom, but still there had been no action.

And in reality, the obkom buro was in no hurry to join in this opinion. After all, it is easy to chop wood in structural reorganizations. Yet it was another circumstance which became the decisive one. The elimination of the raykoms in principle corresponds to a strategic task—to bring the party apparatus closer to the primary organization at all costs, closer to the living man, who will ultimately determine the fate of perestroika; to eliminate the intermediate link in the relations of the gorkom with the "primary base", and at the same time to eliminate parallelism. There are, of course, doubts of another sort. The gorkom will have to carry not only its own "baggage," as they say, but also that of the raykom. But here is what we think. If we understand party work as the sum of former responsibilities and methods, then the burden will truly seem too heavy to bear. Yet if we act as the conference decided, that is, if we do away with the substitution of management activity and strengthen the Soviets, then there will even be time left over for political work. At the same time, having eliminated the raykoms, we will even be able to strengthen the city apparatus to some degree.

But now I will tell you why we at the buro did not make a final decision in spite of so many "pros." The fact is that several of the buro members expressed their concern that perhaps to some communists our decision would seem unexpected or seemingly made in their absence. They would say that we call others to glasnost and democracy, while we ourselves again take the resolution of an important question upon ourselves. There was one other circumstance which prevented us from excess haste. We must speak about it separately.

The fact is that the elimination of the raykoms also predetermines to a certain degree the fate of the corresponding ispolkoms of people's deputies. What should we do with them? Of course, we know that the electors express great dissatisfaction with their activity. They see how often the rayispolkoms hide behind the backs of the superior executive committees. Yet does this absolve us of the responsibility for the fate of these workers, as well as that of the workers of the eliminated party apparatus?

Let us assume that these questions are not so difficult to answer. The specialists who are laid off can and probably must be directed from the offices "to the front." They should be directed to where there is a shortage of doctors, agronomists, experienced militia workers, teachers, or municipal management workers. But what is a person to do if he needs some kind of document? He shouldn't have to go across the entire city or rayon to the passport or social security office! So that, once he gets there, he can stand in endless lines. It turns out that we do need to have a representation of the Soviet in the former rayon... But what kind?

[Ogurtsov] Boris Mikhaylovich, even in the offices of the obkom itself there are more and more empty desks. The name plates still hang on the doors, but the people are already mastering new duties. How complex is this

process? After all, in spite of its objective necessity, some people feel as if the floor will collapse out from under them. The notion has become firmly entrenched in their minds that from the obkom one can go only for a promotion, or in an extreme case—to a lateral transfer...

[Volodin] The obkom apparatus must be significantly reduced. And, as you have correctly noted, we cannot avoid dramatic moments. This is quite understandable. We are speaking of people's fates, but not only from those positions of which you speak. There are quite a few "check-marks" on each personnel list. For example, many who at one time mastered the command-administrative style of management essentially remain "sectorialists." This is a very difficult thing for a person to overcome. Yet we see our task not only in an arithmetic reduction of the apparatus, but at the same time of replenishing it with people who are better suited to general political work.

Therefore, immediately after the conference we held a frank, comradely discussion in the party committees. We agreed that each of us would try to critically evaluate himself and his capacities. Although, I must admit, there were some doubts as to whether self-criticism would be enough. Of course, to a certain degree there is a back-up in the form of sociological studies which are being conducted in the party committees—discussions, public opinion polls, questionnaires, and meetings in the party organizations...

But here comes instructor Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Zotov and places an application on my desk. He asks to be transferred to his native Peschanokopskiy rayon. This is the same Zotov of whom there were no questions, no "check-marks." He is young and promising. However, he has decided to work in his native region.

[Ogurtsov] When I was in Peschanokopskiy rayon, First Secretary N. Ryabtsev told me that the rayon was very interested in Zotov's return. He even admitted that there were demonstrators around the obkom.

[Volodin] Of course, we could have refused Zotov. We always need good people in the obkom. Yet we ourselves were appealing to each person to decide his place in perestroyka as precisely as possible. So, that is what he decided. And he did not go to the deep heartland, but to the very front lines. Zotov was not the only one whom we let go with regret. A precise determination of one's place is in general probably the most difficult problem, both in life and in the party. How much personal unhappiness, how much loss there is in economics and in politics when a person takes someone else's place! Isn't this what perestroyka must begin with—an honest question posed to oneself, a public "re-evaluation" of the personnel?! We might add that there are some party workers who, despite a rather mediocre potential, have evidently decided to wait it out "to the last man."

One way or the other, the obkom section heads V. M. Korzhov and N. M. Naumenko have already changed over to Soviet and management work, as have Deputy Section Head V. A. Toropov and instructors V. V. Vlasov, S. L. Doroshenko, A. A. Yermolayev, and T. P. Salnikova... And as yet nothing dramatic has happened. They themselves have selected their new endeavors. If we speak of salaries, here too many have won out, since the talk of untold benefits of party workers are for the most part a legend. When in Shakhty the public discussion arose about the "underground supply of managers," first Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlevich Ishin invited those who seemed most convinced to get on the bus with him and said: "Name the address!" They went to about 10 stores, checked the subsidiaries, and returned with a light heart. "What people will say!" Yet on the other hand, at times there really are reasons for concern. Recently the following reproach was thrown at the obkom. It seems several years ago they would have had the right, but now? They decided to seriously investigate the matter. And what do you think? They found a "center" which the trade administration had organized for itself, referring to a directive "from above." You can conjecture where "from above" in any way you like. And this two-sided storeroom turned out to be not the only one. They reacted to this extraordinary occurrence as is customary today, but what a moral blow it dealt!

[Ogurtsov] Boris Mikhaylovich, what apparatus structure does the obkom consider to be the optimal one at the present time and in view of the current problems?

[Volodin] I will be able to speak for the entire obkom only after the plenum, which will discuss all these difficult questions. However, here is my personal opinion. Since we intend to reject the most infamous substitution, to hand over economic management questions to the labor collectives and Soviets themselves, then it would seem that the need for sectorial departments disappears, but in no case are we absolved of the responsibility for the final economic result. Rostov oblast is one of the largest grain-producing regions of the country. Recently it has gained significantly in the culture of land management and in product production. However, we must ensure the irreversibility of this process. I believe that the department of agrarian policy could assume this role.

[Ogurtsov] Aren't you afraid that this could be interpreted as an effort merely to change the signboards?

[Volodin] No. I believe there is a principle difference here. The new department could deal with the strategy of agricultural production and the scientific substantiation of further development. Why not the agroprom itself? Let us agree that it is better when each of us does not set the task for himself, but rather when it is set by some unconditionally knowledgeable and objective mediator who is well aware of the true capacities of the work executor and politically correlates them with the most acute needs of society. Thus, we might have something

like state acceptance in the implementation of the Food Program. I must qualify this once again—as yet all this is still just a working proposal.

Yet the departments for organizational party work and agitation and propaganda are even now to a certain degree structurally responding to the problems of political management. However, this certainly does not mean that their present work suits us. Optimal variants will also have to be sought collectively. We also need a corps of "broad profile" instructors, who concentrate directly on the obkom secretaries. You might say that even before this we considered the instructor to be a central figure in the party apparatus. That is true. However, only now can he truly rid himself of the cumbersome duties of an accountant, go-getter, or provider and become a universal figure who will be equally well oriented both in the basics of economics and in the problems of intra-party life, as well as in the peculiarities of cadre policy.

The remaining ideological and organizational departments could then assume the role of methodological instructors of the party aktiv. We do have some experience in this. For example, the Salskiy and Zernogradskiy raykoms long ago liberated themselves of the rigid framework of the current structure. Although, obviously, this is still not all. It is not so easy to rid ourselves of the stereotypes which have been formed for decades. All of us will have to re-educate ourselves: from the instructor to the secretary, correcting each other in a comradely manner.

[Ogurtsov] Probably, mutual learning as well as self-education for the party workers are today becoming the number one problems? All too often they wait for prompting from above.

[Volodin] It is a very serious problem: the ability, or rather the desire of the party worker to constantly learn. Without a doubt, we ourselves are at fault, bringing down the concept of good party work in recent decades to the level of unquestioning execution. Even very proud people have lost the desire to pleasantly surprise their colleagues, to invent something together with the primary party organization under their wardship.

Unfortunately, an entire generation of party workers has become accustomed to working "from here to there." The first thing that we must seriously undertake today is to awaken the desire to think and to doubt, to seek and to try, to take into our arsenal someone else's experience, and to attain our own. In saying all this, I am certainly not absolving the obkom apparatus of its educational responsibilities.

This was named as a primary task at the July Plenum of the Central Committee. Evidently, it will have to be resolved primarily by the information sectors, which today are more concerned with gathering accounts and labor reports than with the systematization and development of truly beneficial experience. Maybe they will

have to be strengthened for the good of the cause, without going beyond the framework of the standard schedule. Or perhaps their functions should be re-assigned to the organizational department. We might add that the problem of re-training the party worker from inspector general and official to a knowledgeable advisor is also one of the main tasks.

Our cadres, sociologists and scientists of the Higher Party School must help the local party workers, absolving them of the search for that which has already been found by someone else.

[Ogurtsov] Evidently, in speaking of the current demands for party workers, we cannot ignore such a problem as the selection of people for party committees and buros? Especially now, in the period of the reporting-electoral campaign?

[Volodin] In this plane, the current reports and elections differ in principle from the preceding ones. No one is forcing anyone on anyone else. After all, it was often the case before: somewhere in the raykom (or even in the obkom) or partkom they would confidently select the candidacy of an orderly person with a complacent character. It is much easier to work with such a person. You hand down instructions from above to him, the papers flow, you criticize from on high—and he will not voice any objections. We know what this has led to. A zone of indifference and political apathy arose around the "sterile leader," while the true soul of the collective turned out to be a different person altogether. But now we have rejected this faulty practice and have opted for competitive elections. And what do you think? Over 3,000 party group organizers and secretaries of party organizations have been elected for the first time. That is "we know our cadres" for you. I, for one, welcome such mass renewal. So what if the new leaders do not yet know all the fine points of party work? Many of these fine points can only serve to hinder us today. Yet there is hope that perestroyka itself, the new relations in the party, will both "set the tone" and give them the current notions about party rights and responsibilities. After all, oftentimes these notions are barely visible. For example, at the buro meeting they discussed the practical experience of the "Rostovstroy" association partkom... It became clear that even the secretary has only the most general notion of the role of communist leaders in the party organization. It was not specific reference points subject to strict verification which were being outlined for them, but some kind of nebulous wishes.

Or, here is another example. Recently I attended a reporting-electoral meeting at one of the shops of the Millerovo Plant imeni Gavrilov. There are good, responsible communists there. A discussion regarding the need to pay greater attention to consumer goods arose. They said first one thing is lacking, then something else. Then they called a recess. The vote tally commission counted up the votes, while we continued to argue about the

possibilities... And, I believe, we agreed that the equipment which stands idle during the third shift may be placed in full operation, and a cooperative may be created on this basis...

It is important for each party organization not to shrug its shoulders, not to wait for handouts, but rather to seek its own variant of participation. And it must necessarily find it, even if it is most humble.

The party conferences will be held after the reporting-election meetings. These too have their own peculiarities. Thus, for example, the competitive elections for membership in the rayon, city or oblast party committees will surely increase the political activity of these bodies. Yet some doubts are still heard. We cannot, they say, leave this electoral "element" totally uncontrolled. If they cross people off the lists—whom can we work with? It is easy to understand that we are speaking more often of "nomenclature," of communists who head up large collectives or are employed in party apparatus work. What is there more of here—sincere concern for the potential of the collective organ, or fear of waiving the doubtful principles of the old organizational scheme? Although no one can really explain why before, for example, an important administrative capacity practically guaranteed a person a place among the party obkom members.

As for me personally, I am concerned by only one thing. For example, the conference delegates still know each other to a certain degree, and, in electing communists for membership in the rayon or city committee, may judge their production activities, their political activity, and their need for participation in staff work. But how can we ensure objectivity of elections at the oblast conference if most of the delegates have come from all over and many names are totally unfamiliar to them? How can we recognize the program of each candidate for obkom membership? How can we understand whether there is such a program in existence? Does [the candidate] intend to implement it, or will he try to sit "on the side?" I stress that my specific concern certainly does not indicate the hopelessness of the situation. We will seek an alternative.

However, all of our present work may generally be called a very broad and comprehensive search for variants and methods of bringing party work closer to life.

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BSSR Znaniye Society Discusses Blank Spots, Nationality, Other Issues

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[Article by Ye. Semashko, from Minsk: "Brotherhood Is More Than a Mere Formula; A Round Table Discussion in Minsk"]

[Text] The achievements of the party's nationality policy are well-known. For the first time in history, the nationality problem, one of the most acute and intractable

problems of world social development, has been resolved. It has been resolved in the form it was passed down to us from the past. We have no idea of national oppression or national inequality. This is wonderful. But do we have the right close our eyes to contradictions in the development of nationalities and ethnic groups or to our own errors in the scientific management of national processes? Of course we do not. However, during the period of stagnation, attempts were made not to notice them. The topic of nationalities relations was effectively close to analysis or criticism. Yet, ideological cliches about "defense" and "fusion" and praises sung to indissoluble friendship did not remove existing problems, but often helped exacerbate them. This has left its marks. In some regions of the country, where people used to take special pride in their internationalist traditions, signs of national hatred and political ignorance suddenly turned up.

How did it happen? It all began with the dilution of the principles of social justice and of principled approach to party and political work among the people. Hence, we must restore all that was lost, erect solid barriers against nationalist distortions and adopt original forms and methods to educate workers in the spirit of internationalism and patriotism. This was the topic of a concerned discussion at party committee and BeSSR "Znaniye" society lecturers' seminar held at the behest of the Belorussian Communist Party's Central Committee. As part of the seminar, a round table discussion was held in which *AGITATOR*'s editor-in-chief and the staff of *POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNİK*, the journal of the Belorussian Communist Party's Central Committee, took part.

A Few Figures on the Ethnic Makeup of the Republic

Representatives of over 100 nations and nationalities live in Belorussia. According to the latest census, the republic has 7,567,955 Belorussians (79.4 percent), 1,134,117 Russians (11.9 percent), 403,169 Poles (4.2 percent) 230,985 Ukrainians (2.4 percent), 135,416 Jews (1.4 percent), 10,851 Tatars, 8,480 Gypsies, 6,993 Lithuanians, 2,923 Moldavians, 2,751 Armenians, 2,654 Azeris, 2,617 Latvians, 2,333 Uzbeks and 22,044 others.

Of the Belorussians living in the BeSSR, 6,319,465 (over 90 percent), consider the Belorussian language their native tongue. In addition, 337,850 members of other nationalities also listed Belorussian as a native tongue. Hence, an overwhelming majority of the republic's population, some 83 percent, are fluent in Belorussian. In addition, 5,093,850 of the republic's inhabitants, or 53.6 percent, use Russian as their second language. Russian was listed as a native tongue by 2,697,581 in the republic, or 28.3 percent. The total share of people fluent in Russian in BeSSR is 81.9 percent.

In a Unified System

Today, Belorussia is one of the most highly developed union republics. Thanks to the fraternal disinterested help of all Soviet nationalities, the BeSSR not only

healed its wartime wounds and rebuilt and expanded its economy, but created completely new industries, such as automotive, tractor building, calculator, radio electronics, ball-bearing, watch making and other industries. Today, 360 enterprises in the BeSSR sell products to over 100 countries. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the BeSSR does not possess all the necessary resources to produce machines and equipment. Without solid support from other republics it could not have developed its heavy industry. Today, Belorussian industry gets raw materials and supplies virtually from every one of the 15 union republics. It thus turns out that every ton of potatoes and corn, every Belorussian tractor, every ton of meat and every television set contains a share of labor of the entire Soviet people.

Nevertheless, strange though it may seem, the question who supports whom is still occasionally being asked in the republic. To illustrate this, director of the BeSSR Gosplan's Research Institute A.M. Dronov, Ph.D. in Economics, in his speech at the meeting cited a poem by Pimen Panchenko published by the POLYMYA magazine. It contains lines on how Belorussia feeds half of Russia with its potatoes, bacon and butter. A.M. Dronov used figures and facts to prove that the poet's assertion has no basis in reality, to say the least. Naturally, to speak of the poet's right to use his artistic imagination is in this particular case ridiculous and inappropriate.

We should not blame the poet too much, however: he is not an economist but a man of letters and does not have to be well-informed. The poet simply reflected, and not very successfully at that, an idea he heard expressed around him. What he heard was that Belorussia is always feeding other people, and had it not been shipping everything out of the republic, there would have been plenty for everyone. Such thoughts have been expressed mainly by educated people. Sometimes those who indulge in such conversations overstep the line beyond which strange rumors and philistine gossip begin to acquire distinct political overtones. Then, suddenly, a meeting of a so-called informal historical literary association passes an appeal to the All-Union Party Conference which, in the guise of lofty statements about full economic accounting, self-financing and self-sufficiency for the republic, essentially calls for some sort of economic independence.

The question arises what "independence" do they have in mind if any competent and sane person has long ago understood that the deepening internationalization of the economy is an objective law of progress. Just as it is clear that the division of labor and industrial collaboration among the republics have reached a level at which the economy has become an integral economic complex.

At the start of its development, could Belorussia have built over 600 industrial enterprises on its own? And what about the rebuilding period? During the war, the occupiers burned, devastated and pillaged 209 of Belorussia's cities and towns, 9,200 villages, 10,000 collective

farms, 92 state farms, 316 agricultural machinery centers, 100,465 industrial structures, 1.2 million agricultural buildings including 420,996 homes of collective farmers. In December 1944, the republic's industry was producing a mere 10 percent of its prewar output. The USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and VKP(b) resolution dated August 21, 1943, "On Emergency Measures to Restore the Economy in Areas Liberated from German Occupation", allotted the BeSSR R429 million to restore its economy, large quantities of machinery, equipment, construction materials and livestock and provided other kinds of assistance.

E.V. Podolyak, party committee secretary at the Minsk automobile plant, reminded the participants of the round table that powerful MAZ [Minsk automobile plant] self-unloading trucks are well-known in the USSR and are exported to dozens of countries on nearly every continent. The labor collective of the plant, which numbers in the thousands, includes workers of 33 nationalities. The enterprise has indissoluble ties with 1,800 suppliers and clients, including friends from other countries in the socialist confraternity. "Our goal is to assert real-life internationalism primarily by means of increasing our own contribution to the integrated economic complex, by raising production and improving quality of output," stressed the party committee secretary. In support of his statement, he cited exact figures on economic ties of the enterprise. Yet, it turned out that some people have not yet grasped the significance of this problem. How else to explain the question posed to E.V. Podolyak: "Why do you tie economic development to the success of internationalist education?"

"Because it is correct," replied the party committee secretary. "Timely, regular deliveries of output to customers are the best proof that the labor collective honestly and diligently fulfills its internationalist duties."

A Look at the Past

The timing of the Minsk seminar coincided with that of the active preparations to an important event in the life of the republic, the 70th anniversary of the BeSSR and the Belorussian Communist Party. "The anniversary is like field repairs: a brief stop, and then you must go on," wrote a poet on the 9th anniversary of the October Revolution in a poem titled "Don't Celebrate Anniversaries!" Unfortunately, when we marked similar anniversaries in recent past, that golden rule all too often skipped our minds: there was too much pomp and circumstance during the period of stagnation, and too little attention was being paid to existing problems. For a long time, attempts to focus on painful moments in the history of relations among nationalities were viewed as washing one's dirty laundry in public. Yet, the entire post-revolutionary history of our country which, by the very fact of its existence, has proven the viability of the Leninist principles of nationality policy needs neither artificial embellishments nor shameful concealment of certain tragic pages of the past.

Judging from the exchange of opinions at the round table, Belorussia, just as other republics, is experiencing a veritable explosion of interest toward the past. Currently, among social scientists and writers arguments often flare up about the "blank spots" related to the emergence of the Belorussian Soviet state. Every direct question requires a direct answer. The only criterium of whether or not an answer is correct is the fact that the historical past of every people, taken in its entirety with all its successes and failures, is a heritage no part of which should be allowed to disappear without a trace; yet, successes and failures must be assessed not from a "national" point of view, but from a class and scientific position, which is something people often forget today.

The argument surrounding a professional revolutionary, one of the leaders of the struggle for Soviet power in Belorussia, A.F. Myasnikov (Myasnikiyan), is typical in this respect. Certain people among creative intelligentsia propose to rename Minsk streets and squares bearing his name. Their argument is that Myasnikov did not support the idea of establishing a Belorussian Soviet republic. Indeed, as a chairman of the North-West District RSDRP(b) Committee, Myasnikov displayed a certain lack of understanding in this extremely important question for the destiny of the Belorussian people. But other things should not be discounted either. Myasnikov's contribution to the revolutionary movement and the task of organizing and carrying out the October revolution in Belorussia and strengthening the Soviet power which made the establishment of the republic possible, are unquestionable.

In short, we must not condemn an individual only because he had a personal opinion. Incidentally, I would like to remind all those who have this skewed view of Myasnikov's actions that to him the interests of the revolution and party discipline were a supreme law. He unquestioningly carried out the center's orders to call the 6th Conference of the North-West District RKP(b), which unanimously declared the necessity to establish the BeSSR and declared itself the 1st Congress of the Belorussian Communist Party. He also joined the first Belorussian government and actively carried out the party line on implementing socialist changes. If we looked at the problem objectively, the very question of renaming the street would seem not only unjustified and baseless, but also unethical.

All this once again proves that the study of "blank spots," as well as the evaluation of those politicians and respected scientists and national cultural figures of the 1920s whose names have begun to emerge from oblivion, should be approached in an even-handed, balanced manner. Belorussian communist historian, V.S. Ignatovskiy, deserves one kind of treatment, while those people whose activities, especially at the early stages of their careers, contained blatantly nationalistic and anti-socialist relapses, a quite different one. One can not help but agree with the thought expressed by senior researcher

of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History N.S. Stashkevich, Ph.D. in History. The essence of his thought is that the life and career of a given person must be viewed in their dialectical unity, closely tied to a given socio-political situation. It would have been a grave mistake—which was, incidentally, often committed in the past—to classify some figures as antisoviet and to present others, on the contrary, as though they were crystal clear. The essence of the highest truth is to give a person his due according to his true merits, deeds and actions, while evaluating his mistakes objectively and critically.

To Restore the Native Language

Internationalism by no means negates special national features. The desire of every people to preserve its national identity, culture, language and customs is worthy of respect. One can understand the concern with which Belorussian writers and cultural figures discuss the state of their mother tongue. Many people felt that the bitter lines in Pimen Panchenko's poem "Farewell," in which the People's Poet of the republic publicly bids farewell to the tongue of his ancestors, struck a sensitive cord in their hearts. Speaking at the latest BeSSR Writers' Union plenum, Maksim Tank said: "Today, we justly raise alarm over the catastrophic condition of the Baykal, Ladoga, Aral, Kara-Bugaz and Polesye. Yet, an even greater danger looms over a clearest among Slavic rivers, the Belorussian language."

Some people may ask: are not they exaggerating the danger? To answer them, it would be useful to cite data described to the participants of the seminar by department head of the BeSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Language Studies A.N. Bylyko, Ph.D. in Linguistics. A sociological study conducted by the institute in 22 of the republic's rayons (17 rural and 5 urban ones) supports the contention that in every one of them Russian is unchallenged as the language of socio-political, administrative and industrial spheres.

Thus, in reality, Russian-Belorussian bilingualism exists only in everyday life, education, science, arts and culture and mass media. Yet, even there it is by no means harmonious. Let us take everyday life, for instance. It is well known that Belorussian is used in everyday communications in villages more often than in rayon centers. Yet, even in rural parts its use is declining, primarily because the village, too, has been impacted by migration processes: rural population is declining while urban population is increasing.

How to correct this situation? Director of the Institute of Language Studies, Correspondent Member of the BeSSR Academy of Sciences A.I. Zhuravskiy thinks that it is time to go from generalities and criticism for criticism's sake on to actual deeds. He noted that the polemic currently under way among linguists and writers on the legitimacy of the language reform that took place in the republic in the early 1930s does more harm than good.

Joint efforts by all concerned individuals and organizations are needed to give back the mother tongue its appropriate place. After that, teachers, based on the practical need, would decide which spelling is better, pre- or post-reform. One feels that one can agree with this point of view.

Fortunately, real steps are being taken in this direction. Deputy Minister of Education of the republic, L.K. Sukhnat, described the work currently conducted at schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities to improve the study of Belorussian. New curricula and programs have been prepared and the makeup of groups of authors to write textbooks and study aids has been approved.

In Search of Fresh Approaches

Whenever one comes across manifestations of nationalist prejudices, there is no need to overdramatize the situation or to panic. This would only play into the hands of extremists and social demagogues. The task is to learn to resolve conflicts and misunderstandings that stem from the nationalities questions without hurting anyone, to accumulate the experience of organizing national and inter-nationalities relations on a democratic basis. In this question, an important role will be played by the large group of those who work on the ideological front, on whom the party has called to address the problem of internationalist education. How to raise it to the level that meets today's requirements? The participants of the round table tried to answer this question. Here are excerpts from some speeches:

Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Brest Oblast Party Committee, A.A. Vysotskiy:

"Well-known events in a number of regions of the country force us to take an attentive and close look at our own experience. To assert that in the area of patriotic and internationalist education everything has been going smoothly would perhaps be a mistake.

"Some people have started to deny their national roots, their national origins. We have seen a decline of interest toward domestic folk songs and toward heroic pages of history. Folk and national attributes have somehow become associated with props used during holidays. But, as it has been repeatedly stated, internationalism can not be inculcated independently of national consciousness, without the knowledge of traditions of one's own people."

Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee' secretary, M.V. Podgaynyy:

"We should encourage the young people's desire to learn more about the past of their land and to use their own resources to restore historical and architectural monuments. This is a great way to cure some of our young people of the disease called memory loss. It is impossible

not to notice the useful work carried out by such associations, such as local history work of enthusiasts from the 'Pakhodnya' association in Grodno. We have been providing support for such enthusiasts in their useful undertakings. To do this, the Komsomol's Central Committee has formed a coordinating council whose task is to establish friendly, creative contacts with unofficial groups that want to work with us productively for the benefit of Soviet society.

"At the same time, it is impossible to pass over the extremist wing of some historical literary associations, in particular ones formed in Minsk. They flaunt their free-thinking and rejection of the experience of older generations, raise various demands in the form of an ultimatum, write 'manifestos' and resolutions and have even tried to set up underground publication of a dirty little journal of a nationalist bent. Here we have a desire to dabble in politics and to create unhealthy public interest to one's own person by adventurous means.

"Naturally, it would be easiest to restore order by resorting to administrative means. Yet, this would only chase the disease deeper into the body. Apparently, we need a different approach. Confronting political dissent, we must learn to draw necessary conclusions from the situation, to search for and to find the true causes of the phenomena and to eliminate them by purely educational means. This would be ours, Soviet, democratic way."

Secretary of the Voronkovskiy Rayon party committee, N.K. Pushnenkova:

"Apropos the subject under discussion, I can say that our rayon has its own characteristics and special features. It lies on the border with the LiSSR. Some 85 percent of its population are Poles, 9 percent Belorussians, 3 percent Russians and 2 percent Lithuanians. This is the reason why the questions of patriotic education and raising the culture of inter-nationalities relations are very pressing for the rayon party committee. It is very important to direct this work properly, to find optimal ways to implement it and the most effective forms and methods of ideological persuasion."

During the seminar, its participants filled out a questionnaire requesting them to offer practical suggestions on how to improve internationalist education. Summing up the results of the seminar, director of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department S.Ye.Pavlov announced that the answers to the questionnaire, together with oral and written questions that were posed to speakers, will be very thoroughly studied and analyzed. Based on this analysis, a set of measures will be developed which will undoubtedly help improve the culture of inter-nationalities relations in the republic.

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**BSSR Chief Sokolov on Honing Party Apparatus,
Mass Media Role in Glasnost**
*18000085 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 5 Oct 88 p 3*

[Report by Ye.Ye. Sokolov to 11th Plenum of the
Belorussian CP Central Committee]

[Excerpts] Comrades! To a determining extent, the success of perestroika will depend on the level of party work. Its forms and methods must be brought into full accord with the conditions of the economic reform and the reform of the political system, democratization, differentiating the functions of party committees, ispolkoms of the Soviets of People's Deputies, and economic organs.

Of course, every communist, every leader must always bear in mind that neither a rejection of duplication nor the substitution of executive and economic organs means, in any way, that party committees and organizations are relieved of the responsibility for solving the problems which confront society.

At a meeting with the leading officials of the mass media, ideological institutions, and creative unions, Mikhail Sergeyevich emphasized that we are now reaching such processes, such innovations, and such scales that this requires enormous efforts in political activity, in organizing, combining, and consolidating the society. And it is only the party which can be the bearer of all this.

Perestroika does not remove a single aspect of our life nor a single sector of social relations from the party's influence. On the contrary, this influence must be increased by all measures.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee receives letters which pose the following questions: Why does the Buro of the Belorussian CP Central Committee devote more attention to economic problems and somewhat less to ideological ones? There are two aspects to be seen here. Obviously, such questions arise because certain comrades fail to understand the essence of the changes now taking place in our country. Perestroika does not consist of political meetings, an attempt to shout each other, to criticize everyone and everything, to condemn both the past and the present. But, you know, it is precisely in these things that certain persons see the ideological aspect of perestroika. Perestroika is intense and daily work, the difficult breaking of everything that hinders our forward progress; it is a persistent search for new approaches to solve economic, social, and educational problems.

Such a work is proceeding along all lines in this republic. And, of course, without radical changes in the economy's development we cannot solve a single one of those problems which are of top priority and which disturb people. All our efforts will not be worth a penny if they

fail to deal with the problems of providing the population with food products, housing, consumer goods, and various services. And all this is a combination of economics, politics, and ideology.

I repeat: the party's influence on all aspects of life must be strengthened. But, in order to carry out, to implement its own vanguard position, all units of the party must proceed differently. The task of mastering the political methods of leadership looms in front of them all in its magnitude.

A major step along this path will be the reorganization of the party apparatus based on the positions taken by the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the just-concluded Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. How and at what level this work will be carried out is very important not only for the present, crucial phase in the life of the party and the country, but also for the future.

In reorganizing matters, we cannot limit ourselves to half-measures or to indecisive steps. Nor sorts of palliatives should be tolerated in this business. The solutions must be of a cardinal nature.

In the Belorussian CP Central Committee the sectorial departments are being abolished, except for the Agricultural Department. Instead of 18 departments, there will be 9: Organizational Party and Personnel Work, Ideology, Socioeconomic, Agrarian, State Law, General, Administration of Affairs, and the Party Control Commission.

The number of responsible officials will be reduced by 30 percent: from 234 to 163.

There will also be analogous departments in the party obkoms. And their apparatus too will be reduced by about 30 percent. For example, in the Brest Obkom instead of the presently employed 80 persons, 57 will remain. As you know, the staffs in our republic's obkoms are approximately equal in size.

Gorkoms and raykoms will be provided with three departments each (organizational, ideology, and general), while the gorkoms of major industrial centers will also have a socioeconomic department and the raykoms of large agricultural rayons will have an agricultural department.

The Central Committees of the Union-republic Communist Parties and the party obkoms have been granted the right, within the limits of the approved wage funds, to solve structural-personnel problems independently. This will allow us to effectively restructure the apparatus, taking into account the problems and new tasks which arise, to more flexibly solve personnel problems, and to optimally determine the allocation of production forces both as to the nature of the production, as well as by oblasts.

To a large extent, reorganizing the party apparatus and changing its functions present new and higher demands on the party's Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. Party committees at all levels must attract fresh forces, communists, and convinced advocates of perestroyka. It is very important to ensure the regular participation of all members of the Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the Belorussian CP in working out, discussing, and implementing the most important political decisions.

We must approach the formation of the party-committee apparatus from a principled point of view. Such an apparatus must consist of the most innovative, creative, and competent communists, those possessing the necessary moral qualities, experience in life and in party politics, those having the theoretical skills capable of successfully solving the problems of perestroyka.

All this work must be carried out before the beginning of the party conferences at which we are confronted with the task of electing the appropriate party committees.

The abolition of sectorial subdivisions within party committees should not lead to a weakening of supervision over various sectors of the economy and culture. Therefore, the appropriate changes must be carried out also in the BSSR Council of Ministers and the ispolkoms of the local Soviets so that they will be able to take upon themselves those administrative-allocational functions which used to be performed by the corresponding departments of the party's Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms.

As you know, one of the concluding documents of the 19th Party Conference was devoted to the struggle against bureaucratism. And this is not by chance. Bureaucratism, which was termed even by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as the worst internal enemy, has become a brake upon social development.

The conference's resolution named the main lines of the struggle against bureaucratism. In the economy—a strict observance of the laws on enterprises and cooperatives, the full powers of the councils of workers' collectives, the development of cost accounting attitudes, an increase in the independence and responsibilities of enterprises.

In the social sphere—increased attention to satisfying people's needs and a persistent implementation of the principle of social justice.

In public-political life—a deepening of democracy and a development of socialist self-administration.

It cannot be denied that the struggle against bureaucratism is being waged. Recently it has succeeded in making headway in many sectors. There has been a reduction in the number of republic-level ministries, departments, and the administrative apparatus as a whole. The flood

of all manner of papers and instructions is being reduced. But the work must be continued more persistently and in a more coordinated manner.

Strengthening the party's influence on the course of perestroyka, analyzing why it is not proceeding successfully everywhere, what and who are hindering it, what must be done to speed it up and who must do it—these are the questions which ought to be at the center of the discussions at the reports-and-election meetings and conferences.

We have not yet managed to ensure everywhere a high level of the reports-and-election campaign. Quite a few meetings have proceeded in a pro forma manner; in essence, they have failed to discuss the questions connected with increasing the effectiveness of the collective's work, with increasing the personal contribution made by each communist to perestroyka.

At the meeting held by the communists of the underground wells capital-repair shop of the Rechitskiy Oil-and-Gas Administration not a single question urgent for the collective was examined in any depth: neither the characteristics and difficulties of making the transition to the new management conditions, nor the neglected conditions of everyday life, nor the shortcomings in educating people. The decree which was adopted contains general words and appeals. Barely more than half of the communists took part in this meeting.

But all this did not disturb Comrade Apkin, the secretary of the partkom administration, who attended the meeting. To the contrary, he even expressed the following justification: Under the conditions of democracy, he said, those who wish to attend meetings can do so.

Such instances as this cannot help but arouse our concern. It means that many party organizations have not yet understood the most important instruction of the party conference—overcome the passivity of party members, achieve a situation whereby every communist becomes a fighter for perestroyka, for a revolutionary renewal of society.

As was the case previously, increasing the militant aggressiveness of the primary party organizations is an extremely important task for us.

It is very important that, at the present, crucial period in time, the primary party organizations react to new phenomena in a timely and correct manner, that they not lag behind events, and that they establish businesslike, reciprocal relations with all independent formations of working people.

Take, for example, the councils of workers' collectives. There are more than 4,500 of them in this republic. Many have already gotten up a good head of steam and are exerting a substantial influence on the solution of production and social problems.

Nevertheless, we cannot also fail to see complex, sometimes contradictory, processes. In the first place, certain supervisors, even experienced ones, of the leading collectives are stubbornly striving to dispose of everything purely on their own, not wishing to put even a single strand of administration into other people's hands. This was manifested, in particular, when the councils were created.

For example, in the Zavodskiy Rayon of the city of Minsk, 18 out of 35 councils have been headed by the supervisors themselves. And efforts have already manifested themselves to organize the work of the new formations in accordance with the poorly recommended principle of permanently acting production conferences. And how did the party organizations react to this? What about the party raykom and gorkom? To put it mildly, they adopted the stance of sideline observers.

This is a patent undervaluation of the role to be played by the councils of workers' collectives as a new form of workers' independent creativity, as an extremely important channel for including workers, engineering and technical personnel, as well as office employees in the active solution of problems of perestroyka. We must not forget the following point: The council of a workers' collective is not a council under the director or manager. This matter must be corrected.

In the second place, it is quite frequently true that it is not those persons who work best who are elected to the staff of these councils, but rather those who, under the cover of democracy, engage in demagoguery. And this happens because the communists have been unable to show the true face of such persons, thereby dooming the new formations to passivity or non-constructive actions.

As was shown by the consideration at the Buro of the Belorussian CP Central Committee of the report by the Minsk Party Obkom on the work of recruiting, deploying, and training personnel, the efforts of the party committees along these lines do not yet fully measure up to the positions taken at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

In industry almost half of the chiefs of workshops, shifts, and sections, a third of the engineering personnel, and one out of every five chief specialists are lacking in higher skills. And this is in an oblast where an enormous scientific potential is concentrated, and one which has the republic's largest VUZ's.

The personnel situation is also analogous in Grodno. Lacking a higher education here are one out of every three chief specialists in industry, as well as almost half of the shop, shift, and section chiefs and their deputies.

With whom, then, should we begin to move scientific and technical progress forward, to introduce resource-conserving and non-waste technologies, to upgrade product quality and reduce its production cost?

The figures which have been cited attest that neither in the party committees in the localities, nor in the departments of the Belorussian Central Committee have we yet made the necessary turn toward working with personnel. To this very day VUZ's, tekhnikums, and PTU's [vocational-technical schools] train only as many specialists as the availability of the educational berths allow, rather than as many as are needed by each sector of the national economy. There has been no system here, nor is there one now.

Instead of searching for ways to solve this problem, certain responsible officials have attempted to prove that it cannot be solved. To agree with such an opinion would mean to allow an extremely important section of our work to simply drift.

Conclusions from this must be drawn by ministers and deputy chairmen of the BSSR Council of Ministers, as well as by departments of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. But heading up all work to institute the proper order in training and utilizing personnel, including personnel in the mass occupations, I repeat, must be done by the Organizational Party Work Department (Comrade Boris) and by the second secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, Comrade Irgunov.

The reform of the political system provides for specific measures regarding the reorganization of the structure of Soviets at all stages, along with the renovation and democratization of the electoral system. They will be carried out within extremely tight deadlines. It would be incorrect, nevertheless, to assume that these measures, in and by themselves, will solve all the problems of restructuring the Soviets' work.

Let's take a look at who has been elected to the Soviets of People's Deputies, to trade-union and Komsomol committees, as well as to the leadership of independent public formations. For the most part, these are the most competent, authoritative, and socially active persons.

Our principal obligation, therefore, consists of providing the conditions and the appropriate demand for the application of these qualities. And we must begin with the communists. In particular, we must facilitate listening to the reports presented at party meetings by communist-deputies regarding their activity as deputies. Because, you know, there are some persons who have not been in their own districts since Election Day. Just what kinds of benefits can the voters expect from them?

But if we take the leading trade-union officials, among them we will surely find persons who have gained some wisdom from life's experience. But first of all, we must ask them why it is that almost half the dismissals from jobs made upon the administration's initiative, concurred in by the trade-union committees, are reversed by the courts.

Nowadays a turning toward human beings, to their social concerns and spiritual world, must become the determining factor in the ideological work of each party organization. This is not yet the case always. Many ideological officials and economic managers have turned out to be poorly prepared to comprehend the new phases of actuality, not to mention the restructuring of practical activity.

The same is true with regard to cost accounting. Having introduced the latter, certain collectives have begun to reduce the number of employees (already small even without this) at clubs, amateur-arts leaders, sociologists, and methods specialists in the fields of physical education and sports. Should we have begun at this end? Such an approach could ruin any foundation for ideological work.

And how many moral, purely human problems have arisen? In certain brigades and workshops they have begun to get rid of persons of immediate pre-pension age, mothers with many children, and teen-age novices. Cost accounting is cost accounting, but there are values which are not changed by money or profits. We must not forget that.

Social scientists must provide continuous spiritual nourishment to our personnel. During the last two and a half years this republic has witnessed the publication of more than 90 books on the subject of perestroika. But it is difficult to find elements of newness and fresh thoughts in them.

The Minsk Higher Party School (Comrade Voytsekhovskiy, rector) has proposed to publish a manuscript entitled "The Essence of Party Work" (dealing with the recruitment, deployment, and training of personnel). It has a formal, high-falutin tone, reports about work which has been done, and an utter lack of recommendations as to how to conduct personnel policy further. And this is what has emerged at the higher party school—the center of personnel training.

The Party History Institute under the Belorussian CP Central Committee (Comrade Platonov, director) has recommended for publication a manuscript entitled "The Agroindustrial Complex of Rayons." It is written in a confused manner, based on old material. You can look night and day in it without finding anything about the problems of the present or the immediate future.

Without reducing our demands on the publishing houses, we must increase the personal responsibility of the leading officials of scientific collectives for the level of scientific research and for the quality of the materials being proposed by them.

The situation nowadays is such that not a single problem of perestroika can be solved without taking national attitudes into account. But, as you know, national problems do not exist in any pure form. They are always

closely bound up with political, economic, social, and moral problems. Therefore, everybody—including party, economic, and ideological officials—must be more competent and aware of matters which comprise the essence of international relations and their cultural standards.

In connection with this republic's transition to the principles of cost accounting and self-financing, the BSSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] and the mass media must provide a complete picture of its economic and scientific and technical cooperation. We must see to it that people in every oblast, city, and rayon have a good knowledge of what contribution they are making to the integrated, national-economic complex and those benefits which they are receiving from general funds.

It is high time that we had a precise system for providing information to the public in the sphere of international relations. This will make the practice of patriotic and internationalist education more objective. Elaborating such a system is a task for the Ideology and Socioeconomic Departments of the Belorussian CP Central Committee.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee and the republic's government have consistently conducted a line aimed at implementing long-term and effective measures to develop Belorussian-Russian bilingualism, as well as increasing the role to be played by Belorussian language and culture in public life.

Important decisions have been taken concerning the development of the BSSR Academy of Sciences, the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin, preserving the historical and cultural collections located in Nesvizh and Zaslavl, as well as improving the aesthetic education of young people. The program works of party and soviet organs on restructuring public education have included a special section on Belorussian-Russian bilingualism and improving patriotic and international education.

This republic's cities have witnessed the opening of Belorussian-language kindergartens and grades in general-education schools, the scope of studying our native language in VUZ's has been expanded, the circulation of publications in Belorussian is growing, and the repertoire of creative professional and amateur collectives is being enriched with works by Belorussian authors. Measures are being carried out to improve the training and retraining of personnel for teaching Belorussian language and literature.

Of course, what we are talking about is not any forced, command-type solution of the problem. It can and must be accomplished via a creative, innovative attitude toward the matter on the part of communists employed in the republic-level ministries and the organizations

under their jurisdiction, as well as in local party, soviet, trade-union, Komsomol, and economic organs, in cultural institutions and creative unions.

Many troubles in social awareness, behavior, and even in the economy stem from a low level of the population's legal knowledge. One out of every three crimes is committed by students in the system of vocational-technical education, one out of every four—by students at general-educational schools; their knowledge of jurisprudence would receive failing grades.

And this at a time when jurisprudence is being studied at many educational institutions. What is the matter here? Out of 5,000 teachers of law, only 200 persons have a juridical education.

Life insistently demands the following: we must organize a legal universal education and, first of all, work out a system for the legal training of personnel and the legal education of working people. For this purpose, it would be feasible for every city and rayon to have a university of legal knowledge and skills; the labor collective should have a school of legal training for everybody, and young people's dormitories should give lectures or courses in moral-legal education and training.

Recently the mass media have been paying more attention to legal matters. But these things frequently amount to reporting on the techniques of complicated crimes. It is entertaining and emotional, but, upon being checked up on, it turns out that such an "education" is only of use to criminals.

There is also another extreme. Certain newspapers devote a great deal of attention to showing the shortcomings in the work of law-enforcement organs. And this is correct. They need to be cleaned of layers from the past. But it is bad when such articles are written with a scornful attitude toward the law, when moral norms are contrasted to legal norms. The reader is inevitably disposed toward being in conflict with the law, rather than toward an alliance with it. Legal propaganda, like any other matter, must be done with common sense.

And again about two extremes in the work of the mass media.

On the one hand, many newspapers, journals, and the editorial offices of television and radio broadcasting are not always sensitive to everything new that is being brought in by perestroika and democratization.

On the other hand, we have not yet rooted out attempts by certain publications to make themselves stand out at any price, to publish the latest sensation as rapidly as possible to the detriment of an analytical quality and a reliable trustworthiness. ZVYAZDA and LITARATURA I MASTATSVI have sinned in this regard.

We have granted more independence and individual rights to the editors of newspapers and journals, and we have abandoned a detailed, watch-dog approach as well as command-type, administrative methods of supervising the press. But some leading officials of the mass media have perceived this as an indulgence for a lack of control and an all-permissive attitude.

We need to hold strictly accountable those persons who, instead of directing the printed word and the airways into the service of perestroika, have begun to act as though they were conspiring against it.

2384

TaSSR's New Khatlon Oblast: Physical, Industrial, Agricultural Parameters
1830067a Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 29 Sep 88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Khatlon Oblast"]

[Text] Khatlon Oblast has been formed in accordance with an 8 September 1988 ukase of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. It combines two former oblasts, namely, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts, and Nurek city.

The first plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Khatlon Obkom emphasized that the purpose of creating the oblast is to sharply improve utilization of the natural, economic and manpower resources of an extensive region that has considerable potential at its disposal, and on this basis accelerate its rate of development along all avenues, in particular in solving the numerous social problems.

What kind of the new administrative unit is it? It is a unified socioeconomic region in the south of the republic. It has a territory of 24,600 square kilometers—17.2 percent of the entire territory of Tajikistan. The population is 1.6 million—one-third of the republic's inhabitants. There are 1.3 million rural dwellers. Khatlon Oblast includes five cities—Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, Nurek, Kalininabad and Pyandzh—19 rayons and 132 kishlak and settlement soviets.

Minerals include oil, gas, salt, limestone, gypsum and dolomites.

The oblast's industry is made up of 85 enterprises of the power engineering, cotton-ginning, chemical, oil recovery, metalworking and light and food industries and the construction industry. It annually produces R1 billion or more of output—almost one-fourth of the republic's total. The leading sector is power engineering. The capacities of the Nurek, Baypazinskaya, Golovnaya and other GES's of the Vakhsh cascade, along with the Yavan TETs, generate more than 4 million kilowatts—90 percent of the republic's entire power capacity. In addition to the power engineering facilities, the largest production



Khatlon Oblast

Key:

1. Nurek
2. Yavan
3. Khovaling
4. Obikiik
5. Dangara
6. Leningradskiy
7. Kuybyshevsk
8. Sovetskiy
9. Kurgan-Tyube
10. Oktyabrsk
11. Vakhsh

12. Kalininabad
13. Vose
14. Kulyab
15. Kabodiyen
16. Dnilikul
17. Kolkhozabad
18. Parkhar
19. Moskovskiy
20. Shaartuz
21. Dusti
22. Pyandzh

- Промышленность
- A. Химическая (Chemicals)
 - B. Минеральные удобрения (Mineral fertilizers)
 - C. Электроэнергетическая (Electrotechnical)
 - D. Строительные материалы (Construction materials)
 - E. Газ (Gas)
 - F. Легкая промышленность (Light industry)
 - G. Пищевая промышленность (Food industry)
 - H. Машиностроение (Machine building)
 - I. Хлопчатобумажная промышленность (Cotton gins)
 - J. Соль (Salt)
 - K. Электростанции (Power stations)
 - L. Нефть (Oil)

facilities are the Tadzhikkhimprom Association, the Vakhsh Nitrogen Fertilizer, Kurgan-Tyube Transformer, and Kulyab Technological Supply plants, and the Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, Shaartuz and Kolkhozabad cotton gins.

Agriculture. The oblast contains 1.6 million hectares of agricultural land, including 385,000 hectares of arable land and 277,000 hectares of irrigated land; there are 192 kolkhozes and sovkhoses and 14 intersovkhoz organizations. Last year gross output was more than R1 billion—more than half of the republic's total agricultural output.

Almost two-thirds of Tajikistan's cotton, about half of its wheat, two-thirds of melon crops, and 40 percent of

grapes, citrus, vegetables and fruit are grown. The livestock in the oblast make up almost half the republic's total of cattle, goats and sheep—38 percent—and more than 40 percent of the hogs.

Some 90 percent of the fine-fibered raw cotton is produced in Khatlon Oblast. The sovkhos imeni Rasulov in Ilichevskiy rayon is the flagship of non-irrigated viticulture there. It has the best varieties of grapes with a high sugar content. Two sovkhoses specializing in rice cultivation operate in Parkharskiy and Kumsangirskiy rayons, and the sovkhos-tekhnikum imeni Kuybyshev has to its credit fine achievements in dairy farming. The "Geran" sovkhos-factory is also there. The Vakhsh zonal test station for subtropical plants is the oldest and the only one in the republic.

There are 135 construction and repair-and-construction organizations in the oblast, employing 28,000 people. The annual volume of contract work is more than R300 million. Highway transport is well developed. The Dushanbe—Kurgan-Tyube—Kulyab narrow-gauge railroad is in operation. Access to the country's main transport routes is effected via the Yavan—Kurgan-Tyube—Termez railroad. The wide-gauge Kurgan-Tyube—Kulyab railroad, whose construction is provided for in new work, will become the main unified transport network and a pivot for development in other sectors of the national economy.

Retail trade in the oblast is almost R850 million—about 30 percent of trade turnover in the republic. The volume of consumer services is R31.2 million—one third of the republic total. Slightly less than one-third of the hospitals and outpatient polyclinic facilities are located in the oblast.

The Kulyab Pedagogical Institute and a branch of the Dushanbe State Pedagogical Institute in Kurgan-Tyube function there. There are 7 secondary specialized training establishments, 25 vocational and technical schools, and 996 general education schools, along with 590 public libraries and almost 500 clubs.

These are the main indicators for the economic and social development of the new oblast—Khatlon Oblast.

09642

IZVESTIYA Investigates Removal of Raykom 1st Secretary in Kazakhstan

*18300018 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Sep 88
p 3*

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondents E. Maksimova and Yu. Orlik: "Suspected of Conspiracy"]

[Text] The rayon center of Marke cannot be found in every atlas, and everyone may not know where it is. It is hidden in the shadows of the Tien Shan mountains, among the gardens, in the deep south of Kazakhstan. The customs and traditions of the Kazakhs, Russians, Germans, Kirghiz and Uzbeks have become intermingled here. We might add that they all live peaceably with each other. It is not really a village, and yet it is not really a city. Here we see the colored umbrellas of the cafes, a park with game machines, and fountains. Next to the mighty IL-18, which was a gift from aviators to the House of the Pioneers, mules and sheep busily munch the grass.

The entire district is famous for its sheep raising. There are 33,000 head at "Krasniy Vostok" alone, one of the best farms in the rayon. The kolkhoz workers say that the chairman, Asil Kurmanaliyev, works "day and night in livestock raising." What could have happened to cause a

diploma-holding economist, deputy, and member of the raykom buro to have been removed from his duties, and generally for his entire life to have been turned upside down?

The Dzhabul party obkom buro dismissed the first secretary of the Merke raykom, Yermek Saurakbayev, from his duties. He was accused of blatant violations of collective leadership and distortions in cadre policy which led to the creation of an unhealthy situation in the rayon. This decision was announced at the raykom plenum, which had elected him to this position 4 years ago. The raykom did not agree with the obkom, and the obkom viewed this as an act of organized discreditation of a superior organ. Part of the raykom members were given strict punishment, and some were excluded from the party.

More than a year has elapsed, and the climate in the rayon should have improved. We cannot say, however, that the Merke residents are walking around with their heads held high and their shoulders back. There has been a letter to IZVESTIYA on this subject: how Merke is paying for its wilfulness.

We will not try to synonymously evaluate the activity of the secretary. An official sent from the capital observes a lot of random, varied occurrences. Even from the oblast center, we believe, part of the truth can be seen. The most reliable opinion is that which is comprised of a multitude of points of view around and aside, from day to day. It is capable of striking a real balance of the good and the bad in human nature, whose complexity or banality is exposed unmistakably by holding a high position.

Pig-tenders and party organizers, teachers and agronomists—could they all be toadies and hypocrites? That is impossible. Of course, everyone has his own measuring rod. The chairman of "Krasniy Vostok" valued the support of his social-constructive plans. The military commissar—he maintains order and businesslike precision. For him even the fact that the secretary came to visit the shooting range is significant. The women tending the sugar beets—the attitude toward them was that of equals. Tamara Abdullayeva, an Azerbaijani woman and Hero of Socialist Labor, said: "I never before saw a secretary who walked in boots on the dirt, asked the opinion of the kolkhoz workers first, and then of the chairman." A Kazakh woman, Yermenkul Alimkulova, said: "He was interested in us."

This is what is important to us—what motivated those who voted for Sauranbayev. It was not two and not three, but most of the raykom.

He accepted the plentiful rayon which had been bankrupted by bribe-taking. He set his primary goal as the elevation of agriculture through the improvement of the living and working conditions of the peasants. He did not always act in a smart or prudent manner. He

sometimes made uncircumspect decisions, was abrupt, and even rude. When he got some burning idea, he would rush forward headlong and would take risks. However, the rayon did move off of the minus sign. Even his enemies admit that.

What has been built has been done before our very eyes: the meat combine which had been no more than empty words for decades, the road to the winter pasture land, the canal to the fallow land, and the feed complexes. The new hospital, much housing—the demand for it was merciless. It may seem odd—underground passageways in the rayon center. They even criticized the two-story museum on the main square. Prestigious whims, they would say, what kind of historical relics could there be in Merke? It is true, the main museum exhibits are photographs of dairy maids, tractor operators, and shepherds working in full conscience.

Sauranbayev became a deputy to the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet. Articles about the rayon appeared in the newspapers, including the central newspapers. Television—"Vremya" and "Selskiy chas"—also became interested in the achievements of the Merke residents. And at the same time, during his last year, there were two publications in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on the critical letters of readers.

He was too hasty in the most delicate, sensitive matter—that of cadre policy. The changeover of personnel was greater than the number of people who remained. In his impatience he shot from the hip. He trusted imprudent, and sometimes even dishonest, recommendations. There were complaints about those who had been insulted and removed. The number of anonymous letters alone numbered 150.

The obkom buro issued a strict reprimand to Sauranbayev after the comments which appeared in the republic newspaper. Yet the raykom buro came to the conclusion that the article was biased.

It is easy to guess the conflicting relations of the raykom secretary with the obkom leadership. These relations did not deteriorate suddenly, wrote PRAVDA in its correspondence, "But the Canvas is an Old One," in regard to the authoritarian nature of obkom First Secretary A. Zhakupov, and his intolerance to criticism.

Let us get back to the plenum. Place yourself in the position of the communists who were called to the raykom with only a few hours notice. They were told that Sauranbayev is being relieved of his duties, and that the main reason for this is that he selected the cadres according to the principle of bias and close kinship. But what proof was given? The only "close relative" in the obkom report was a second cousin. The appointments were coordinated through the oblast and discussed at the raykom buro.

The meeting hall buzzed. There were unscheduled speakers and outcries from the audience.

It is still a year until the 19th Party Conference. There is still a year to go before the worker Yu. Surkov will approach the tribune unsummoned and ask the respected first secretaries to state matters as they really are. And no one will put him down. On the contrary, they the presidium will approve: "What a good fellow!" Yet Tasan Duanabayev, who rushed forward to speak, as the stenogram reports, "without permission," was accused of hooliganism.

At the demand of the audience, Sauranbayev came up to the microphone. He refused point after point. They believed him, but they believed themselves even more. "Decide for yourselves," suggested the chairman—the obkom second secretary. The end of the meeting did not portend any storm. Alright, Yermek, go ahead and do your secretarial duties, since the people are "in favor."

Three days later he was excluded from the party. In a week these same communists happily raised their hands in favor of a new secretary.

How did this happen? Possibly, they were confused, or perhaps dissuaded? Certainly not. For a patient and respectful discussion we must at the very least believe that a subordinate has the right to judgement.

For decades the raykom has silently accepted secretaries handed down from above, and has let them go at the first demand. And then suddenly the regularly operating mechanism broke down, having hit upon a point of elementary common sense: they call upon us to "decide for ourselves!" So we are deciding.

Four years ago, Yermek Sauranbayev could have been depicted as anything at all. They brought him in, a Central Committee instructor, from Alma Ata and said: "You will elect him!" It is said, and it is done—with unanimous indifference. Now they were really electing him. However, that voting—on command—the obkom considers to be a manifestation of consciousness, and conscious voting is servility and clannishness.

The Plenum participants explain their disagreement with the obkom in different ways. Some believed and still believe that the accusations are unfounded and fabricated. For others the very turn of evaluations was insulting. PMK Chief G. Ilyin said: "Yesterday they were placing a laurel wreath on the man's head, today—a wreath of thorns." Someone, we admit, acted not without malice. Everyone had their reasons. That is why the voting was held. Here it is appropriate to say that Azerbaijanis, Russians and Ukrainians alike all raised their hands in favor of the Kazakh Sauranbayev.

The stormy plenum ended Saturday evening. Already that night the obkom sounded the alarm.

For 2 years they themselves had called upon the communists to exhibit independence and democracy. How was it interpreted—only as a slogan over the obkom building or bold headlines on a newspaper column? No sooner had the fresh shoot matured and broken through the soil into the light of perestroyka than the entire conservative experience of the former life demanded that it be trampled out.

The thought proceeded along the customary circle. Isn't there a similarity here with the recent events in the republic's capital? Later they can accuse us—they let the chance slip by. Being over-zealous in watchfulness is more easily forgiven than negligence. And so, they began to pull the noisy rayon plenum up to the level of a political extraordinary occurrence.

Hurriedly, on Sunday, A. Isakov, the obkom secretary of ideology, was sent to the rayon center with special authority and an almost predetermined scheme: there was a conspiracy in Merke. It remained only to identify the conspirators and their connections (several days would go by, and the formulation would appear in the newspapers "exposed group conspiracy.")

He took A. Shamray, the chief of the rayon section KGB, with him on the trip to the rayon. The roles were distributed: Isakov was in charge of investigation, while Shamray remained in the car. Yet the master of the house would have time to see who was sitting in the back seat. The expected obedience out of fear of the administration was justified, but not everywhere.

That night, dairymaid Tursunkul Sydygaliyeva was awakened from her sleep. For 2 hours the obkom secretary tried to convince her, a member of the raykom buro, to tell whose orders she was carrying out. She told us: "The buro agreed with Sauranbayev on everything. My conscience did not let me speak out otherwise. For 4 years it was good, then bad."

We didn't dare believe it. We asked Shamray: "Why did you agree to participate, Aleksandr Konstantinovich?"

"I didn't participate. I sat in the car. At first, it is true, I had my doubts. What would the people think? No, they said, we need you. Possibly I was needed for another purpose. What was it?... Ask Isakov."

"Well," Almukhan Abdrakhmanovich answered: "I might have needed a witness."

The facts were found to "substantiate" the version. First of all, signatures had been collected in defense of Sauranbayev. Secondly, there was verbal agitation. For example, the kolkhoz team leader Nadezhda Ryzhova was "influenced" by partkom secretary Tasan Duanabayev. I don't know how to act, she said to him. Decide for yourself, he told her, only be honest. Don't forget how much has been done for the kolkhoz workers. We cannot vouch for absolute accuracy, but that was the general

meaning. Tasan was a childhood friend. They had grown up together and had been classmates and friends for many years. They turned the conversation into part of the insidious plot, as they did the collection of signatures, even though the signature gatherers quickly rejected the idea and didn't send letters anywhere. And what is so reprehensible in this day about our effort to defend our secretary?

That is how the unusually long, tiring investigation began. The verbal testimony was followed by written, and along with the other documents which were summoned in the case, they comprised volumes. The appeal of Sauranbayev alone comprised 5 of these volumes. Everything was investigated—from the effectiveness of the turnover plowing method which was introduced under him to the quarterly pay stubs. They did not find anything which could be punishable as a crime, but this did not stop them from accusing the former secretary in print, for the whole republic to read, of taking with him two chandeliers and a wooden dish cupboard when he moved to his new place of residence.

His wife, a teacher, broke into tears as she showed us the yellowed receipts for the purchase of the chandeliers.

But the secretary was not the only one they went after! They sifted through the documents of dissenters. They inquired at the places of their former work and study, in the militia and the KGB. They pored over the biographies of their fathers, who were old men. A scrupulous study of the genealogical and service records confirmed that these people, alas, were no angels. They did obtain certain things. One concealed an administrative reprimand, another—a Komsomol penalty, a third one, all the more—a prior conviction. Only the sins were mostly old, and some of them were not even sins before.

Refuting the anonymous letters about Sauranbayev, the obkom, for example, certified that the "partkom secretary of the Kolkhoz imeni Dzhambul, comrade Alpysbayev, while a student at the age of 16, was in fact convicted in 1964 of participating in a group brawl and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. He was freed after 10 months. When entering the party in 1976 he told of his conviction in his autobiography and application form." The date was 13 June 1986. A year later Alpysbayev was accused of concealing this shameful fact, and together with the discreditation of the superior organ and verbal agitation, he drew for expulsion.

"The case of Sauranbayev and others" became practically the main concern of the Merke raykom. The meetings were held one after another. The raykom workers did not even have time to prepare for them. The meetings expelled, issued reprimands, removed, and called back deputies. If we judge by the publications in

the rayon newspaper, time had begun to move backwards. "Politically harmful actions," "infamous methods," "political blindness," "those who have stained their reputations," "a sin and a shame," "these black days."

And now even the guilty were disavowing their words, and even the right to them. They were seeing the light and beating their chests: "The superior party organs do not make mistakes."

What is this—the instillment of a new regional loyalty instead of the old blind faith in the superior organs?

The explanations are similar to the protocols of the interrogations. "By the essence of the questions presented to me, I clarify..." "I confirm that no one forced me to vote 'against' either on the day of the plenum, nor before..." "I affirm that I did not enter into contact with anyone..." "I met with the first secretary only in the raykom. We had no other associations..."

By the answers we may determine the questions, the nature of what interested the investigators and what confessions they were looking for.

The people were pleading for leniency. The chief of the rayon section militia asked that consideration be given to the fact that he came to the plenum sick, with a fever, and was unable to concentrate. The kolkhoz chairman said that he was afraid of Sauranbayev, "having 7 children and a sick wife."

The common reproach was that people thirst for power due to the benefits, the material privileges, which it provides. Oh, but not always! For many this is not the main enticement. It is an irresistible temptation—to hold court, to command and to watch how people obey, sacrificing their dignity.

Team leader Nadya Ryzhova was also saving herself. At the next plenum, where they were disavowing and branding, she announced: "I have great respect for our party organizer Duanabayev and his work. He enjoyed the trust of the collective, but... This is Sauranbayev's plot, there were hangers-on around it. We can make allowances for the rank-and-file members, but for the leaders it is unforgivable." Poor Nadya! They convinced her, a member of the raykom and obkom, that she was acting to the detriment of perestroyka.

Betrayal of friendship, self-incrimination—the payment has been set for everything. Those who were "of the plow" and confessed would be pardoned. If they did not want to come to their senses—they would be held up for public view. A ditch-digger stated the honest truth: "My portfolio weighs 20 tons, you won't make it any less. I acted as I thought." He was given a penalty... for lack of principle.

For those who had portfolios there was a different scale. The "conspirators" such as Tasan placed their party cards on the table. The others—chairmen, directors, party organizers, rayispolkom workers, and the editor of the rayon newspaper—had to be forced to repent. They tried to break them down with no witnesses, but different people tell similar stories. Here are tape recordings with their voices, notebooks with their signatures, confirming what has been said. "It was an open barter: Say that you collected signatures in defense of the raykom secretary, write that he is your relative, and your punishment will be reduced." "I compromised my soul in order to remain a communist..."

"Does the commission have proof that Sauranbayev instigated people to intercede for him?" we asked the chairman of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee Commission for Party Control, A. Mukhambetov.

"There is no direct proof, but his influence was present."

"Is it possible to equate the events in Merke to those in Alma-Ata and to see a connection here?"

"It is hard to prove, but it is something to think about."

The assumption became the basis for a political accusation. The KazTAG related the official commission report for publication: "Sauranbayev, not wishing to part with his leadership position, took decisive action after the obkom buro meeting... He tried to play on the national sentiments... Together with his minions he undermined the work of the plenum..."

Did they fan the flames so as to excel in extinguishing the fire?

The commission is a court of party honor. It reviews personal matters, and often it is a person's fate that hangs in the balance.

"For me to give up my party card would be tantamount to death," said Sauranbayev when he heard the judgement.

He evidently said it in such a way that they had to enter it into the protocol.

A broom, noted Tolstoy, is broken one switch at a time.

After a stern conversation with Isakov, the chairman of "Krasniy Vostok," Asil Kurmanaliyev, also found himself at the crossroads. He could not bring back Sauranbayev. There were many new construction undertakings at the farm: a sewer, shepherd's houses in the pastures, an automatic telephone station—telephones for veterans and for doctors. If you remain honest, they will take away your beloved work and the things you have planned will not be realized... Kurmanaliyev had been backed into a corner, from which no way out was the

best. And so he decided to yield to the authorities. "Let me finish what has been started, and then I'll leave of my own accord. Give me 2 more years!" They promised they would.

The general cleaning was undertaken by the new raykom chief V. Pavlovskiy and the remaining second secretary, N. Seydualiyev. We must give the latter credit. He was the first persecutor of Sauranbayev, and had no mercy for his supporters.

At first the communists issued strict reprimands to some of them. That did not pass! The raykom met trust and understanding with suspicion. The decisions were rescinded "as being liberal." The course was strict, one might even say eradicating.

Whom did they annihilate—enemies of the state or criminals? No, it was their own co-workers, their neighbors, we can barely bring ourselves to say it—their own fellow party comrades. Don't they know the price of principle under the sword of practical conclusions, of repentance against one's will? What is it supposed to serve—the purification of ideals, the increase in the harvest, the improvement in work attitudes?

Well, so be it. The punishments have been meted out. Sauranbayev is yesterday's news, even last year's. He has left Merke long ago. Why must we continue to rage? Why, because the spirit of that plenum is not extinguished. It still smoulders. Not everyone has been convinced. They write, they sow discontent.

Vekbolat Duanabayev, former director of the repair enterprise, says at every available opportunity: "They stunned us at first with this cliquishness, with some mass psychosis. Each one ran for his rabbit hole—thinking, 'perhaps they won't touch me...' In 30 years I had neither reason nor time to analyze myself, but here it occurred to me: the hell with it, with the management. Why, I will lose my self respect forever if I allow them to intimidate me. If you don't allow yourself to do something, then you will be able to prohibit others as well."

Baysenaly Aripbayev, former chairman of the rayon planning commission, said: "Why is it that, in voting according to my convictions, I become a bad communist? The search for enemies, for hooks is delirium! People who support perestroika to the marrow of their bones are forced to leave the party. Whom does this benefit?"

Beket Alpysbayev, former kolkhoz party organizer and currently a cargo handler in Dzhabul, said: "I still remain a communist. The truth is, I will surely get my party card back."

Tomorrow, at the new elections, everything might be repeated. It is specifically out of fear of the expression of free will that they continue to spread fear over the public.

At first, by some miracle, Kurmanaliyev maintained his chairmanship. Others were not even given work according to their specialty—economist or veterinarian. They even had trouble finding work as laborers. In a small town the "prohibition for profession" is an instrument designed to make a person feel like an exile. The openings exist, he goes here and there, but runs into walls everywhere he goes. And even in the neighboring rayon the retribution will follow him along the iron chain: the Merke raykom reports to the obkom, and the obkom—to the other rayon. The question here is no longer one of humanity. Rather, it is a question of mismanagement and waste. And simply, it is a question of the violation of a person's right to work in accordance with his education.

Engineer Kynat Shaykhiyev, who was the head of the RAPO supply base, was unemployed for 9 months. Three procurator's offices—at the republic, oblast, and rayon levels—were dragged into the web of paperwork, and two protests were filed. Reliable clerks, ashamed of their helplessness, skillfully slip away from Shaykhiyev. Menacing dispatches are sent to the agroprom. The chairman promises to sign the order tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. The oblast deputy procurator laughs: if we directed the energy which has been expended to keep Shaykhiyev out of work toward a beneficial goal, we would be able to turn a mighty turbine.

What is the agroprom chairman afraid of? Why is the chief of the general supervision section only good for bitter jokes? Who has such power in the oblast and in the rayon that he is above the law?

This is the very time to recall the recent resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on measures to prevent violations of the law. This resolution states that Dzhabul oblast has the most unfavorable situation in the country in regard to adherence to socialist legality, and the person responsible for this is named. It is A. Zhakupov, obkom first secretary.

"We must ourselves learn and teach others how to work under conditions of democracy... It is based not on mindless obedience and blind fulfillment, but rather on the equal and principle participation of the members of society in all matters."

"No one can have a monopoly on the truth, and we must instill the culture of criticism and debate."

This is what both first secretaries—from Dzhabul and from Merke—said from the tribune, and specifically in regard to the described events.

Here is a classic example of the lack of correspondence between word and deed. As far as the lexicon is concerned, even in the remote kishlaks they have learned to pronounce this word—"pluralism."

We flew to Kazakhstan separately and in turn, which is a rarity in journalistic practice. The first correspondent was met with distrust. A non-party journalist, they said, is not qualified to understand the matters of the rayon party organization. Therefore we had to send a second correspondent.

We really did approach the matter from two different directions. One met with the people and the other—with the documents. One went to the courts and the procurator's offices, the fields and the farms, while the other spent several days at the party committees, from the rayon to the republic. He had the opportunity of meeting with the first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, G. Kolbin.

We should probably also mention that one chatted with the Merke residents in private, in his hotel room, while the other—in an office assigned to him by the raykom. They didn't want to do a bad turn for the people, and the hotel seemed to be a busy and safe place. But far from it! The hotel staff reported to the raykom about the visitors. There they didn't even bother to hide the fact that they knew everything: who you went with, in whose car...

We made our trips with an interval of 2 months, before and after the All-Union Party Conference. The conference rehabilitated political discussion and showed respect for opposing views. At the conference they not only counted votes, but also took into consideration those who were "against" or who "abstained," seeing in this not a threat to the order, but rather a possibility of expression of public opinion in its entirety. Like-minded persons are certainly not those who think exactly alike. It was an honest debate, in full view of the country. It was both a lesson and an appeal. If we strive toward an open society, then that means we also strive toward a party which is open to freedom of thought and comradeship.

The retribution in Merke is an extreme case. It is not entirely common, but nevertheless the ranks have been

formed, monolith and extensive, if it has become necessary to speak at the conference about the inadmissability of pressure methods, about the irreconcilability with which Lenin refuted the persecution of comrades for differences of thought.

Recently, returning to an analysis of the causes of events in Alma-Ata, G. Kolbin noted how important it was at that moment not to dramatize the situation, not to stir the passions, not to seek out political opposition where it does not exist. He said that the improvement of the situation in the republic was facilitated not so much by punitive and destructive measures as by constructive ones.

In short, we were convinced: they have come to their senses in Merke and Dzhambul, and at least the second one of us will be lucky enough to witness the rebirth of the rules of normal everyday party life. However, none of this happened. The conservative fervor is still gaining strength, and the revengeful feelings are gaining momentum.

Asil Kurmanalkev, who had been warned of our correspondent's arrival, met and stopped the IZVESTIYA car a 100 kilometers from Merke. Only there did he allow himself to unburden his soul. The chairman has been driven to the limit. In March the kolkhoz workers re-elected him unanimously to a new term, and in May the new kolkhoz party organizer told him in a manner that was too confident to be his own idea, "It would be better if you left, Asil Kurmanaliyevich." After that Kurmanaliyev ended up in the hospital, but even there they reminded him of his departure. He finally gave up. He wrote out his resignation and left the key to his office with the secretary. Three times the meeting of the kolkhoz representatives voted and three times they decided not to let the chairman go.

Then the representatives were re-elected...

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Historians Bordyugov, Kozlov on Bukharin's Policies

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[Article by Candidates of Historical Sciences G.A. Bordyugov and V.A. Kozlov under the rubric "Concepts, Hypotheses, Problems": "The Turning Point of 1929 and Bukharin's Alternative" (A number of new archival documents were drawn upon for writing this article.)]

[Text] We are introducing NEP "seriously and for the long-run,"¹ Lenin thought at the beginning of the '20s. This was also the opinion of most party leaders. At the same time, however, those who were thinking seriously about the fate of NEP in Russian, beginning with Lenin and Trotskiy and ending with Kautskiy and the supporters of a "change of landmarks," saw in it the danger of a Thermidor and a bourgeois counterrevolution or the "quiet" restoration of capitalism. The brilliant socioeconomic results of the first years of the New Economic Policy did not blunt the awareness of that danger. It continued to be one of the most important themes in the mind of the Communist vanguard and a constant argument in disputes and the ideological struggle within the party. Lenin and Trotskiy, Bukharin and Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, Rykov and Preobrazhenskiy resorted to it. And while one of the main issues of our post-October history today is frequently how and why NEP could and should have been retained, for the contemporaries of NEP the problem was fundamentally different. It was how to avoid the dangers involved in this policy while at the same time taking maximum advantage of the possibilities it held for the nation's socialist development. Although there were highly diverse interpretations of NEP, all of the party leaders, without exception, agreed that we had two main classes, workers and peasants, at the end of the civil war, but there were two and a half classes at the beginning of the '20s. The half, the so-called "third force," was the new bourgeoisie, potential agent of restorative trends. We can understand nothing about events at the end of the '20s outside of this context.

The thought of NEP's curtailment is voiced as the dominant theme in the area of party policy in today's debates about the turning point of 1929, and we should have a clear picture of what specifically is being referred to. For the Communists of the '20s the curtailment of NEP meant first of all the elimination of the private market and of free trade in those forms which had developed by the mid-20s. (There were no direct attacks on the principles of economic accountability in industry in the beginning.) This curtailment of NEP, or more accurately its gradual transformation for purposes of socialist reconstruction, did in fact take shape as early as 1927. The 15th VKP(b) Congress worked out a concept for putting NEP onto a new foundation and accelerating (but not forcing) socialist reforms.² (No mass collectivization was planned at that time, and from this standpoint the assessment of the 15th congress as the congress

of collectivization, which took hold in the literature, is truly a strained one.) It was exactly that, a program for the gradual transformation of NEP and not its curtailment.

Decisions of the 15th congress did not take into account changes in the economic and political situation, however. The congress proceeded from the possibility of relatively smooth, balanced development with no crises, like that which had continued during the preceding 2 years. The grain procurement crisis which erupted in the winter of 1927/28 was in great part a surprise to the nation's leadership. It complicated the plans outlined and contributed to a drastic shift in policy and to the forced curtailment of NEP—not at all in the form of the "peaceful" transformation laid out at the 15th VKP(b) Congress.

In contemporary debates about the fate of NEP, about alternatives and unutilized possibilities at the end of the '20s, the analysis of the problem ordinarily begins precisely with the 15th congress decisions. Representatives of various points of view derive arguments from the praxis of 1927-1929, which are used as the basis for the most diverse opinions. The analysis does not cover the preceding period of 1925-1927, however, which predetermined to a significant degree the conflicts and dramas occurring at the end of the '20s.

The Apotheosis of NEP: Problems, Expectations, Hopes

The completion of the restorative processes and the return to the "normal exploitative course of management"³ in the mid-20s made the question of NEP's future an urgent one. How far and in what direction could the development of a management system oriented toward the private market go without omitting prospects for progress toward socialism as "a system of civilized cooperatives"? How were we to combine with the private market the need to "pump" funds from agriculture into industry for industrializing and overcoming the technical and economic backwardness? How were we to ensure normal relations with the peasantry in general, without neglecting the concept of industrialization? These questions were at the center of debate within the party during the years 1925-26. Specifically, one of the key problems was defined as that of completing the economic and political restructuring of NEP as a restoration of free commodity circulation and the replacement of the tax in kind with a new one, a unified monetary tax carrying the danger of a new type of crisis. The first crisis encountered by NEP, in 1923, was a crisis of overproduction, a crisis of excess peasant grain intensified by an incorrect pricing policy and accompanied by exacerbation of the political situation (strikes by the workers at a number of enterprises, the uprising in Georgia, peasant absenteeism from the voting in Russia, demands for an independent peasant party, and so forth). Now, in the rational opinion of Kamenev and Zinoviev, the nation was threatened by a crisis in the

form of a dearth of goods and the impossibility of guaranteeing supplies for the city (whether the harvest was good or poor)⁴ (the tax in kind provided this guarantee during the first years of NEP).

This was a serious warning, particularly since, according to A.I. Rykov's statement at the 15th party congress in October 1926, "it would be insane to accuse the opposition (he had in mind the so-called "new opposition") of deliberately attempting to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR."⁵ The market-based economy, the intensified elemental factor and the increasing activity of private capital in the city and the village did in fact pose serious problems and made the economic and political situation in the nation dependent upon the ability to strike a balance in the situation of NEP's "glorification" and to avoid errors in management. Instead of this kind of maneuvering, representatives of the "new opposition" proposed using the existing NEP system for "pumping" funds from agriculture for industrialization. Otherwise, Trotskiy, who supported them at that time, said, the potential size of commodity surpluses from agriculture, in the absence of commodity stocks for industry, could become a factor not accelerating the rate of economic development in the direction of socialism but, on the contrary, distorting the economy and exacerbating relations between the city and the village.⁶

The method proposed by the opposition, that of combining accelerated industrialization with "traditional" NEP, could possibly have had a certain effect for the year immediately ahead, but would then have developed into enormous political instability and led to a peasant Vendee and the demise of Soviet power. The party conference could not accept the opposition's economic program, particularly in Zinov'ev's simplified definition: "cut costs by a half-billion by reducing the bureaucracy. Take the kulak and the NEPman by the collar, and we get another half-billion."⁷ The opposition's warnings about the danger of a crisis and the possibility of an extraordinarily severe economic upheaval, and their indication of its sources deserved the most careful of attention, however. They did not get it. The party leadership thought that the state had generally succeeded in mastering methods of regulating private capital and the small-scale commodity elements.

The point of view of Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov and most of the party won out in 1925-26. They counted on NEP's ability to function "semiautomatically" and did not attach major importance to a number of factors which could lead to difficulties at a later stage. In addition, the good economic conditions and the good political situation in the nation generated a number of dangerous illusions. One of them was that relations with the peasantry had been worked out and "we have... a tranquil village,"⁸ and that the problems and tasks of socialist industry could be resolved without major changes in NEP, without a focused effort to disseminate the higher forms of combining the peasant's personal commercial interests with state interests.

The conversion of the supply system for the cities and the growing working class essentially to a market basis (deliveries of food to the cities had previously been guaranteed by the food taxes in kind, which provided more than 30 percent of the commercial grain even in 1923-24⁹) produced major changes in NEP practices. Paradoxical as it seems, the further development of money-exchange relations and the freeing of the productive activity of the individual peasant farm on the basis of free trade, combined with the need "to pump over" blocked possibilities for the advance of cooperation. Some scholars had still not directed attention to the fact that by 1927 the practical functioning of the cooperative movement had come into conflict in a number of respects with the slogans proclaimed by the party. Administrative supports for the traditional NEP system were essentially being created by turning the cooperatives into state bodies. This was contrary to the economic-accountability principles of cooperation. It was falling under increasingly rigid control by state agencies. The state set procurement and selling prices, relations with the consumers, capital investment norms, overhead norms, and so forth. The result was that the cooperation system, as well as state trade, were gradually turning into a "pumping" tool. At a conference of the Communist faction of the Soviet of Agricultural Cooperative Unions in September 1927, the thought was even voiced that the cooperative movement now represented "something to which it would be difficult to apply the word 'cooperation,'" that "we have not quite yet found on the practical level" the needed degree of combination of private commercial interests and common interests.

Behind the figures, which indicated significant quantitative results, one could detect a movement, elemental in great part, which was frequently stymied by bureaucratic shackles. At a conference of the Ryazan Guberniya party organization in November 1927, for example, it was noted that the oblast agricultural cooperative unions "approach certain cooperative cells like aristocrats, like feudal lords approaching their vassals. They begin to acknowledge these cooperative units when the latter become powerful enough to avoid assistance." Nor were efforts focused on another area of agricultural production, the state and collective farms. Their already small numbers were hardly increasing, and even tended to drop in 1926-27.¹⁰⁻¹¹

All of these processes demonstrated that in real life, in the practical economics, there was an elemental deformation of a number of NEP components and an accumulation of elements of management by administrative decree. In addition, despite the fact that the trusts were autonomously financed, the state industry was unable to exist in the beginning without powerful administrative supports. From the moment NEP was introduced the party deliberately avoided using market mechanisms in relations between heavy and light industry. At that time, according to the 12th RKP(b) Congress, this carried the threat of heavy industry's destruction with its subsequent restoration—now based on private ownership. A

significant number of the heavy industry enterprises operated with state subsidies, which in and of itself foreordained the use of administrative means of redistributing funds. Relations between the workers and the administration at plants and factories were regulated not by the work performed for the end result and not by forms of economic accountability—the group contract, for example—but by the traditional system of quotas, rates and prices. The result was that the worker had little material interest in the final results of the enterprise operation, and the interests of the enterprise itself were specific. Its profits were thus depersonalized in the common trust balance. Figuratively speaking, the system operating in state industry was economic accountability for the chiefs.

The negation of NEP was maturing deep inside it—the embryo of the future system of management by administrative decree, which, in case of a deterioration of the international and domestic situation, could substantially restrict or even displace the economic methods of managing the economy. New ideas were born in the medium of this conflict, with an awareness of the dangers inherent in it—ideas about NEP's evolution to a higher stage, into a "system of civilized cooperatives" (the expansion of economic accountability in industry, its extension down to the enterprise, the shop and the individual work station, the enlargement of the cooperative system's economic independence, and its use for "snaring" the assets of middle and well-off groups based on material incentives). The matter of systematic development of production forms of cooperation were being discussed as early as 1925. Speaking of the rural NEP at the 14th party congress, Yu. Larin asked that the bourgeois nature of the upper elements not be glossed over and insisted on reinforcing the socialist prerequisites in the rural area, down to the kolkhozes inclusive.¹³ "The kolkhoz is indeed a powerful thing," Bukharin replied at that time, "but it is not the highway to socialism."¹⁴

Recognition of the need for new approaches in the cooperative movement and the development of its production forms lagged, as it were, 2 years behind the industrialization process. The opportunity organically to combine the tasks involved in industrializing the nation with the purposeful and relatively gradual development of cooperative forms, including production forms, was missed as a result. This was particularly true for grain farming, in which production cooperation in the form of the kolkhoz could have had a considerable effect. Analyzing the causes of the grain procurement crisis in April 1929, N.I. Bukharin concluded that the grain problem had been overlooked during the period 1925-27. Party leaders, including Bukharin himself, "did not notice the grain situation for a certain period of time and carried out industrialization by expending stocks (involutes—*authors*) and emissions taxes." Instead of paying attention to the situation of the grain sector in previous years and achieving a very significant acceleration of construction on a solid basis in one, two or three years, Bukharin commented, have arrived at inevitable difficulties.

These difficulties "began to manifest themselves most clearly when those sources upon which we had traveled for a certain period of time became exhausted and we could all see that we could travel no further on them. This moment coincided with the greatest difficulties. Since things had turned out this way, however, since these difficulties had become an objective fact, we then fell into the first round of emergency measures."

And so, by the time the 15th party congress had worked out the program for NEP's smooth transformation based on socialist reconstruction tasks, it was already hardly possible to implement the program. The international situation had been exacerbated. The grain procurement crisis of 1927-28 had befallen. There was no time left for maneuvering.

The "Unexpected" Crisis of 1927-28

The events of August 1927 attest to the increased strain in the NEP economy and the intensification of conflicts between state industry and the fragmented agriculture. Rumors of war swept over the nation at that time, caused by a test mobilization, large-scale "stockpiling" of goods began, and the "blackmarket" and speculation grew. The nation experienced "*economic difficulties on the eve of the war, even without a war.*"¹⁵ Commodity stocks were exhausted even before the new harvest was gathered. The change in the situation was not taken into account, however, and the summer events were perceived as happenstance.

In the fall of 1927 all of the current party leadership (both the future "right-wingers," headed by Bukharin, and Stalin's supporters) failed to attach serious importance to the bad news from the procurement front and asserted that the situation was stable. "When the crisis was detected," Rykov acknowledged 6 months later, "I considered it to be temporary and more superficial than it turned out to be. This assessment was reflected in my report at the 15th party congress."¹⁶ And so, the strategically correct decisions of the party congress contained a serious tactical blunder. The lessons from the August 1927 difficulties and the symptoms of the developing grain procurement crisis were not analyzed with adequate thoroughness, which prevented the party from taking preventive steps.

Errors of the economic agencies, specifically the lowering of state grain prices at the beginning of the procurement campaign, were the direct cause of the grain procurement crisis. In the winter of 1927-28 the kulaks actually stopped selling grain to the cooperative system and state procurers. Anticipating an improved market situation and more advantageous selling terms, the middle peasants also began to hold back their grain. There was nothing for them to buy with their money in any case. The poor people had sold their surplus items in the fall,

and the large grain holder benefited most from the price revision. And the state did not have adequate grain reserves at that time nor the currency reserves to import enough grain from abroad.

The unexpected grain procurement crisis, which could easily have turned into a general economic crisis, was perceived by the party leadership as a new attack by the petty bourgeois element, as an attempt to enlarge the confines into which the dictatorship of the proletariat had placed the capitalist element. The state responded with emergency measures. They made it possible to effect a turnaround in grain procurement, to provide the city and the army with grain and to preserve the pace of industrialization. The administrative pressure had to evoke large-scale dissatisfaction among the peasants, however. It became especially great during the "second wave" of emergency measures (May-July 1928) taken after the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission had actually promised in April 1928 to put an end to them.¹⁷ Although Stalin officially described the events as a "kulak strike," and consequently indicated extraordinary measures applying to a narrow class, they actually affected broad segments of the peasantry. As a result of the stretching of criminal liability, a large number of middle peasants were punished.¹⁸ It is not just a matter of the number of people who suffered, however, but also of the political repercussions caused by the anti-middle-peasant extremes. Memories of "war communism" had still not disappeared from the minds of the peasants, and any manifestation of administrative or judicial pressure seriously disturbing commodity circulation therefore brought back to them the whole picture of "war communism" with all of the deficiencies and deprivations they had suffered at that time.

In a speech about the results of the July 1928 Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee at a meeting of the Moscow party aktiv, A.I. Rykov announced that the emergency measures had not succeeded in totally eliminating the crisis. He also considered the hope that the entire campaign would be carried out by relying on the poor peasant and stable links with the middle masses to be a false one.¹⁹ A partial lifting of the emergency measures in July of 1928 actually indicated a victory from the standpoint of Bukharin's group, which was shared at that time by most of the Central Committee members. Party policy was based on the need to combat those elements which "are attempting to circumvent the 15th congress decision and 'further develop the offensive against the kulaks,' and those elements which are attempting to make the temporary measures permanent or prolonged."²⁰ The increase in procurement prices and the elimination of the practice of making the rounds of the households and conducting illegal searches, and each and every relapse into the requisitioning of food normalized the situation in the country somewhat but could not change the peasantry's attitude immediately. There was no confidence that the difficulties would not be repeated and that the large holders of grain, who had been taken

unawares by the extraordinary measures, would not be able to make their preparations for the new campaign. Rumors of the abolishment of NEP swept through the countryside. In fact, however, this was not being discussed. Many people understood that the program for NEP's "peaceful" transition was no longer possible.

The deteriorated political situation in the nation caused by the crises in the economy intensified sensitivity to all conflicts of the NEP society among the Communists and the workers. That which was accepted as a "necessary evil" in the situation of "temporizing" (this is what the communists sometimes called the period 1925-1927), now assumed fundamentally new and very acute meaning and produced alarm and active protest.

We know, for example, that real steps were taken in the mid-20s in accordance with 15th party congress decisions toward relieving the rural area of remnants of "war communism" and the democratization of rural political life. Not just the poorest and middle peasants took advantage of these new opportunities, however, but the kulaks as well. The latter were trying to make their way to the tools of political power, relying on their economic possibilities. They used the elements of "dual power" previously developed in the rural area for this period: the soviets on the one hand and the traditional peasant commune on the other. The latter made decisions within the framework of the land associations at meetings of the farmers. The soviets frequently assumed the role of mere registrars of the decisions adopted at the meetings, where kulaks enjoyed the right to vote. This provided the exploitative elements in the village with a political tool for defending their interests. Their loss of voting rights not just in elections to the soviets (they had not had this right since 1918) but also in the land associations, would inevitably intensify the search for roundabout ways to express their class interests: the giving and taking of bribes, and other forms of corruption.

A number of criminal cases of a later date demonstrated that the private-capital sector had indeed made attempts to secure its interests by corrupting the state agencies. The 15th VKP(b) Congress warned in 1927 of the danger of a "rebirth" of some of the political workers and leaders and of an intensification of the "psychology of tranquility."²¹ The so-called "Astrakhan affair" and the "Smolensk hotbed" acquired notoriety in the party.²² Part of the aktiv became corrupted in party organizations in Astrakhan and Smolensk Guberniyas, and there were frequent instances of individual leaders joining forces with private capital. The differentiation with respect to property, the antisocial position of many entrepreneurs and, as a consequence of this, a distortion of the views of certain party and management workers, evoked an acute reaction in the Soviet society.

Dissatisfaction with NEP grew among the cadres. Many of them were already in favor of curtailing it. As early as 1925 there were appeals from the workers to think up "some sort of tack" for reaching the "cherished goal" as

soon as possible.²³ Strictly speaking, the conversion from economic accountability to economics by decree was not a drastic change for the workers but an extension of relations which already existed in industry. NEP fed the workers and improved their material situation but did not penetrate deeply into production, and when social problems intensified and food supply difficulties arose in 1927, ration books (a food rationing system) were introduced in 1928, and the industrial workers was no longer tied to the traditional NEP in any way. The "distortions of NEP," unemployment and various social anomalies (poverty, prostitution, alcoholism) linked to it and to other factors were now perceived as completely intolerable.

Among the Communists and the workers there were unquestionably sentiments against the curtailment of NEP, however. The position of the so-called "new workers" with close links to the peasant economy was particularly complex. The duality of interests of these "unpolished muzhiks" caused them to protest the increased pace of industrialization.²⁴ These protests reflected primarily the "peasant side" of the "new workers" social situation. There was also a perfectly justified rejection of the emergency measures and the violence toward the middle peasant.

This social and psychological milieu had a great deal to do with the decisions of 1928-29 and the course of the discussion within the party on the fate of NEP. The positions of the heterogeneous and differently oriented forces was reflected in the party itself to one degree or another. This complicated the adoption of decisions. In general it is sometimes fairly difficult to see the line beyond which specific changes grow into a major breakup. This is what occurred in 1920-21, when a search was underway for a way out of the crisis in the system of war communism. A similar situation developed in 1928-29. The deterioration of the situation once again generated debate within the party. The main opponents were Bukharin and Stalin.

The Beginning of the Debate Within the Party

When a political party is seeking a way out of a complex, dialectically tense situation, it always has a choice of either preserving the existing system of relations and sticking to more or less extensive adjustments and improvements or of moving beyond the system, looking toward qualitative changes. The first way makes it possible temporarily to improve the situation and gain a respite but does not guarantee that the crises will not reappear. The second leads to a drastic alteration of the situation but produces new conflicts, increases the danger of errors and blunders and, at first, does not lessen but intensifies the difficulties. Making the choice calls for thorough consideration of a large number of factors: whether the possibilities for progressive development on the old basis have been exhausted, how much time is available for maneuvering, and whether the forces capable of decisive change have matured.

Bukharin asked what had caused the crisis. Was it because the basic market proportions had been disturbed? Had too few industrial goods been produced? Was there a great demand for them in the village? Had the kulak been terribly enriched and his position strengthened, and he had closed ranks with the middle peasant? Bukharin felt that both of these approaches were one-sided. "From the economic standpoint," he asserted, "we have had a breakdown of the basic economic proportions and on this basis, a certain economic activeness on the part of the kulaks, far greater than before, and an attempt by them to close ranks with the middle peasant around a certain pricing policy."²⁵ Furthermore, like most of the Central Committee members at that time, he assumed that the "difficulties which we have experienced have not been inevitable difficulties. They developed as a result of our sluggishness, errors made by those in charge of planning, and the party debate."²⁶

Despite all of his circumlocutions, however, Bukharin at that time saw the main causes of the grain procurement difficulties not in the objective fact that the level of development of agriculture did not coincide with that of industry or that the possibilities of the "old" NEP had been exhausted to a certain degree in the situation of the industrialization underway and the rapid growth of the urban population, but primarily in errors having to do with the market. In his opinion, a slight adjustment of the general course could correct the situation. But Bukharin did not oppose the rapid pace of industrialization at all. On the contrary, he condemned the suggestion of a number of economists that the rate of industrialization be slowed, that the workers' wages and the price of grain be raised, primarily for the individual farms, calling such proposals an "totally undisguised kulak program."²⁷ Nor did he rule out, as a temporary solution, a repeat of the "extraordinary measures."

The heart of the conflict and the political differences between Bukharin's group and the majority of the Central Committee lay elsewhere. In the beginning Bukharin believed that it was possible to combine the rapid pace of industrialization and the NEP management system just as it was at the time of the 15th party congress. On this basis, he believed, a balance could be reached the following economic year, 1928-29.²⁸ An orientation toward this kind of balancing in the altered situation would have meant continuing to equate the pace of the nation's industrialization to the backward, single-family-farm economy and remaining under the sword of Damocles of crises.

Nor did Bukharin's opponents have a precisely defined program at first. Relying on the long-term effect from the emergency measures, which intensified the political instability in the rural area, it could not be regarded as such a program. The method of forcing industrialization based on the individual peasant farm and relying on coercion had already discredited itself both theoretically,

during the struggle against Trotskyism, and on the practical level, during the grain procurement crisis. Stalin and his supporters sometimes groped their way blindly toward the development of a different, more radical course, one which involved not the mere elimination of crises and stabilization of the situation by making concessions to the petty bourgeois element but the elimination of the very possibility of the emergence of such crises. Just how was this to be done?

Back when the crisis struck, in January of 1928, Stalin proposed other measures for stabilizing grain procurements: developing the building of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and tying the process of socialist transformation of the rural area to these economic and political strong-points of Soviet power.²⁹ The problem of "pumping" funds from agriculture was thus being shifted to a different level. It was no longer a matter of selecting certain limits for the "pumping" of funds (the plan of the "new opposition" or that of the "right-wingers") but of what the "pumping" was to be based on: whether it was to be effected from single-peasant farms through the market system (or requisitioning and extraordinary measures) or by means of the kolkhozes?

Stalin and his supporters saw the kolkhozes as that element of the rural social and economic structure which conformed to the new system and could make it possible to effect the redistribution of funds and supply the city with bread without creating the danger of economic and political crises in the future. This idea was to a significant degree a pragmatic reaction to the grain procurement difficulties: the marketability of the kolkhoz of 1928 was twice that of the individual peasant farm. In certain situations the kolkhoz offered the possibility of lopsided exchange between the city and the rural area, which was the very essence of the "pumping" process. The resolution of the main problem in the second half of the '20s was taken beyond the scope of the "traditional" NEP and the capabilities of the individual peasant farm. The very system of relations in the rural area was altered.

The grain procurement problem intensified once again at the beginning of 1929, and once again the question of emergency measures came up. At that time Bukharin and Rykov insisted on importing grain from abroad to supply the cities. That would have necessitated spending significant currency assets designated for purchasing industrial equipment. An agrarian, peasant nation had to import grain from abroad! This obvious dilemma demonstrated that the "traditional" NEP was not "working." Just the idea of procuring grain from abroad was an attempt to prop up the poorly functioning system. If it were implemented, we would halt the nation's technical reequipment, because we could not carry it out on the old basis. The nation needed to acquire advanced Western equipment while the capitalists agreed to sell it to us at all, and failure to purchase it would drastically slow the industrialization. This would therefore in fact be a

retreat, albeit a temporary one. In any case, it was a trend of preserving for a fairly long period of time the transitional NEP society, which was gradually "creeping" toward socialism.

Bukharin's group came out with its alternative program at the April 1929 Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the VKP(b). It essentially consisted in importing grain from abroad to normalize the food situation in the cities; resolutely rejecting extraordinary measures; preserving revolutionary legality; applying a more flexible system of grain levies and prices (Bukharin believed, nonetheless, that there could no longer be a question of equivalent exchange between the city and the rural area); and increasing the output of agricultural equipment. Ideally, this route would have been preferable, even though it would not eliminate the danger of crises.

Objectively, the people, dissatisfied with the deteriorating situation and subject to a certain degree to Philistine, "down-dragging" sentiments, accepted the position of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy as the banner of their feelings. These were representatives of that portion of the party and the people which were still not oriented toward change, had still not grasped the need for change and were still not prepared psychologically for them (changes). These people responded to the growing difficulties, including the difficulties of personal, daily life (the rationing of bread, the deterioration of the economic and material situation, and so forth) with calls for a return to NEP. This resulted in a sort of merging of the grass-roots sentiment and the political position of Bukharin's group, which were united artificially in great part by a common concept of a "right-wing leaning." This leaning had no organizational definition or any sort of clearly defined factional features. Bukharin became the authority figure on whom relied not just the "down-draggers" but also those who called, perfectly reasonably, for prudence and caution locally.

If the Soviet society had had a lot of time at its disposal, these appeals could have been considered justified, and the solution proposed by Bukharin's group of manipulating prices and taxes, procuring grain from abroad, and so forth, would have been possible. But was there any guarantee that the nation would not find itself on the verge of a crisis again a year later? It is not surprising that Ordzhonikidze responded in precisely this spirit to the dilemma as rigidly defined by Bukharin: "Either extraordinary measures or the procurement of grain from abroad." And indeed, up to that point, crises had arisen with a certain cyclical consistency, gaining force at a time when possibilities for controlling the situation had narrowed. The very necessity of accelerating industrialization and the "pumping" of funds into heavy industry provided no leeway for maneuvering. At the April 1929 Central Committee plenum even Bukharin did not deny the need for such "pumping" based on lopsided exchange. Could they afford a respite of a year or two in any case? In the specific situation existing at the end of

the '20s, when, even Bukharin admitted, we stood at the threshold of a "second round of wars,"³⁰ when a "third force," the new bourgeoisie of the city and the rural area, was stepping up its resistance to socialism and the petty property owner still had his dual nature, the implementation of this policy would in fact have been a retreat under the onslaught of the petty bourgeois element and economic difficulties.

Paradoxes and Dramas of the "Great Turning Point"

The first five-year plan, unanimously approved at the 16th party conference in April 1929 and designed to overcome market balancing and to provide outstripping rates of development for heavy industry was itself a major change in party policy. A trend of unrealistic planning began to take shape precisely at that time. The already intensive, optimal version of the five-year plan was replaced by "fantastic, arbitrary leaps in the annual plans."³¹ As a result the increased targets for the most important branches of industry (electric power engineering, coal and oil extraction, and production of iron, mineral fertilizers and tractors), which were the key branches at that time, were not met by the end of the five-year period. This ultimately led to a drastic drop in the pace and to the need for major adjustment of the control figures, and the latter was effected at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in January 1933 and at the 17th VKP(b) Congress in January 1934.³²

In a certain sense the setting of economically unattainable goals during the revision of the five-year targets in 1929 could be explained, but it could not be justified. The stimulation of labor activeness in the workers during the first five-year period was based primarily on enthusiasm and administrative tools. The wage rate reform of 1928, designed as a leveling factor, and the establishment of fixed supply norms in the cities blocked or at least limited material incentive possibilities. The obvious weakness of the material incentives could be offset only by appealing directly to the class sense of the workers. Setting modest goals in this situation meant significantly constricting the very basis of the mass enthusiasm, a fairly unstable social and psychological phenomenon always oriented toward significant goals. The mass enthusiasm, divorced from material incentives during the first five-year period, inevitably had to be based on "goal gradation"—increasing activeness as the desired result was approached—or nothing would come of it. "Instant socialism" could have been such a goal, but the normalization of economic life on the old NEP basis, hardly. I repeat, this does not justify the setting of economically unattainable goals, but it does explain their social and psychological effect to some degree. The grand scale of the plans was a powerful stimulant to the workers, even those who had not supported the acceleration in the beginning. It attracted them with the idea of building socialism and gave additional stimulus to the

development of industry (we should not forget that state industry could not have existed without the "underpinnings" of enthusiasm and administration by decree throughout the '20s).

The orientation toward inordinately high rates of economic growth produced voluntaristic interpretations of the plan, feelings of "economic romanticism" and a desire for an immediate transition to direct barter. In February of 1930 even Bukharin was talking about a "leap toward *socialist barter*," and about reducing the extent of market relations and replacing them with contractual relations among enterprises.³³ We did not succeed in establishing such relations, however, which in the long term could have become a special form of the socialist market. N.A. Voznesenskiy wrote in 1931 that "instead of implementing contractual relations among... suppliers and consumers, based on economic accountability, what we achieved was the complete bureaucratization of the supply system and a lessening of consumer control over the supplier in matters of product quality, the cutting of production costs and the timeliness of deliveries."³⁴ The "breakdown of economic accountability"³⁵ followed the credit reform of 1930, which replaced promissory (commercial) crediting with direct bank crediting of the entire national economy. In reality, instead of specific economic transactions, the wholesale crediting of a plan was established. Possibilities for actually controlling the ruble were reduced. The economic reality (specifically, the breakdown of the plan for the first quarter of 1931 for all industry of the VSNKh [Supreme Council of the National Economy]) destroyed the illusions and forced us once again to raise the question of economic accountability, but now in forms which were extremely restricted by the rigid centralization of control and administrative management methods.

While the 16th party conference opened the door for "furious rates" (Stalin's expression) of industrial development, collectivization, thanks in great part to the position of Bukharin's group, was still regarded as a modest supplementary measure, and the individual peasant farm was viewed as the mainstay of agricultural production. The five-year plan called for combining 18-20 percent of the peasant farms into kolkhozes (TOZes, artels and communes) by the end of 1933.³⁶ This was the basic consideration. In the fall of 1929, in V.P. Danilov's opinion, approximately one sixth of the nation's peasant farms had the transitional production relations immediately preceding collectivist relations, and the production relations of approximately a third were at the very initial stage of transformation into collectivist relations.³⁷ In 1928 and the first half of 1929 gradual methods of collectivization were tested, methods such as establishing a specific number of large kolkhozes and sovkhozes, developing a system of supplying grain under contract, using the peasant institution of the mir for forming various production associations, and so forth. All of these methods produced certain results. They did not undergo further development, however.

Although the 1928 harvest exceeded the previous one, grain procurement by the usual method was not successful. Nor was the threat of procurement plan failure reduced by attempts to stabilize the situation by raising state grain prices again, increasing the amount of goods sent to the rural area, an almost total cessation of grain exports, and so forth.³⁸ With respect to the peasants themselves, some of them offered some very unique suggestions. The peasants were dissatisfied with the fact that they were informed of the grain delivery plan only after they had sold their stocks on the free market. They wanted to be given the plan first, so that they could freely dispose of what remained. These sentiments coincided with the suggestion made by S.I. Syrtsov, speaking out at the April 1929 Central Committee plenum for a return to a new level of tax in kind, or more precisely, state obligation—some sort of happy medium between requisitioning grain by force (the establishment of grain delivery plans) and tax in kind (the right freely to dispose of the excess). This and other plans for overcoming the grain procurement difficulties had little effect on the actual praxis, however, and the question of finding a radical solution to the situation had arisen once again by the summer of 1929. It was precisely this period which saw the application of those grain procurement principles which had decided the shift toward mass collectivization and the departure from previous NEP principles. Restrictions on the free sale of grain, which had previously been applied as a temporary, emergency measure, was legalized in the Ukraine and the RSFSR. Approved by the village meeting, priority was established for commitments for grain sales to the state.³⁹ The village residents themselves were to determine also the amount of excess grain which the kulak segment of the village was required to sell to the state. In reality, this served as the legal basis for the partial dispossession of the kulaks to begin in the second half of 1929.⁴⁰

The introduction of mandatory grain sales to fulfill state procurement plans fundamentally altered the economic substance of all the forms of collectivization. Advance contracting became a means of mobilizing commercial grain and in the opinion of some economists, even a transitional form leading to direct barter.⁴¹ The various primary forms of cooperation were restricted and then curtailed. Shortly after that the land management associations were eliminated, and all of their authority and duties were turned over to the rural soviets.⁴² The new grain procurement regulations were accompanied by such measures, subsequently condemned by the VKP(b) Central Committee, as the closing of the bazaars, the posting of barrier groups and other obstacles to peasant trade. The changes inevitably led to the alteration of the entire trade structure, the entire system for providing the population with consumer goods.

The substance and the nature of these changes, which differed sharply from the previous NEP principles, were not accepted by a considerable portion of the peasantry, who had become accustomed to disposing of their excesses as they saw fit. They led directly to the idea of

establishing kolkhozes. The delivery of grain to the state on a planned basis at prices disadvantageous to the peasants would have reduced grain production down to the minimum required for consumption. Supporting at first the initiative of a number of local organizations for carrying out mass collectivization and considering the large results produced by the new grain procurement regulations (the plan was fulfilled even before 1930 began, and significant grain reserves were laid in for the first time), a Central Committee plenum adopted a decision to accelerate collectivization in November of 1929.⁴³

By that time the position of the Bukharin group was moving closer to the opinion of the Central Committee majority. In their statement at the plenum, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy concluded that "this past year can be considered a turning point," that the "scope of capital construction, enormous and unprecedented in its pace, and the enhancement of industry's leading role... can no longer be reconciled with the dominance in agriculture of the individual peasant holding, the wooden plow, strip farming, and so forth. The growth of the large, socialized farm has therefore not merely come to the fore, but the kolkhoze movement has become truly large-scale, achieving a pace which exceeds all the targets of the planning agencies and all expectations." What Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy continued to firmly insist upon was the fundamental inadmissibility of extraordinary measures. All of the disagreements were now concentrated in this area. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy rightly regarded the system of "extraordinary measures" as a betrayal of Leninism, as Trotskyism. Their position did not get the support of the Central Committee, however. (I would point out parenthetically that the significance of this decision went far beyond the pace of collectivization. By raising the extraordinary measures to the level of a system, the Central Committee majority was actually sanctioning the shaping of that political situation in which the executive and extraordinary agencies of authority would move outside of party control.)

In reality, the establishment of kolkhozes by means of extraordinary measures led to violations of Leninist principles of socialist development, to abuse of power and to a drop in agricultural output. Since the shift to accelerated collectivization occurred very rapidly, as a reaction to the situation, the reform process inevitably acquired some features of spontaneity, particularly at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930. Against the background of the successes achieved in collectivization at the beginning of 1929, the foundation for which was laid by the entire previous course of development, a significant part of the party workers at the center and locally acquired illusions and a desire to maintain the set pace at any cost, "to speed ahead as far as possible," without considering the need for serious explanatory work. The sense of moderation was lost as a result, and adventuristic attempts to resolve all problems pertaining to socialist development instantly emerged and grew.

The party leadership pointed out the errors only when the volatility of the situation had become critical. The Politburo members regularly received reports on the progress of the kolkhoz movement. There were other sources of information as well. The party leadership knew about gross violations of legality in the village, although no drastic steps were taken to correct the situation until March of 1930. The responsibility of the leadership, which Stalin subsequently shifted to the local workers, lay not in the fact that it encouraged excesses but that its failure to provide clear explanations due to the shortage of time evoked a surge of activeness of a completely specific type at the lower level: a striving to fulfill and exceed clearly excessive targets for collectivization at any cost and as rapidly as possible developed into an inability to convince people and a weakness of the organizational, material and technical, social and psychological prerequisites, and directly encouraged many lower-level workers to use force. Any criticism of erroneous and precipitate actions was very frequently rejected as a "right-wing deviation." The fear of becoming known as a right-wing deviationist and the theory that right-wing deviation was now more dangerous than leftist deviation, that it was "better to push too hard than not hard enough," very frequently prevented the counteracting of leftist excesses locally. The situation was such that a very strange assertion was voiced at a conference of representatives of the areas of mass collectivization in the VKP(b) Central Committee in January of 1930: "If you go too far in some matter and are arrested, remember that you have been arrested for the cause of the revolution" (G.N. Kaminskiy, head of the Central Committee's Agitation and Propaganda Section during those years.)⁴⁴

That same January of 1930, however, even in that tense situation, there were warnings about the inadmissibility of deciding all questions pertaining to collectivization with a sudden attack. Doubts were sometimes expressed at workers' meetings that the workers sent to the village, who did not even have a vegetable garden of their one, would be able to effectively direct a large farm. All of the doubts were generally well founded. They were all too frequently ignored and not taken into account, however, even though it was clear that these were people who knew life in the village. All of these warnings were voiced in January of 1930—that is, at a time when the storm of excesses and violations of the law was already sweeping over the rural area. The hobgoblin of right-wing deviation made it impossible to hear the voices of reason, however, which were calling for that which was done later, but now as a crisis measure. If, 2 months later, in March of 1930, there had not sounded a temporary "cease-fire" in Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" (Stalin himself was not inclined to regard the March decisions as a major shift in policy, attributing them to simple "restraint" of "comrades who had gotten ahead of themselves"⁴⁵), the subsequent development of events, according to the Central Committee's retrospective assessment, would have produced a "broad wave of peasant uprisings," "a good half of our 'lower-level'

workers would have been slaughtered by the peasants" and "the building of kolkhozes would have been undermined." The nation was at the brink of disaster.

Could the local reaction to the appeal for the "establishment of kolkhozes" and dispossession of the kulaks have been foreseen? The meaning attached to the term "kulak" by lower-level party and soviet activists was well known. Since the times of the kombeds they had been demanding simplification of the definition of this complex socioeconomic phenomenon, its reduction to a set of formal, official features (the number of draft animals, for example). For the rural workers a kulak was anyone who was against soviet power and who remembered the "sweet rolls from the time of Nicholas, which would be no more." Everyone who dealt with the village knew this. It was clear that the lower-level workers, who would be the ones to provide the percentage of collectivization and dispossession of the kulaks, would proceed from their own concepts, concepts which appeared clear at first glance but were in fact extremely confused.

The orientation toward administrative measures, dispossession of the kulaks, at least called for precise "administrative discretion." The local workers did not receive such instructions. The logic of the reasoning at the sites, inevitable given the low level of political and general sophistication, was simple: Soviet authorities call for the "establishment of kolkhozes," so those who have doubts or who object, and also live better than the others, are against the authorities. This means that they are kulaks, upon whom the "punitive sword" of the dictatorship of the proletariat must fall. As a result, the "administrative discretion" was very frequently replaced by administrative spontaneity. The passive resistance of a considerable portion of the individually farming peasantry could also have been foreseen. The total percentage, quite considerable, of these peasants was well known both at the center and locally.

A longer period of substantial work would have been required for considering all of these factors, of course. A smaller number of well organized kolkhozes and fewer peasants drawn into them, however, would have made it possible to provide them with effective state assistance. It would have been possible without resorting to direct force to accelerate collectivization and draw a considerable portion of the middle peasants into the kolkhozes, even with the clearly inadequate material and technical, organizational, social and psychological prerequisites. It would have been necessary only to use the patriotic feelings of the peasants, their faith in soviet power and the moral assets which the party possessed at that time. The danger of war should have been frankly pointed out, an argument perfectly understandable to the peasants, who were ready to do anything to preserve peace except lose soviet power. The developing disappointment of the very poor peasants and those of little means on the single-peasant farms could have been relied upon. Finally, indirect economic pressure could have been stepped up.

The range of methods was fairly great. Lenin in his time introduced the political restriction: "Don't dare to give orders!"⁴⁶ This does not mean that he rejected every kind of force or even the "kumbed methods" in the village. Coercion and force are right when they are directed against resisting exploiters and counter direct actions against the dictatorship of the proletariat. Bukharin's "concept" of "civic peace" was based on precisely these premises. If the force is directed against "our own," however, against the middle peasantry, it can take the nation to the brink of political disaster, to the brink of a petty bourgeois counterrevolution.

Every revolution, of course, including a "revolution from the top," initially "bites off more than it can chew." We "sped" a very great distance at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930, but that distance should have been covered slowly. Haste in the implementation of mass collectivization ended up costing too dearly, because the mode of action selected and the tactics used for achieving historically progressive goals were politically faulty.

It was impossible to totally reject force. A great deal depended upon the society's general level of political sophistication, particularly that of the Communists. We are still encountering the psychology of excesses, scantily understood instructions from above, the objective impossibility of considering everything and issuing instructions for every specific case. At any revolutionary turning point aware leadership is combined with large-scale spontaneous actions. During the acceleration of mass collectivization, there was no talk of totally avoiding spontaneous actions on the part of lower-level workers and activists. The unleashing of elemental processes and a weakening of the organizational basis, however, invariably create a situation in which unworthy people worm their way into a good cause. They act not out of conviction, like Makar Nagulnov in "The Virgin Lands", but exploit the errors of the authorities for their own personal goals, for career-furthering or avaricious considerations, which further destabilizes the situation. At the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 the balance between the organized aspect of the process and its elemental side clearly shifted toward the elemental and crossed the line at which simply incorrect policy begins.

Where Does Historical Inevitability End and Subjective, Arbitrary Rule Begin?

To what extent was the policy of 1929-30 a reflection of historical necessity? Where does historical inevitability end and subjective, arbitrary rule begin? Can we say that the area of error was limited to the sphere of praxis—excesses in collectivization, the unjustified forcing of rates of industrial development—or did the roots and the essence of the errors go deeper?

Neither Bukharin nor Stalin's way was the optimal. The proponents of each point of view could clearly see the weaknesses of that of their opponents but did not notice

(or tried not to notice) the deficiencies of their own decisions. Unfortunately, no one at that time proposed other, more acceptable alternatives which would have made it possible realistically to accelerate industrialization without falling out with the peasantry and without resorting to the crude argument of using extraordinary measures. The Central Committee's switch to Stalin's position was not so simple as it sometimes appears. We did not succeed, A.I. Mikoyan admits, in adopting a "clear and unshakeable line of behavior" because "the party's hands were tied to one degree or another by the vacillations and the struggle of right-wing members of the Politburo." Indirectly this demonstrates that Bukharin's group was functioning as a sort of political counterbalance, which to a certain degree restrained Stalin and his supporters from leftist radicalism in the setting of goals and from the unrealistic forcing of rates of industrialization and collectivization. Furthermore, the willingness of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy to compromise (they actually accepted the standpoint of the majority at the November 1929 Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee, insisting only that extraordinary measures be rejected for the rural area) collided with the impatience of Stalin and his close supporters.

The way out of the situation least painful to the nation—preservation of the socialist perspective and the development of methods conforming to the objective—could have been found with a common theoretical and practical search. This did not occur, however. The party found itself faced with the need to make situational decisions, responding to "breakdowns" in the economic system with conventional kinds of direct action. The historically conditioned transformation of NEP was burdened with errors and miscalculations.

It is doubtful that the real roots of these miscalculations can be traced to a lack of mutual understanding among members of the Politburo. Strange as it seems, the weakness of the opponents' positions had a common gnoseological basis. The fact is that theoretical studies of the '20s, interesting and useful in and of themselves, essentially absolutely ruled out the concept of spasmodic progress for the socialist society but were oriented toward a smooth and gradual conversion of NEP Russia into a socialist Russia. Lenin's theoretically significant idea that "we shall have to go back and put the finishing touches on, redo and start all over from scratch more than once," did not undergo development in the '20s.⁴⁷ Social science had no, somewhat clearly defined concept of infrastructural leaps or transitions in the process of building socialism. In the mid-20s members of the Central Committee's majority could not foresee the crisis which the NEP system encountered at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928. A number of hasty, pragmatic decisions ensued as a result. Theory lagged far behind praxis and was unable to offer it acceptable solutions. Bukharin, the party's leading theoretician, continued to seek a way out of the conflicts based on the "traditional" NEP at a time when NEP could only be retained unchanged at the price of abandoning the

acceleration of industrialization and of major concessions to the petty bourgeois element. The gap between theory and praxis was actually one of the main reasons why the historically inevitable progressive shift and movement beyond the bounds of the "old" NEP were accomplished at too great a cost, by trial and error. The roots and the causes of the dramatic events occurring at the end of the '20s and the beginning of the '30s should be sought here and not just in Stalin's "evil will," not in the laws of socialist development but in a poor knowledge of those laws. The party did not support Bukharin not because he advocated more humane and gradual solutions, but because the treatment he proposed could only drive the disease inward for a certain period of time. The treatment involved mainly the traditional "balancing" by means of prices and taxes, while adapting NEP to the tasks involved in socialist construction was what was needed. Bukharin himself thoroughly understood the necessity of such a "reconstruction." He offered no alternative acceptable to the Central Committee members, however, and the theoretical model developed by him in the mid-20s was designed for a longer historical period. Bukharin's group did have an alternative, however. It consisted of the fundamental rejection of extraordinary measures as a set of methods for building socialism.

At the end of the '20s both theory, represented by Bukharin, and praxis, represented by Stalin, sought a way out of the crisis, sought ways and means of achieving the inevitable shift toward socialist reconstruction based on past experience. The "traditional" NEP was treated as the absolute in the former case; the experience of the "war communism" era with a gradual transition to truly revolutionary solutions, in the latter. This conflict between theory and praxis was both political and personal. Bukharin's defeat at the end of the '20s and his forced departure from the political arena signaled the conversion of theory into a handmaiden to policy, which declared "everything real" to be reasonable.

Stalin's personal responsibility for the errors committed in the second half of the '20s lay in the fact that he made the process of working out political decisions totally subordinate to the struggle for power. This is precisely why Stalin failed to fulfill the main function of the General Secretary in the political system which had developed, which was that of finding the right solutions based on all the different shades of opinion. Stalin compensated with the "theory" of constant exacerbation of the class struggle and direct use of force for his obvious theoretical weaknesses, his inability to accept the "grain of reason" from his opponents—and Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy unquestionably had that—and his disinclination even to consider their willingness to compromise.

Could Bukharin's group have been retained in the Politburo? Could a compromise have been found within the bounds of its rights as a minority? The participation of Bukharin's group in working out decisions would have

made it possible to avoid many of the gross errors. Furthermore, unlike Trotsky and his supporters, the "right-wing members" could have existed within the framework of party discipline and not striven to create a faction. In the final analysis, Bukharin and his supporters were neither Tolstoyans nor liberals. Nor did they reject stringent measures in principle. Bukharin could see the socioeconomic and political limitations of force, however, and advocated observing the principle of voluntary participation. But in March of 1930 Stalin himself "swung to the right" (in the terminology of the time) and countered the pressure of leftism, which, at the end of 1929, rushed into the breach created by Bukharin's expulsion from the politburo. The party leadership could have made such a retreat back in November of 1929, in the process of seeking a political compromise with the "right-wingers," who at that time, in the opinion of N.K. Krupskaya, "had taken an enormous step toward the position of the majority but fundamentally objected to extraordinary measures. It could have been a forestalling retreat, and the nation would not have been taken to the brink of disaster.

In the first half of the '30s Bukharin continued his theoretical study of the shift of 1929. As early as February 1930, in the article "The Great Reconstruction (On the Current Period of the Proletarian Revolution in Our Nation)," he assessed the shift which had occurred in the nation as a special form of intrastructural leap, an alteration of the conventional manner of progression, for which the party found itself theoretically unprepared.⁴⁸ The process of switching agriculture onto socialist rails, Bukharin stressed, like our entire revolution, is not occurring according to the "classic" formulas of the pedants: *first* hundreds of thousands of tractors and then the remaking of the peasant economy into a collective one. We have a "more appropriate formula: first the remaking of production relations, *then* a technical revolution."⁴⁹ Bukharin's article was imbued with humanistic pathos and a desire to consider the era in its human dimension and demonstrate the limitations of coercion and force in the Soviet society's historically inevitable and dramatic transition to a new socioeconomic foundation.

This theoretical work, begun by Bukharin in 1930, was no longer backed up with either adequate political prestige or realistic possibilities for influencing decision-making. The concept of intrastructural leaps in the development of socialism and the theory of political and economic turning points had not been developed at that time, the accumulated experience had not been critically summarized and theoretically assimilated, and the study of the conflicts had consisted of a search for "wreckers" and "class enemies." As a result, the party traveled an excessively long and tortuous path of trial and error to reach the contemporary restructuring, attempting to find a way out of the conflicts of a decreed economy within the framework of that very decreed economy. The deformities in the culture of the political leadership which emerged in the party following Lenin's death in the

situation of acute internal party struggle and which clearly manifested themselves at the end of the '20s subsequently made themselves fully felt. Just what were these deformities?

When Lenin analyzed the party's errors, he always used the pronoun "we." For example, he openly acknowledged as baseless attempts made in 1920 to move directly to socialism on the wave of military enthusiasm. In charging the party—and therefore himself personally, as its leader—with full responsibility, Lenin was not simply following communist ethics but was opening up the way to a profound theoretical interpretation of the experience, leaving no areas exempt from criticism. In the development of NEP all of the socialist reality of 1920-21 was subjected to dispassionate Marxist analysis. Any other treatment of the reality, particularly the errors committed, would have seriously complicated the development and implementation of a new economic policy, if not actually blocking the way for it. In April 1985, actually for the first time since Lenin's death, the whole party accepted responsibility for the near-crisis state of the economy. Only on this basis was it possible to work out the concept for the acceleration and restructuring. This was not the case even in 1956, when placing the blame exclusively onto Stalin's shoulders "protected" many negative aspects of the socialist reality from critical analysis. This ultimately had a negative effect upon the progression of the reforms effected in the system of administering by decree, on their consistency and depth.

In 1929 Bukharin was defending not just his own views; he was defending also the right of the old party guard to an independent point of view, to criticize and analyze all aspects of socialist reality, without "dead zones" and "persons off limits." He understood that if the blame for the difficulties experienced were laid exclusively onto people outside the party—class enemies, wreckers, irresponsibles—or onto the opposition within the party itself, if the subjective errors of the authorities were totally written off as due to the class struggle, this sort of partial, half-hearted indication of the causes of the errors and difficulties would make it impossible to derive lessons from them and make the necessary adjustments in policy, and the half-hearted nature of the admissions would lead to inconsistency of decisions.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 43, p 329.

2. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenimov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Central Committee Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], Vol 4, 9th edition, supplemented and amended, Moscow, 1984, pp 261-262, 274-278.

3. "The 15th VKP(b) Congress, December 1927," stenographic record, two volumes, Vol 2, Moscow, 1962, p 890.

4. "The 15th Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), 26 October-3 November 1926," stenographic record, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p 484.

5. Ibid., p 138.

6. Ibid., pp 137, 514.

7. Ibid., p 128.

8. I.V. Stalin, "soch." [Works], Vol 10, p 197.

9. Yu.A. Moshkov "Zernovaya problema v gody sploshnoy kollektivizatsii selskogo khozyaystva SSSR (1929-1932 gg.)" [The Grain Problem During the Years of Mass Collectivization of Agriculture in the USSR, 1929-1932], Moscow, 1966, p 62.

10-11. NA AGRARNOM FRONTE, No 6, 1930, pp 12-13.

12. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh....," op. cit., Vol 3, Moscow, 1984, pp 60, 61.

13. "The 14th Conference of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)," stenographic record, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p 141.

14. Ibid., p 188.

15. "Pyatnadtsatyy syezd VKP(b)," part 2, p 1094.

16. PRAVDA, 15 July 1928.

17. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh....," op. cit., Vol 4, p 319-320.

18. PRAVDA, 15 July 1928.

19. Ibid.

20. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh....," op. cit., Vol 4, p 352.

21. "Pyatnadtsatyy syezd VKP(b)....," op. cit., part 1, Moscow, 1961, pp 77-79, 116.

22. "Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika" [The party Worker's Handbook], issue 7, part 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, p 353; IZVESTIYA TsK VKP(b), No 16, 1929, p 14.

23. "The Third Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," stenographic record, Moscow, 1925, p 212.

24. L. Reysner, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1958, p 410.

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"Voprosy istorii KPSS," 1988.

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Need for Accurate History of CPSU Stressed
18300029a Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 8, Aug 88 pp 148-152

[Article by O. B. Belyakov, candidate in historical sciences: "Current Questions in the Historiography of CPSU History"]

[Text] The role of historiography of CPSU history as a science is great, since it is only by evaluating what researchers have achieved that we can name the questions which party historians have yet to work on.

This was the topic of the expanded meeting of the head council on "Methodology and Historiography of CPSU History" under the RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, which was recently held at the Moscow Higher Party School. The council chairman, head of the IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism] sector under the CPSU Central Committee and Doctor of Historical Sciences V. P. Naumov presented a speech. He noted that historical-party science is currently undergoing a period of crisis, which is based on the great revolutionary changes taking place in party life and in the development of society. The main question facing party historians is the question of how to evaluate the development of science on the whole and the development of its historiography. Historians have not yet entirely become effective helpers of the party in perestroika. We are speaking not only of evaluating the state of studying individual problems in party history, which is important in itself. The main thing is that as yet we have been unable to develop a methodology, an approach which would allow us to combine the study of the unquestionable successes and achievements of our party with an analysis of the miscalculations and errors in its activity over the past years. The absence of such an approach is what hinders the forward movement of historical-party knowledge.

A most important future direction in historical-party research is the restoration of the Leninist conception of socialism. The miscalculations in this sphere are associated with the scholastic approach to the study of the Leninist theoretical legacy. V. I. Lenin spoke openly of the evolution of his views, yet we try to present them as invariable over the course of his entire life. Historians must not only show what was created by Lenin. They must also analyze to what measure his conception has found embodiment in the construction of socialist society in the second half of the 20's and in the 30's. We must determine what objective and subjective circumstances caused the departure from Leninism. In this connection, evidently, we must perform an in-depth study of those conceptions of socialism which prevailed in the 30's-40's, in the 50's, and in the 60's-80's.

V. P. Naumov said that researchers are faced with a number of problems of a methodological character. Specifically, it is necessary to expose on the basis of specific material the Leninist understanding of the principles of party affiliation and objectivity.

He stressed that one of the most important tasks is to overcome the conceptions of the "History of the AUCP(b), A Short Course." We have still not departed from it in a number of important positions. Let us take, for example, one of its key positions—the so-called "theory of two leaders" in the party. We might object that this problem has already been eliminated, since no one says that Lenin and Stalin are figures of equal greatness. However, it also assumed that, aside from these two personalities, there were no other leading and authoritative leaders in the party, that everyone else who was a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo were primarily enemies of socialism and of the party, people who already in November of 1917 had set their goal as the overthrow of Soviet rule and the restoration of capitalism. Unfortunately, these anti-scientific fabrications have penetrated into the depths of the public consciousness. We are speaking of truthfully depicting the people who surrounded Lenin, those who together with him prepared and realized the Great October Socialist Revolution, who fought for Soviet rule, for the implementation of the new economic policy, etc.

The situation is the same, declared the speaker, with another most important position of the Stalinist conception of party history—the theory of exacerbation of the class struggle with approach to socialism, which was introduced into the practice of social life over a period of several decades. Let us recall certain events. At the end of the 20's, the "Shakhtin case," the cases of the "Industrial Party," the "Peasant Labor Party," the case of the saboteurs in the defense industry, etc. arose and were widely publicized in court proceedings. The next step in "proving" the exacerbation of the class struggle was the affirmation of the unification of the remnants of the broken anti-party groups on a common platform. A court proceeding was organized which was associated with the accusation of a group of communists headed by M. N.

Ryutin, the former secretary of the Krasnopresnenskiy party raykom and the editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which supposedly created an underground organization with its own manifesto and program to unify all the anti-party forces within the party itself. And then, supposedly, there was a unification of these forces with the old intelligentsia, which had spoken out against Soviet power. The proceedings during the second half of the 30's became an apotheosis.

Today the first steps are being taken in reviewing these erroneous positions. Of course, we can hardly expect the rapid appearance of expanded monographic studies. However, even the very formulation of the questions testifies to the fact that there are forces which will allow us to come to conceptual solutions of the problem of overcoming Stalin's legacy in the near future.

The speaker stopped to illuminate the individual stages of our party's history. One of the most important problems is the reinterpretation of the ideological-theoretical struggle in the party in the 20's-30's on the basis of the development of a broad circle of sources and the study of the views and positions of the foremost party leaders and the Soviet state, as well as the scientists of that period, including those whose ideologies were refuted by the party. We must remember that the intra-party struggle was intertwined with the struggle for leadership within the party. A number of questions arise: in what measure were theoretical arguments used in the struggle for power, and in the affirmation of theoretical principles—the force of power which one or another grouping had at its disposal? What were the character and essence of this struggle? Was this a manifestation of some personal qualities of individual leaders, or was it a natural process?

On the whole we do not yet show that the struggle was waged from both sides. Until now we have spoken of the attacks on the party by those who turned out to be in the minority. However, if this was a struggle for leadership in the party, this means there were not only attacks, but also defenses. If we do not show this, we will not be able to expose the essence of the political crimes committed by Stalin and those around him. In other words, we are faced with a broad circle of questions whose solution will allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of the changes taking place in party life during that time. We are speaking here not only of the need to rehabilitate someone, but rather of understanding the relationship within the ideological struggle between the positions of those who spoke out in favor of the affirmation of Lenin's concept of socialist transformations and their enemies. We are striving to understand the turmoil in the struggle for leadership within the party which was waged by various groups: first Stalin, Kamenev and Zinovyev against Trotsky, and then Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy and Molotov this time against Zinovyev and Kamenev, etc.

A further study of the historiography of CPSU history presents us with the task of expanding the circle of sources, which up to the present time have been unjustifiably narrowed. It is impossible to study our party's history without a knowledge of the works of such major leaders as N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov, G. Ye. Zinovyev, L. B. Kamenev, and L. D. Trotsky. We must judge their positions not by accounts, not by one phrase excerpted and placed in circulation in its own time. We need to study their publications and speeches in order to expose in full measure their world outlook, to understand the essence of their vacillations and erroneous concepts. We might add that the introduction of Bukharin's works, for example, into scientific circulation certainly does not mean that we are replacing one serene image with another. Such an approach would be a grave error. We must show both the strong and the weak sides of the personality of this and other party leaders.

A new circle of sources would allow us to approach the comprehensive analysis of the basic stages in the development of science itself. We must once again return to defining the boundaries in the history of its development. The problem of defining the criteria of these boundaries arises most acutely. Before, for example, we oriented ourselves around the Constitution adopted in 1936, which proclaimed the building of socialism in the USSR in general. Yet if we take the development of science, then it will become apparent that the adoption of the Constitution certainly did not become such a boundary. Changes in superstructure do not occur simultaneously with changes in the base, while the periodization of science blindly follows the changes in the base.

Again we must analyze the circle of questions associated with the development of historical-party science in the 20's. Without belittling that which was achieved, we must openly admit that which had been shamefully kept quiet until now. In the mid, and especially in the late 20's, there emerged a fierce struggle against the representatives of the so-called "old historical school." Here N. I. Bukharin played an active role. Under his aegis, a definite attitude toward the old intelligentsia was formulated, including also toward historians.

In this connection, the question arises of studying the discussions of the 20's, the question of their evaluation and summary. We must take a new look at the reorganization of the Russian Association of Scientific-Research Institutes of Social Sciences, the Institute of the Red Professorship, and the Communist Academy. How did it develop, where did the cadres go, what centers were established, and what were their thematics? The 30's require particular attention. Such questions arise as: what historians were touched by the repressions, how did the changes in science occur?

S. V. Kuleshov, chairman of the department of history at the CPSU Moscow VPSH [Higher Party School] and doctor of historical sciences, spoke of the need for studying the works of V. I. Lenin from the standpoint of

dynamics of the transformation of new ideas. He noted the importance of analyzing those sources which Lenin used. Behind each of his works is a huge strata of polemics and different points of view, an intellectual and political situation in the party at one stage of its history or another. We will not limit ourselves here to Lenin's "Collected Works." We cannot be fully satisfied with a knowledge of the works of Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinovyev and others. We must also have a knowledge of the foreign historiography of the problem, since there are a number of archival materials in the West which we do not have.

The speaker posed the question of the attitude toward inclinations in the party. He noted that the subdivision into left and right is not a very definite concept. In each specific case the left- and right-wingers had their own aspects. There were different types of leftists and different types of rightists, and there was their evolution. Today such a gradation is not suitable for us. These are the tools of dogmatism, which do not allow us to understand the real dialectics of historical processes.

S. V. Kuleshov stressed the need for expanding the circle of historiographic sources and for introducing publicistic and fictional works, which play a great role in the formulation of historical self-consciousness, into their category. Moreover, today we have come across a phenomenon which is new to us—author's versions on the topic of events which occurred not too long ago. And, frankly speaking, many were shocked by this. When **Aleksey Tolstoy** was writing the novel "Peter I," his goal was not to give a complete, true picture of that period. He wanted to bring the image of Peter to life, to give him an individual, emotional character. The novel contains many inaccuracies from the standpoint of historical science. However, thanks to the parallel existence of a great volume of scientific literature, the reader could and can compare the Tolstoy version with this literature, with the studies of **Klyuchevskiy**, **Solovyev**, and others, and to perceive it as a fictional work. **M. Shatrov** creates his works in a different situation, when the official model falls apart, and unwillingly his works serve the cause of historical enlightenment. However, since there are no historical studies on the topics which he illuminates, we begin to level at him those accusations which, in essence, we have no right to present. Our task is not to point out how one should not write, but to show how one should.

The problem of a new, more in-depth reading of Lenin's works was substantiated by Professor **A. I. Zevelev**, problems council deputy chairman and doctor of historical sciences. One of the conditions for solving the problem is the study not only of Lenin's works themselves, but also the preliminary materials to them, such as a unique source as the *Biographical Chronicle*, as well as Lenin's collected works.

The speaker stressed the timely need for expanding the circle of sources subjected to critical analysis based on certain resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee. As

one of these, A.I. Zevelev named the Central Committee resolution dated 30 June 1956 and entitled "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences." It did not expose in full depth the objective factors for the formulation of the cult of personality associated with the level of development of the country. It did not formulate the question of the socio-economic basis of the personality cult. The subjective aspects of emergence of the personality cult were also not fully illuminated. Nevertheless, in this resolution Stalin is proclaimed a "great theoretician" of Marxism-Leninism.

Another complex problem, in A. I. Sevelev's opinion, is the development of the scientific periodization of the historiography of party history. The periodization adopted to the present time requires serious correction. While the facets of the pre-October period do not require review, although even here we must introduce many new documental sources into scientific introduction in order to substantiate them, significant corrections are needed in the determination of other periods. If we formulate the question of how to relate the victory of socialism and the building of the new society with the deformations in the political superstructure which occurred during this time, it will become clear that the 30's cannot be considered a facet of the development of historical-party knowledge. Today it is becoming evident that the turning point was the middle, and not the end of the 50's. It was the 20th Party Congress, after which a new political atmosphere was created in the country and particularly in historical science. We still do not have a final answer to the question of what is understood by the concept of "developed socialism." We must give an evaluation of that (not only negative, but also positive) which entered into this concept. The new period in party history begins with the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee. This boundary must be reflected also in historiographic studies.

One of the most important tasks in the historiography of CPSU history, stressed A. I. Zevelev, is the development of "personalities." Up until now we have written primarily about the historians of the 20's—A. S. Bubnov, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, V. I. Nevskiy, and M. N. Lyadov. This circle must be expanded by means of critical analysis of the works of those party historians whom we formerly classed only among the Trotskyites (Vaganyan, Volosevich, etc.).

Professor I. P. Osadchiy, head of the department of scientific communism at Kuban State University and doctor of historical sciences, spoke about the comparison of the Leninist concept of socialism with all the experience in building the new society accumulated over the 70 years of existence of Soviet rule. He stressed that if we follow the path proposed by certain authors and return to the dogmatic restoration of the Leninist conception of socialism, if we engage in a search for the "discrepancy" between the scientific-theoretical Marxist-Leninist conception of socialism and real socialism in the USSR and other countries by superimposing the

latter over the former, this would be a caricature of Marxism-Leninism, the worst example of dogmatic Marxism. Won't it turn out a decade later that our "reading" of the teachings about socialism, our "model" of socialism, are inconsistent? And won't our descendants call us the greatest revisionists of all?

If we are today firmly convinced, continued I. P. Osadchiy, that we and our predecessors have incorrectly perceived and realized Marxist-Leninist teaching on socialism, then we are even more justified in arguing as to the correctness of an entire series of theoretical positions formulated by our party, already without Lenin. These concern the all-people's state, the Soviet people as a new historical community, etc.

Doctor of historical sciences, Professor P. P. Andreyev (MVPSH) called for a more precise and scientific definition of the place and role of Stalin. He said that we cannot compare Stalin with Trotsky. In P. P. Andreyev's opinion, historians themselves create the "gaps" more often than they eliminate them. It is necessary to study the party documents and the published literature more thoroughly. Docent S. M. Smagina, head of the department of CPSU history of the history faculty at Rostov State University and candidate of historical sciences, reminded us of the complexity of the process of overcoming the formulated schemes and stereotypes. In her opinion, we do not speak or write enough about the methodology of the Leninist conception, whose main moments were enrichment through theoretical generalization of the practical experience of the masses and the permissibility of a certain multi-variance in determining the forms, methods and means of achieving the set goals.

In order for history to become a science in full measure, noted Professor G. G. Vodolazov, chairman of the department of international politics of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and doctor of historical sciences, we must solve a number of organizational, methodological, and theoretical problems. First of all, we must provide the broadest possible access to information, statistics and documents. Without this, history will remain an a priori ideological construction. How long must we wait for the stenograms of all the meetings, conferences, plenums, congresses and political proceedings of the 20's-50's to become available? If we are seriously speaking of perestroika as a revolution, then we must do everything not in the "Louis Blanovsky" manner, but in the revolutionary manner. Such problems as the disclosure of sources of information can and must be resolved in one day. The entire scientific (and not just the scientific) community must have the opportunity to control and to knowledgeably evaluate the new conceptions of our historical path which are proposed by certain historians and "official commissions," so that one set of a priori ideological schemes is not imposed on it instead of another. The effectiveness of such control is ensured by the possibility of comparing these conceptions with all the richness of the documents which are accessible to all.

History can become a science, said G. G. Vodolazov, if we maintain the proper relations between scientific research and political documents. Before, political documents aspired to the role of the highest scientific law, and most scientists obediently agreed with this. As a result, their "research" was reduced to a repetition of and commenting on political formulas. To propose principles which were not illuminated by a political document in the sphere of social sciences was a hopeless, and sometimes even a dangerous matter. As a result of this, not only did theory suffer, but politics itself ceased to be nourished by the juice of true science. Politics and science are joined not by the principle of subordination, but by the principle of mutual enrichment. They are different. Each of them has its own arena, its own methods. And the position where a scientist believes that his specific scientific methods are sufficient for a skillful solution of any political problem, or when politicians believe that their political approach is capable of providing the solution to difficult scientific problems—this position brings nothing but misfortune. However, they are also one, since they do not possess an absolute independence, but are mutually augmenting aspects of the integral activity of man.

In conclusion, G. G. Vodolazov noted that the downfall of our historical science in the past was not in its dogmatism as such, but rather in the dogmatism supported by the methods of administrative-repressive action. Dogmatism is not frightening if its opponents have the opportunity to freely and publicly respond, and to develop their views. Our task, consequently, consists of formulating a new scientific atmosphere which would exclude the possibility of administrative-bureaucratic pressure, political threats and labelling—an atmosphere of democracy, free search, and true glasnost.

Candidate in historical sciences, Docent **M. I. Kondrashova** (Sverdlovsk) presented the question of the shortage of studies on problems of the cultural revolution in the USSR, and specifically on the history of formation of the socialist intelligentsia.

Professor **V. M. Ustinov**, chairman of the history department of the CPSU Moscow Historical-Archives Institute and doctor of historical sciences, dealt in his presentation with two aspects of the historical-party study of sources, which is closely associated with the problems of current historiography of CPSU history. These two aspects are: 1) the need to develop a methodology of source-study analysis of documental materials which have been put aside under conditions of stagnation; 2) the expansion of a source base on CPSU history.

In recent decades, he stressed, particularly in the 70's-80's, in practice the great majority of documents and materials were marred by various additions and distortions in reporting. Data and information were often presented in them which did not correspond to historical reality. Under the conditions of the cult of personality,

voluntarism, show-off, and the administrative-command style of management, the use of such documental materials led to incorrect generalizations and conclusions which were published in the historical-party literature. All this could not help but be reflected also in the historiographic generalizations. In this connection, in the opinion of V. M. Ustinov, we need to perform serious work on determining the reliability and degree of fullness and objectivity of a broad circle of sources which have been falsified to one degree or another.

As for expanding the source base of CPSU history, V. M. Ustinov proposed that we significantly step up the use of works and speeches by party and state leaders of republics and large national regions who have subsequently become foremost leaders of the party and the Soviet state. Among these are N. Narimanov, T. Ryskulov, F. Khodzhaev, and A. Ikramov.

In the concluding statement, **V. P. Naumov** once again stressed that the key question is associated with the study of Lenin's theoretical heritage. This will allow us to more closely approach the objective and creative study of all the current problems in the history of our party, and the study of its historiography.

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Methodologies for Histories of Local Party Organizations Discussed

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[Article by M. V. Iskrov, doctor of historical sciences: "Problems in the Development of History of Local Party Organizations"]

[Text] On 13 May a joint meeting of the collectives of three sections of the CPSU Central Committee IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism]. These were: the sections on CPSU history, party construction, and the branches for coordinating scientific-research work. Associates from the branches of the IML also participated in this meeting. The questions of developing the history of local party organizations were discussed at the meeting. **V. I. Yurchuk**, director of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented a speech entitled "Methodological Questions of Illuminating the History of Local Party Organizations (Based on the Example of Preparing Outlines of the History of the Ukrainian Communist Party)."

During the present sharp breakthrough in the life of the country, when revolutionary restructuring unprecedented in its scope and depth is taking place, there is a growing importance of scientific development of methodological problems in illuminating the history of the

Leninist party, including its local party organizations, he said. This is conditioned not by some temporary, conditional circumstances, but by objective needs for recognizing social development and utilizing the mighty revolutionary-transformational potential contained in the historical experience of the CPSU for solving the strategic problems of perestroika.

The speaker noted that in the course of preparing new publications on the history of the local party organizations, we must, obviously, not discount the work that was done before, and which is a definite property of scientific thought. This, naturally, does not reduce the need for in-depth reinterpretation of many problems, for new and truly scientific approaches to illuminating the history of local party organizations from the positions of Leninist principles of historical analysis, and for a current review of many party documents.

V. I. Yurchuk noted that on one hand, we, the party historians, are called upon to develop and introduce new approaches to the illumination of the primarily positive, ground-breaking experience of the CPSU in the complete, truthful and convincing disclosure of the objective progress along the socialist path at all the historical stages.

On the other hand, we must master the skills of analyzing the difficulties and contradictions in the work of the party organizations, and develop processes for overcoming them.

In this connection, we must significantly raise the theoretical level of our outlines, our conclusions, and the generalizations contained in them. We must theoretically interpret each specific fact, as V. I. Lenin demanded. We must cardinaly improve the system of argumentation in illuminating the history of local party organizations. In illuminating certain questions of the history of a local party organization, it is also important not to take them out of the general context, out of the logic of development of the historical process. It is important to feel the pulse of other fraternal republics and the changes in the life of the country, said the speaker.

The problem of scientific periodization is acute. Also, we cannot ignore local specifics. Unfortunately, standardization is seen even here, and we have no detailed developments.

A worthy place in the scientific interpretation of the history of local party organizations, as well as in the history of the party as a whole, belongs to the questions of illuminating the human factor, the personalities, the "population" of the history of republic party organization with living people. In this matter we, the party historians, have significantly fallen behind, said Yurchuk.

Then the speaker dealt with the characteristics of the source material base. We are forced to conclude that a contradiction has arisen between the current tasks of historical-party science, including the tasks of illuminating the history of local party organizations, and the state of the source material base, as well as the effectiveness of its application. Improving work with source materials may be done by means of expanding the source base, i.e., identifying and including in the sphere of active study sources which for one reason or another have not been used for many years. Work with source materials may also be improved by increasing the level and developing the methods of their scientific application, and by presenting a new reading of numerous sources which are seemingly well known.

R. P. Platonov, director of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History and doctor of historical sciences, said that the outlines of the history of the union republic communist parties should be viewed as the key direction and as the main object of scientific activity of the branches, and that all other types of work must be subordinated to the writing of these outlines.

In our republic of Belorussia, noted the speaker, the decision has been made to publish outlines of history of the republic communist party in several parts. The first and second parts, which cover the period from 1883 through 1966, were published in the late 60's. Naturally, they do not meet today's requirements. An Institute collective is currently working on the third part within the chronological framework of 1966-1985, i.e., up to the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. We have decided to prepare these works in monograph form. At the same time, the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro has ordered the Institute to begin writing an outline of the history of the Belorussian CP in one volume, intended for the party membership and for the general reader.

What problems arise in the course of this work? First of all, R. P. Platonov believes, there is the problem of the theoretical-methodological readiness of the collective for this work. This is associated primarily with the scientific interpretation of the essence of the current state of development of socialism.

Work on reflecting true history, which would fill in what we today refer to as the "gaps," "black holes," or "hot spots," the speaker believes, suffers insufficient provision also in a factological sense. In Belorussia there are also entire stages, as well as problems, which have too few factual data available to present a truthful evaluation. Yet the materials stored in party archives (and not only in party archives), especially for the period beginning with the early 30's, bear a glossed-over and apologetic character. The press publications, and even the scientific works which illuminate this complex and contradictory period also do not give an objective picture.

However, the main thing is probably psychological readiness. The present-day cadres of party historians were formulated under certain conditions and raised on certain ideas, which are not so simple or easy to overcome.

The speaker noted that he views the aid of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism as being expressed in the provision of methodological and methodical direction for this work, as well as in the evaluation of what has been done. All those working on the outlines should be told to rid themselves of the influence of those who are interested not so much in writing a true scientific history, as they are in producing a cosmetic-superficial, slightly renovated review and re-publication of that which has already been written and which today does not satisfy any of us.

As for the other problems of the scientific development of the history of local party organizations, the speaker said in conclusion that, with consideration for the situation which is arising, it is important to expand the publication of documental materials on the history of the party organizations in our institutes. This should be done in full volume, without allowing various "omissions" which have become customary, because we need creative research.

The absence of a monopoly on truth, announced Doctor of Historical Sciences **P. A. Rodionov** in his speech, means that we must draw our conclusions on the basis of analysis of actual reality. We must put forth new principles and give recommendations. In order to write good outlines, we must clarify the general theoretical questions and show the Leninist conception of socialism and the Leninist teachings on the party in their true form.

Yet can we negate everything that has been done by historians? I believe, announced **P. A. Rodionov**, that we must make use of all that is valuable in the multi-volume history and in the outlines of history of local organizations.

Moldavian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History Director and Candidate in Historical Sciences **V. D. Isak** noted that the discussion of questions of methodology is today more current than ever before. We need to search for new methods, and this is not so simple after the long period of stagnation which had gripped our theoretical thought. We must write truthful outlines of the history of local party organizations. Yet the truth always includes a contradictory, dialectical process. We can create a truthful picture of the past only with consideration of positive as well as negative experience. A necessary condition is a thorough study of the "gaps". I believe that we should not be hasty in the publication of generalizing works, as these outlines are, the speaker stressed.

V. D. Kashauskene, director of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History and doctor of historical sciences, spoke of the great difficulties in

preparing outlines on the post-war period in the history of the Lithuanian CP due to the lack of development of a number of key questions in the class struggle at that time. He also spoke about the work being done on an instructional manual dealing with the history of the Lithuanian CP.

The director of the Estonian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History, Doctor of Historical Sciences **E. G. Kaup** reported that the decision has been made to prepare three brochures on the basis of one-fourth of the outlines of the history of the republic's party organization. The preparation of these outlines will begin only after their broad public discussion. **E. G. Kaup** dealt in detail with the question of forming archive funds for current materials. Specifically, he criticized numerous investigative commissions which prepare a certain question for the plenum, go to the rayons, study the situation, and as a result accumulate much critical material, statistical data, etc. However, these materials are not forwarded to the party archives, and so this most valuable material is lost to researchers in party history.

Doctor of Historical Sciences **Ye. I. Bugayev** expressed his position on a number of questions.

The question of the functions of historical-party science was raised by **V. V. Shelokhayev**, sector chief of the CPSU IML history section and doctor of historical sciences. Many still reduce these functions to agitation-propaganda, he stressed, while party history is primarily a science which has its own regularities. The speaker also touched upon the question of the new thinking in historical science. Only by attracting the entire totality of facts can we move science ahead, he said. And for this the researchers must have all the sources at their disposal, and not only certain selected materials.

When we speak of outlines and of a multi-volume party history, continued the speaker, let us ask ourselves: Do we have a unified conception of a multi-volume work and a conception of outlines? Unfortunately, this conception never existed, and even today we do not have one in full measure. In outlines and in a general history, the speaker noted, the primary attention, as in the "Short Course," was given to the ideological struggle, while the work of the party among the masses was not illuminated. Where are the guiding reins from the party to the masses? How are they studied? What is the reverse connection? It is not only a one-sided, direct connection: party—class—masses. There is also a reverse connection: masses—class—party. This aspect of the matter in general has, in my opinion, been weakly developed.

In her speech, Candidate of Historical Sciences **I. S. Kulikova** presented a number of questions which await answers. Why have we been unable to introduce the NEP seriously and for a long time? Why have we been unable to implement Lenin's cooperative plan as it was intended? Why did we not counteract the manifestation of the cult of personality in the 30's? Touching upon the

preparation of outlines, Kulikova noted: the conception of outlines was present, but was too simplified, I would even say schematic. The conception of a multi-volume history was taken as the basis, and local material was superimposed onto it. The speaker noted that it is incorrect to build party history from congress to congress. By far not every congress was a major event in our life.

Candidate in Historical Sciences **G. A. Bordyugov** supported the idea that there has been a standardization of local specifics, and noted that we can overcome it only when we define precisely what the outlines of the history of local party organizations should entail. Each party organization has its own internal logic of development. Having found this internal logic, it is easier to define the object itself. The speaker focused attention on the formulation of administrative-command methods of leadership in the 30's, their outgrowth into the regime of Stalin's personal power, and the transformation of Stalin's policy from a balance between the right and left wings to a balance between the apparatus and the masses.

The questions of reflecting the history of the Great Patriotic War in future outlines of the history of local party organizations were reflected in the speech of Doctor of Historical Sciences **V. G. Kolychev**. He noted the dialectical connection of two aspects: war as a great tragedy, and the greatness of the feat accomplished by our people.

Candidate in Historical Sciences **V. Yu. Niynoya**, speaking about the publication of N. Andreyeva's article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, pointed out that ideological activity still experiences to a certain degree the influence of the old approach. In other words, any rustle may move us first to the left, then to the right, then forward, and then back. Yet this is not a suitable practice for scientific activity. How can we rid ourselves of this? How can we eliminate once and for all the influence of the "Short Course," which, as we know, has completed the anti-scientific turnover in social sciences in our country? Evidently, the time itself—both democratization and glasnost—suggest those levers which make it ever less possible to interfere in any way in scientific affairs. I am referring primarily to the circumstance, said the speaker, whereby our activity, including also our work in writing outlines of the history of local party organizations, takes place and will take place under the control of the workers and the youth. This is already a fact. We already see this by the publications whose authors are speaking out, both historians and publicists.

The head of the author's collective, Candidate in Historical Sciences **Yu. S. Aksenov**, spoke about a multi-volume history of the CPSU. He stated that the collective which he heads up is today less ready to write an official publication—a multi-volume history of the CPSU—than it was a year ago. The fact is that the methodological development of a number of problems of

the stagnation period (70's-early 80's) has demanded a rejection of those stereotypes which were formed earlier, in the writing of books for a multi-volume history, as well as outlines of the history of individual republic party organizations. Very extensive internal work must still be performed for a scientific interpretation of the difficulties and complexities of this period.

Our source material base—the periodical press and party journals—is a product of the time of stagnation, the exaggeration of actual and supposed achievements, and the hushing up of all shortcomings. Local archives, and evidently our own Central Party Archive, which has materials on local party organizations for the 70's, are also to a significant degree a product of the style of work of the party organizations of that time when the main emphasis was placed on the achieved successes. Recently it has become fashionable to blame all our woes on the 30's, saying that therein lie all the roots of the mechanism of inhibition. However, we must understand that the mechanism of inhibition, which was not present in the 30's, arose in the 70's. These were the stagnant phenomena in the sphere of spiritual development, psychology, in the sphere of party life, the rebirth of part of the leadership cadres—all this began and developed in the 60's-70's and early 80's. Having characterized the difficulties which history encountered, Aksenov stated that despite this we must actively turn to the readership community. We do not have the right to give everything over to the complete control of the journalists.

I believe, concluded Yu. S. Aksenov, that we should not be in a hurry to produce the outlines of the history of local party organizations. We must find different methods of effectively reaching the reading public—from articles in newspapers, in scientific and literary journals to brochures and individual monographs. The main thing is not to remain silent, but to enter into scientific discussions.

In his speech, **V. V. Anikeyev**, TsPA deputy chief and candidate in historical sciences, spoke of the documental publications. In his opinion, they suffer from some rather significant shortcomings. A large portion of them generally include materials of a directive character—resolutions, circulars, and directives to local party organizations. However, the organizational work of the party in implementing its own decisions is weakly reflected. Another shortcoming consists of the fact that the documental publications generally reflect the positive side, while the shortcomings which were present in our life are not reviewed. We have published many documents, and we will probably again have to return to these publications, augmenting them with definite documents which disclose the organizational work of the party, as well as the negative phenomena. According to our data, today statistical collections and chronicles have been published in approximately 60 branches and local party archives. This work must be developed, and an information bank

created. A chronicle on the history of activity of our party is not being developed in the center. We believe this work should be expanded.

Professor V. Ya. Bondar, chief of the IML party construction section and doctor of historical sciences, pointed out the importance of resurrecting Leninist teachings about the party in their full volume. This must become the basis for all work on preparing outlines on the history of local party organizations. He disclosed the position on the increased role of the party as the political avant-garde of society on the basis of affirmation of the democratic style of leadership. He also spoke of the need to delineate the functions of party, soviet and economic management organs and focused attention on the Leninist position regarding the fact that to strengthen the ties with the masses means not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from them, to correct our policies with consideration for the sentiments of the masses. V. Ya. Bondar noted the need for increasing international party training, whose weakening was the reason for the negative occurrences in the development of national relations which we have witnessed.

The concluding speaker was N. A. Barsukov, sector chief of the CPSU history section and candidate in historical sciences. The very concept of historical experience is quite multi-faceted, he said, and until we find the exact methodological key, the approach to the concept of "historical experience," and as long as we drag the chronicle of all of history directly into our outlines of history, these outlines will expand to 3-4 volumes. Meanwhile, the most important moments of specifically that historical experience which characterizes the path travelled by the given communist party and which comprises a part of the experience of our entire party, will disappear.

Society, no matter how complex it may be, said the speaker, represents a finished system. It is not a conglomerate of pluses and minuses, positives and negatives. It is an integral society, all of whose aspects are interrelated, beginning with the Stakhanovite movement and ending with the repressions. We must seek the key which will help us to explain the historical phenomenon that was our society in the 30's and Stalin's cult of personality.

We have not yet even felt out an approach to this historical puzzle, noted N. A. Barsukov, and we cannot yet solve it specifically because we have never tried to systematically approach this period, proceeding from an analysis of the basic phenomena. What happened during that time with our working class, our peasantry, etc.? Yet this is what determines the forms of interrelations of the party and the masses, the state and the party, the state and the people.

Having touched upon the problem of the general and the specific, N. A. Barsukov said: Did all the processes proceed the same from beginning to end in the Prebaltic

region, for example, as they did in the entire country? No. Yet we have tried to necessarily describe them in a common channel. Today we must pay more attention to identifying those peculiarities, those specific traits which characterized the situation in the republics. All this is very important today. Otherwise, we will not be able to explain why the events in Nagornyy Karabakh occurred.

N. A. Barsukov dealt with the current fashionable tendency to write all our misfortunes off to Stalin. In my deep conviction, he stated, three-fourths of the negative occurrences, our misfortunes, downfalls, shortcomings, and horrors were the "acquisitions" of the 60's and 70's rather than the legacy of the 30's. In many ways we intensified these shortcomings of the 30's and came to a pre-crisis, or directly speaking, to a state of crisis.

N. A. Barsukov dealt with the approach to party documents. They must be subject to analysis and analytical criticism, as any other documents, he said.

The essence of the practical proposals expressed at the conference may be reduced to the following basic recommendations:

1. We must perform a deep historiographic study of the existing literature on the history of local party organizations and give it a principle evaluation from present day positions.
2. We must clarify regional periodization with a strict consideration for the specifics of the historical development of communist organizations under the specific conditions of development of national regions.
3. We must broadly expand work on the application and introduction of new sources into scientific practice; we must expand the source material base.
4. We must define the "gaps" in illumination of the historical process and concentrate our attention on studying them on the basis of the entire set of documents, many of which have not been introduced into scientific usage prior to the present time.
5. We must expand work on creating a bank of biographical information on the leaders of the party and the Soviet state at all levels. We must give a critical analysis of the existing evaluations of personages, without overlooking the negative subjects in the life and work of the leaders.
6. Involving the broad scientific community, we must organize discussions on poorly studied problems in history and on individual periods which have received a prejudiced and conditional evaluation in historiography. We must publish the materials of these discussions in the local press.

7. We must not force the publication of outlines of the history of local party organizations, yet at the same time we must perform systematic work on their preparation.

8. We must prepare and publish brochures, books, and general works, including those of a popular character, on individual periods and problems in CPSU history. We must broadly and innovatively expand work on popularizing the history of local party organizations, involving in this work historians from party VUZes and representatives of other social sciences as members of coordinating councils.

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N. D. Kondratyev's Economic Approach Judged Relevant to Current Planning

18300031 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
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[Article by N. Makasheva under the rubric "From the History of Economic Thought": "N. D. Kondratyev: A Brief Biographical Sketch (On the 50th Anniversary of His Death)"]

[Text] When it comes to manifestations of recent years in the vanguard of lawfully governed phenomena, we may cite without reservation the increased interest aroused in the work of the economists of the 1920's. This difficult time, marking the youthful emergence of Soviet science, gave rise to an entire galaxy of outstanding scholars, who were guided in their endeavors by a single criterion—scientific truth. This meant not relinquishing their scholarly integrity in favor of ideological and political guidelines or of their own personal welfare. Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kondratyev (1892-1938), whose brilliant and tragic fate reflects the stormy epoch of social upheaval in the 1920's and 1930's, was one such eminent scholar.

N. D. Kondratyev made noteworthy contributions to methodological principles of planning and predicting economic change during the transition period, ways of transforming agriculture, macroeconomic regulation, and a theory of market conditions and economic dynamics. His work marks the beginning of a whole series of scientific advances the significance of which we only now thoroughly understand.

Interest in the life and times of N. D. Kondratyev and his scientific heritage is at present very great. Witness his published work, which is now being edited for wider circulation in print. After more than half a century, however, during which his name has not been mentioned and his work consigned to oblivion, there are many aspects of the life and scientific advances of N. D. Kondratyev that remain little known.

Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kondratyev was born 17(4) March 1892 in Goluyevskiy Village, Kineshema District, Kostroma Province (Kineshmenskiy Rayon is now located in Ivanovo Oblast) in a peasant family with many children. He received his elementary education in his native district at a church school, a parochial teacher-training institution, and a special school of agriculture and horticulture before continuing his general education by attending the courses of A. S. Chernyayev in Petersburg. In 1911 N. Kondratyev passed his secondary-school examinations as an external student and then enrolled with the faculty of law at the University of Petersburg.

During his studies in Petersburg Kondratyev participated actively in a series of scientific study circles and seminars presided over by leading representatives of the Russian social sciences of that day. Prominent among them were M. I. Tugan-Baranovskiy, the well-known economist; A.S. Lappo-Danilevskiy, historian and academician; M. M. Kovalevskiy, sociologist and ethnographer; M. I. Petrazhitskiy, jurist; V. V. Svetlovskiy, economist and historian; and P. P. Migulin, economist. In 1915, after successfully defending his thesis for a diploma entitled "Developing the Services of the Kineshma Zemstvo of Kostroma Province," which was published that year in Kineshma, N. D. Kondratyev remained in the university with the department of economics and statistics in preparation, as he wrote at the time, "for a professional calling." Concurrently with his scholarly work at the university, N. D. Kondratyev served as the head of the department of economics and statistics of the Zemstvo Union in Petersburg.

In a stormy time of pre-revolutionary strife, the interests of the young scholar were concentrated on agrarian problems and food supply for the people.

With regard to land reform he supported the program of the Social Revolutionaries for socialization of the land according to principles of equal land use for the working people.¹ The position of Kondratyev on ways of moving the peasants towards socialism had already taken shape. While acknowledging in principle the superiority of large-scale agricultural production as compared to small-scale peasant farming, the solution to the task of raising agricultural production and creating a potential for export at the existing stage of history was in his mind functionally related to the development of individual peasant farms and, consequently, their voluntary cooperation.

In 1917 questions of land organization were hotly debated by the many organizations that came into being after the February Revolution for the purpose of preparing the ground for agrarian reform. Along with a number of specialists in agrarian problems (including A. V. Chayanov, A. N. Chelintsev, and N. P. Makarov), N. D. Kondratyev participated in the work of the League of Agrarian Reform, the Commission on Agrarian Reform attached to the Main Land Committee, and in the work

of the committee itself. At the same time he was a member, and subsequently associate chairman, of the State Food Committee. After serving in this position, on 18(3) October 1919 N. D. Kondratyev was appointed associate minister of food supply in the last Provisional Government.

In December 1917 N. D. Kondratyev took part in the work of the All-Russian Food Supply Conference, which convened in Moscow, and he was chosen to be a member of the Constituent Assembly.

In early 1918 the scholar traveled to Moscow, where his activities were closely associated with the cooperative movement. Kondratyev became a member of the Council of United Agricultural Cooperatives; he lectured at the Cooperative Institute, and he worked at the Central Association of Flax Growers. He devoted most of his attention to economic problems associated with cooperative systems, and primarily to the principles governing the operations of agricultural produce markets. An entire series of works appeared in the wake of these studies, including, among others, "The Production and Sale of Oil Seeds as a Function of the Peasant Economy" and "The Grain Market and Its Regulation During the War and Revolution."

In 1919 the scientific interests of N. D. Kondratyev brought him to the Petrovsk Agricultural Academy (now the Agricultural Academy imeni K. A. Timiryayev), where he participated in the work of the Advanced Seminar of Agricultural Economy and Politics (under the leadership of A. V. Chayanov), soon to be renamed The Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economy. In September 1920 N. D. Kondratyev became a professor, and in 1923 he was named head of the Department of Agricultural Market Studies of the Petrovsk Agricultural Academy.

An event of particular importance for N. D. Kondratyev was the founding in October 1920 of the Institute for the Study of National Economic Conditions (Market Study Institute), whose associates under N. D. Kondratyev's leadership conducted scientific research on problems of market conditions, combining profound theoretical analysis with efforts to resolve important practical tasks posed by party and economic organs. The institute published a large number of scientific monographs, a journal entitled "The Economic Bulletin," and periodically a collection of articles entitled "Questions of Market Conditions," the editor of which was N. D. Kondratyev. In the early 1920's his own works on market conditions appeared, including a book entitled "The World Economy and Market Conditions During and After the War" and articles entitled "Concepts of Statics, Dynamics, and Economic Conditions" and "Major Cycles of Market Conditions."

In 1924 N. D. Kondratyev made a long journey to the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Germany to study local agricultural production organizations, to

acquire an insight into agricultural development trends in these countries, and to gain an understanding of their roles in the world market with a view to improving the market position of our own country.

On his return from abroad N. D. Kondratyev continued his work in the fields of prediction and planning, principles of management, and market conditions research. In February 1926 at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Association of Scientific Research Institutes of Social Science he delivered a lecture entitled "Major Cycles of Market Conditions," which proved to be of fundamental value in shaping the future direction of world science.

In the summer of 1925, "The Basic Principles of a Long-Term Plan for the Development of Agriculture and Forestry" was presented to the Presidium of Gosplan. The principles referred to had been incorporated into the Land Plan [Zemplan] with the very active involvement of N. D. Kondratyev and subsequently became known as "Kondratyev's five-year plan for agriculture." The document expressed the fundamental position of the scholar with respect to agricultural development. Implementation of the general directives of the party and the state for speeding the development of productive forces and developing an industrial type of agrarian economy was linked by Kondratyev and his colleagues with a considerably broadened base for the supply of raw materials to industry, and with accelerating the process of acquiring and increasing the tax-paying and purchasing power of the population. All of this made the task of expanding agricultural production especially urgent, the solution to which, in turn, presupposed stimulating economic initiative and independence on the part of the producers of agricultural produce, increasing capital accumulation on the farms, improving forms of management, and so on. The so-called "five-year plan for agriculture" aroused a good deal of criticism in the course of discussion, but the principles enunciated in it were not renounced.

The discussion about the projected development of the national economy was more crucial, and it was of as far-reaching consequence for the fate of the economics scholars as it was for our planning. In the course of this discussion fundamental differences of opinion became sharply drawn between those who upheld the idea of strict centralization, as a drastic measure due to the resources of agriculture, and those who considered it important to take into consideration the objective possibilities of economics and to observe a proportional balance in the development of industry and agriculture, as primary and secondary subdivisions, and so on. N. D. Kondratyev spoke up sharply against the first point of view. He underscored the necessity of reconciling the directives to accelerate the development of industrialization with a concomitant growth of agriculture, without which, in his opinion, successful social and economic development in the future would be impossible.

Amidst the intensification of Stalinist repressions, the position of N. D. Kondratyev and those who shared his views was declared hostile to the work of building socialism, and they themselves were counted among its enemies as members of the "peasant workers party." At a closed judicial hearing in 1931, N. D. Kondratyev was sentenced to eight years in prison. In 1938 a second sentence was imposed, and he was executed by a firing squad.²

As a true scholar and patriot, even in prison as he struggled to overcome dire illness and the onset of blindness, N. D. Kondratyev did not cease his investigative efforts. He continued his work on the dynamics of capitalist and socialist economics, and worked out entirely novel ideas in the field of macroeconomic modeling and productive functions, anticipating much that was eventually to be done in global economic science.

Footnotes

1. N. D. Kondratyev joined the Social Revolutionaries during the period of the Revolution of 1905 as a teenager, and he left the party in 1919.

2. Subsequently, both sentences were reversed in view of the absence of elements of a crime, and in July 1987 N. D. Kondratyev, together with a number of other economists, was fully rehabilitated.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988

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Soviet Socio-Economic Changes in 50's, 60's Examined

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Russian No 8, Aug 88 pp 52-65

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences L.A. Openkin under the rubric "Debate: The CPSU Between the 20th and 27th Congresses": "Were There Turning Points in the '50s and '60s?"]

[Text] The discussion of problems pertaining to the work of the CPSU between the 20th and 27th party congresses, begun with the publication of articles by V.I. Glotov and Ye.Yu. Zubkova,¹ is of great scientific and political importance. It was dictated primarily by the practical need for revolutionary reform of the Soviet society. It was precisely the initial results of the Communist Party's interpretation of trends in the nation's socioeconomic development emerging during the last 2 or 3 decades which provided the impetus for a search for ways to accelerate socialism's progress, developing into that understanding of the restructuring reflected in materials of the 19th All-Union party conference.

The fate of the restructuring today is defined by two issues: the democratization of all public life and radical economic reform. Ways to resolve them were thoroughly analyzed at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Its documents assess the first positive results of the restructuring. At the same time, M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report at the conference, "we have still not overcome the underlying causes of the retardation and have not universally plugged in the renewal machinery—have not even developed it in some respects. The capability of many party organizations is still not up to the level of the restructuring tasks. We need new qualitative changes in our development, and this requires major decisions, vigorous action and initiative."²

The demands of the restructuring make it essential to activate the historical experience accumulated over the decades. Specifically, we need a thorough, in-depth study of the party's experience in guiding the society from the mid-50s to the beginning of the '80s.

Beginning in the mid-50s the CPSU made attempts to alter the functional machinery of socialist democracy and the system of dominant economic relations in the nation. They did not produce the desired results, however. At the juncture of the '70s and '80s the Soviet Union found itself at the brink of an economic crisis, and many abnormal developments were progressing in the social and the spiritual and moral areas. This naturally raises a number of questions. Why did the process of the society's renewal begun in the mid-50s not result in the creation of conditions which released socialism's enormous potentials? How could it happen that the period which began with the rectification of the consequences of the cult of I.V. Stalin's personality in the political, economic, social and spiritual areas of the Soviet society's life ultimately result in the reproduction of an entire group of stagnation phenomena in all of these areas, the totality of which formed a mechanism retarding socialism's progress?

The articles by V.I. Glotov and Ye.Yu. Zubkova which opened the debate in the magazine VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS contribute to a more thorough understanding of many problems without which it would be impossible to answer the questions raised. Furthermore, some of the conclusions and points in the articles are specific, while others have a clearly defined conceptual orientation. I would like to discuss in greater detail one of the latter.

In Ye.Yu. Zubkova's article "The Experience and Lessons From the Unfinished Turning Points in 1956 and 1965" she makes a productive attempt to trace the dynamic of the struggle between democratic and bureaucratic trends in the Soviet society's development. This process, the article states, was characterized by two clearly defined turning points—in the mid-50s and the 60s. The first of these, which began developing most intensively in 1956, was primarily political and involved the society's democratization. The second, which took shape in 1965, was defined by economic reform. As

Ye.Yu. Zubkova notes, however, the new approaches to the management of the national economy were not bolstered by major changes in the society or by vigorous action to implement the economic policy which had been worked out. "As a result," she writes, "the turning point occurring in the mid-60s was unable to attain its full potential. The democratic processes were essentially obstructed by the forces of bureaucratic conservatism. The turning point of 1965 was therefore unable to complete the 1956 development, even though logically and historically it was a continuation of the turning point of the mid-50s.

We thus have a process which is internally unified but is discrete in its development, a sort of **singular turning point** in which the events of 1956 and 1965 represent two aspects, as it were, or two components: a course toward the society's democratization and a course toward economic restructuring. This discreteness, however, complicated by inconsistency of action, was one of the factors causing the breakdown of unity and the failure to complete the turning points as a whole."³

The conclusion from this is that if the Communist Party had succeeded in neutralizing the bureaucratic forces and implementing the economic reform, while simultaneously bringing about the further development of that process of democratization whose main features emerged following the 20th CPSU Congress, the shift as a whole would have been assured and would have considerably accelerated socialism's progress. This is precisely what Ye.Yu. Zubkova apparently had in mind when she concluded that "the significance of 1956 and 1965 lies precisely in the fact that a first actual attempt was made to master the mechanism of 'reformist' turning points, the completion of which would take the society up to a qualitatively new level of development."⁴

Based on this view of the problem, the main task in the study of factors contributing to the reproduction of the mechanism retarding socialism's progress during this period is that of analyzing the factors preventing the full implementation of measures worked out by the CPSU in 1956 and 1965. This approach to comprehending the CPSU's historical experience during the period between the 20th and 27th party congresses is a promising one. It should get the closest of attention from the scholars and could become an extremely significant scientific quest. At the same time, I feel that the historians should not limit themselves to any single view of the problem. In connection with this, I would like to direct the readers' attention to a somewhat different view of the interrelationship and conditionality of the party's political acts during the mid-50s and -60s and their effect upon the process of building socialism in the USSR.

We need first of all to precisely define the starting point: Were there any sort of turning points in the life of the Soviet society in the mid-50s or later, in the mid-60s? A complete change in focus in the processes occurring in the main areas of the society's life is a mandatory

condition for a turning point in historical development (in the strict sense of the term). In this respect, while totally sharing Ye.Yu. Zubkova's conclusion that "a historical turning point is always a moment of resolution of conflicts in public life," one can hardly agree with the theory that it can "be a completed process or remain unfinished."⁵ A turning point is a final result: either it occurs or it does not. The appearance of the turning point's incompleteness is created by the gap which frequently develops between the party's political positions designed to bring about a breakthrough in the economic, political, social and spiritual areas of life and the practical process of their implementation.

Did the Communist Party formulate political decisions following the 20th CPSU Congress, the implementation of which would have brought about a turning point in the society's development? In order to answer this question let us explain: A transition from what to what? It is well known today that major changes occurred in the activity of the Communist Party at the juncture of the '20s and '30s, which essentially altered the process of socialist development in the USSR.

Were the party and its leaders aware in the mid-50s of the fact that the Leninist concept of socialism had been replaced with simplified concepts of the essence and the methods of building the new society, and of the need to return to Leninist theory and praxis in the building of socialism? There is no basis for answering this question in the affirmative. I believe that at that time the people who comprised the CPSU's directing nucleus actually had no particular reason to ponder this subject. The Great Patriotic War had ended in victory quite recently, and no one was thinking about the cost of the victory yet. The restoration of the devastated economy had been rapidly completed. There were good indicators for the meeting of targets set for the 5th Five-Year Plan. The elimination of obvious shortcomings in the development of agriculture, manifested especially clearly during the latter years of Stalin's life, and the development of the virgin lands had made it possible to correct the situation in this area significantly.

Criticism of the cult of the personality developed in the nation soon after Stalin's death. The 20th CPSU Congress spoke of large-scale repression and unlawful acts which occurred in the climate of abuse of power. The discussion of these matters provided the impetus for developing the process of democratization in the Soviet society. Party and state documents which came to light after the congress contained not even a hint that their compilers had set themselves the goal of preparing a comprehensive program for democratization and the establishment of self-government by the people in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist conception of socialism as a system which "is not created by ukases from above" and in the spirit of which "officious and bureaucratic automatism is alien."⁶ The objective of the party's basic moves from the mid-50s to the beginning of the '60s was primarily that of excising the monstrous tumor which

had formed on the body of the public organism under the domination of the cult of Stalin's personality. And only a few of them contributed to the development of democratic processes measuring up to the real needs of the socialist system. A merging of the process of democratization, in the form in which it developed at the end of the '50s and in the first half of the '60s, with economic reform was therefore hardly capable of bringing about a shift in the nation's development following the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

On the basis of an in-depth analysis of yet inaccessible sources (including materials of the CC plenum at which N.S. Khrushchev's retirement occurred) the scholars are going to have to ascertain whether the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet State advanced in the mid-60s a program of reform capable not only of preventing curtailment of the trend of democratization, the impetus for which was provided at the 20th CPSU Congress, but also of bringing about major changes in the political area. In any case, however, the political decisions on which the economic reform of the mid-60s was based were objectively incapable of producing an historic turning point. In order to establish the potential baselessness of the economic policy defined following the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, let us examine certain aspects of its genesis.

In the given period, in the situation of a developing scientific and technological revolution, the CPSU's main task was one of developing a policy which would make it possible organically to combine the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist system of management. At that time the party had not yet freed itself of the heavy burden of concepts of management methods developed in the '30s and '40s, which differed substantially from the Leninist concepts. The essence of V.I. Lenin's idea of ways to integrate scientific and technological and socioeconomic progress was to establish organizational and management relations which would make the national economy receptive to the most modern scientific and technological achievements. The GOELRO plan took this approach. The NEP principles contributed to the implementation of Lenin's ideas in the '20s. They called for the extensive application of economic accountability, wholesale trade and the development of material incentives to give the workers an interest in the results of their labor. During the curtailment of the New Economic Policy at the juncture of the '20s and '30s Lenin's ideas on socialist management methods were consigned to oblivion, and a system of management of the economy based on administrative decree developed in the nation. The CPSU made no attempt in the mid-50s or the first half of the '60s to break up this system, to replace the predominantly administrative methods of management with economic methods. The scientific and technological revolution underway in the world prompted the party to seek new approaches for enhancing production efficiency based on the extensive application of scientific and

technological achievements. This objective dictate of the times was not successfully realized in the practical work of the CPSU, however.

In the mid-50s the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers implemented a number of measures demonstrating that a purposeful search for ways to merge the results of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism had begun in the nation. An All-Union conference of industrial workers was held in Moscow in May of 1955, which discussed questions pertaining to the large-scale retooling of the national economy.⁷ At that time the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers also passed a decree "On Improving the Study and the Adoption in the National Economy of the Experience and Achievements of Advanced Soviet and Foreign Science and Technology."⁸ In July 1955 the matter of scientific and technological progress was specially discussed for the first time in party history at a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which outlined a program of steps to enhance industrial efficiency.⁹ Scientific research, planning and design, and technological work were stepped up drastically in the nation in accordance with decisions coming out of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, and party moves to rectify the effects of the cult of Stalin's personality contributed significantly to their development.

It would appear that all the signs of substantial change were present in the CPSU's economic policy. But let us not jump to conclusions. An increase in party attention to this or that problem and the passage of numerous decrees, our historical experience has shown, far from always result in historical shifts or foreordain conditions conducive to their implementation. A detailed look at steps taken by the party in the second half of the '50s shows that they all focused on altering the functioning of each component of the "science-technology-production" system and absolutely did not have the objective of making revolutionary changes in the system itself. A unique symbol of the continuity of the measures outlined with the previous party policy was the fact that the report presented by N.A. Bulganin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee began with a thorough analysis of the results achieved in the fulfillment of the program for developing the Soviet economy defined in I.V. Stalin's speech to electors on 9 February 1946 and containing tasks for achieving a quantitative increase in output of the main types of manufactured products.¹⁰

The system of economic relations which developed in the mid-50s continued to have a clearly defined primacy of centralization, which significantly restricted the possibilities of factories and plants for influencing the resolution of questions having to do with accelerating technological progress, and a predominance of administrative factors over material incentives. Yet another agency of specialized management, the State Committee for New Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers

(USSR Gostekhnika), was added to almost five tenths of the ministries in 1955. The committee launched an extensive effort to prepare plans for applying the most important inventions and discoveries in the national economy, as well as programs for the comprehensive mechanization and automation of the branches. These plans and programs were implemented primarily on an administrative basis. The world's first super-efficient steel casting plants were built in the USSR through the joint efforts of TsNIIchermet [Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy imeni I.P. Bardin] and the Krasnoye Sormovo, Krasnyy Oktyabr and Novo-Tul'skiy Metallurgical plants. At the suggestion of Gostekhnika the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision requiring the ministries to develop continuous steel-casting plants in 1956 and to build 10-15 of them in 1957.¹¹ Other urgent scientific and technological problems were similarly solved. The State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers, formed out of USSR Gostekhnika, began to deal with these problems in May of 1957.

The party backed up the course of retooling the national economy with a variable structural policy, again one involving altering proportions in the centralized distribution of resources. In keeping with the position set forth at the 21st CPSU Congress, the USSR Council of Ministers began to allocate more than half of all the investment capital for the modernization of operating enterprises.¹²

Nor did the 1957 reorganization of industry and construction management, which is sometimes viewed as a form of development of production democracy, essentially alter the functioning of the national economy. As Ye.Yu. Zubkova astutely noted, the "political determinism" of the 1956 events had a great deal to do with its implementation.¹³ While altering the form of functioning, this reorganization left intact the essence of the system of managing the economy by administrative orders. Furthermore, the replacement of the system of ministries with sovnarkhozes, a system which had developed over the decades and was reinforced with absolutely no economic incentives for technological progress, led to a drop in labor productivity, since it drastically disrupted the smoothly functioning process of developing and introducing technological innovations and limited possibilities for conducting a unified technological policy in this or that branch. Only 53 percent of the planned 5,353 new equipment projects were completed in 1958. The situation was no better with respect to the use of existing models of new equipment in production: the production of only 57 percent of 503 manufactured products was mastered.¹⁴

Aware of the full complexity of the situation which had arisen in the national economy, a certain part of the members of the CPSU Central Committee spoke out at the June 1959 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee about the need to find ways to eliminate the real conflict between the new tasks involved in the scientific and

technological modernization of production and the old methods of accomplishing them. In the opinion of S.A. Afanasyev, chairman of the Leningrad Sovnarkhoz, and K.N. Grishin, first secretary of the Vladimir CPSU Obkom, better methods of awarding bonuses to members of the collective, primarily its leaders, should have served this objective.¹⁵ I.V. Spiridonov, first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, stated that a more effective system of economic indices for evaluating the performance of plants and factories should be the most important means of providing incentives for adopting new technology.¹⁶ Most of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, led by N.S. Khrushchev, however, felt that the shortcomings in the use of advanced technology were mainly caused by the imperfection of administrative factors and placed the emphasis primarily upon the resolution of organizational and structural questions.¹⁷ This was reflected also in decisions coming out of the June 1959 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in June 1960, "On Economic Incentives for Enterprises and on Increasing the Material Interest of the Workers in Developing and Adopting New Equipment and Technology and in the Comprehensive Mechanization and Automation of Production,"¹⁸ which was essentially a palliative.

Nor did documents from the July 1960 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee inject anything fundamentally new into the approaches to the resolution of the problems faced. It discussed the course of fulfillment of 21st party congress decisions on the development of industry and transport and the adoption of the latest achievements of science and technology in industry,¹⁹ as well as the November 1962 Central Committee plenum, which discussed the subject "On the Development of the Economy of the USSR and the Restructuring of Party Supervision of the National Economy."²⁰ The implementation of the measures defined by them did not make it possible to alter the declining rate of growth of labor productivity in industry which took shape at the end of the '50s. It was 7.7 percent annually during the period 1951-1956, and only 5.5 percent in 1957-1964.^{20a} As a result of the weakened influence of scientific and technological progress on the national economy the portion of national economic effect from the adoption of the achievements of science and technology in the overall national income dropped from 12.1 percent in 1950-60 to 7.4 percent in 1961-65.²¹ This immediately affected also the growth of the national income, which dropped from an average annual rate of 11.3 percent in 1951-55 to 6.5 percent in 1961-1965.²²

In that situation party, soviet and trade union workers, managers and scientists were increasingly vigorously bringing up the need to alter economic policy and bring it into conformity with the enormous possibilities opened up by the scientific and technological revolution.²³ It seemed that a situation conducive to the accomplishment of this task arose following the October

1964 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which condemned the bureaucratic administration and elements of subjectivism and liberalism in the planning and economic management, and underscored the need to establish a scientific approach to the economy. It only appeared that way, however.

Two main views on prospects for improving the national economy had emerged by the time the plenum was conducted. The essence of one of them was described most fully by Academician V.S. Nemchinov in the journal *KOMMUNIST*. He discussed the need to effect a decisive transition to economic methods of management of the national economy which would activate the creative potential of the labor collectives.²⁴ This position was actively supported by A.N. Kosygin, the new chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. It would be appropriate to recall that as early as 1941, in his address at the 18th party congress, he consistently demonstrated that it was economic methods of management which were capable of assuring consistently high rates of economic growth based on the use of new technology.²⁵

Supporters of the other point of view were less radical. They believed that the main cause of the economic mess at the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s were not flaws in the management system itself but that "administrative itch" which was typical of the latter years when N.S. Khrushchev headed the party and the government. The powerful economic surge of the mid-50s provided a certain basis for concluding that it would be possible to continue achieving perceptible national economic results if stability were established in the administration of the economy and "cosmetic surgery" were performed on the management system.

This position was clearly reflected in a leading article, "A Scientific Approach to the Economy is a Demand of the Times," published in the magazine *KOMMUNIST*. The authors attempted to support their position by citing Lenin's idea that "we do not need to begin all over again, not rearrange things right and left, but to be able to 'utilize' what has already been created to the greatest possible extent. We need the fewest possible overall restructurings and the greatest possible number of serious measures, techniques, methods and instructions, tested on the practical level and confirmed by the results already achieved...."²⁶ With this in mind, the article concluded that the resolution of pressing problems lay not in reforms "but in a painstaking, thorough study of our own practical experience acquired at the center and locally, in the comprehensive development, rectification and improvement of the system of planning and management of the socialist economy."²⁷ Views of this kind were not alien to L.I. Brezhnev, who headed the CPSU Central Committee. Soon after the plenum the two leaders made public their view of ways to further develop the national economy.

In November 1964, in the report presented by L.I. Brezhnev on the 47th anniversary of Great October, he concluded, without denying in principle the need for the

extensive application of economic incentives for developing production, that "the crux of the matter lies not in reorganizations, not in new decrees, but in the people and in verification of performance."²⁸ A month later, in a report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.N. Kosygin stated the opposite, placing the main stress on the need for changes in production relations. "The present system of planning and economic management," he stressed, "requires considerable improvement. It is a matter of further developing the principles of democratic centralism, putting the organization of planning into order, eliminating duplication in the functioning of economic and planning agencies, increasing the responsibility of each agency for its assigned job and thoroughly strengthening economic incentives in production."²⁹

It is perfectly apparent that differences between the views of the head of the Communist Party and that of the Soviet Government on ways to further develop the national economy of the USSR would have to affect not only the practical implementation of the political decisions adopted in 1965 but also their content. In the form in which it developed in the mid-60s, the CPSU's economic policy was incapable of bringing about major changes or a turning point in the nation's economic development. A study of the documents defining its substance provides a basis for believing that the measures contained in it were incapable of converting the national economy to economic methods of management. It was essential to return to the branch principle of economic management, of course. Overall, however, the focus of the decisions adopted at that time was not on breaking up the existing structure of the system of management by administrative decree but on merely perfecting the economic foundation of its functioning to the greatest extent possible. We retained the situation in which the interests of the main national economic component, the enterprise, were absolutely dependent upon the interests of the central departments.

The implementation of measures specified in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 4 October 1965, "On the Improvement of Planning and the Strengthening of Economic Incentives for Industrial Output," helped to improve the nation's economic development indices for a certain time. The annual rate of growth of public labor productivity was 6.8 percent during the period 1966-1970, for example, compared with 6.1 percent in the first half of the '60s.³⁰

The positive processes in the Soviet economy did not develop further, however. The following fact is noteworthy. Production effectiveness in the USSR rose by 16 percent overall in the '60s and '70s. Calculations show, however, that the growth of effectiveness occurred mainly (by 14 percent) during the years 1964-1970. This indicator remained practically unchanged during the period 1971-1974 and began to drop in 1975.³¹ This was mainly due to the fact that measures based on the reform of the mid-60s made it possible to activate only the most

immediate economic reserves. They did not create fundamentally new economic conditions for accelerating scientific and technological progress in the national economy, however.

The September 1965 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee advanced the following as the main tasks of the reform: the improvement of planning and expansion of the economic independence of enterprises, the enlargement of economic incentives for industrial output, and the enhancement of material concern in the workers for its intensification. The setting of these tasks was unquestionably in keeping with the demands of the time.

The conversion to the branch principle of industrial management was also a good thing. It was designed to provide unified leadership of scientific research and development and the adoption of new technology in production. Steps to improve the economic basis for the functioning of the central agencies of industrial management were not supplemented with effective decisions to stimulate interest in the labor collectives and individual workers in adopting new technology.

The amount transferred from enterprise profits to the material incentive fund, for example, was directly dependent upon two factors: the increase in sales of output volume, and its profitability level.³² Disruptions of the production cycle, unavoidable in the technical reconstruction of an enterprise, were economically unprofitable for the labor collective in that situation, since they resulted in a deterioration in the overall results of the work, a reduction in the amounts transferred from profits to the material incentive fund and a drop in monthly earnings. Nor did the decree allow for the possibility of economic incentives in the form of the basic kind of material reward for the adoption of the achievements of science and technology, because average wages were retained as one of the mandatory indicators for the performance of an enterprise.³³

The labor collectives were granted the right to independently plan and implement measures to improve production: to replace obsolete and inefficient equipment and to install new production systems, among other things. A special production development fund was set up for this purpose, also out of enterprise profits. The amount transferred to the fund was based on norms depending primarily upon the increase in sales of output volume or the amount of profit, as well as upon the profitability level.³⁴ The decree thus initially produced a real conflict: the conditions most conducive to an increase in the production development fund developed when no measures were implemented toward the adoption of new equipment, mechanization and automation or modernization of the equipment, for the implementation of which the fund was set up.

One other factor. In 1960 the USSR Gosplan issued the basic methodological regulations for compiling the state plan for development of the USSR's national economy.³⁵ For the first time indices describing the development and adoption of new technology were isolated in independent sections and embraced all of the main sectors of the national economy. The compilation of the plan at all levels of the national economy was to be started by working out measures toward the development and adoption of new technology. This was unquestionably a progressive step in the matter of planning. An important shortcoming was revealed at the very beginning, however. The normative documents in no way defined the dependency between the results of an enterprise's economic performance and the results achieved in fulfilling the plan for new technology. And it was not eliminated in documents defining the substance of the management reform.

The significant changes in forms of industrial management implemented by the Communist Party in the mid-60s were thus not reinforced with an effective system of economic incentives for technological progress. And it is not surprising that major problems with respect to stimulating the process of adopting new technology were pointed out in a number of publications during the very first year of the economic reform.³⁶

In an attempt to create conditions more conducive to the conversion of the economy to intensive development, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On Measures to Enhance the Operational Effectiveness of Scientific Organizations and to Accelerate the Use of Scientific and Technological Achievements in the National Economy" in September 1968.³⁷ It paved the way for developing an extensive network of scientific production associations in the national economy.³⁸ The decree left practically unchanged, however, the system of economic incentives which could accelerate the use of scientific and technological achievements in the national economy.

As early as the juncture of the '60s and '70s the facts made perfectly apparent the unrealistic nature of plans for accelerating scientific and technological progress in the national economy by means of those principles applied in the implementation of the reform. In 1969, for example, at enterprises converted to the new management terms, transfers to the production development fund amounted to only 1.5 percent of the industrial production funds. The calculations of the economists showed that in this situation it would be impossible for most of the enterprises to carry out normal reproduction of the fixed capital or to renew and modernize it out of their own funds.³⁹ Academician A.G. Aganbegyan pointed out in 1969 that "when the rates of national economic development increased and the national economy was generally in good condition, the leading economists sent a letter to the leadership stating that if a major shift were

not made in economic policy because of the altered conditions for growth of resources, we faced a significant drop in the rates, but, to put it mildly, they did not listen to us."⁴⁰

Unfortunately, the CPSU Central Committee was unable to properly assess the situation which had developed in the national economy. The idea, advanced by a number of leading workers, of conducting a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on scientific and technological progress was not carried out. The party leadership was inclined to believe that the principles of planning and economic incentives worked out in the course of implementing the economic reform basically conformed to the requirements of intensive production. Because of this the main task was believed to be that of merely improving them and perfecting the organizational work for implementing the scientific and technological policy.

Assessing the fact that rates of growth for the output-capital ratio had slowed and that targets for the adoption of scientific and technological achievements in production were not being met, L.I. Brezhnev noted in an address at the December 1972 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "Speaking of the real causes of the difficulties we have encountered in the fulfillment of plans for the first 2 years of the 9th Five-Year Plan, the most important of these are precisely the failures of management, soviet and sometimes, party, organs in the fulfillment of decisions coming out of the 14th party congress for enhancing the effectiveness of public production...."⁴¹ A.P. Kirilenko, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for economic development, also believed that enhancing the work in each area of economic development, improving the organization and further improving the existing system of planning, economic incentives and management were the main means of overcoming the difficulties.⁴² Materials of the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses contained similar assessments.

This kind of approach also defined CPSU policy in the area of accelerating scientific and technological progress in the '70s. It was aimed at the evolutionary development of systems of management and the economic machinery shaped in the second half of the '60s. In accordance with 24th party congress decisions a number of steps were taken to improve economic accountability: the size of economic incentive funds began to be influenced not just by growth of sales of output (or profit) and the profitability level, but also by the specific portion of new and modern items in the overall production volume. The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree "On Certain Measures to Further Improve Industrial Management"⁴³ in March of 1973, which helped to establish large production associations in industry and to enhance efficiency and flexibility in the functioning of the administrative machinery.

These decisions could not drastically alter the situation in the Soviet economy, of course. The key task, that of organically combining the plans for adopting scientific

and technological achievements, developing production, distributing and using investment capital, enhancing labor productivity and reducing basic production costs and the consumption of materials in the product, was not accomplished. Rates of renewal of fixed production capital continued to slow in the '70s. With a standard coefficient of 5.6 percent for its replacement in production, the actual renewal was only 2 percent during the 9th five-year period and 1.7 percent during the 10th. Nor did the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving the Management System and the Tasks of Party and State Organs" in 1979 halt the trend: the replacement of fixed production capital dropped even further, to 1.3 percent, in 1981-82.⁴⁴

The inadequacy of the system of economic incentives for technological progress resulted in a situation in which new construction, into which most of the capital invested at the juncture of the '70s and '80s was channeled, became the most simple and accessible route for including the new achievements of science and technology in the production process. An increase in the time required to master scientific and technological achievements was the result of this investment policy. In the '70s only 20 percent of the new equipment models recommended for production were mastered in the year they were produced, another 30 percent the second year, and the remainder even later.⁴⁵ The influence of science and technology upon production effectiveness weakened. Beginning with the 10th Five-Year Plan, production growth occurred in most of the industrial branches only as new capacities were started up.⁴⁶ The situation was similar in agriculture.

The portion of intensive factors in the overall growth of national income was only 25 percent in 1980, whereas it had amounted to 40 percent in 1960.⁴⁷ Rates of growth of national income dropped to a critical level, around 3 percent annually, at the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s. In this situation, however, in which the national economy was essentially in a near-crisis, the party leaders were unable to correctly determine the factors contributing to the failures.

The main thing was that the CPSU did not provide a timely political assessment of the economic situation which had developed and did not fully recognize the severity and urgency of the need to convert the economy to the intensive development methods and to take major steps to apply the achievements of scientific and technological progress in the national economy. "The situation demanded change," the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress stressed, "but a unique attitude of improving matters without altering anything began to get the upper hand in the central organs and even locally."⁴⁸

All that has been said here makes it possible to conclude that the economic policy developed by the Communist Party following the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU

Central Committee was objectively incapable of effecting a shift in the nation's economic development. As a result of this alone there could be no historic turning point in the development of the Soviet society as a whole, even if the trend toward democratization which took shape following the 20th CPSU Congress had continued to expand.

The democratic reforms were curtailed not only—more precisely, not so much—because the process was stymied by the forces of bureaucratic conservatism. Events of the mid-60s stemming from the departure from the line laid out at the 20th CPSU Congress were the logical result of the development of that objective conflict which occurred between the trends toward democratization of the economic, social, political and spiritual areas of the society's life, and the old system of socialist development, which was manifested most prominently in the area of economics and which had not been fundamentally altered.

The need to alter this system drastically and bring it into conformity with the Leninist concepts of socialism had not been acknowledged at that time by either the CPSU leaders or the social scientists. Conclusions which were developed from the end of the '20s to the mid-50s on the laws of revolutionary renewal of the world, on socialism and ways for it to develop into communism did not undergo major changes during that period and continued to be unequivocally described as creative development of Lenin's concepts regarding ways to build the new society.

In that situation the conflict discussed here could be resolved only by curtailing the process of democratization of public life and bringing it into conformity with the system of management by administrative decree, which continued to dominate. And that is what occurred following the October 1964 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

With respect to this, it would appear that the main task of the scholars should consist not only and not so much in analyzing the lessons from the implementation of the policy set forth in party and state documents between the second half of the '50s and the beginning of the '80s (although this is unquestionably important in and of itself) as much as in studying the Communist Party's historical experience related to the development of the policy itself. This is because political errors are the errors which cost most dearly. What are some of the lessons from the historical experience of the period from the mid-50s to the beginning of the '80s as applicable to the subject of this article?

First of all, even when administrative methods of management appear to be functioning perfectly at certain stages in the society's development, they do not ensure stable growth of the socialist economy based on scientific and technological progress. At best, they can temporarily

halt a decline in production effectiveness and provide for its rise for a period of several years, as was the case in the mid-50s and the first half of the '60s. That is all, however.

Historical experience further teaches us that the Communist Party cannot leave the methods of socialist management unchanged in the course of seeking ways to perfect management of the economy. The situation which developed in the national economy at the end of the '50s and the beginning of the '60s, and then in the '70s, demonstrated the need for a basic change in management methods in order to ensure the advancement of the socialist economy. Despite this, however, the party continued to place the main emphasis on the methods of management based on administrative decree.

It has become absolutely clear that steps aimed at merging scientific and technological with socioeconomic progress are doomed to failure if in the course of implementing them we do not succeed in establishing improved organizational and economic relations which interest the basic national economic element—the enterprises and associations—in the extensive application of scientific and technological achievements in production. The party's efforts during the period of the mid-50s to the beginning of the '80s were mainly aimed at finding more effective ways of functioning for the central and local management agencies but did not actually increase the interest of the labor collectives in improving industry's production base.

The historical experience with national economic development has fully demonstrated the groundlessness of an attempt to find some single, universal means of achieving the objectives of social and economic progress. Neither the change made in investment policy at the juncture of the '50s and '60s for purposes of increasing the portion of capital invested in the modernization of existing enterprises, nor the reforms effected in the system of national economic management at the end of the '50s and the mid-60s, nor the improvement of the management system or the establishment of an extensive network of production and scientific production associations, whose numbers exceeded 4,000 by the beginning of the '80s,⁴⁹ could ensure economic growth based on scientific and technological progress.

Finally, a particularly important lesson emerged from the nature of party leadership of the search for effective ways to accelerate scientific and technological progress in the national economy. It is essentially that the era of scientific and technological revolution is imposing fundamentally new demands upon the performance qualities of party leaders, particularly at the highest level. This era does not accept a simplified concept of the process of communist development, self-satisfaction, adherence to conventional patterns and formulas which do not reflect the new realities or sluggishness in the resolution of urgent problems. It insistently demands that the modern party leader possess a high level of intellectual, political, economic and moral sophistication enabling him to

continuously analyze the constantly changing social and economic situation, to detect conflicts inherent in the process of socialist development and find effective ways to resolve them. Firm reliance on the latest achievements of Marxist-Leninist science and the establishment in the society of a climate in which fundamental questions pertaining to the creative activities of the CPSU, including those which are not yet a component of the party's political decisions, are constantly in the focus of attention of the social scientists is an absolute requirement for the accomplishment of this task.

The interpretation of these lessons begun following the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee contributed to the development of the concept of the restructuring and the renewal of the Soviet society set forth at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and specifically defined at the 27th party congress, subsequent Central Committee plenums and the 19th All-Union party conference. Based on the Communist Party's mastery of the historical lessons, it has worked out a program for radical reform of management of the national economy, which essentially consists in effecting **"a transition from primarily administrative to economic methods of management at all levels, to administration based on and by means of interests, to the extensive democratization of management and all-around stimulation of the human factor."**⁵⁰ The program was supplemented at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference with a large number of decisions aimed at all-embracing democratization of the Soviet society and profound reform of the political system. Implementation of the measures outlined by the party is designed to open up broad scope for accomplishing the historical task of combining the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of socialism, to accelerate the achievement of the goals of the CPSU's program and to significantly enhance the prestige of socialism and its attraction in the international arena.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Glotov, "On Certain Lessons from the Historical Experience of the CPSU From the Second Half of the '50s to the First Half of the '80s," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 4, 1988; Ye.Yu. Zubkova, "The Experience and Lessons From the Unfinished Turning Points of 1956 and 1965," *ibid.*

2. M.S. Gorbachev, "On the Course of Implementing Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress Decisions and the Tasks Involved in Intensifying the Restructuring: Report at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on 28 June 1988," Moscow, 1988, p 5.

3. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 4, 1988, p 87.

4. *Ibid.*, p 76.

5. *Ibid.*, p 75.

6. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 57.

7. PRAVDA, 17, 18 and 19 May 1955.

8. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of CC Congresses, Conferences and Plenums], Vol 8, 9th edition, supplemented and revised, Moscow, 1985, pp 505-509.

9. *Ibid.*, pp 510-528.

10. PRAVDA, 17 July 1955.

11. Party Archives of the Party History Institute of the Ministry of State Control and the Moscow Committee of the CPSU, fund 4589, inventory 1, file 1, sheet 25.

12. "XXII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 17-31 oktyabrya 1961 goda" [The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 17-31 October 1961], stenographic record, Vol 1, Moscow, 1962, p 580.

13. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 4, 1988, p 79.

14. "Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 24-29 iyunya 1959 goda" [Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24-29 June 1959], stenographic record, Moscow, 1959, p 728.

15. *Ibid.*, pp 36, 173.

16. *Ibid.*, p 292.

17. *Ibid.*, p 463.

18. "Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika" [The Party Worker's Handbook], Issue 3, Moscow, 1961, pp 301-312.

19. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh...", *op. cit.*, Vol 9, Moscow, 1986, pp 519-547.

20. *Ibid.*, Vol 10, Moscow 1986, pp 288-296.

20a. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 let. Yubil. stat. yezhegodnik" [The National Economy of the USSR for 60 Years: Anniversary Statistical Yearbook], Moscow, p 79 (author's calculations).

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- Soviet-German 1939 Non-aggression Pact
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- [Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences A.S. Yakushevskiy under the rubric "Pages of History: Reading Them Anew": "The Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact: A View Through the Years"]
- [Text] No other prewar event is evoking as much interest today as the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. Soviet historians have written a great deal

about it. There is not a single work on the history of our nation or the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II which does not discuss this pact to some extent. To one degree or another the pact is discussed in books and articles dealing with the causes of World War II and fascist Germany's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union.¹ A number of memoirs of Soviet diplomats and public figures touch upon the pact.² The pact has occupied an important place in Soviet works analyzing and criticizing bourgeois historiography of World War II.³

The Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact has recently been receiving a great deal of attention from scholars in the Polish People's Republic, who regard it as a "blank spot" in the history of Polish-Soviet relations. Polish publications on the pact are frequently accompanied by references to the Declaration on Soviet-Polish Cooperation in the Field of Ideology, Science and Culture, signed by M.S. Gorbachev and W. Jaruzelski. In 1987 and the beginning of 1988 the weekly *POLITIKA* carried a series of articles on Soviet-Polish relations in 1939, including the Soviet-German pact. Excerpts from Polish Historian W. Kowalski's book "The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" and certain other writings saw the light of day in the weekly *ZYZIE LITERACZE*.

Sovietologists of the West devote even greater attention to the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. They have published dozens of works both specifically on this problem⁴ and as part of general works on World War II.⁵ Hundreds of magazine, newspaper and encyclopedia articles are devoted to it.

Despite the abundance of these publications it is necessary to return to the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. The fact is that a great deal still remains to be said about the subject in our historiography. Soviet authors have fairly completely described the factors which prompted the government of the USSR to agree to sign it and demonstrated the foreign policy gains obtained by the Soviet Union as a result of signing the pact. Works published in the '40s through the '70s, however, exaggerate what the Soviet leadership did following the signing of the pact to strengthen the nation's defense capability and enhance its military strength. This has resulted in a not entirely justified magnification also of the pact's role. The contemporary situation demands a more thorough study and all-around clarification of the problems surrounding the signing of the pact and of its consequences.

With respect to bourgeois publications, two trends run through them. Some scholars dealing with the Soviet-German pact truly want to understand the meaning of the events of that very complex period. It is sometimes difficult for them to do this, since the matter of the pact is surrounded by a mass of misinformation. Others continue to make active use of the pact for anti-Soviet profiteering from and the slandering of the USSR's prewar foreign policy. Following in the footsteps of the

Munich appeasers, they maintain that the Soviet Union was pursuing "sinister objectives" in concluding the pact with Germany and "stabbed the democratic forces in the back," and make other absurd and unsubstantiated accusations against our nation.

In the sessions of the 16th International History Congress held in Stuttgart (FRG) in August 1985, for example, the USSR was accused of entering into a compact against the world with Hitlerite Germany in 1939. The bourgeois Swiss newspaper *ZURICHSEE-ZEITUNG* reproached Soviet historians for "nonobjective," "biased" reporting of events of the summer and fall of 1939.⁶ On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of fascist Germany's attack on the USSR the West German magazine *SPIEGEL* wrote that in the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union attempted "to gain Hitlerite Germany's trust" and conclude a pact with it, as a result of which "the stage was set for Hitler to begin World War II."⁷

The anti-Soviets attack vigorously, using to great advantage for themselves the fact that there were hush-ups and reticence in our discussion of this very acute problem. All of the documents and material of the Hitlerite leadership pertaining to the German-Soviet talks just prior to the concluding of the non-aggression pact and up to the pact itself were published in the West. Most of this material is still not available to our scholars.

The position of remaining silent sometimes taken by Soviet historians creates doubt about the veracity of everything we write about the pact and undermines the prestige of Soviet historical scholarship.

When we publish items on this subject we think primarily about how it will be perceived abroad and whether it will harm the USSR's international prestige. In fact, however, remaining silent undermines confidence in our scholarship among our foreign friends and even among the Soviet readers. Doubts about the veracity of the published works have arisen even when they have conformed totally to the historical truth. Only by publishing all of the documents can we fill in the "blank spots" which still exist in the coverage of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact.

Soviet historians strive to make the most effective possible use of published documents and other material for producing an objective picture of the past and for refuting anti-Soviet fabrications spread by imperialist propaganda about the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. This applies primarily to the bourgeois theory that when the USSR concluded the pact it was not really guided by "self-defense motives" but was attempting "to deliberately incite a war."⁸

The historical facts show, however, that it was not the Soviet Union but the fascist states which were striving for this, particularly Nazi Germany. Power had been seized by the party which represented the interests of the most aggressive circles of monopolistic capital there,

whose main objective was to establish world dominance for German imperialism. Immediately upon coming to power in 1933 the Hitlerites began to prepare for a war to repartition the world.

According to the initial, rough plans, the Hitlerites did indeed plan to begin the main military operations to secure "Lebensraum" in 1942-1945. The situation which developed hastened the beginning of these operations, however. In the first place, Germany's militarization and the rapid growth of its armed forces created internal difficulties for the Hitlerites: the nation was threatened by a financial and economic crisis which could have evoked dissatisfaction among the population. The Hitlerites viewed expansion of the economic base by seizing the wealth of other nations as the most simple and speedy method of overcoming the difficulties, and this would require beginning the war as soon as possible.

In the second place, Germany and the other fascist, militaristic states were being nudged to switch to aggressive action as rapidly as possible by the connivance of ruling circles in the Anglo-Franco-American camp. Nazi Germany's invasion of the Rhine Demilitarized Zone in March of 1936 went unpunished. When the Italo-German intervention in Spain was begun in the summer of 1936, the Western powers announced their policy of "non-intervention," thereby abetting the aggressors. Nor did Japan's attack on China in July of 1937 encounter any opposition on the part of the Western powers.

The complaisance of ruling circles of the Western powers toward the fascist aggressors was demonstrated particularly graphically by the Munich Agreement of September 1938. In sacrificing Czechoslovakia, England planned to nudge Germany against the USSR. She was supported in this by France.⁹

According to the concept for Germany's conquests accepted by the military-political leadership, Germany planned to carry out successive attacks against its enemies and defeat them one after another, first the weaker ones and then the stronger. It was planned to use not only military means but also various methods from the arsenal of politics, diplomacy and propaganda to prevent Germany's enemies from uniting.

Aware of fascist Germany's expansionist plans, the Western powers attempted to direct its aggression against the USSR. Their propaganda ceaselessly spoke of the Red Army's weakness and the frailty of the Soviet rear, depicted the USSR as a "colossus with clay feet" and strove to draw socialism into the flames of war.¹⁰

The Nazi press also contained many assertions that the USSR was weak. This nurtured the hopes of leading circles in the Anglo-Franco-American camp that German expansion would be directed to the east. In 1938-39 (unlike 1940-41), however, the German General Staff assessed the Red Army as a very serious foe, which it was not yet desirable to confront. "Numerically, the Russian

armed forces," a 28 January 1938 report by the General Staff's 12th Department stated, for example, "are an enormous war machine. Their weapons as a whole are modern. Their operational principles are clear and specific. The nation's vast sources and the depth of its operational space are good allies [of the Red Army]."¹¹

The opinions of the generals—Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command W. Keitel and Commander in Chief of German Ground Forces W. Brauchitsch—were typical in this respect. When Hitler asked how it would end if the Reich were to attack Poland and France and England came to its assistance, both generals replied that Germany would finish off Poland within a month. Keitel also felt that Germany would then defeat France and England. If, however, the Soviet Union too were to go against Germany, then, in Brauchitsch's opinion, it "would suffer defeat."¹²

Based on an assessment of the strength of its enemies, the fascist leadership designated Poland as the first victim of its aggression, even though Ribbentrop had quite recently proposed to the Polish government the conduct of "a common policy toward Russia."¹³ But when Poland refused to be Berlin's vassal, the Hitlerites decided to deal with it militarily,¹⁴ since they had postponed the war with the Soviet Union, a very powerful enemy, until a later date.

At the beginning of 1939 Germany launched intensive preparations for a military campaign against Poland. A plan was worked out and given the name "Weiss." It called for inflicting "powerful surprise strikes" and achieving "rapid success."¹⁵ Under a 3 April 1939 order by W. Keitel, chief of staff of Germany's Supreme Command, the Weiss plan was to be started "at any time as of 1 September 1939."¹⁶ Germany's political leadership wanted "to isolate Poland as far as possible" and prevent England, France and the Soviet Union from intervening in Polish affairs.¹⁷

On 28 April 1939 Hitler announced the abrogation of the 1934 German-Polish Declaration of Non-aggression and Friendship and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. A military alliance ("steel pact") was signed by Germany and Italy on 22 May. Mobilization steps were being taken in Germany at that time. On 23 May Hitler held a conference of leading personnel of Germany's armed forces, which analyzed the present military-political situation and assigned the missions to the Wehrmacht.

The Fuhrer demanded that it be totally prepared for a military invasion of Poland. "...The Polish question," Hitler proclaimed, "cannot be avoided: there is only one solution left—to attack Poland at the first convenient opportunity." The possibility also of a war with the West, primarily England and France, was taken into account too.¹⁸

The steps taken by Germany to prepare for an attack on Poland were no secret to the governments of England, France, the USSR and other nations. The world recognized the danger of fascist aggression. Sincerely striving to establish a collective front to defend peace and to unite the forces of the non-aggressive nations, the Soviet Government made specific proposals to England in April 1939, and then to France, for concluding a mutual assistance agreement, including a military convention in case of aggression in Europe. It proceeded from the premise that the most decisive and effective measures were needed to prevent war, and particularly a firm position on the part of the great powers with respect to the problem of the world's collective preservation.¹⁹

The governments of England and France received the Soviet proposals with restraint. They first took a temporizing position, but then, upon recognizing the danger posed to them by Germany, they altered their tactics somewhat and agreed to talks in Moscow, which began in May 1939. Our delegation made a maximum effort to form a powerful defensive wall which would block the way to war.

The USSR's steadfast resolve to achieve equal agreement with England and France was demonstrated particularly clearly at special talks by the military missions of the three powers, which began in Moscow on 12 August 1939. Our nation presented a detailed plan under which the USSR committed itself to field 136 divisions, 9,000-10,000 tanks and 5,000-5,500 combat aircraft against the aggressor in Europe. The plan contained three specific versions of joint operations by the armed forces of the USSR, England and France.²⁰

In contrast to the Soviet Union, Soviet historians have already convincingly demonstrated, the governments of England and France were not sincere and were playing a dual game in the Moscow talks.²¹ Neither London nor Paris wanted to establish equal allied relations with the USSR, since they expected that this would strengthen the socialist state. Their hostility toward it had not changed. The agreement to engage in the talks was only a tactical move and did not conform to the essence of the Western powers' policy. They went from exhorting and encouraging fascist Germany with concessions to intimidating it in an attempt to force Germany to reach an agreement with the Western powers. In the talks with the USSR England and France therefore proposed versions of agreements which would only have set up the Soviet Union for a strike, while not committing themselves with respect to the USSR. They were at the same time attempting to gain its support in case Germany should act contrary to their desires and move first not to the east but to the west. All of this attested to England and France's desire to place the Soviet Union into an unequal, degrading position, and to their reluctance to conclude an agreement with the USSR which would conform to the principles of reciprocity and equality of commitments.

Completely unfounded are the assertions by certain bourgeois authors that in the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union was not trying to cooperate with the Western powers or to conclude a mutual assistance pact with them, but was making "a deal with Germany" behind their backs.²²

In fact, German diplomacy was making persistent efforts to accomplish the mission assigned to them—to prevent "Russia's intervention" in the war to be started. Workers in Germany's foreign policy department repeatedly contacted representatives of the USSR in Berlin and Moscow, and presented proposals for improving Soviet-German relations.²³

Right up until mid-August 1939, as long as there was a hope of concluding an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement, our government did not respond to the German feelers. The collapse of the talks by the military missions of England, France and the USSR was predestined by the position taken by the governments of the Western powers however. "The British government," stated instructions for the delegation at the talks approved at a meeting of England's Royal Defense Committee on 2 August 1939, "does not want to be drawn into any sort of specific commitment which could tie our hands under any circumstances. With respect to a military agreement, we should therefore strive to limit things to the most general statements," conduct the talks extremely slowly, "maintain caution" and not conduct "talks on the defense of the Baltic states."²⁴ This was actually a recommendation not for the concluding of a military agreement with the Soviet Union but for failure, and that is just what resulted. England's Foreign Secretary E. Halifax, aware that Admiral R. Drax, head of the British delegation, was not authorized to conclude any kind of important agreements, told his colleagues in the cabinet with concealed satisfaction: "The military talks are to be dragged out indefinitely, and we shall thereby gain time to get out of the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, in the best possible way."²⁵

Some bourgeois authors criticize the Soviet Union for "intractability" and "inflexibility" in the trilateral talks of the military missions in Moscow, and for a reluctance to make concessions on the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory.²⁶ But what kind of "intractability" was there, when the Soviet Union was only demanding the right to use the territory of Poland and neighboring states to make it possible for Soviet troops to close in on the enemy. Without this how could the USSR have fulfilled its commitments under the mutual assistance agreement? This was a perfectly legal demand on our part. That is precisely why the Soviet delegation called it the "cardinal issue" of the talks.²⁷ Further talks made sense only if this, essentially the main issue, were resolved in the affirmative. The justification for the Soviet demands has been acknowledged even by sober-minded bourgeois scholars. "Now, the only chance of avoiding war," wrote British Historian V. Liddel Hart about the situation in the summer of 1939, "is to enlist

support for Russia, the only nation which could provide direct assistance to Poland and serve as a restraining force on Hitler. However... the British government has demonstrated evasiveness and insincerity. ...The objections of the government of Poland and other small countries to aid from Russia has also played a ruinous role...."²⁸

The unproductiveness of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks reduced to naught efforts of the Soviet government to create a coalition of non-aggressive states. The Soviet Union remained in international isolation. It was threatened by war with very powerful enemies on two fronts: Germany to the west and Japan to the east. The danger of an anti-Soviet deal by the entire imperialist camp continued to exist. In this extremely complex situation, with possible severe consequences, the Communist Party and the government of the USSR had to think first of their own country's security.

Our government had the option of either waiting passively for Germany to initiate aggression on the western borders of the USSR, which could develop into a war against the Soviet Union, or of trying to preserve peace for the nation if possible by delaying the date of armed conflict with Germany as long as possible. Proposals coming out of Berlin for improving Soviet-German relations could not have been more opportune in that situation.

In response to a German request of 15 August 1939, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov received German Ambassador F.[sic] Shulenburg, who presented Ribbentrop's announcement. It affirmed that Germany had no "aggressive intentions" toward the USSR and proposed the settling of all existing disputes "to the complete satisfaction of both parties," for which the German minister of Foreign affairs was prepared to travel to Moscow immediately. V.M. Molotov did not give specific answers to the questions posed.²⁹

Berlin was obviously impatient. Shulenburg kept receiving new instructions. Hitler announced to those around him that he was prepared to travel to Moscow himself if necessary.³⁰

The Soviet government did not give in to the pressure from Berlin, but it was decided to use the talks beginning on 15 August on the improvement of Soviet-German relations to exert diplomatic pressure on the Western powers, particularly England. It was for this purpose, one must assume, that V.M. Molotov received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR L. Steinhardt on 16 August and informed him of F. Shulenburg's visit and the proposals made by the government of Germany for the concluding of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact and, together with the USSR, of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Baltic states. Just as the Soviet government calculated, the ambassador immediately reported this to Washington. On 17 August U.S. Under-Secretary of State S. Welles delivered to British Ambassador R. Lindsay the

information received from Moscow on the possibility of an agreement between the USSR and Germany.³¹ The latter was obviously aware of his government's position and its reluctance to make any sort of concessions to the Soviet Union for the sake of creating a united Anglo-Franco-Soviet front against Hitlerite Germany, and he therefore considered it unnecessary to rush to inform London of the information received from Welles. He sent his report on the matter by airmail and not by telegraph, and it did not reach England's minister of foreign affairs until 22 August, when it was already too late to exert any significant influence upon the course of events.³² Today it is impossible to predict, of course, what the government of England would have done had Lindsay's report reached London 4 days earlier. Judging from the reaction of the British ambassador to the USA, however, and the behavior of the British delegation at the talks in Moscow, London would hardly have changed its position.

On 17 August the German ambassador in Moscow visited V.M. Molotov again and confirmed Berlin's willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact and, together with the USSR, to guarantee the sovereignty of the Baltic states. The German government promised also to influence Japan to normalize relations with our nation. The answer to Shulenburg was that relations between the USSR would have to improve gradually and that a trip by Ribbentrop to Moscow would require advance preparations.³³

On 20 August Hitler sent a personal message to I.V. Stalin, proposing that Germany's foreign minister, "vested with all extraordinary authority to compile and sign a non-aggression pact," be received on 22 August.³⁴ A minimum of time had thus been allocated for making extremely important decisions. The typhoon of war, which had already engulfed a significant part of the planet, was bearing down on the Soviet nation. Urgent action based on a correct assessment of the existing situation was required in order to avoid the typhoon.

The Soviet Government had to decide whether to decline or accept the German proposal. In the first case the USSR faced the threat of war with Germany in the west and with Japan in the east. Since the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks had been exhausted by mid-August, the Soviet Government agreed to a concession to Berlin, although it was initially proposed that Ribbentrop be received on 26 or 27 August. This was designed to gain more time, for time could alter the situation.

Unlike England and France, Germany treated the USSR as an equal in its talks with us, making reciprocal concessions in response to our nation's. This was manifested particularly clearly with respect to the Baltic states. All of this led to the achievement of rapid and mutually satisfying agreement on a Soviet-German pact.

The USSR government's decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany was forced but was perfectly logical in the situation. In the existing situation the Soviet Union had no other choice, since it had not been possible to achieve the signing of a mutual assistance treaty with England and France, but it was only a matter of days to the time planned in advance for Germany's attack on Poland. Even some Western authors acknowledge that the USSR's actions in August of 1939 were forced and were proper. "The situation in 1939 was difficult for the Soviet Union," West German scholars M. Bartsch, H.-F. Schebesch and R. Scheppelmann noted. "It was completely isolated and encircled by openly hostile neighbors. Furthermore, it was in a state of war... with Japan, the most dangerous great power in the East."³⁵ British authors R. Haigh, D. Morris and A. Peters believe that the situation in the summer of 1939 completely justified the concluding of the Soviet-German pact. "Although the Soviet Union's interests were basically confined to Eastern Europe and the Far East," their book states, "the concluding of a multilateral agreement on problems of security in those regions could have altered the course of history. Instead, Western statesmen were more afraid of Soviet communism than of the growing fascist threat.... The blame for the fact that a broad alliance capable of restraining German ambitions was not established with England and France must lie squarely with the Western allies."³⁶

Morally, the Soviet Union suffered certain damage in world public opinion and also in the international communist movement from the concluding of the non-aggression pact with Germany. The USSR's unexpected "rapprochement" with fascist Germany seemed unnatural to progressive-minded people. They could not know everything known to the Soviet Government. Many of them simply erred, not understanding the meaning of the pact concluded between the USSR and Germany. The signing of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany was exploited for fanning anti-Soviet hysteria in "the democratic nations." "Some People here, even people not hostile to the USSR," Soviet Ambassador to England I.M. Mayskiy recalled, "were unable to properly understand its actions and drew erroneous conclusions about our policy."³⁷ Friendly socialist nations gradually recognized the justification for the diplomatic move made by the Soviet Union and the logic of concluding the pact under those historical circumstances, since there was no alternative.

The Soviet people's attitude toward the pact was unequivocal. They trusted their government and believed that it had acted properly. They did not all understand the unexpected turn in relations with fascist Germany, however. Many things seemed inexplicable. Some Soviet people, particularly those who had fought the fascists in Spain, expressed a certain confusion, even embarrassment and awkwardness, before our allies in other nations, who saw the Soviet Union as the main buttress in the battle with world fascism. "There was something impossible to comprehend with feelings,"

Konstantin Simonov, a witness to the events, commented in his memoirs. "With the mind, perhaps, but not with feelings. Something had turned upside down both in the world around us and in ourselves. It was as though we had become someone other than who we had been; as though we had to continue living with a different self-perception after this pact."³⁸

While the concluding of the non-aggression pact was justified in the minds of the Soviet people by the need to avoid war—and no one wanted war—the signing of the agreement on friendship and on the border between the USSR and Germany on 28 September 1939 was absolutely incomprehensible. No one felt any friendship for the German fascists. F. Haus, a worker in Germany's Foreign Ministry, said that I.V. Stalin announced in response to a question from Ribbentrop during talks between Molotov and Ribbentrop on the concluding of a non-aggression pact: "There can be no neutrality on our part so long as you do not stop making your aggressive plans with respect to the USSR." He then stated it more specifically: "We do not forget that your ultimate goal is to attack us."³⁹ If Stalin said this even about the non-aggression pact, then how does one explain his decision to conclude an agreement on friendship and on the border? There is every basis for saying that its conclusion should be regarded as an important mistake by the USSR's leadership at that time.⁴⁰ The treaty and everything which followed it in the mass media disarmed the Soviet people spiritually. They hated fascism, understanding that it was the greatest of evils not just for our nation but for all mankind, and our official propaganda was calling upon them to accept this evil to a certain degree.

A considerable number of anti-fascists who came from Germany and territories annexed by it lived in the USSR from the mid-30s. Their memoirs indicate that they greeted the non-aggression pact with understanding. Some of them, under assignment from the Komintern, addressed meetings of Soviet workers in various of the nation's cities and explained how the USSR had avoided war by means of the pact. According to Leopold Grunwald, who fled from Czechoslovakia to the USSR in March 1939, however, the anti-fascists living in the Soviet Union greeted in a negative way the "treaty of friendship with a mortal enemy of socialism and peace."⁴¹ This is one more proof that it was an error to conclude that treaty.

Individual unfriendly acts by the Soviet leadership against certain of the anti-fascists residing in the USSR also evoked dissatisfaction among them. Several groups of German and Austrian anti-fascists, who had suffered repression in the '30s and were under investigation or imprisoned in the USSR, were turned over to German authorities at the beginning of 1940. It is particularly regretful that in many cases this was done against the will of those handed over.⁴²

One cannot help asking whether the concluding of the non-aggression pact with Germany was the best way for the Soviet government to resolve the urgent problems of that time. It is not easy to answer this question. From today's vantage point, when we know a great deal which was not known even by leading statesmen at that time, one can say with confidence that the best thing under those circumstances would have been to accept Soviet proposals for collective security and sign the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty on mutual assistance and the corresponding convention. This would have led to the establishment of a united anti-Hitlerite coalition, prevented aggression and possibly, World War II. Not just Soviet but also many Western students of recent history are now coming to that conclusion.

The unification of all peace-loving forces is what the Soviet Union was striving for during the prewar years. It is not the Soviet Union's fault that this possibility was not realized. Ideological biases among ruling circles of the Western powers barred the way to unification. They were unable to overcome them even in a situation of danger threatening all mankind. Their egotistical, selfish, class interests came before common human interests.

Events began to go against the plans of ruling circles of the Western powers following the signing of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. They urgently made vigorous attempts to make a deal with Germany, to give it Danzig and the Polish Corridor and to conclude an agreement with it similar to the Munich Agreement. Fascist Germany no longer wanted to share the world with anyone, however, and it was striving for unrestrained dominance. Hitler had no desire to alter his plans. German forces invaded Poland on three sides on 1 September 1939. The guarantees extended to it by England and France were backed up with nothing but diplomatic posturing. Chamberlain and Daladier hastily asked Mussolini to mediate, counting for the umpteenth time on reaching an agreement with Hitler by making concessions at the expense of third countries. This attempt too was unsuccessful, however. England and France were forced to declare war against Germany. The war in Europe began.

Poland became the first state to enter into armed conflict with fascist Germany. Poland's war was defensive, just and anti-fascist from the very start. And this needs to be particularly stressed, since conflicting opinions about this matter can sometimes be found in our literature.

The Polish people's struggle against the German fascists met with sympathy on the part of the simple Soviet people. They wished the Polish people victory and hoped that the German fascist forces would not succeed. These hopes were reinforced by England and France's entry into the war on Poland's side. It turned out, however, that these powers did not give the Poles any sort of effective help. To everyone's disappointment, Poland was rapidly defeated. Polish workers, peasants, soldiers and the best representatives of the intelligentsia had

arisen to defend their homeland from the fascist invaders. Events took a tragic course, however. Taking advantage of its superior forces, particularly with respect to tanks and aircraft, the German army was able to effect a Blitzkrieg ("lightning-like war"). Just a week after the attack German forces had penetrated deeply into Polish territory and reached the approaches to Warsaw. The Polish government fled to Romania on 17 September, abandoning the country and the people to the mercy of fate. Even after that, however, the Polish people did not lay down their arms. The ancient fortress of Modlin, where the people's home guard fought alongside the soldiers, battled the fascist aggressors until 2 October. The heroic defense of Warsaw continued for 20 days. A workers' brigade, led by leftist socialists and communists emerged from the underground, fought there together with the garrison units.

The Polish people demonstrated courage and steadfastness in the fighting against the fascist aggressors and an inexorable desire to defend their national independence and freedom. Poland's workers responded with armed warfare to the evil deeds of the Hitlerites.

Unfortunately, during the first weeks of fascist occupation of Polish territory the Soviet press carried items, including statements by officials, which were insulting to the Poles. One such statement, as an example, was the profoundly erroneous depiction of the Polish state as a "hideous offspring of the Treaty of Versailles" which fell to pieces at the very first attacks by the German forces. This assessment was given in a report by V.M. Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, at the special, 5th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939. Lumping the anti-Soviet policy of Poland's reactionary circles and the fate of the Polish state and of its people together, essentially stamping them as equal, contradicted the principles of Leninist foreign policy, the facts of history and common sense.⁴³

One cannot justify such evaluations, even if they were dictated primarily by competitive considerations and by a reaction to the anti-Soviet foreign policy of Poland's bourgeois government of land-owners. Its hostility toward the Soviet Union and its disinclination to reach any agreements with the socialist nation were one of the main factors contributing to the failure of Soviet efforts to form a military alliance of non-aggressive states to repel fascist aggression and forcing the Soviet Union to seek other ways to ensure its national security.

The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany was one such way in the situation at hand. History has vividly confirmed that it had a considerable impact on the international situation, led to an exacerbation of conflicts among the imperialists and played a positive role in the Soviet Union's battle against fascism in World War II.

Just what specifically did our nation achieve by concluding the pact?

In the first place, the Soviet Union avoided becoming involved in a war on two fronts, and this was a real danger. The pact between the USSR and Germany was concluded in the heat of the battle between Soviet and Japanese forces on the Khalkhin-Gol. As many as 100,000 men from each side fought in those battles. And so, a "first front" already existed for the USSR in August of 1939—it was in the Far East. We were threatened by fascist Germany in the West. Is there any need to prove what a war on two fronts would have meant to the Soviet Union in the situation of capitalist encirclement and foreign political isolation? With respect to this problem, British Historian J. Grenville wrote the following: "By concluding the Soviet-Nazi Non-aggression Pact on 23 August 1939, Stalin avoided being drawn into a war against Germany. The lack of military preparedness would have made a war more catastrophic for Russia in 1939 than in 1941. ...In 1939 Stalin had no desire, of course, to rescue Western democracies. He was striving to protect Russia."⁴⁴

A major split in the anti-Komintern pact resulted from the concluding of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. For the Japanese leaders, who were oriented toward military solidarity with fascist Germany, its pact with the Soviet Union was a complete surprise. Japan had pinned great hopes on Germany's attacking the USSR and counted on this for the success of its operations in the Far East. The action taken by Berlin, without coordinating it with Tokyo, to improve relations with the USSR was a disappointment for the Japanese leaders and undermined the faith of the Japanese rulers in Germany's reliability as their strategic ally. H. Grosskurth, a worker in the Wehrmacht Supreme Command's intelligence and counterintelligence service (the Abwehr), made the following entry in his diary at the end of August 1939: "The Japanese are seriously disturbed. The entire anti-Komintern pact has been shaken."⁴⁵

The distrust which arose between Japan and Germany at that time was not overcome by the end of World War II and affected Japan's relations with the USSR. It is in many ways clear why Japan decided to operate independently in the Far East, why it concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April of 1941 and did not break the pact, even though Germany expressed the desire more than once to have Japan as an ally fighting the USSR.

In the second place, by concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany the Soviet Government dealt a decisive blow to imperialism's plans for creating a united anti-Soviet front. All of the schemes of the European Munich parties to unite Germany, England and France in plans directed against the USSR were frustrated. And such plans were hatched up by influential groups not only of the Western powers but by the fascist states as well. In Germany, for example, Admiral W. Kanaris,

director of the Abwehr, pinned great hopes on achieving an anti-Soviet Anglo-German agreement.⁴⁶ World War II began as a war between two imperialist groupings and not as a war of the fascist bloc operating against the Soviet Union with the support of the entire imperialist camp.

In the third, the USSR's emergence from foreign political isolation in 1941, following fascist Germany's attack on it, resulted directly from events of the summer of 1939 and from diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet Government at that time. While prior to the beginning of World War II the Western powers frustrated all of the USSR's efforts to establish an association of non-aggressive capitalist states and the socialist states directed against fascism, during the war, due to objective circumstances, those states found themselves on the same front line. They had a common enemy, and despite the serious differences which remained, they were able to see the war through to total victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism. The fact that the socialist Soviet state had powerful allies among the capitalist nations made it easier to achieve victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In the fourth place, as a result of concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany the Soviet Union avoided a war in 1939 and gained around 2 years for strengthening its defense capability. One can question only whether adequately effective use was made of the time gained by the Soviet Nation.

Our literature contains numerous statements to the effect that everything possible was done. The fact is stressed that the war industry was enlarged, munitions production increased, the numerical strength of the armed forces grew, and the nation's defense capability was strengthened. All of this is true. The fact should be stressed, however, that the political and military leadership at that time did not devote adequate attention to the qualitative improvement of the armed forces as a whole and made certain errors. Concentrating primarily on quantity, the Soviet command element overestimated the capabilities of its forces, believing that they would be able not only to repel the Wehrmacht's attack but would rapidly crush it if necessary. This opinion was thoroughly publicized by the mass media. As a result the time afforded by the non-aggression pact was used less effectively by the Soviet Union than by fascist Germany. It enhanced its military capability more than the Soviet Union during the 22 months which elapsed. While at the beginning of 1939 Germany's military-political leadership assessed the Red Army as a very powerful enemy with whom an armed clash was undesirable, at the beginning of 1941 it had already detected a weakness in the armed forces of the USSR, particularly their command personnel.

This is what was said in a secret report prepared by the intelligence section of the General Staff of Germany's ground forces on the state of the Red Army on 15

January 1941: "As a result of the systematic 'purge' following the execution of Tukhachevskiy and a large group of generals in the summer of 1937, of which 60-75 percent of the senior command personnel with some fighting experience were sacrificed, the leadership 'at the highest military echelon' (from the high command down to the army command elements) has a quite insignificant number of outstanding individuals.... Those subjected to repression were replaced by younger and less experienced people. The vast majority of the present higher command personnel do not have skills and know-how in directing military formations."⁴⁷

In works on Soviet history and memoirs one finds statements to the effect that when the Soviet government concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany it "did not count... on the Hitlerites to be true to their commitments."⁴⁸ It allowed for the possibility of fascist Germany's violation of the pact, of course. At the same time, however, the Soviet leadership, particularly I.V. Stalin, was highly confident that, based on the experience of World War I, Germany would not dare attack the USSR until the latter had made a complete break with England. For one thing, this position is apparent from correspondence between Stalin and Hitler in the beginning of 1941. When the Soviet Government learned of the concentration of German forces on Polish territory, Stalin sent a personal message to Hitler in which he indicated that there was an impression that Germany planned to begin a war against the USSR. Hitler replied that large bodies of German forces were indeed concentrated in Poland but that they were not directed against the USSR. As the head of state, he assured Stalin on oath that he would steadfastly observe the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. Even though this was clearly a lie, it seemed believable to Stalin.⁴⁹ Admiral I.S. Isakov told K. Simonov that Stalin was stunned when Germany attacked the USSR. He absolutely refused to allow for the possibility of war. Until the very end, Marshal A.M. Vasilevskiy said, Stalin did not believe that, given the pact, the Hitlerites could begin a war without any cause on our part.⁵⁰

This was Stalin's mistake, one which had a fatal effect upon the initial period of the Patriotic War.

Many historians and commentators compare the concluding of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact with the signing of the Brest Peace and point out the similarity between them in light of Lenin's position on the possibility of the communists' use of compromises with the bourgeoisie and conflicts among the imperialists in the interest of socialism. There is in fact a similarity between them from this standpoint. They were both concluded in a situation extremely complex and dangerous for us and their objective was to strengthen the socialist state's position in the situation of capitalist encirclement. There was also a significant difference between these two diplomatic acts of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, however. In the first

place, the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty with Germany was openly discussed in our party, there were proponents and opponents of the treaty, and everything was decided democratically. The non-aggression pact was concluded with Germany at a time when the system of leadership by administrative edict and the cult of the personality predominated in the nation. All of the most important issues were actually decided personally by Stalin. No other opinions were expressed. According to available data, even many members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central committee learned of the pact only after it had been signed.

In the second place, V.I. Lenin stressed the fact that, in compromising with German imperialism and signing the Brest Peace Treaty, "nowhere did we cross the line undermining or discrediting socialist power."⁵¹ The situation developed entirely differently following the concluding of the non-aggression pact. That line was crossed when the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Germany and our propaganda drastically altered its attitude toward fascism, changing it from critical to neutral. The Soviet State and socialism as a system suffered major ideological losses as a result.

When we view the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact and ensuing events through time, from the standpoint of today, we can confirm many points already established in Soviet historiography and simultaneously point out some new things previously ignored by our historians.

First of all, one is struck by the extremely complex international situation existing by the summer of 1939. Both imperialist groupings were hostile toward the USSR. Each of them wanted to benefit at the expense of the Soviet Union. The capitalist powers absolutely refused to view the USSR as an equal partner. They conducted an anti-communist, anti-Soviet policy and were vehemently against any form of collaboration with the USSR for repelling fascist aggression. Even today, the ideological enemies in the West are not above distorting the situation on the eve of the war; they mix truths with half-truths and try to depict everything upside down. "They say that the decision made by the Soviet Union to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany," M.S. Gorbachev has said, "was no better. This might be true if we take not the stern reality but speculative abstractions taken out of the context of the time. Even in this situation the question was approximately the same as that during the time of the Brest Peace: whether or not our nation was to be independent, whether or not socialism was to exist on earth. ...We succeeded in postponing the clash with the enemy, an enemy which left only one choice for us and for the foe—to conquer or perish."⁵² The Soviet people and the socialist system passed this rigorous test. The war years constitute one of the most glorious and heroic times in the life of our party and our people.

The Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact makes it possible to conclude that we must prevent the unleashing of a new world war, create a nuclear-free world, free civilization of the fear of destruction and, in order to achieve this, shape a new kind of relations among states, a new moral climate of trust and respect among partners and not among enemies in the world arena. The general trend is already taking shape, and it can lead to the achievement of a mutually advantageous result which will benefit all mankind.

Footnotes

1. "Prichiny vozniknoveniya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [The Causes of World War II], Moscow, 1982, pp 9-30, 96-124, 152-163; L. Bezymenskiy, "Osobaya papka 'Barbarossa'" [The Special "Barbarossa" File], Moscow, 1972, pp 143-152; "SSSR v borbe protiv fashistskoy agressii, 1933-1945" [The USSR in the Struggle Against Fascist Aggression, 1933-1945], 2nd edition, revised and supplemented, Moscow, 1986, pp 69-148; "Yu.N. Rakhmaninov, "Problema yevropeyskoy bezopasnosti: istoricheskiy opyt yeye resheniya, 1917-1977" [The Problem of European Security: Historical Experience in Resolving it, 1917-1977], Moscow, 1979, pp 114-140; D.M. Proektor, "Mirovyeye voyny i sudby chelovechestva. Razmyshleniya" [World Wars and the Fate of Mankind: Reflections], Moscow, 1986, pp 72-81; D.M. Proektor, "Who Opened the Way for Hitler?" GLOBUS, No 23, 1984, pp 3-15; V. Falin, "Why in 1939? Reflections on the Beginning of World War II," NOVOYE VREMYA, No 38-41; "The Eve of the War: March 1938-October 1939," ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 37, 1987; and others.

2. V.M. Berezhev, "Stranitsy diplomaticheskoy istorii" [Pages From Diplomatic Historic], 4th edition, Moscow, 1987, pp 11-19; I.M. Mayskiy, "Vospominaniya sovet-skogo diplomata, 1925-1945 gg." [Memoirs of a Soviet diplomat, 1925-1945], 2nd edition, Moscow, 1987, pp 427-433; K. Simonov, "Through the Eyes of One of My Generation," ZNAMYA, No 3-5, 1988; and others.

3. "Falsifikatory istorii. (Istoricheskaya spravka)" [Falsifiers of History (a Historical Reference)], Moscow, 1948, pp 38-41; Ye.N. Kulikov, et al., "Pravda i lozh o vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [The Truth and the Lie About World War II], Moscow, 1983, pp 51-71; P.A. Zhilin, et al., "Kritika osnovnykh kontseptsiiy burzhuznoy istoriografii vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Criticism of the Main Concepts in Bourgeois Historiography of World War II], Moscow, 1983, pp 74-92; "O proshlom vo imya budushchego. Vtoraya mirovaya vojna: prichiny, itogi, uroki" [About the Past for the Sake of the Future: World War II—Causes, Results, Lessons], Moscow, 1985, pp 20-28; and others.

4. J. Brugel, "Stalin und Hitler: Pakt gegen Europa" [Stalin and Hitler: the Pact Against Europe], Vienna, 1973; N. Grant, "The German-Soviet Pact, August 23, 1939: A Non-aggression Pact Prepares the Way for

War," New York, 1975; S. Axel, et al.; "Der 'Hitler-Stalin-Pakt' von 1939: Diskussions-beitrage und dokumente" [The "Hitler-Stalin Pact" of 1939: Discussion and Documents], Cologne, 1979; R.N. Haigh, D.S. Morris and A.R. Peters, "From Non-aggression to Barbarossa: German-Soviet Relationships," Sheffield, 1981; W. Leonhard, "Der Schock des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes: Erinnerungen aus der Sowjetunion, Westeuropa und USA" [The Shock of the Hitler-Stalin Pact: Memoirs From the Soviet Union, West Europe and the USA], Freiburg, 1986; and others.

5. "History of the World: The Last Five Hundred Years," Feltham, 1984, pp 666-667; E. Topitsch, "Stalins Krieg: Die sowjetische Langzeitstrategie gegen die Westen als rationale Machtpolitik" [Stalin's War: The Soviet Long-Range Strategy Against the West as the Rational for Power Politics], Munich, 1985, pp 95-107; and others.

6. ZURICHSEE-ZEITUNG, 14 May 1985, offprint.

7. DER SPIEGEL, No 26, 1986, p 111.

8. S. Morris, "The Revisionist Historians and German War Guilt," N.Y., 1977, p 70; M. McCauley (ed.), "Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949," N.Y., 1977, p 9.

9. For a more detailed account see V. Falin, "Why in 1939?" NOVOYE VREMYA, No 39, 1987, p 19.

10. "Semidesyatiletie Velikoy Oktyabrskoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Sovmestnoye torzhestvennoye zasedaniye Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 2-3 Noyabrya 1987 goda" [The 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: A Joint, Formal Session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 2-3 November 1987], stenographic record, Moscow, 1988, pp 26-27.

11. Quoted from L. Bezymenskiy, "Osobaya papka 'Barbarossa,'" p 95.

12. B.Ya. Sipols, "Diplomaticheskaya borba nakanune vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [The Diplomatic Struggle on the Eve of World War II], Moscow, 1979, p 273.

13. "SSSR v borbe za mir na kanune vtoroy mirovoy voyny. (Sentyabr 1938 g.-avgust 1939 g.). Dokumenty i materialy" [The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939): Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1971, p 63.

14. V.Ya. Sipols, "Sovetskiy Soyuz v borbe za mir i bezopasnost, 1933- 1939" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace and Security, 1933- 1939], Moscow, 1974, pp 276-277.

15. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny, 1937-1939" [Documents and Materials From the Eve of World War II, 1937-1939], two volumes, Vol 2, Moscow, 1981, pp 66-68.
16. Ibid., p 64.
17. Ibid., p 66.
18. Ibid., p 98.
19. Ibid., p 72.
20. Ibid., pp 240-242.
21. V.Ya. Sipols, "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz, 1936-1939 gg." [The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy, 1936-1939], Moscow, 1978; and others.
22. F. Maclean, "Josep Broz Tito: A Pictorial Biography," London, 1980, p 40.
23. For more detailed information on the subject see I.F. Maksimych, "Diplomatiya mira protiv diplomatii voyny. Ocherk sovetsko-germanskikh otnosheniy v 1933-1939 godakh" [The Diplomacy of Peace Against the Diplomacy of War: An Outline of Soviet-German Diplomatic Relations During the Period 1933-1939], Moscow, 1981, pp 178-248.
24. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny," Vol 2, pp 168- 169.
25. Quoted from P.A. Zhilin, et al., "Kritika osnovnykh kontseptsii burzhuaznoy istoriografii vtoroy mirovoy voyny," p 79.
26. G. Rauch, "Zarenreich und sowjetstaat im Spiegel der Geschichte" [The Czarist Empire and the Soviet State in the Mirror of History], Gottingen, 1980, p 275; "Handbuch zur deutschen Militargeschichte 1648-1939" [Handbook on German Military History, 1648-1939], Munich, 1978, Part 7, pp 275-277.
27. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny," vol 2, p 234.
28. B. Liddell Hart, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna" [World War II], Moscow, 1976, p 651.
29. "Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945," Washington, 1976, Series D, Vol 7, pp 62-64, 76-77.
30. A. Speer, "Erinnerungen" [Memoirs], Frankfurt am Main, 1969, p 176.
31. R.H. Haigh, et al., "European Re-armament Policies and their Effect on the Balance of Military Power From Munich 1938 to the Outbreak of War 1939," Sheffield, 1981, p 113.
32. Ibid., pp 113-114, 139.
33. "Documents on German Foreign Policy," Series D, Vol 7, pp 121-123.
34. I. Androsov, "Na perekrestke trekh strategiy" [At the Crossroad of Three Strategies], Moscow, 1979, p 172.
35. M. Bartsch, H.-F. Schebesch and R. Scheppelmann, "Krieg im Osten, 1941-1945" [The War in the East, 1941-1945], Cologne, 1981, pp 65-67.
36. R. Haigh, D. Morris and A. Peters, "Soviet Foreign Policy, the League of Nations and Europe, 1917-1939," Croft Road, 1986, pp 116-117.
37. I.M. Mayskiy, "Vospominaniya sovetskogo diplomata, 1925-1945," p 431. (It should be acknowledged that the reaction of world public opinion and the international communist movement to the Soviet-German pact has been very inadequately explained in our country and requires further study).
38. ZNAMYA, No 3, 1988, p 35.
39. Quoted from "The Eve of the War: March 1938-October 1939," ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 37, 1987, p 5.
40. Assessing the position of Stalin, who, in his opinion, believed to the very last that Hitler would steadfastly observe the non-aggression pact, well-known journalist E. Henry wrote: "Did Hitler observe the 'non-aggression pact?' Or did he in the most ignoble manner deceive Stalin and along with Stalin, the entire Soviet Union? He did. Hitler ridiculed Stalin." (A reply to a non-respondent. A continuation of the subject raised 23 years ago in a letter to I.G. Erenburg. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 18 May 1988).
41. L. Grunwald, "Wandlung: Ein Altkommunist gibt zu Protokoll" [A Conversion: An Old Communist Goes on Record], Vienna, no year given, p 71.
42. W. Leonhard, "Der Schock des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes," Freiburg, 1986, pp 66, 68, 79-84.
43. G. Smirnov, "Going Back to the Lessons," NOVOYE VREMYA, No 35, 1987, p 21.
44. J. Grenville, "A World History of the Twentieth Century, 1900- 1945," Brighton, 1980, p 486.
45. H. Grosskurth, "Tagebucher eines Abwehroffiziers, 1939-1940" [Dairies of an Abwehr Officer, 1939-1940], Stuttgart, 1970, p 181.
46. Ibid., pp 69-70.
47. Military Archives of the GDR, W-10/21797, Bl. 793.

48. V.M. Berezhev, "Stranitsy diplomaticheskoy istorii," p 18. See also V.Ya. Sipols, "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1936-1939," pp 327-328, and others.

49. MILITARBULLETIN APN (Berlin), No 20(25) 1987, p 3.

50. ZNAMYA, No 5, 1988, pp 76, 83.

51. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 57.

52. M.S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya" [October and the Restructuring: The Revolution Continues], Moscow, 1987, pp 23-24, 25.

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"Voprosy istorii KPSS," 1988.

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Purge Of Minority Nationalities, Stalin As Georgian Phenomenon Discussed

18300026 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Jul 1988 p 3

[Letter to the editor from Sergey Serebryakov, senior scientist of the Institute of Georgian Literature imeni Shot Rustaveli, Georgian Academy of Sciences: "Are They Debunking the Myths? Or How They Arise"]

[Text] KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE (Issue 2, 1988) published Grigoriy Nekhoroshev's interview with Eduard Beltov, a member of the staff of the journal DRUZHBA NARODOV, under the heading "This is needed not by the dead, but by the living." For almost 15 years now, E. Beltov has been collecting material concerning the victims of the personality cult period, revolutionaries, scientists, military and literary figures, and artists oppressed in the 30s - 50s. As he says in the interview, "'this card-index of sorrow' now contains about 17 thousand names."

Among the questions asked E. Beltov, was the following, "Since you are talking about national literatures, couldn't you be more specific about which one suffered the most? After all there exist a multitude of myths to the effect that the Armenians and Azerbaijani suffered the most, since Stalin was a Georgian, and so forth. The 'father of the peoples' was also not fond of the Jews."

And here is how E. Beltov answers this question: "Once more let me repeat. It was not simply one or another particular literature which was annihilated, but virtually all literatures."

And he goes on to elucidate:

"Almost all the best writers of Udmurtiya were arrested.. Altay literature was pulled up by the roots, the majority of Bashkir writers were annihilated.. more than 20 writers of North and South Osetiya perished.. Soviet Jewish literature was dealt a shattering blow."

He goes on to enumerate writers, Karbardin, Kazaks, Tadzhiks, and then turns to the names of Armenian writers..

"What was done to Ukrainian literature," says E. Beltov, "is too terrible to describe, the same is true of Belorussian literature."

Words fail, it is so bitter and terrible to hear all this, it is difficult to reconcile oneself to the thought of what an enormous, irreplaceable loss our multinational Soviet literature suffered during those tragic years. But one detail attracts attention: this longish, mournful list of our losses cited by E. Beltov, for some reason, contains no Georgian names (if you don't count Sergey Amaglobeli, playwright and director of the Malyy Theater). Could this be accidental? If it is, than it is a very annoying coincidence. After all this could completely mislead the uninformed reader: they call it a myth, but maybe there is something to it after all and Georgian culture occupied a privileged position, exempt from all repression and persecution!

That such misconceptions do, unfortunately, exist is confirmed by an article by Eldar Shengelaya, "Half truths feed lies," published literally the next day after the KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE article, 18 June, in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA.

"The picture of arbitrary power and persecution of innocent people in the homeland of the 'leader' portrayed in the film 'Repentance,'" the article says, "was a revelation even in certain circles of the intelligentsia. The legend current among the Philistines that life under Stalin was good in Georgia, that there were no kolkhozes in the republic, that the peasants did not pay taxes, and lived carefree and happy as a result of Stalin's patronage is absolutely without foundation and is ridiculous .. The tragic list of innocent victims is endless.. It is terrible to contemplate the excesses of Beriya, sycophantically doing more than required to fulfill all the 'assignments' given to him by the leader, which grew into a national tragedy, the mass destruction of the best people, thousands and thousands of innocent people, among whom were the best sons of Georgia, the pride of a nation, the writer M. Dzhevakhishvili, the poets P. Yahvili and T. Tabidze..."

But let us return to the interview in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE.

E. Beltov reminds us that when he was collecting the names of illegally repressed writers, he had the editor-in-chief of the journal DRUZHBA NARODOV, Sergey Baruzdin, ask the writers organizations of the country to help him in his further search. He goes on to say:

"But I received an absolutely shocking letter from Georgia in reply to Baruzdin's communication. G. Tsitsishvili, the chairman of the Georgian writer's union answered literally that, 'we do not have detailed data and suggest that comrade Beltov communicate with the appropriate agencies.' Georgia lost such outstanding writers as Titsian Tabidze, who is not only of importance to Georgian literature, but to Soviet literature as a whole. The Georgian Writers' Union can scarcely be expected not to be unaware of this."

Of course, the Georgian writers union knows of the "important" Titsian Tabidze, as well as of other talented writers whose lives were tragically cut short during the years of the personality cult. And without a doubt, G. Tsitsishvili knows about this as does E. Shengelaya, every inhabitant of the republic and every even slightly educated person in our country knows it. Yet the reason for this answer from the leaders of the Georgian writer's union is simple and understandable—after all the writer's union still did not have accurate and confirmed data, and so the leadership considered it inadvisable to respond to the request with unconfirmed facts. And this is why E. Beltov was advised to apply to the appropriate agencies, where he could obtain an exhaustive answer. In my opinion there is nothing shocking here.

This story served as yet another pretext for biased arguments and dissemination of ludicrous myths.

But it seems to me that a staff member of a journal bearing a name like DRUZHBA NARODOV should, to all appearances, have refused to reply to such a tendentious and incorrectly formulated question as "...did the Armenians and the Azerbaijani suffer more, since Stalin was a Georgian, and so forth." I do not know what they had in mind here, but G. Nekhoroshev's idea, although he refers to "myths," is somewhat strangely formulated. He explains Stalin's bad treatment of the Armenians and Azerbaijani simply with reference to his nationality. In other words it is foreordained that a Georgian should make the Armenians and Azerbaijani suffer the most. And if the beginning of the question is concealed by the word "myth" (a designation which G. Nekhoroshev appears to think allows one to say anything with impunity), then the question ends with an assertion: "the 'father of the peoples' was also not fond of the Jews." Notice how simply and unobtrusively the interviewer for KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE uses a single question first to formulate a theory and then to offer supporting arguments for it to the reader.

For some strange reason, until now I never happened to hear any myths suggesting that being a Georgian predisposed one to hostility to the Azerbaijani and Armenians.

It is not for me to convince KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE of the internationalism which from ancient times has been characteristic of Georgia, to speak about the fact that over 100 nationalities and ethnic groups live here and live as brothers, as friends. One could also ask members of the Armenian and Azerbaijan nationalities and they undoubtedly would tell us how ridiculous it is to pose the question in this way. The Jews living in Georgia can also confirm the fact that they have never experienced either resentment or oppression from the Georgians.

Unfortunately, from time to time one now hears people emphasize Stalin's nationality for some reason when they criticize him, as if to foist a particular conclusion on their listeners.

Recently, unfortunately, we have been compelled more than once to acknowledge how complex, subtle, and contradictory are relationships between ethnic groups; how easily an ill-considered word can at times destroy the bonds of friendship that have united peoples for centuries; how easy it is to find oneself at the mercy of ungovernable passions and emotions...

Today, when so much is being said about the importance of interethnic education, and of strengthening the friendship among Soviet peoples, it is particularly surprising to read this in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE. Whether it was accidental or intentional, the Transcaucasian peoples are united into a single insulting and offensive phrase (I am referring to the phrase quoted earlier from the interview with E. Beltov); even if some Philistine thinks that way, it is no justification for publishing his thoughts in hundreds of thousands of copies distributed throughout the nation.

True culture of interethnic communication implies, first of all, patience, a respectful and benevolent attitude toward another ethnic group. It calls on us never to transfer the shortcomings and faults of individuals to a nation as a whole. After all, I hope, no one would dream of attempting to explain Vlasov's betrayal of his fatherland by referring to his nationality, even speaking in terms of myths. And E. Shengelaya is correct when he writes in SOVETSKAYA LITERATURA, "Stalin as an historical figure is not at all a Georgian phenomenon. He is rather a Soviet, and even a common human phenomenon. Georgia was never in the center of his particular interests and attention."

The years referred to be KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE cause pain in the hearts of every Soviet people, including, without a doubt, the Georgians. And there is no need to rub salt in this common and bloody wound. None of us has deserved this and attempts to kindle the bonfire of hostility among nationalities—are not only harmful, but criminal.

Appeal for Immediate Amnesty of Political Prisoners Supported

18120006 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 35, 4-11 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Mark Smirnov: "Tolerance and Charity"]

[Text] It is with a feeling of gratification that I read an appeal in the press from the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights at the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: the Commission calls for "announcing in connection with the millennium of Christianity in Russia the gratitude of amnesty to persons condemned or being tried under Articles 142 and 227 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, or under similar articles of the criminal codes of the other Union Republics." I see this appeal as a good omen.

Perestroika affects all spheres of life, religious included. We are witnessing remarkable changes in relations between the Church and the State. Democratization and glasnost raised the question of a strict observance of all articles in the USSR Constitution which may not always have been realized in the past. We are seeing religious communities which were formerly denied registration being accorded such permission; churches and monasteries which were closed down are being turned over to the Church; new ones are being built. Copies of the Bible and other religious literature are increasing. The nature of relations between the Council for Religious Affairs, Church representatives and believers are changing; if once command-and-administrative methods prevailed, then today we see the employees of the Council and its representatives as friendly people trying to help believers.

However, there are certain problems which are difficult to solve with a smile and a handshake—the problem is, we're still living according to old laws. It's no secret that many of them were based on the desire to restrict religious life, to place it under strict control. It's no wonder many clergymen and even ordinary believers found themselves at swords' point with law-enforcement bodies without even trying!

Among those convicted for involvement in religious cults there were and probably still are fanatics and extremists who harmed society and certain individuals. But when the solution to questions involving complicated emotional experiences was undertaken by zealous administrators, many believers landed in the dock and sometimes even in prison thanks to imperfect laws and the inability to apply them in real life. The leaders of religious communities found themselves in a complicated situation when they were denied official registration—sometimes these refusals were justified, but more

often than not they weren't. Frequently such situations arose because of teaching religion to minors and forbidding religious gatherings, services and processions which nevertheless took place.

The new law on freedom of conscience will have to clearly regulate the rights and duties of religious organizations, and individual believers. All signs indicate that something from the previous legislation will have to be revised. But while work gets under way, is it humane to leave people who have been deprived their freedom due to religious convictions in captivity among killers, thieves and rapists?

I think most Soviet people will back the appeal made by the public commission for international cooperation on humanitarian problems and human rights. It was signed by well-known and respected people, among them writer Daniil Granin, Metropolitan Juvenalius, Academician Boris Raushenbakh, and art historian Irina Antonova. In this year of the Millennium of the Baptism of Rus, such an act of mercy and humaneness will be yet another step towards rapprochement and understanding between the Church and the State.

The word tolerance is just as topical as it was when the voices of Leo Tolstoy, Anton Cherkhov, Vladimir Koro-lenko and other representatives of the Russian intelligentsia sounded in Russian society. They tirelessly propounded the tolerance of other religions, opinions and world views.

The absence of tolerance for people around us makes life complicated, conflict-ridden and sometimes even unbearable. Had we had more tolerance, perhaps there wouldn't have been any ethnic conflicts in Alma-Ata, Sumgait, or any "Pamyat" society employing national sentiments and an ignorance of history.

We're all fellow-citizens living in one big house called the Fatherland. And we'll all have to work hard to fix it up: it hasn't been repaired for quite a long time.

9274

Youth Paper Discusses Worldwide Role of Islam

18300036 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by R. Guseynov: "Under the Green Banner: Reflections on the Role of Islam in the Life of Present-Day Society." The end. For the beginning, cf. the issue for 27 September 1988]

[Text] I have had the occasion to be often not far from the center of Paris, in the quiet, comfortable side-streets of the Latin Quarter. I came here to study at the Sorbonne, I spent hours in the library here, and I frequently dropped in for tea at the corner cafe next to the subway station. The Moroccan proprietor, who had done an excellent job studying the predilections of his

permanent customers, invariably brought a small piping-hot teapot with a fragrant beverage having the taste of jasmine. The relatively inexpensive prices attracted a considerable number of students to this cafe. Obliquely, across the road in the shadow of dense plane-trees, the minaret of a mosque could be seen. Friends explained to me that this mosque—the largest in Paris—is an architectural monument, with a fine library and a cozy inner courtyard, and I made plans to have a look.

That evening, as usual, my friends and I occupied the corner table, and the proprietor affably waved to us with his hand, when I noticed an unusual commotion at the house across the street. Dozens of cars blocked the crowded side-street, the police were inconsistent in directing traffic. Limousines with diplomatic license plates and embassy flags on their radiators parked majestically. At a slight distance stood a police bus with bars, stuffed with armed keepers of public order. Judging by everything, the security measures were taken because of the large number of Arab diplomats. "Could it be that the mafia is assembling the 'godfathers' here?" someone among us joked, addressing the proprietor of the cafe who had come up to us. He did not appreciate the joke and, nodding respectfully in the direction of the mosque, said that today a well-known theologian from Saudi Arabia is giving a sermon here.

The Saudi Arabian theologian turned out to be of small stature, a lean man with a handsome face, and was endowed with the uncommon talent of a speaker and polemicist.

I will not enumerate the basic theses of his speech. In short, they reduced themselves to a eulogy of Islam as an active and powerful force, which is finding more and more supporters "in all continents and in the entire world." "The Muslim region of the world," the theologian noted, "possesses significant manpower, material, and natural possibilities. Finally, we have the main thing that binds us together and makes us powerful. This is the faith in Allah and the power of the spirit which comes from this." At the same time, the scholar and theologian complained about the fact that there is no agreement in the Muslim world and that there is no unity in the struggle with the godless.

From the sermon one could also find out the paths that were proposed for the strengthening of unity. This is the solidarity and cooperation of the Muslim states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other important spheres. The elimination of racial segregation and discrimination, as well as the eradication of colonialism in all of its forms. The coordination of the efforts to protect the holy places and the support of the struggle of the peoples of Palestine for their rights.

It cannot be denied, the platform is a constructive one, and here the true believers can count on the sympathy and support of many people. The end of the sermon seemed strange to me. It is. . . communists who are

declared to be main enemies of faithful Muslims. His entire fire the theologian directed at the exposure of the conspiracy aiming at the taking away from the Muslim their oil—their main weapon, to cause them to quarrel among themselves and to establish Marxist rule. Here his pronouncements started to remind me of others, which in recent years have been heard from the White House, where influential "protectors of Islam" have appeared.

From the conversation of those assembled in the mosque that evening, I understood that the Saudi occupied an influential post in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and that it was precisely as its representative that he made the trip through Europe. The next day I was again in the mosque and asked to be taken through the library.

Clearly worried by the interest manifested in regard to yesterday's lecture, the polite attendant gladly responded to my request—to help with materials about international Muslim organization—and quickly brought me a stack of books and journals. "There are now no fewer than three dozen such organizations," he said, "but only three of them are the largest and most influential." In so doing, the librarian significantly remarked that he had not noted such interest in a sermon for a long time, although he has been serving here for many years. And the issue here is not only the personality of the theologian, but the attention to the "Islamic factor."

Along with Christianity and Buddhism, Islam in our days is one of the three world religions. More than 800 million people today belong to Muslim communities in 120 countries. In 35 of them, Muslims constitute the majority of the population, in 18—the followers of the Koran represent an influential minority. Twenty-eight states, including Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and a number of others, recognize Islam as the official religion.

Modernistic tendencies in Islam have also affected its propagandistic structure to a considerable extent. Contemporary pilgrims who aspire to go to Mecca by no means have to make this journey on foot, but the last meters to the sacred place even to crawl, splitting the knees. The "Boeing" charter trips bring them quickly to the country, and buses equipped with artificial climate bring them to the holy places in comfort. If the architecture of the mosques built in recent years has remained traditional, the interior filling in regard to the quantity of radioelectronic and amplification equipment cannot but impress. Saudi Arabian theologians travel in "Cadillacs" equipped with computers, personal telephones and television antennas capable of receiving satellite communication. They gladly give interviews, take part in television broadcasts, and when going abroad, they frequently give preference to European dress.

The revolution in Iran serves as a graphic example of how much can be done by the modern organization of propaganda. The Muslim clergy in this country has at its

disposal a powerful and far-flung organization. Approximately 180,000 mullahs, tens of thousands of ulama, about a thousand Muslim theologians of the highest rank—ayatollahs, as well as hundreds of thousands of people serving in the mosques of believers—this whole enormous and influential force saw in Khomeini their indisputable leader. Having lived in Neufl-le-Chateau, a small locality near Paris, the ayatollah successfully directed the revolution in its decisive months and days. His residence was equipped with the latest telex communication and a direct telephone link with Teheran, which cost considerable sums.

The latest information from Teheran, including from the highest governmental circles sympathetic to the imam and even from the Shah's secret service, the SAVAK, arrived without interruption in Neufl-le-Chateau and was carefully analyzed by Khomeini's assistants. The statements and messages of the ayatollah, being dictated from Paris, were taped in Teheran on taperecorders connected to telephones, then with the help of skillful operators the recording was cleared of noises and efficiently circulated in thousands of copies. An enormous army of clergymen immediately picked up these instructions and literally within a few hours they became known to millions of people. This is what the Soviet historian A. Reznikov, the author of the interesting book "Iran: padeniye shakhsogo rezhima" [Iran: The Fall of the Shah's Regime] writes about this: "Tens of thousands of clergymen during the organization of demonstrations and processions utilized megaphones and amplifiers, which they had in huge numbers, as if the megaphone-amplifier were a part of their common equipment. The Iranian revolution was a mass revolution, a violent and irrespressible one. But also an organized revolution. Otherwise the political leadership would not have succeeded so effectively in slowing it down. This revolution was simultaneously violent and massive, as well as guided and controlled."

At the same time, however paradoxical, the activation of Islam also gives rise to the forces of ignorance and fanaticism, the severe laws of the shariah, and the ominousness reminiscent of the past.

A number of years ago, in Jiddah (Saudi Arabia), in a large confluence of the people, an executioner in cold blood cut off the head of a youngster from a distinguished family. This tragic event was preceded by a story reminiscent of the one written by Shakespeare. Two young lovers, in spite of the prohibitions of the parents, decided to get married. But for this, it was necessary to flee to Europe. In the airport of Riyadh, agents of the secret police, and precisely it has been charged with the duty to see to the observance of Muslim customs, arrested the ill-starred fugitives. The girl was publicly executed by shooting, and the young man ended his life on the executioner's block.

Public flogging with a whip, the cutting off of hands, stoning, and burial up to the neck in the ground—that is the ominous and by far from complete list of punishments that are widespread in present-day Pakistan. A

case is known where an execution by hanging was broadcast on national television. The chief minister of the government of the province of Punjab, Mian Navaz Sharif, even announced the creation of a mobile gallows to frighten his fellow-citizens.

It should be noted that only murderers and criminal elements end their lives on the executioner's block. The activists of political opposition parties, the followers of other religions, and even Muslims not belonging to the Sunni community that is dominant in the country become the victims of the barbarian laws.

There is no doubt that the moving force of such tendencies is by no means the masses of orthodox Muslims, who are concerned about the degradation of morals and the corruptness of the young people. The opponents of the national liberation movement advance a program of the reorganization of the socio-political and economic system on a religious foundation. Contemporary Pakistan serves as an example of such an attempt. In this country, religious fanaticism, aimed both against Hindu India and against neighboring Afghanistan, is being stirred up skillfully and consistently with the participation of the United States. In Pakistan, as the Italian journal PANORAMA noted, the general Islamicization of society is being conducted. Detachments of the Muslim militia are being created in the universities. The entire public life is being built on principles sanctified by the Koran.

Women, for example, are not allowed to participate in sports competitions. This prohibition was imposed in spite of the fact that the Pakistani sportswomen declared that they are prepared, in accordance with the norms of Islam, to give up short sports dress and to play in pants or the wide trousers that are part of the national costume. Fanatic Muslims are now introducing proposals to deprive women of the right to take part in elections, to drive cars, and, as in Saudi Arabia, to pay to women, who have suffered from an automobile crash, only half the sum that in an analogous situation is paid to men.

One also observes a trend of forced Islamicization in some countries, of the imposition of obsolete rites and traditions. Thus, in Lebanon, the pro-Iranian Hezbollah party pays 100 dollars each to Lebanese women for wearing the yashmak. Literally a day or so ago, the parliament of Bangladesh adopted a supplement to the constitution, which declared Islam to be the state religion. As a sign of protest, the opposition left the hall and did not take part in the voting. 85 percent of the 105 million people of Bangladesh are Muslims, but, evidently, by far not all of the followers of this religion are in agreement with its declaration as the state religion.

Among the works of foreign specialists in Islam studying the USSR, the studies of Turkish Sovietologists are singled out in particular. A considerable part of them is devoted to the prospects of a future "predominance of a

population of Turkish origin in the USSR." In connection with this, gloomy prognoses of "intensive competition with the Russians" are made.

I would like to advise the Turkish "Sovietologists," who are concerned with the situation of the Muslims in the USSR, to turn their attention to the situation of the working Turks in their own country and other states. I had occasion repeatedly to meet with and to have discussions with the Turkish workers in France, the FRG, and Belgium, and everywhere I was struck by their oppressed position without rights, even in comparison with other foreign workers, who also do not live an easy life.

"Before I turned up here, in Nanterre, I had the occasion to go through considerable suffering," said Ismail Bakhysh, with whom I got acquainted in a restaurant in the university town in the suburb of Paris. Here Ismail washed dishes and cleared tables.

His story is sufficiently typical to give an idea about the fate of the Turks who have turned up abroad. In 30 years, Ismail, who had lived in a small village near Istanbul, proved to be ruined. His small shop went to pay for his debts, and the father of four children found himself in the street. Somehow having arranged for his wife and children to stay with close relatives, Ismail went off to the city to earn money. However, the poor, who were looking for work like himself, were more than plentiful in Istanbul. After a year had gone by unsuccessfully, when he had had more than enough despair, Ismail departed for France. He has been here for three years already. During this period he was home only once. His dream is to save money for a shop and his own home. I did not ask him whether he has come close to this dream today, after living for three years in a suburb of Paris. But his exhausted and sickly appearance and his shabby clothing purchased for a cheap price in a clearance sale speak for themselves. I was his guest once. With three of his countrymen, Ismail rented a small room, which could only be compared with a hovel. A semi-basement accommodation with damp walls and a dim little window. The room has three metal beds, one dresser for all of them, a cheap transistor tape recorder and a wash-stand. "I have not acquired more property," Ismail smiles apologetically, pouring the strongly brewed coffee.

The block where he rented his room is inhabited mainly by Turks. There is a small coffee house here, a small store which trades in Oriental sweets, and a meat store. To go out into the city, what is more by himself, as I came to understand, is not anything Ismail likes to do. In enlightened France, which prides itself on its liberties and democracy, foreign workers during the past few years have had to put up with daily insults and humiliations.

The situation is no better in the FRG, where Turkish workers number more than half a million. The well-known West German journalist Gerhard Kromschroeder lived for several weeks in Frankfurt on the Main in the

guise of an "auxiliary worker from Anatolia." This is what he writes about his odyssey in the magazine STERN: "I get up every morning at 4 a.m. The work day begins at 5, and for 8 hours I sweep in orange overalls the sidewalk in my section between the Hotel Luxe Frankfurter Hof and the theater building. Without foreigners, the city would wallow in refuse: 95 percent of the street-sweepers are Turks. The main thing for them is to learn to be meek and mild. The first time I still quivered when I saw the inscriptions painted by someone's hand on the walls of the subway station: Akhmed, a gas furnace awaits you," "Muslim, go back where you came from." Or the inartistic painting on two dozen benches next to the police presidium: "For Germans only."

No one pays attention to me, stands up for me. Neither in the cafe or restaurant, nor at the streetcar stop, where a 50-year old passenger attacks me with his fists without any evident reason and pins me against the house wall: "I will kill you, you Turkish brute!" No one among those standing at the stop so much as moved. Only when the streetcar approaches does he let me go."

In recent years, they have liked to talk in Washington about the fact that the United States is the most devoted defender of Islam, a friend of the Muslim states. President Reagan repeatedly made declarations about his support for the "defenders of Islam" in Afghanistan. But it would be naive to think that in the Islamic states they have forgotten the constant hostility which the makers of American foreign policy have manifested in relation to these countries for decades.

Who to this day takes a sharply anti-Arab position on the question of the Arab territories occupied by Israel? Who creates obstacles to a just Near East settlement? It is the United States which does this. It is precisely Washington which slights 4 million of the Arab people of Palestine driven out from its lands by Israel, which categorically objects to the realization of its lawful right to the creation of its own independent state.

Every time when the Muslim states attempt to fully take into their own hands the natural resources belonging to them and to dispose of them at their own discretion, imperialism comes out with threats against them, right up to the use of force, in order to compel them to subject themselves to the will of the monopolies, which are always ready to trample the right of any people if it diverges from its appetites.

The sessions of the Anti-imperialist Tribunal became some of the most memorable ones during the work of the 12th World Youth and Student Festival in Moscow. I remember how many of those who were in the hall at that moment had tears in their eyes when one of the chief witnesses for the prosecution stepped onto the platform—Abduldzhamil Abulsabir, a 12-year old Afghan lad. He does not have hands on both arms. A number of years ago, Abdulsabir, going out into the street, saw a ball-point pen lying on the road. He picked it up and

removed the cap. And here an explosion was heard. This is precisely how children in the Muslim quarters of Beirut became cripples and died. In contrast to the ball-point and cassette bombs, there is no trade-mark "Made in USA" on the lethal toys, but there is every reason to put it on. Because only the generous assistance of Washington makes it possible for the Israeli aggressors and the Afghan opposition to sow death and destruction.

Such is the truth, and, in order to end this subject, I would like to cite one piece of evidence. The statement belongs to a guest from Sri Lanka, Seykh Farid Mukhamed Zavokhir, who visited the USSR: "The Muslims are occupied with peaceful work, they carry out their beliefs without hindrance. And here is something else that is important—this is the vitally active work of the mosques, and the free performance of the religious cults does not in the least interfere in the affairs of state; on the contrary, Muslims take an active part in the creation of material and cultural values. I will say it directly—your believers live much better than their fellow believers in other countries. All of them are guaranteed work, and they do not worry about their tomorrow."

8970

Cardinal Glemp Visits Belorussia, Officiates at Masses

18120009 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 38, 25 Sep-2 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by Natalya Buldyk: "We Should Try To Understand One Another"]

[Text] "Although different, Orthodox and the Catholic churches exist side by side. That is why we have sought and found a common language. It is a language of mutual understanding and the aspiration to do good, to meet human wants and needs and to help implement them," said Cardinal Jozef Glemp, Primate of Poland, who recently visited Byelorussia. The Roman Catholic Cardinal was speaking about the interaction between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches.

The road we travelled to Grodno took us past local villages filled with people bearing flowers who wanted to see the Cardinal. Parishioners from Grodno's three city cathedrals welcomed Cardinal Glemp with bread and salt. The clergy and parishioners of the Orthodox Cathedral of the Intercession of the Virgin, welcomed the Polish guest with joy. Filaret, Metropolitan of Minsk and Byelorussia, when greeting the Primate of Poland, expressed hope that the Roman Catholic and the Russian Orthodox churches would be at one in their main aspirations—for good, for love among people, and for peace on Earth.

Cardinal Glemp's sermons, delivered in cathedrals in Lida, Novogrudok, Nesvizh, and other Byelorussian cities, spoke of the need for joint activities between Catholic and Orthodox churches in order to achieve the

forementioned goals. His sermon in the Farno Cathedral, where he said a mass on the first day of his arrival, returned all those present to the difficult and sometimes even tragic times dating as far back as the Crusades. The Cardinal's itinerary in Byelorussia was packed. He visited seven cities and said masses in many cathedrals. He visited museums and historic places. Everywhere we went, laying flowers by graves and monuments, he paid his respects to soldiers killed during World War II. The Primate of Poland had an opportunity to meet with representatives of state and public organizations.

Answering our question of his impressions after the visit, the Cardinal said:

"This is my first visit to Byelorussia but not my first to the USSR. I thought I'd meet only with small groups of believers—Catholic Poles. But Soviet authorities also officially received me. I was shown lavish hospitality and I felt the openness of people and also expressions of sincerity from people at the cathedrals."

Speaking about Byelorussians' goodwill and hospitality, the Primate noted that the Poles, living in Byelorussia, refer to it as their own country, i.e., as he said, they "feel good here." He said that the people who now are responsible for the situation in the society in the USSR are doing very much, thinking about the future and exerting every effort to substantiate this future based on values raised by perestroika. The Cardinal said that the Russian Orthodox Church is very active in this.

08309

Tensions Between Moldavian Authorities and Religious Sects Outlined

18000027 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 88
p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent E. Kondratov in the column: "Learning Democracy": "This One Is a Believer, That One Is Not"]

[Text] The life of Mariya Kupcha, secretary of the Novaya Synzhereya rural soviet, has taken a turn for the worse. Four thousand rubles which her brother-in-law earned working on the BAM railroad disappeared from the house. And he was building a house for himself. On top of that, her son Vitaliy did something foolish: while taking his turn to tend cattle, he failed to notice that they were feeding on large amounts of poisonous grass. Three animals died. Their own cow was their loss, but the other cattle belonged to neighbors who demanded compensation. Where was Mariya to obtain the money? She earned 150 rubles a month, while her sick husband received 87—there was no more than that. So, Mariya decided to work for extra income, as she had done the previous year. She started the leave due her, managed to join Nataliya Gordash's brigade, and in the company of 18 fellow villagers departed for the Lithuanian beet fields.

Residents of Novaya Synzhereya go to the Baltic area every year under this arrangement. Sometimes the group numbers 100, other times 150. They are paid quite well, in money and grain. They pay a high price for this: to be able to thin the mangel-wurzel on three to five hectares, they must start work in the field at 6 am and work until twilight. The rains never stop; the mud is up to their ears; and it is cold—no mild Moldavian autumn there. Especially hard was work on the farm, loading manure onto trucks.

Mariya is a large and strong woman. She did not spare herself, working earnestly, at a fast pace. Being on leave, she had less time than the others. They were not tied down to any one job. Some of them were always doing odd jobs, while others would quit their regular employment for the season, confident that they would be hired back. The workers were largely young people who had recently graduated from secondary school. Anastasiya Kobynnik—the oldest—would grumble at the overly zealous Kupcha. Seemed that Kupcha was overdoing it. Mariya would laugh the matter off: "I am a communist. Should I not set a good example to follow?" And she would jokingly promise to tell the pastor about his lazy parishioners, his brothers in faith. "Don't you dare," the frightened Anastasiya would say.

A word of explanation is in order here. About half the brigade were believers—Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists. Nevertheless, there, far from parents and spiritual overseers, this was not noticeable at all. Not because a tired person had no time for prayer. The youth, "at liberty," underwent a transformation: they had fun, told jokes. And when they sang, it was not hymns they chose. They went on trips to Shyaulay, unafraid of secular temptations. They got along well with each other, all living on a khutor situated in a forest, five to a room. A bus would bring them milk and other food products.

Having earned 400 rubles and a ton of wheat for her three weeks of work, Mariya worked her last day and hurried home. Her heart ached: How was everything at home? Although she hurried, she did not make it on time: her mother, hopelessly ill for a long time, died only four hours before her return. Mariya cannot ever forgive herself for being late, not ever.

She returned on a Saturday; on Monday she was ordered to report to the rayispolkom. "But I am burying my mother," she said in desperation. "You are to go without fail!..." She went, but on Tuesday, with the question preying on her mind: Why? She could not know that the Lazovskiy party raykom had received an anonymous letter stating that she had taken a trip to earn extra money in the company of believers. The raykom members gasped: In the company of believers! Why, that's an extraordinary occurrence!

The letter was transmitted through channels to the rayispolkom. On Tuesday deputy chairman V. Simak asked Mariya sternly about where she had been, what she

had done. Severely frightened, she lied that she had gone to the Baltic area to visit her brother. "Now look here, do not try to deceive me," said Simak. Three days later the raykom received additional information: a list of names of believers who had worked with Kupcha in Lithuania. The anonymous letter threatened that the list would be sent elsewhere for action if the party authorities do not take the necessary measures. Mariya was called onto the carpet. After crying quite a bit, she admitted the truth and wrote out an explanation. They then left her alone, but at the rayon level her case was decided: **suchworkers** were not required by our soviets.

Although personnel matters are decided quickly at the rayon level, in Kupcha's case a difficulty surfaced: her elective position had to be filled by another deputy. There was no suitable candidate in Novaya Synzhereya, and the matter had to be "worked on," entailing selection, re-election, and only then removal of Kupcha. The truth was that she had served as secretary of the soviet for 17 years without compromising herself, working earnestly and knowledgeably. But what can be said if the raykom had already made a decision?

Five months passed while the matter was "worked on," a selection made and another election held. In the last days of February rural ispolkom chairman A. Andritskiy and party committee secretary M. Gadeyek of the Progress feed enterprise were summoned to the rayon office, where they were ordered to bring the Kupcha matter to a close. It was recommended that they explain to her in a friendly way that, from the morality standpoint, she can no longer... Well, in general, a discreditation. If state organ workers are to hobnob with... In a word, let the Kupcha matter be settled first at the party committee level, then submitted to the session of the rural soviet.

Judgement day arrived. Mariya was overcome with a feeling of uneasiness when she realized what was to come. Pale, frightened, and in tears, she ran to the party committee chairman a half hour before the session to say: "Do not disgrace me in front of everyone. I will write my own statement... On my own..." Gadeyek telephoned the rayon office, where the decision was: all right.

At the session, Mariya acted like a captured partisan. Explaining nothing, all she could do was to keep repeating "Let me go." The deputies were puzzled: What was going on? They thanked her for her many years of service and released her, without fully realizing what they were doing.

Mariya Kupcha did not work for two months, behaving as if she were devoid of her senses. She sold her young pigs, the cow, the heifer. She finally found a job in the school library. She recovered somewhat, then set out to submit complaints. To the republic Supreme Soviet, to the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party, to newspaper editors. The injury still hurts.

Mariya is convinced that she was squeezed out by the chairman of the rural soviet, since he would like the secretary to be more compliant. An apparatus worker from the Presidium of the MoSSR Supreme Soviet came to the village. He made an investigation and arrived at a conclusion: Mariya was not squeezed out; she left the job voluntarily. I myself made a trip to Novaya Synzhereya. I also became convinced that there was no basis for Mariya's suspecting the chairman of intrigues; he had done nothing of the sort. "She compromised her position," I was told as the reason for her dismissal. Regardless of whom I talked to in Novaya Synzhereya, and later in Lazovsk, all were certain that Kupcha deserved her punishment. Even without that the rayon was experiencing increasing religiousness among the populace, and this, to boot, as it were. There is no excuse for it.

The first Baptist community in Novaya Synzhereya was formed a long time ago—in 1925, whereas the Adventist community appeared about two decades later. At that time only a few families belonged to them. But after the church doors were ceremoniously closed in the village, the communities started to attract larger numbers of people, with the slow decades nevertheless showing rapid growth. Judge for yourself: At the present time, 6 out of ten families in the rural soviet consider themselves to be adherents of one of the doctrines of evangelistic Christians—Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and supporters of the Council of Churches (or of dissenting Baptists). For religious reasons, almost every third pupil in the two secondary schools does not join the pioneers or the Komsomol, skips certain classes, or refuses to participate in social activities. Many children do not attend moving picture theaters at all, do not watch television, and do not read "secular" books. Adventist pupils do not attend class on Saturdays, while students from dissenting Baptist families sometimes organize evangelistic debates and mass hymn singing right in school corridors.

There are few villages in Moldavia where believers comprise such a large percentage. There is good reason why. The generals of the atheistic front consider Novaya Synzhereya to be worse than a thorn in their side. It seems that the village is prominent in their thoughts, what with the visiting lecturers, the theme gatherings "Chemistry without Miracles," "Village Days," and demonstrations of new procedures. All to no avail. The reason is well-known: the believers do not attend any of these grand functions. The rural soviet showed me a list of people who had abandoned religion in the last 15 years. It consisted of 21 names. I did not see a list of names of people who joined the local religious communities during that time, but I became sufficiently convinced that the latter list is longer by dozens of times.

"How can you prove to them that religion is evil, when they refuse to hear what you have to say?", complained A. Gadeyek bitterly. "Absolutely no impact made by our agitators or visiting lecturers. As if there were a brick

wall separating us and the believers. They do not believe us. And, most importantly, they are completely independent of the economic organization."

So, here is the real difficulty. How easy can it be to influence the convictions held by a person with whom you have no contact either at home or at work? The members of the religious communities in Novaya Synzhereya prefer to earn their living in some other manner. The women make trips to seasonal agricultural jobs, while the men build farms, hospitals, residential buildings in Kazakhstan, in Siberia, in the Ukraine. Almost all of them have their own greenhouse and cattle; they are well-to-do, dressing and furnishing their houses expensively. While it is true that a few believers do work in the local cattle feeding organization, there are not enough animal husbandry jobs to go around. And they are not interested in field crop work, preferring the Baltic fields to the Moldavian.

The years have done nothing to lessen this alienation. The believers are steadfast in their dislike for any relations with the "authorities." Nothing would be easier than explaining away this alienation on the basis of unreasonableness on the part of believers, scrutinizing the religious dogmas for sources of hidden and at times open unbelief in the health of the social economy. But we should know that life itself over a period of many years has convinced them that they cannot rely on the word of representatives of the state. One need only recall how many reorganizations the local economic unit has undergone, how much it has rearranged itself, how many name changes it tried. The instability of employment, the lack of solid guarantees of having a job the next day have left their mark: Rely on yourself; keep yourself at a distance from the authorities. Better to work until you drop. At least then you can be sure that everything you earn belongs to you.

It has cost the managers of the Progress much time and effort to convince a very few members of the communities to agree to grow vegetables under family contract. They are trying to prove to other members, showing them facts and figures, that the same type of beet here at home can earn them more than in the Baltic area. Alas! the ice of distrust is thick.

Workers of the local soviets feel the impact of the believers' lack of trust even more strongly than the people representing the local economic organization. This is no surprise. It will be a long time before people forget how the head and the secretary of the rural soviet used clubs to smash the believers' glass-enclosed greenhouses, the area of which exceeded the legal 20 square meters. Regardless of how many times we hear it said that a foolish decree caused atheists to suffer as well, people have formed their opinion: it was a fight against faith. Now, when appeals are made to develop hothouse gardening, one sees a smile of distrust, an expectation of deceit. How can the authorities be trusted? How many times have they mistreated the Novaya Synzhereya

Adventists, who received permission to open a meeting house that was paid for long ago. But the red tape attached to the formalities has been going on for several years. The rayon apparently is of the opinion that bureaucratic obstacles are also a weapon in the struggle to render victorious the ideas of materialism.

The events taking place in Novaya Synzhereya are only part of a larger picture. It is not only in Lazovskiy rayon that soviet party organs consider it their duty, nothing less than a matter of honor, to "struggle against the religious opiate," using all available means. In Chimishliya, for example, when Seventh Day Adventist pupils missed a test given on a Saturday, it was rescheduled for the following Saturday. What happened then? "We are at war!" was the proud statement sent to Kishinev by the leaders of the Suvorovo rayispolkom, which stands in opposition to opening the churches in Fetelitsa and Kaplany. Papers are being drawn up in the Floreshty rayispolkom "to intensify the struggle against religious fanatics."

I looked over files of numerous complaints, letters, and grievances made by Moldavian believers against state organs. Why were they dissatisfied? There were many causes. In some cases it was failure to include members of religious communities on lists for apartments or telephone service. Complaints of illegally requiring presentation of identification during christening; demanding that pastors furnish lists of parishioners. Difficulties believers experience in applying for jobs, and even outright refusal to hire believers. There was a case where parents were refused permission to register their son, who was returning home from the Army. You will never see the name of a believer on the board of honor, even though he may work better than everyone else. Not even one has been granted a diploma or certificate.

Lawlessness? Of course. Could this be due to lack of knowledge or to legal illiteracy? What can one say? If one considers how suspiciously often the changes in bureaucratic prohibitions take place at the higher levels, it can be seen that the rayispolkoms violate the law on cults frequently and deliberately. The thinking is: Let Moscow correct us—we have nothing to worry about. On the other hand, in Kishinev, and most importantly in our own party raykom, this will be more proof that we are irreconcilable atheists. Their poor minds somehow cannot grasp the fact that our country is not an atheists' state at all, that it does not classify its citizens on the basis of "this one is a believer, that one is not." The USSR Constitution guarantees equal rights for all by law—for the communist as well as the Adventist. We do not have, and we cannot have, second-class citizens, regardless of whether the Soviet person explains the universe on idealistic or materialistic grounds. Most important to the state is man's relationship to "secular matters," his status as a citizen, participation in developing the socialist economy, respect for the law, strength of his moral fiber. The state is genuinely interested in having millions of believers feel that they are not detrimental, but

instead free, full and equal members of society. Believers should have no doubts in their minds that it is in the soviets—at the rural, settlement, and rayon levels, that they will always find understanding and support when their civil rights are involved.

Thus, our local soviets should be concerned not with winning victories on the antireligious front, but with making up for the great amount of time lost in gaining believers' trust in the government. Enough is enough; let the fighting end. Novaya Synzhereya is a graphic example of "successes" attained by employing a forceful approach to managing the spiritual life. At one time it was the feeling everywhere, not only in Lazovskiy rayon, that the problem was very simple: Knock "worthless" ideals out of a person and replace them with more suitable ones. Red tape and prohibitions lead directly to opposite results: members of religious communities acquire a feeling of moral superiority; they start to see life as an opportunity for sacrifice, while for others this kind of life offers attractions.

Thus, how are organs of local authority, the same rural soviets, to gain the respect and sympathy of the believers among the populace? Certainly not by mere scrupulous observance of what is "permissible" and what is "not permissible," and not by mere implementation of regulatory articles. In our days, when we finally have started to speak aloud and seriously of social justice, of mercy and love of people, this is not enough. The authority of the worker in the soviet will depend to a great extent on how humane he himself is. It should be kept in mind that people are most often attracted to religion by what they see as a lack of morality; people distance themselves from the cruelty, callousness, heartlessness, and formalism with which they come into contact in their daily lives.

I do understand that the directive approach to demanding that workers of the state apparatus exhibit patience and humanity is awkward. But the time has really come. The situation previously was of course much easier: If Baptists were to comfort a person suffering grief, for example, it could be said that they were "clever"; if they helped anyone materially, they were said to "ensnare," "set a net"... There could be no thought that the believers' interest in someone's fate, their readiness to render aid to a neighbor, fellow villager, even a stranger could be dictated not by a selfish motive, but by ordinary humanity—the same kind so rarely seen in the offices occupied by representatives of people's power. Incidentally, if people were to hear kind words, if they were met with sympathy and found help more often in these offices, could it be that they would react more favorably? Would they be more trustful?

Meanwhile... Merely for being in the company of believers, merely for working alongside them, the rural soviet secretary forfeited her job. "As far as the authorities are concerned, we, believers, are worse than the plague..."

Just try to refute that, after the Mariya incident. Incidentally, she buried her mother with the help of the members of the same religious community. The "clever ones." The unclever leaders of the soviet and the economic party organization did not even think of extending a helping hand to a comrade who had fallen upon hard times.

Well, the youth of Novaya Synzherya are not blind. They see everything. They make comparisons. They watch in silence. When election time comes, it will be interesting to observe: Will the visiting hurried lecturer be able to convince them of anything?

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Writer Astafyev Interviewed on His Talk With Gorbachev, Other Issues

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[Interview with writer Viktor Petrovich Astafyev by Nataliya Zinets, published under the rubric "Autograph for the Reader": "We Interview Writer Viktor Petrovich Astafyev: 'The Only Charge Is Shared Love'"]

[Text] Interviewing a prominent writer, the author not only of the well-known novels "Tsar-Ryba" [King of the Fishes] and "Pechalnyy Detektiv" [The Sad Detective] as well as numerous short stories, novellas, and articles of sociopolitical commentary, is not a simple undertaking, and is perhaps doomed to failure from the very outset: repetition of what has already been written or said, mere superficial treatment, especially after publication this year in the journal *MOSKVA* of the sociopolitical commentary novella entitled "Zryachiy Posokh" ['Seeing-Eye Dog'], which had already been published separately as a small volume, consisting of letters written by prominent critic Aleksandr Nikolayevich Makarov, a close friend of Viktor Astafyev, plus commentary by the writer himself, which seems to contain responses to all currently popular "critical" issues.

Nevertheless, over the course of the week spent by Astafyev in Kiev, the number of persons wishing to rub shoulders with him grew steadily.

A get-together held at the Union of Writers of the Ukraine was standing-room only. Young literary colleagues with a university or institute of literature-level education, as well as with graduate-school study, listened to every word uttered by a person who at the age of 21 had only 6 years of school, plus the experience of the war, and who only a decade and a half later managed to add to the fragmentary knowledge he had amassed at night school the benefits of systematic study obtained from a two-year Higher Literature Curriculum.

At the Officers' Club an imposing general—his chest festooned with medals—respectfully asked for the autograph of this former private who served with the 17th Artillery Division, a get-together for the combat veterans of which was in fact the purpose for the trip to Kiev by USSR State Prize recipient Viktor Petrovich Astafyev.

"It was with pain and sadness that I listened to the list of names of comrades who have taken leave of us during these last 2 years," he stated, addressing his fellow soldiers. "I believe that in the very near future it will become evident that this seemingly imperceptible force, which steadily lessens as the years pass, has served as a fundamental moderating force in our society. And if our society has found the strength for the current process of renewal, a large part of the credit for this must go to the

soldiers of yesteryear, the majority of whom have lived a fine, worthy life, never diminished in value, did not cheat or swindle, and always remained a model of moral excellence for society."

He did not speak long, and he calmly sat through two hours of a rather boring session. He did not raise an objection when the speakers, one after the other, emphasized: "All of us should write our reminiscences of the war. The job of editing such a book and getting it published we shall entrust to writer Astafyev." Do his fellow soldiers not realize that Astafyev's talent is far beyond the task of editing somebody else's memoirs, that this is not a young man standing before them but rather their contemporary? And, filled with creative ideas, he does not simply wish to embody them in words but hopes to do a successful job of it.

After the session was over he softly said: "I should go back to the hotel and take a blood pressure reading."

He strolled leisurely with a few companions along the autumn-hued streets of Kiev. It is unlikely that the passersby, preoccupied with their own affairs, had any idea that they were passing the author of "Pastukh i Pastushka" [Shepherd and Shepherdess], "Tsar-Ryba," and "Pechalnyy Detektiv," some of the most popular books in the country's libraries.

"The common people treat me with considerable respect and sincerity," confessed Viktor Petrovich with some embarrassment. "My telephone never stopped ringing on the eve of M.S. Gorbachev's arrival in Krasnoyarsk: local people called to ask me to relate our common problems to our country's leader. Letters asking for help came in from everywhere. During a certain period of time a wave of complaints against willful and arbitrary actions by officials came in from Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk oblasts. People not only wrote, but came in person. A woman with three children, living in dire financial straits, recently came to see me. She was broke by the time she arrived. 'Why did you come such a long way?' I asked her. 'Can I help you, at least with a little money?'"

"'I have related to you all my misfortunes, and I already feel better,' she replied."

I did not have to observe Astafyev very long to notice that he was pleased to have the opportunity to say nice things about others.

He was asked about his visit with O. T. Gonchar.

"A very good question," he replied with enthusiasm. "I would be happy to tell you about it. I had always wanted to get to know Oles Terentiyovych better, but had not had the opportunity to do so, although we were acquainted.

"My teacher at the orphanage, Vasiliy Ivanovich Sokolov, always explained to us children that pushiness is a bad thing, but that obligingness is a very good thing. And it is sometimes very difficult to hold myself back, especially regarding honored and respected people.

"I was also very pleased at the opportunity to visit Gonchar and talk with him. Our get-together at Oles Terentiyovych's dacha was a very moving experience.

"I am familiar with the group of writers whom we call the conscience of our society. It is as if they all bear blame before their fellow men. As I was leaving, Oles Terentiyovych and his wife stood by the gate, and he was smiling in a kind of solemn, guilty way. It brings tears to my eyes when I see that smile. I know how Valentin Grigoryevich Rasputin always seemed to be apologizing for the fact that he was a writer, as if he would like to give it up but was unable to. Obviously this is real talent, a real gift. It is at the same time both happiness and punishment for a person.

"He is a fine person, a fine example of both civic and artistic courage. It is regrettable that in such a big country there are so few Gonchars. Let us hope that new Gonchars will appear."

All these words also apply to Astafyev himself, a man who is implacably opposed to dishonesty and injustice. It is precisely this uncompromising attitude which has always moved him to action. At the age of 27, angered by phony portrayal of the war in a short story by one of the members of the literary group of the newspaper CHU-SOVSKOY RABOCHIY, Viktor Astafyev, who was working as a helper at a meat packing combine, wrote his first short story while working on the night shift. Later, in 1965, once again, coming out against injustice—unwarranted persecution of Konstantin Vorobyev—he published what was perhaps his first critical article in defense of this gifted prose writer.

Now, concerned about the fate of Siberia and its inhabitants (the alarm has long been sounding in many of this writer's works), he openly expressed his thoughts in this regard during a meeting with M. S. Gorbachev, a meeting which surely hastened the arrival in Krasnoyarsk a few days ago by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary.

[Zinets] Viktor Petrovich, I imagine that it is not so easy to gain access to the office of the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary.

[Astafyev] In April I traveled to Moscow to a conference titled "Historians and Writers About History and Literature."

When I arrived the auditorium was half empty; they had not even invited newspaper and magazine editors. The conference began. Academicians read papers which appeared to be several years old. That same old yellowed

paper and those same old naive ideas, as if in our society nothing takes place behind the walls of this institution. I was really angry: why on earth had I come here, spending government money and wasting time?

During a break V. Karpov, first secretary of the board of the USSR Union of Writers, came up to me and said: "Get up there and talk; otherwise this will become intolerable." I replied: "I am not prepared; I have no text ready." "That's even better," Karpov persisted.

So I took the floor and spoke. In particular, I said that everything that had been spoken from the podium can be read in any oblast or rayon newspaper. I am not going to recount what I said. Anybody who is interested can read it in Issue No 6 of VOPROSY ISTORII, in which it is published almost in its entirety.

During a break I was informed that Central Committee Secretary Comrade Yakovlev was looking for me. Well, I thought, here goes, I've gone too far in my remarks. But no, it turns out that he liked my speech.

He suggested that we have dinner together and asked me what problems were of concern to me. I told him that I would like to have a serious discussion with somebody about Siberia. He replied: "Then get together with Mikhail Sergeyevich. Don't worry, he likes to receive writers. But he won't order somebody to be brought in for a talk with him. You have to take the initiative. I will help you arrange a meeting. But be frank!" I had the feeling that I had been waiting my entire life for this moment.

Upon returning from a trip to Latin America, I tried to prepare properly for our meeting, in order to be not only frank but concise as well. There was no way I could cover everything; the main thing was not to leave out the most important items.

[Zinets] Could you go into some detail?

[Astafyev] I should say right at the outset that Mikhail Sergeyevich is a fine conversationalist, very approachable and straightforward, with a sense of humor. Within five minutes I felt right at home.

I told him what I thought about our agriculture and the family contract. This is a good thing—one of the ways to return to the peasant farmer the feeling that he is master of his land. It is simply shameful to purchase grain abroad with the lands we have, take Siberia, for example. I travel a great deal and always inquire about local agriculture. I cited some examples. Take Finland, with climatic conditions and soils almost identical to our Vologda Oblast, and yet an immense difference in crop yields.

When I was in West Germany I was shown the farm of a 74-year-old woman, valued at 14 million marks. She had seven employees and 100 hectares of reclaimed land. She uses no agricultural chemicals. She adheres to the rule

that a farm should have everything: from chickens to a breeding bull. She has a small grain elevator. I asked about crop yields. "They are low," she replied, "since we do 100-percent organic farming—52 quintals per hectare. The national average is 60 quintals, and some farms produce as much as 80."

Climatic conditions in West Germany are certainly no better than those in our Ukraine.

Leo Tolstoy's grandson came from Italy to visit Yasnaya Polyana, as well as to see the country in general. They chose the finest farm in Tula Oblast for him to visit, where they produce 5,000 liters of milk per cow. "Is that all?" he asked, surprised. "In Italy the yield is 10,000 liters; otherwise you could go bankrupt."

It always hurts me to hear things like that: our country has been driven to such a state. I spoke frankly on this score with Mikhail Sergeyevich. It was easy and at the same time difficult to talk about this with him. His father was a combine operator, and he himself worked as a towed implement operator and knows what the score is.

There is a saying that the dead sleep soundly in their graves. I would not like those who left us this legacy to sleep soundly in their graves.

During my conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich, drawing his attention both to the exploitation of Siberia's resources and to hydroelectric construction (the situation is not good: we already have 219 reservoirs, and they are planning to drain water out of the Yenisey like they are doing from the Volga), I told him that he really had to visit such places as Krasnoyarsk and Kemerovo, for it is a disgrace that they are turning Siberia into a colonial territory. They are depleting its mineral resources and cutting down its forests. The air is getting polluted. Cases of bronchial ailments are increasing.

[Zinets] In "Zryachiy Posokh" you write that for many gifted writers relations with the representatives of power, the leadership, so-called officialdom have not been easy. Is this inevitable?

[Astafyev] Of course! Are you familiar with the title of A. M. Gorkiy's first, little-known collected volume of stories? "I Came Into the World to Dissent." As long as injustice and lack of freedom exist, the artistically creative individual will always come into conflict with his environment. Another problem is the fact that we are not accustomed to living in a democratic society and enjoying at least relative freedom. Yevgeniy Nosov aptly commented in an article: "If they don't grab us by the collar, that is democracy."

Now there have come forth people with different, often unconventional ideas. From the viewpoint of that same apparatchik, of course what they are saying is wrong, what they are doing is wrong, and what we writers are writing is wrong.

As I see it, all these painful crises are inevitable companions in the emergence of democracy. Where have you seen something worthwhile not preceded by something totally without merit? After all, life is a complex thing. Suddenly a person is inundated with a great quantity of information about the acts of repression and horrors of the 1930's and 1940's, we don't have enough food, the quality of goods is poor, and general indifference reigns. All this in some way or another must be addressed, analyzed, and comprehended. People are coming forth and even joining into organizations, who seek to live not according to the old pattern and not to help specific individuals but rather us, society—this is their main task. But they are doing this in an unskillful fashion. So help them, set them straight, but do not condemn them right at the outset, for is it a better situation where some young people prefer to sit by the stove, letting somebody else fight for them? I know groups of people who get together, spend four hours or so arguing, gesticulating, shaking their fists in some secluded corner, then disperse, but are incapable of action. Nothing can be accomplished by such "under-the-covers" courage. But the state of our society is so alarming, we have neglected ourselves to such an extent that it simply cannot be tolerated further. Things have reached the point where we are capable only of marching to a drumbeat and of standing in lines. No capitalist could allow himself the luxury of letting his workers become emotionally drained in the search for groceries and clothing, be jostled and crowded on public means of conveyance, and have poor rest and recreation opportunities. What kind of productivity would they have? But we permit this everywhere.

[Zinets] Tell us about the proceedings of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. How do you assess present progress in perestroyka?

[Astafyev] I don't know, I never graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences. In general I see perestroyka like I stated at a get-together between members of the editorial staff of NASH SOVREMENNİK and readers in Irkutsk: all of us must work hard and honestly, and the authorities must not impede us from working hard and honestly. That's about it. That is the basic principle, at least as far as I am concerned. As for the conference, I am party-unaffiliated and was attending such a forum for the first time. I sat there, my eyes wide in amazement. I carried away from the conference a feeling of anxiety and concern, as perhaps everybody did.

[Interviewer's Comments] Our time has indeed shed brighter light on the character, merits and shortcomings of certain individuals and officials. A large number of people have emerged whose names even five years ago

were unknown to us. Now they are loudly exposing the cult of personality and the period of stagnation from every public forum. There are also a considerable number who, remaining as presidium members, are today making pronouncements which are quite opposite to what they were declaring yesterday. And it is disturbing that some of these "fighters" are succeeding with their speeches in deluding their audiences.

About 10 years ago Viktor Astafyev commented in a newspaper article: "Nobody has yet come up and nobody will come up with a way to block the truth...." He was expressing a principle to which he strove to adhere and has adhered regardless of the political weather, be it a period of stagnation or a time of perestroika. This independence in statements, actions, and writing, sanctified by truth, is an independence built upon the foundation of talent, extensive knowledge, the wisdom of experience, and it evokes the greatest respect on the part of the writer. "He is as neat and clean in his writing as he is in his living," comments Boris Oleyunik about Astafyev. "The most honest person of our time," he is described by the reading public, who are convinced that the works of such writers as Astafyev, Rasputin, Bykov and Zalygin fostered the emergence of perestroika.

[Afanasyev's Answer Continued] People ask me what I think of Rybakov's "Children of the Arbat." I was in Paris when a review of this novel appeared in the emigre newspaper RUSSKAYA MYSL. The review stated that it was a needed work of current relevance but was only of average literary quality. I suppose that is about the way it is.

I, for example, who have seen just about all there is to see in this world, was afraid that the times of cult of personality—this phenomenon which is very tragic for our people and our country—would be plucked apart like tourists are plucking apart the Parthenon, stone by stone, that this subject would be dragged out by people who are not very well prepared for such a task, people who would seek to gain personally from it. Portrayal of such phenomena as Stalin and his era requires an inner, spiritual and intellectual tension, a spiritual, intellectual and even physical preparedness or fitness. As for myself, I do not believe that I am quite ready for this and do not even know who in our country today could handle this tragic stratum of our history, even in part.

When I was young and wanted to write about all this, I traveled to the Northern Urals, visiting a great many communities in which resided people who had been resettled from the Ukraine, who had been forcibly driven to these wild places, places where it was unusually difficult to sustain life—these were so-called dispossessed kulaks. To this day I shudder when I think about the conditions which had prevailed there: the people were compelled to cut timber which was rotting on the stump, since nobody was bothering to haul it out; they had to get in food supplies for themselves, through deep snow. They were forbidden to have any contact with the

local civilian population, and the commandant was empowered to have people shot without trial or preliminary investigation. There was a women's camp housing common criminals on one of the hilltops, containing petty shopkeeper embezzlers and women who had stolen a bucketful of potatoes from a kolkhoz field. They were savagely beaten; steel nuts and pieces of wire were tied to the whips, in order to cut the flesh open to the bone on the very first stroke. Very few survived those harsh conditions.

Once I was sitting by a campfire not far from the site of that camp. I saw shepherdesses kicking along something white, like a soccer ball. They shouted to me: "Catch it!" I looked at it, and saw that it was a human skull. I called them over, lectured them on the value of human life, and I suddenly found myself saying: "Please, never play with a human skull." And I thought to myself—this is a title for a novel. And I very much wanted to write such a novel. I had already heard a great deal from various people. But later I met a woman, who was only 37 years old, but she looked to be in her sixties—she had been so physically destroyed by the camp. She related a great deal, and I realized that I was not ready, not literarily strong enough to handle the subject. Just as, for example, I was not ready to write "Pastukh i Pastushka." I carried the idea around for 14 years and was ready to produce a novella, but I was simply unable to put it on paper.

I also think that in order fully to analyze and deal with such a tragic period of our history as the era of the cult of personality, even Sholokhov, who worked for 15 years on "Quiet Flows the Don," would need a couple of decades.

[Interviewer's Comments] Astafyev considers that he has had a great deal of good fortune: as a budding author to meet A. T. Tvardovskiy, who headed NOVYY MIR at that time. Their conversation only lasted 15 minutes but, as Viktor Petrovich writes, it left an imprint which would remain throughout his life.

[Afanasyev's Answer Continued] From that time on I have had only the best relations with NOVYY MIR. It is my favorite magazine. Today as well its editor is a fine individual, S. P. Zalygin, an unusually erudite and highly-educated individual. And what is most important, he never retreats from his convictions or is willing to accept compromise. This is the reason why NOVYY MIR offers its readers not only writings of current relevance but of high literary quality as well.

[Interviewer's Comments] V. P. Astafyev remembers with gratitude not only Tvardovskiy. He was fortunate to have the teacher at his orphanage, and he was fortunate to have Aleksandr Nikolayevich Makarov as a close, true friend, mentor, and adviser. In "Zryachiy Posokh" I was personally impressed by a letter from a critic, in which he complains that he is unable to complete an article about Astafyev's works, because "you will finish your short stories about childhood, write another novella, and I can

comprehend that a certain area will be exhausted. At least this is all within a single system. But neither you nor I understand where to go from this area. I am wrestling essentially with this question. I would very much like to suggest something in my article...."

[Zinets] Viktor Petrovich, you are very concerned about the purity of the Russian language. Here in the Ukraine the situation pertaining to our native language is rather difficult. In your works Ukrainians speak Ukrainian, but in real life one hears Ukrainian spoken for the most part only in the village.

[Astafyev] Lexical change and interpenetration of languages is observed throughout the world. In Japan, for example, there are two TV networks: one uses the old language, while the other uses the modern language. They are so different that young people frequently cannot understand old people. And do they really speak Spanish, for example, in Colombia or Peru, which I recently visited? No, it can be called only half-Spanish. Civilization inevitably brings not only benefit but also destroys certain foundations. I would not say that it has arrived prematurely, but nevertheless it has encountered unprepared soil. And the interpenetration of languages is inevitable today. Take our Siberia, for example, where a lot of people are originally from the Ukraine. This naturally has influenced the vocabulary of the Siberians. To my knowledge the island nation of Iceland is the only civilized country which has been able to protect its language. In 200 years no foreign word has penetrated the language, except for technical terms. But whether such sterility has positively or negatively affected the development of culture is a matter for future investigation.

But of course one cannot permit the destruction of language, and its preservation is a primary obligation and task of science. In our country there has been much loss and scattering of language, and instead of rectifying the situation, blame is being cast about. But how can you put all the blame on Ukrainian fathers and mothers, since just in this century alone two terrible wars have raged across your lands, wars which have destroyed everything but the language. Various compromises and "wise" experiments have also done their bit. I wish you greater courage in defending your native language, for the destruction of language inevitably leads to the destruction of culture. One need not look far afield for examples. The Ukrainian vocal school was famous through the world. Where is it today? Why can one not hear beautiful folk songs? How can this be tolerated?

I always regretted that T. H. Shevchenko died so young. If he had lived another 30 years, by virtue of his dedication, his erudition, and his talent he would have substantially raised the level both of your culture and dignity.

[Interviewer's Comments] How many years is a person allotted? How many joyful and sad events will he experience during these years? Can it be foreseen? Astafyev was not harmed by his fate from early childhood. He lost his mother at the age of eight and was raised in an orphanage. He was at the front from the age of 18. His tiny daughter, his firstborn, died during the time of hunger following the war. His wife was seriously ill on several occasions. And he himself was robbed of his health by the war. Work, study, literature, two children—at times it seemed that the burden was too much. Friends died—making things even harder to bear. Last year he lost a daughter. "It is awful to outlive one's children. She looks at me from a photograph with such reproach in her eyes." There was pain, and sorrow, and guilt in his voice.

The heroes of his stories also have a hard life. They experience unsettledness and absence of comfort, lack of understanding and inability to appreciate those close to them before they gain an understanding of the true value of life.

[Zinets] Viktor Petrovich, what does your own personal life and your family mean to you?

[Astafyev] Everything! My children, my wife, and my grandchildren. Mariya Semenovna and I got married at the end of the war, in the Ukraine. We were issued a marriage certificate. Later we moved to the Urals, to Mariya's home town—Chusovoy. A baby was born. We went to the executive committee to obtain a ration card, and we were told: "What kind of a certificate of marriage is this? What kind of phony document are you trying to foist on us." We had to re-register our marriage.

Even today, when someone says to me jokingly: "You are not meeting your writer's quota for marriages," I reply: "What are you talking about? I have been married twice." Of course it was with the same woman. But I am happy with that. All joking aside, the number of divorces with the writers of our generation is truly awful. And you know the reason for these high figures? Most of us after the war worked as bakers or metal trades benchworkers, for example, and possessed a corresponding level of education and culture. And our wives likewise. And if the husband made any efforts to grow further, their Russian women frequently had no desire or intention to go beyond the role of baker's or mechanic's wife. On the contrary, they would even raise a ruckus with their husband about it, ridicule and make fun of him, and tear up his manuscripts. Do you recall Lerka in "Pechalnyy Detektiv"? There were very few like my wife, who supported their husbands and endeavored to grow along with them. I was fortunate with Mariya. Life with her was both interesting and harmonious. It is true she is no beauty—she is small, with a long nose, and does have her rough edges. And it would seem that she had every reason not to dream for the stars: she had two children and me on her hands, and she had a serious health condition. But she did aspire! She had seven books

published and became a member of the Union of Writers. She always used to say: "Of course I can't catch up with Vitya, but I should certainly measure my performance against him."

Her entire life she went to bed later and got up earlier than everyone else, and she retyped all my scribbled notes. I never typed a single line. Until quite recently I always wrote with a schoolchild's wooden penholder, and wrote with terrible handwriting, constantly crossing things out and making corrections.

I would wake up in the morning, and next to me there would be neatly folded typed pages of what I had scribbled down longhand late the evening before. And she would come over to me, stroke my hair, and say: "Just what is going on in that head of yours?"

I remember how rude and ill-tempered I was after the war. But she never called me anything but Vitya or Vitenka. She would become very angry when neighbor women would call their husbands by their last name.

Of course my modest Mariya and I seem quite plain and simple, especially in comparison with some writers' spouses, who look like they are deliberately playing that role for show. But she is better read and more intelligent than any of them. I remember one time, I had already published quite a bit and had even become well known. We went to a rest house. General M. Naumov came up to me and proposed that I edit his book. "Who referred you to me?" I asked. He replied: "They pointed you out to me, saying that this poor couple had come from beyond the Urals and that they were probably in need of money."

There are very few women in the world like Mariya. She is a very fine person. It is difficult to be the wife of a writer, and it is indescribably difficult to be a good wife to a writer.

[Interviewer's Comments] My interview with Viktor Petrovich was coming to a close: they had managed to get through from Kiev to Krasnoyarsk—several thousand kilometers away, Mariya Semenovna had come to the phone.

As I was walking down the quiet street from the hotel at which the writer had been staying for several days, I found myself musing over the following question: how many recipients of the USSR State Prize are there from the period of stagnation who did not deserve it, whose work is not of a high artistic level, and whose award was totally contrived? But you know, nobody would ever say that about "Tsar-Ryba," which was written in 1976, and for which he received the award in 1978 (right at the height of the period of stagnation, one might say), for at all times Astafyev remained Astafyev.

BSSR Gostelradio Chairman Backs Radio, TV Broadcasts in Belorussian

18000028 Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
7 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview with Gennadiy Buravkin, Chairman of the BSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, conducted by BELTA correspondent G. Novikov: "Let Us Teach Others, and Let Us Ourselves Learn"]

[Text] "Television and radio are an objective mirror of real life, of processes taking place in society, and thus, of the development of the national language," believes G. Buravkin, chairman of the BSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. "From the screen and over radio today one hears the kind of language that you and I hear from the people around us daily and hourly: good literary language, language based on dialects, and so-called 'mixed' language."

[Novikov] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, let us begin our conversation by discussing the Belorussian language, first of all as a working tool of republic radio and television.

[Buravkin] I agree. There is no other way we can look at it. We have a rule: a creative staff member who comes to work with us should have a command of both Russian and Belorussian and use them in accordance with the specific situation. I am absolutely convinced that such a requirement is correct. After all, if a person is getting a job, say, as a driver, the ability to drive a vehicle is a mandatory condition for him. So why should we have a different professional approach to journalists, directors, etc., when they have no mastery of their working "tool"? Theoretically my colleagues also adhere to these principles—everyone understands perfectly well that that is in accord with Lenin's ideas of nationalities policy. But in practice it is much more difficult to follow the proclaimed slogan.

[Novikov] Could you make that thought more specific?

[Buravkin] Today's difficulties are formed and "presented" to us by the schools and higher schools. For example, the journalism division of Belorussian State University and the theater arts institute train specialists for us who have a very poor command of Belorussian. That, unfortunately, is reality. When he fills out his application form a person writes that he knows the language, but then he takes a microphone in hand or goes on camera and—we are forced to rectify work that someone else has failed to do; we have set up courses for people to study their native language. That may sound like a joke, but it's true, and I see no other way out of the existing situation.

[Novikov] And do you believe that this sort of "do-it-yourself" approach can do away with linguistic ignorance?

[Buravkin] Yes. There is one condition—desire. That is confirmed by experience. We have employees who have graduated from Russian or Ukrainian higher schools and who are conversing with viewers and listeners in Belorussian after a year or year and a half. For example, Lyudmila Melnikova, a graduate of Moscow University, started doing television broadcasts in Belorussian after a year and a half. And not just recorded broadcasts, but “live” ones—believe me, that is rather difficult.

[Novikov] Nonetheless, judging from broadcasts, one can assume that you do not have enough qualified “bilingual” staff members.

[Buravkin] I would not be so categorical. The situation is noticeably changing for the better. Today about 80 percent of our radio broadcasts are in Belorussian, and about 40 percent of our television broadcasts are. And 10 years ago, say, the figures were barely over half that. Every year we hold competitions for announcers, and hundreds of entrants participate. Whereas a few years ago only an isolated few of them knew Belorussian, this year one in three, if not one in two, already had a fairly decent command of the language.

That fact, in my opinion, is a fairly accurate reflection of today's awakening of interest in their native language among the broad masses. Indisputably, it also reflects the extensive work that has been begun by party agencies, the mass media and, of course, people in literature and the arts. I am an optimist and believe that if this process, which has begun with restructuring, will continue to develop further, in five years or so we will no longer have today's extremely complicated problems with Belorussian.

I should say that a very great deal depends on the personal example of those whom people pay attention to and respect. Here the principle of “do as I do” should operate. When republic executives start speaking Belorussian, their example will invariably be followed by middle-level executives and, after them, the broadest masses.

[Novikov] But for the time being radio and television do have language problems, and viewers frequently criticize you. They say, for example, that the commentary on soccer matches is in Belorussian, and yet for some reason broadcasts of one of the most popular programs for young people, “Television Youth Center,” is in Russian. Moreover, the moderators on that program are unable to carry on a conversation with a person who speaks the indigenous language.

[Buravkin] There is nothing for me to contradict there. I could try to justify myself by arguing that that situation is a mirror that reflects the worst features of a pro forma understanding of bilingualism. We see our own shortcomings perfectly well and are trying to rectify them. For

example, at one of their next collegium meetings the youth-programs editorial staff will report on just the questions you and I are talking about.

You mentioned soccer coverage. When we started conducting it in Belorussian, rather menacing voices were heard accusing us of nothing less than nationalism! And I should say that people among us, unfortunately, frequently confuse and mix up such elementary concepts as “national” and “nationalistic” and rush to pin labels. We had a mass of difficulties with that very coverage. Spiteful critics would catch every mispronounced word and every misplaced stress by the commentators, forgetting that we were taking an untrodden path and the sports terminology was not very well developed in our language. But now time has passed, and you will scarcely find anyone today who is dissatisfied with the coverage of Vladimir Novitskiy (several years ago, incidentally, he did not know Belorussian). Sergey Novikov and Vitaliy Solomakhin do a decent job of commentary on sports competitions in Belorussian.

So, as I have already said, everything depends on people's desire and their general level of culture.

[Novikov] Now to discuss the work that radio and television are doing to publicize the indigenous language. After all, they bear a special responsibility—whereas the print runs and circulations of Belorussian books, newspapers and magazines number in the tens of thousands, the listening and viewing audience numbers in the millions. There could be no better forum for publicizing the indigenous language.

[Buravkin] I agree that television and radio bear a special responsibility. The very sound of Belorussian over the airwaves forms the listener's culture and language environment, involuntarily for the listener. And that alone works to expand the sphere of the use of the indigenous language.

We attach special significance to broadcasts pertaining directly to the development of Belorussian. They include the television magazine “Rodnaye slova” and the radio magazine “Zhyvoye slova.” Whereas the radio program, which is moderated by the writer Vladimir Yurevich, is geared toward children and teenagers, the television programs are prepared for the broadest possible audience. They are both monthly programs, and judging from letters, their range of listeners is fairly wide.

Programs put on by the literary and drama editorial staffs of both radio and television are directly or indirectly devoted to publicizing the indigenous language. I shall cite “Lira” as just one example. It has featured appearances by such favorite authors of ours as V. Bykov, Ya. Bryl, R. Borodulin, M. Luzhanin, N. Gilevich—you can't name them all. And every installment discusses the teaching of language and literature in the schools, language culture and certain more specific things. The BELARUSSKAYA MALADZYOZHNYAYA

radio station, in my view, does a decent job of handling these topics; the successes of television's youth-programs editorial staff have been more modest. And the very smallest television viewers should not feel left out. The children's-programs staff puts out "Litarynka," a television elementary-language lesson that allows the young child to study his native language through play, in a literal sense. Every night we have "Kalykhanka" on our screens. In it we accustom young viewers to Belorussian through fairy tales and puppet presentations. Many people initially gave it a hostile reception, too, incidentally. But today, judging from sociological research, it has almost as many viewers in the republic as Moscow's "Goodnight, Kiddies!" Granted, we are concerned that we cannot show children Belorussian cartoons—there practically are none.

I could also talk about our television drama productions. But here one encounters the same problems we have already discussed. Unfortunately, the Belorussian of many actors today leaves a great deal to be desired. Even at the academic puppet theater some people's artists have only a relative mastery of it, and the directors are even worse. You yourself understand how difficult it is to put on television drama productions, which ideally should be paragons of the sound of the indigenous language.

In general, we try in our work to do the maximum to elevate the standards of Belorussian speech, reveal the problems that exist today, and help solve them correctly on the basis of the principles of Leninist nationalities policy.

[Novikov] Do you believe that is sufficient for the genuinely effective publicizing of the indigenous language?

[Buravkin] Not at all. Considerably more should be done and, what is most important, it should be of a better quality. There are steps that we intend to take in the immediate future. For example, we are beginning a new series that will be called "Gavorym pa-belarusky." It will be a kind of language "illiteracy-elimination" course, with practical lessons for people of all ages who want to master the conversational language. We will try to make the program entertaining and fun. At the present time, an editorial council is being formed from among leading linguists, writers and teachers.

The national language is inconceivable without national history. Therefore we intend to at least partially fill in the blank spots left by the schools and higher schools and will also begin a history "illiteracy-elimination" course in the near future. It will be a long-term series intended to last more than just one year and will encompass the period from the mention of Belaya Rus in the chronicles to our day. We will try not to circumvent anything in silence, not to forget all those who should be remembered, and to talk about everything good and bad that has happened in our land.

We are also planning a good many other programs, but there is probably no sense in putting out advance notices—viewers and listeners will see them on their screens and hear them on the air. And it will be possible to judge the effectiveness of republic radio and television by whether people start speaking Belorussian.

"One thing I know for sure," stressed G. Buravkin in conclusion, "since the problem of the national language exists in the republic, and you and I are compelled to have this discussion, radio and television are not doing enough work. And I do not want to try to console myself with the fact that other ideological organizations are doing even less work, and some are doing nothing at all. I see our task as ourselves learning and teaching others. There is no other way."

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**New Laws for 'Socialist Rule-of-Law State'
Discussed**

18000031a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 88
p 3

[Interview with Professor R. Livshits by Yu. Feofanov, under rubric "Legal Dialogues": "Law in a Rule-of-Law State"]

[Text] The democratization of society is inconceivable without the reinforcement of legality. In other words, it is only inflexible law that guarantees freedom without allowing it to develop into anarchy. But completely different qualities are presented to law in this instance. That is the topic of a conversation that IZVESTIYA commentator Yu. Feofanov had with Professor R. Livshits, sector chief, Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences.

[Feofanov] Strictly speaking, the special conference under the NKVD, the Special Presence of the USSR Supreme Court, and the "troykas" and "dvoynkas" that became the weapons of unconcealed repressions were legal, rule-of-law institutions. The state agencies that were empowered to do so formulated them by completely official acts. But elementary justice and common sense cannot reconcile themselves to that kind of "legality." Does this mean, then, Roman Zinovyevich, that a law enters into conflict with jurisprudence? This is unusual, but it is so, if, by law as a system we understand a social and cultural value that does not depend upon the political situation. However, in the generally accepted sense we always equate "law" and "a law."

[Livshits] You have said, and perhaps you made a slip of the tongue, that the Special Conference under the NKVD was a rule-of-law institution. Legalized, yes, but not rule-of-law! The leadership of the law is the outward, formal side of a rule-of-law state. Because "a law" and "law" are not one and the same. This posing of the question differs from the traditional one, when "law" is understood as a system of norms or a system of laws, when any individual law, on the basis of its content—whether it be a good law or a bad law—is recognized as "law." The concept of a rule-of-law state requires the changing of those ideas. By "law" it is necessary to understand not any law, not any norm, but normatively consolidated justice. Justice defines the content of law. When an unjust idea receives normative consolidation, then it becomes "a law," but not "law." An unjust law is not "law."

[Feofanov] But are we not moving away from jurisprudence to morality? "Justice" still is a vague concept. What is just for one person is not accepted by others.

[Livshits] Of course it is very important to define justice itself, but at the same time to do this in a sufficiently simple and accessible manner, so that it can truly be used for defining the genuinely legal content of a law. As the most overall initial premise I would propose viewing justice in a socialist rule-of-law state as the guaranteeing

of the interests of the working man. But this is an overall idea that must be embodied in the specific laws. And in order for them to correspond to that idea, there must be a fundamental change, there must be a democratization in the legislative process itself, and a procedure of the public preparation of laws must be created.

[Feofanov] Do you want to define a concept by procedure? Or truth by a vote? Forgive me, but in 1937 the "overwhelming majority" demanded the annihilation of "enemies of the people." And quite recently the Law Governing the Fight Against Nonlabor Income. A law that had been enacted "by the will of the people." Is it a just law, if it has encroached upon honest people?

[Livshits] But the crux of the matter is that, most often, there is no nationwide will, and under present-day conditions there cannot be any. Sociologists and economists (most clearly, T. Zaslavskaya and L. Abalkin) have shown convincingly that, at the present-day stage, we do not have any social homogeneity of society. For such questions as the fight for peace, the protection of the environment, and the attitude toward monuments of culture, one can still speak about a single will of the people. But for other problems—and there is a tremendous number of them, from the determination of pensions and the distribution of housing to the raising of prices and the size of taxes—the opinions and interests of various social groups and segments diverge. The laws that were enacted yesterday, and even those being enacted today, reflect the will and interests only of those people who prepared those laws—the workers in the state apparatus—or, to put it even more accurately, the will of the leadership of that apparatus. One could cite dozens of examples: the preservation of the vast rights of the ministries and departments; the nullification of the official protection of civil rights; the recently enacted ukase that introduced a procedure that authorizes and limits, rather than a procedure that requires no registration and provides complete freedom for the holding of meetings, rallies, and demonstrations.

[Feofanov] All of this is very convincing. But, in my opinion, you have departed from the problem, Roman Zinovyevich. You have departed from "justice" as a criterion by which "a law" corresponds to "law." I agree that one can speak of the "nationwide will" with a certain degree of conventionality. But nevertheless it is necessary to take into consideration in a law not only the will of the majority, but also the interests of the minority. And a transgressor must be guaranteed definite rights in a rule-of-law state. Crudely speaking, it wouldn't be a bad idea to ask him also about the quality of the law. It might be that what is more beneficial is not "nationwide discussion," but a scientifically verified sociological survey. Take that same ukase governing demonstrations. How was it prepared? Did science take part in developing it? We do not know that.

[Livshits] Or do I know how the ukase was enacted. I do not know whether the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet met as a full body, whether statements were made by

experts and jurists, or whether foreign practice was discussed. We in general do not know how ukases are enacted, but in our society there are many more ukases than there are laws. Obviously, the future change in the structure of authority will also make changes in the process of making laws. But you will agree that, whatever the alternative version is, the legislator must orient himself on public opinion. There is no other method of achieving justice.

We must discuss the high professional level of the legislator. It is only that kind of professionalism that can guarantee, in combination with a consideration of the opinion of the majority, a truly just decision. But at the present time many institutions of law dealing with criminal proceedings, including the preliminary finding, the nonparticipation of a lawyer in the investigation of cases, etc., are unjust. We shall hope that the new legislation dealing with criminal proceedings will eliminate these injustices.

How does one ascertain the opinion of the people? The only known means of immediate democracy is the referendum. One can and must resort to a referendum when a future law will affect every individual in a real way and when it is possible in an unambiguous and simple manner to formulate the questions. It is undesirable, for example, to bring to a referendum the Constitution, with its abundance of problems: a vote according to the "aye or nay" principle will not make it possible to ascertain people's attitude to the numerous articles in the Constitution. But there are a number of problems—one of them is the problem of retail prices—that definitely must be brought to a nationwide referendum.

[Feofanov] But, Roman Zinovyevich, aren't you fascinated by just the idea of a referendum? Aren't you forgetting that the question of "aye or nay" limits very much the ascertaining of public opinion with regard to complicated questions? You have already mentioned prices. How do you pose the question to the people? "Should we raise them or not raise them?" Because what is needed is "yes or no?" I make so bold as to predict immediately the results of the referendum—"don't raise them." Although, possibly, a price reform will be beneficial, it is specifically in the interests of the "entire nation." Carrying out an intelligent price reform is a series of measures that are sometimes contradictory, that give an advantage to some people but encroach on others. In a word, aren't you simplifying the problem?

[Livshits] It may be that the example with prices is not a completely felicitous one. But if, nevertheless, one formulates the question in such a way that it will be correct even for a referendum, why not carry out a referendum? It is a matter of technology. What is important is the idea—how to adopt laws in a rule-of-law state. It is necessary to take away from the apparatus the decisive role in the preparation of legislative drafts. As long as the fate of a state production order is resolved by Gosplan and the ministries; the fate of wholesale trade, by Gossnab; the size of

pensions, by Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems]; and the size of taxes, by Minfin [Ministry of Finance], we shall not get close to a rule-of-law state. The department's interest is not society's interest. The department's opinion must be heard and taken into consideration, but it cannot, by any means, be taken as the indispensable basis of a law. But we must not consider it to be a normal situation when deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet insist on raising the pensions for kolkhoz members and the minister of finance says that there isn't any money (which is precisely what happened when the most recent session was being prepared). I would like to ask whether Minfin would have made this statement if, say, the Politburo had stated that it was in favor of an increase. In a word, the apparatus must be returned to its administrative function, which is completely subordinate to the legislator.

[Feofanov] We do not have a law governing referendums, but we do have one governing the nationwide discussions of legislative drafts. We also have had practice in carrying out these discussions. But for some reason one question has never, so far as I remember, been put "before the people": is such-and-such a law necessary at all? Does it correspond to the idea of justice?

[Livshits] I have to say outright: nationwide discussions as a means of realistically ascertaining and taking into consideration the opinion of millions of people have not proven their worth. We do not have a mechanism for summing up the results of the discussion or accounting for them. Nor has that mechanism been provided by the Law governing nationwide discussion of important questions of state life. Once again, the persons who take into consideration the results of the discussion are the apparatus workers—either the very same ones who prepared the draft, or their associates. During the discussion of the draft of the 1977 USSR Constitution, the authors of approximately one-third of the letters (and the total number of recommendations sent in was approximately 400,000) mentioned the extending of annual leave. The question not only was not resolved, but it was not even mentioned in the report on the draft of the Constitution. During the discussion of the draft of the Law Governing Labor Collectives (1983), the majority of the participants recommended establishing a labor-collective council. The recommendations were rejected for no convincing reasons and, as has been shown by life, they were rejected without foundation. The nationwide discussion of the draft versions of laws, indubitably, is a democratic norm.

Nevertheless the decisive role in ascertaining the opinion of the majority of the nation will apparently be played by representative democracy. According to the Constitution, laws in our country are adopted only by Supreme Soviets. The fate of a law is decided by deputies who have been elected by the people and who are called upon to know the interests of and to express the will of their

constituents. This is completely democratic. Unfortunately, we have largely moved away from what is written in the Constitution. Much has been said and written about the formal role of the deputies, about the *diktat* of the apparatus in making laws, and about replacing laws with ukases and instructions. The fact that it is precisely the deputies who must actually determine the fate of a law is without doubt.

[Feofanov] But among the deputies there are very few jurists, especially at the higher echelons. Let us assume that we will return the deputies to the making of laws. Are common sense and experience all that are required for that job?

[Livshits] Yes, it is not enough to return the deputies' rights to them. They must be taught how to carry out the legislative process. The development and confirmation of laws is not simply public work. It is complicated and highly professional activity. A considerable amount of time will pass before there is a substantial change in the makeup of the deputies, and they acquire the practical skills and knowledge needed by legislators. Until that time, the deputy corps needs help.

Not the help that has been rendered until now by the apparatus, by deciding everything, or almost everything, for the deputies. Rather, it needs help in acquiring its own competency. The deputies must be given alternatives, reasons pro and con, the necessary computations, and detailed materials about the actual state of affairs. The chief role in rendering this kind of assistance belongs to legal science. The participation of the scientists in preparing legislative drafts, in their joint work with the deputies, must be constant, rather than what it is currently—on an ad hoc basis.

The returning to the law of its true role as the basic regulator of social life must be linked with the limitation of the opportunities of the Councils of Ministers in the activity of establishing norms and with the elimination of the ministries and departments from that activity. The basic scheme is simple: the rights and duties of the participants in social relations are firmly established in the law. Everything that has not been resolved in these acts and that is cause for disputes is resolved by the court and arbitration.

[Feofanov] Complexity results from the formula "Whatever is not prohibited by the law is authorized." Recently Professor M. Bablay (IZVESTIYA, No. 245) wrote, "we must change over from an 'authorization system' to a 'prohibition system.'" This idea, he wrote, may seem reactionary... Recently the editorial office was informed that, apparently, the author had misspoken, although one thing remains clear: "The knowledge of what the law prohibits is a blessing." By this I do not simply want to correct the error, but to emphasize how difficult it is to perceive many legal formulae and their

nuances. It seems to me that universal legal instruction, which was mentioned at the 19th Party Conference, must prepare citizens precisely for the knowledgeable discussion of legislative drafts.

[Livshits] I agree that universal legal instruction must not be reduced simply to confirming that it is bad to kill and steal. The development of laws, and especially the formation of the practical aspects of applying them, is a complicated matter. Depending upon the area of social relations that the law is called upon to regulate, there is a change in the regulatory methods and means. As a result it is necessary to take a very cautious attitude toward judgments to the effect that at the present time everything fits into the formula "whatever is not prohibited is authorized." Actually, this principle has been broadly and validly used in recent laws that are aimed against the authoritative-fiat style of administration. But the sphere of application of this principle is limited. The principle encompasses the "vertical" relations, and extends only to the object of administration. The principle affects, for example, enterprises in their relations with superior economic agencies; members of cooperatives and "individuals" in their relations with state agencies; and citizens in relations with agencies of administration. But, for example, in labor or housing relations, and in relations between citizens, this principle is not applicable. The role of overall regulator here is played by the precise regulation provided by the law, and, beyond its limits, by agreement between the parties.

In the tremendous job of improving legislation we cannot forget that, in a rule-of-law socialist state, the state itself is a tool for implementing law. And policy also is a means of implementing law as duly established justice. The final addressee of law and the individual laws that embody it is man. In this approach lies the essence of a law and the legislative activity in a rule-of-law state.

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Kazakh Obkom Discusses Dual-Language, Working-Class Issues

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[Article by A. Diyenko: "To Be Internationalists: Questions of International and Patriotic Education Discussed at the Kazakhstan Communist Party's Kzyl-Orda Oblast Committee Plenum"]

[Text] On the eve of the plenum's opening, I happened to talk with B. Mustapayeva, a member of the Kazakhstan Communist Party's Central Committee, a group leader of the Chirkeylinskiy Sovkhoz, and a Hero of Socialist Labor. The conversation, I can tell you, was frank and self-critical. This is how the illustrious farmer assessed the activities of the party obkom buro, of which she was

a member, in fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization Regarding the International and Patriotic Education of the Workers."

"The fact that the obkom buro managed to make a significant number of party, soviet, and Komsomol members, business managers, and ideological workers to some extent aware of the importance of international and patriotic education is a positive achievement. Undoubtedly, it is a change for the better."

From time to time, however, as I return to the bitter memory of the events that occurred in Alma-Ata during December of the year before last, which, having witnessed, bring pain to my heart even to this day, I see that we all need to seriously study internationalism—and not only in books, but in fact. There are neither social, nor political, nor legal reasons, it would seem, for differences between nationalities to appear among us. Nevertheless, every so often this rotten "mold" appears. It is no secret to anyone that it flourishes today, in those neglected corners, as a rule, where the eyes of the party do not look.

In confirmation of this thought, it was emphasized in the report of the party obkom first secretary, Ye. Ayelbekov, in particular, that the oblast party organization should add significantly to the effort to strengthen the international and patriotic education of the workers. In the past, he noted, within the oblast as throughout the country, there were a lot of serious mistakes and errors made in this respect. The struggle with manifestations of chauvinism, nationalism, and parochialism in economic, cultural, and psychological spheres for all practical purposes amounted to nothing. Former leaders of the oblast as well as the republic were impatient with attempts to criticize shortcomings in the development of the economy and relations between the nationalities. Such attempts were looked upon as nothing more than anti-patriotism.

In such a situation of universal silence with respect to negative manifestations, morality and morale deteriorated, and the principles and standards of party life broke down. All of this demanded a decisive restructuring of the activities of party organizations and associations in their efforts to remedy the situation by providing for social justice, extending glasnost, and increasing the responsibility of management personnel for the state of international education in the collectives.

Today, it was stated at the plenum, many party committees and organizations are trying to acquire effective methods of working with people locally. The introduction of new democratic forms of operating are having a beneficial effect in returning the situation and the moral climate to normal. Commissions dealing with nationality and interethnic relations have begun to operate at the gorkoms and raykoms as well as at the party obkom. Similar bodies of workers are being established at the local soviets of people's deputies, the trade unions, and

the Komsomol organizations. Tasks for the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee resolution are under discussion at party gorkom and raykom plenums and at party organization meetings. More than 600 courses and study circles have been created for studying the Russian and Kazakh languages, and decisions are pending for broadening the base of studying the languages of other peoples, including the small ethnic groups. On this theme special political days have been held as well as international family festivals, interethnic rallies of those in the military, and other mutually enriching meetings.

At the same time, the speeches noted, for the present the work carried out does not respond to the needs that have arisen. There are still quite a number of bottlenecks in establishing the fundamentals of socialist internationalism. And if we must speak specifically, not all the party organizations are carrying out this effort actively and with the proper goal in mind. Some party, soviet, and Komsomol workers and propagandists are only slowly ridding themselves of the mistaken notion that nationality affairs are without problems.

Little attention is being devoted to atheistic education, the struggle against the influence of the Moslem religion, and ridding ourselves of the mores and customs of a certain share of the native population predisposed to the teachings of Islam. Such remnants of the past as the theft of the betrothed, the payment of the bride-price, etc.—it was stated in the report as well as in the speeches—are flourishing in the oblast. Cases of communist participation in religious ceremonies persist; even worse, there are instances when communists themselves are known to have contributed to the propaganda of religious rites and traditions. In Kazalinskiy Rayon a self-styled mullah, A. Baydildayev, has become a CPSU member. This fact is well known to the party raykom, but it is in no hurry for the present to submit this situation to a proper party appraisal.

As soon as possible, the plenum noted, it is necessary to revise conventional attitudes towards certain national customs and traditions and more boldly purge the national culture of religious elements and everything capable of bolstering national isolation. Feudal ways in domestic family relations and a humiliating attitude towards women, who have a lowly position in life especially in rural areas, can no longer be tolerated.

As the CPSU Central Committee resolution emphasized, more persistent attention must be given to the problem of developing national and Russian bilingualism. This issue is being addressed in the oblast in an extremely slack manner, it was stated at the plenum by A. Abenov, first secretary of the Chiilinskiy party raykom; A. Azhibayeva, a rice cultivator of the Zadarinskiy Sovkhoz; G. Baliulov, an oblast military commissariat member; and A. Elvina, an electrician with the electricity network enterprise. In a number of rayons there is almost no work going on to help the adult population master the language of interethnic communication.

"In Kazalinskiy Rayon the issue of bilingualism is a critical one for us," said diesel locomotive engineer S. Chernpyatov from the rostrum. "For example, at such large-scale enterprises as the locomotive works and the sovkhoz imeni U. Tukibayev, where all the conditions are available for increasing conversational practice, studies are almost at a standstill in the circles created for this purpose. People who are not specialists for a long time have been conducting Russian-language lessons in a number of the rayon schools. About half the students in the senior class got unsatisfactory grades in Russian-language dictation. Approximately 40 percent of the military servicemen inducted last year from the youth of the native population had no knowledge of Russian. The speech at the plenum of our party rayon first secretary, Ye. Kushyrbakak, who glossed over the critical nature of the prevailing shortcomings in our rayon, is incomprehensible to me. This problem, it seems to me, is made even worse by the fact that most of the managers and specialists in the rayon's agricultural enterprises, as well as other enterprises, have a poor knowledge of Russian."

To resolve problems of bilingualism, plenum participants emphasized, party committees must exhibit not only great tact but also persistence. It is desirable for Russian-speaking managers to concern themselves with the study of the Kazakh language and for Kazakh managers to study Russian. While exhibiting the utmost correctness of attitude, it is necessary to nurture the demand for language study on a strictly voluntary basis.

The plenum acknowledged that today the oblast party organization still does not exercise proper control over the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee resolution and its own decisions. Much that has been assigned to be carried out by the party gorkoms and raykoms, by the soviets of people's deputies, as well as by the trade unions, the Komsomol, and the ideological institutions remains unrealized.

Meanwhile, there has been a lack of properly self-critical assessment of the situation with respect to international and patriotic education in the public appearances of S. Ansatov, second secretary of the Kzyl-Orda party gorkom; of N. Podolskikh, chairman of the oblast trade union council; and of D. Aysina, ispolkom chairwoman of the Ternosekskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. An attempt by certain plenum participants to speak out in the old manner with a loud sense of self-importance could even be discerned.

There are many matters still unresolved in the international and patriotic education of youth. However, the speech by A. Solomatin, the Komsomol obkom chairman, who like many others participated in discussing key aspects of party work in international and patriotic education of oblast workers at one of the plenum section meetings (47 plenum participants spoke at these meetings in all), resounded with self-complacency.

But how is such Olympian calm to be reconciled with the fact that—as the plenum pointed out—the intellectual inertia existing now among Komsomol activists is hampering efforts to penetrate the lives of young people and to exert an influence in molding strong class attitudes and internationalist beliefs in young men and women?

Take, for example, students and those enrolled in study programs. The results of an oblast questionnaire carried out by members of the Institute of Social Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences indicated that 15 percent of students questioned considered the immature, hooligan behavior of their peers at the time of the notorious disturbances in Alma-Ata to be lawfully justified; 36 percent had no opinion regarding what happened; and about 30 percent expressed approval of appointing members of their own ethnic group to leadership positions, and likewise declared that nationality should undoubtedly govern the choice of leaders. Thus more than one half of the students questioned obviously lacked any clear internationalist outlook.

All of this, it was emphasized by the speakers, attests to the fact that the party obkom and its buro ask too little of the departments of propaganda and agitation as well as scientific and educational institutions in seeking to overcome poor party leadership of these vital activities (the obkom secretary is O. Sapiyev, and the department heads are Zh. Bakirov and I. Borobyev). Their efforts still lack concrete application and precision in coming to terms with internationalist education.

Internationalism is inseparable from patriotism. The unique experience of the older generations and of veterans is in this respect of lasting significance, the plenum noted. Living forever in the memories of those who live in Kzyl-Orda are the names of Bolsheviks P. Yermolov, A. Chervyakov, and N. Seliverstov, as well as others, who five days after the victory of the armed uprising of Great October in Petrograd established Soviet power in the lower reaches of the Sur-Darya. Of substantial assistance in consolidating the power of the workers and peasants were those working in the Turkestan Commission—M. B. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, and others. A letter from Vladimir Ilich to the fishermen of the Aral Sea was filled with solicitude for their selfless assistance to those starving in the area of the Volga. Thousands of experienced party workers—emissaries from Russia and the other republics—made a worthy contribution to the renewal of the hot desert region. These were young people from whom we can learn, whose example we can follow, and many in this area are the heirs of these glorious traditions.

Such an example was cited at the plenum. Recently the party obkom buro and ispolkom passed a decision to perpetuate the memory of military border guard Batyrzhan Shalgumbayev. The name of the youth, whose heroic exploit was performed in Afghanistan at the age of 20, was given to one of our streets and to a Young Pioneer service group.

In performing a mission assigned by its command post, the subunit in which Private Shalgumbayev served was suddenly exposed to a surprise attack by the dushman. The border guard group engaged in an unequal battle, completely surrounded, for five hours. Not one of the young soldiers faltered. When their ammunition was running low and they were threatened with capture, the young men blew themselves up as well as the onrushing bandits. Private Shalgumbayev was captured by the cutthroats as he lay unconscious. They tried to force this security guard to betray his motherland, but he furiously rejected their foul suggestion by spitting in their faces. The youth was savagely torn to pieces on the spot.

Fidelity to a soldier's duty, courage, and heroism were demonstrated in the performance of his international duty by a villager in Sulfat Aralskiy Rayon, Lt Col Valeriy Ochirov. On his chest, along with his battle decorations, shines the Hero's Star. Valeriy's mother is Russian and his father a Kalmyk; he was born on Kazakh soil, and he is all the more loved by the people of Kzyl-Orda Oblast for this reason.

Unfortunately, the examples of such heroes are not used nearly enough in patriotic education, the plenum noted. Measures have yet to be taken in the oblast to restore patriotic and heroic places. Even in the oblast center nothing but modest gravestones mark the burial sites of those who died of wounds at the evacuation hospital during the Great War of the Fatherland, and on some of them the names of the soldiers have been effaced. All of this attests to the fact that far more attention must be given to patriotic education. It is important, plenum participants said, to teach young people to value and and safeguard the memory of those to whom they are indebted today.

Plenum participants particularly emphasized the fact that a steadily developing economy with the cumulative contribution of each region, and of each collective in every single national economic complex in the country, must be the foundation for strengthening the friendship of peoples and education in internationalism. It is precisely this point that the Kazakhstan CPSU Central Committee resolution on the international and patriotic education of republic workers brings to the attention of Kazakhstan communists.

The contribution of the oblast to this reserve as of today remains a modest one. It is sufficient to say that last year the oblast produced only 1.2 percent of the republic's total industrial production, and wholesale agricultural production amounted to only 2.8 percent. Until recently the oblast has barely provided for itself in produce and the bulk of consumer goods have been brought in from the outside. There are grave shortages in capital construction, trade, and consumer services. Because of all this there is an output shortfall of a million rubles, and public demand is unsatisfied here in Kazakhstan as well

as beyond its boundaries, a fact, the speakers emphasized, inconsistent with the task of strengthening international economic ties and business cooperation with enterprises in other republics.

The situation that has developed in the oblast and the critical problems that have arisen in connection with severe shoaling of the Aral Sea, and consequently a considerable exodus of the Russian population that has lived in the local area since ancient times, is causing great concern to oblast workers. Republic as well as union agencies have been giving increased attention to the solution of social and economic questions during this five-year plan, it was said at the plenum. But the measures taken will lead to the results desired only with the vigorous, goal-directed efforts of the entire oblast party organization, and, above all, the oblast committee itself, together with elected officials and all communists.

A keen discussion developed at the plenum regarding the forming of national cadres of skilled workers. This problem is of the utmost importance to the oblast. Much has been said about it, and at all levels. Yet it has remained at a standstill. Moreover, it is difficult to trust in changes for the better, the plenum participants said, so long as there is no clear-cut program in the oblast for forming and training the leading branches of highly qualified workers, and so long as the primary party organizations fail to devote to this problem the attention it deserves. The plenum criticized V. Morozov, director of the Kzyl-Orda Reclamation Organization, and B. Yermakov, secretary of the party organization, who were largely at fault for the collective's failure to concern itself with training national cadres of workers with the basic skills to operate bulldozers, scrapers, and power shovels.

The situation is no better at a number of other enterprises in the oblast. The party organizations at the Kzyl-Orda cardboard box factory and the Dzhusaly machine shop. The collectives of these enterprises deliver products to a hundred cities in the country. Yet there is scarcely a single brigade that knows where these products are sent. Meanwhile, not enough people are adequately informed, and there is a low degree of ideological indoctrination, which is one of the reasons why certain levels of the population have immature judgments and opinions. This would seem to explain why some think that Kazakhstan gives more output to other republics of the country than it receives from them. The effort to establish normal international relations is a long, arduous, and painstakingly slow process, and it needs to be addressed in earnest.

There can be no doubt that the effective resolution of economic and social issues has a beneficial effect on altering and improving the overall atmosphere, helping to avert the rise of unhealthy manifestations in intra-nationality and interethnic relations, it was emphasized at the plenum. In view of this the plenum demanded of the party obkom buro, the secretaries directly responsible for the development of these fields (V. Brynkin, N.

Makarenko, and V. Ryabov), and the oblast soviet ispolkom (Ye. Zolotarev, chairman) that they take the steps necessary to implement social and economic programs as soon as possible.

The CPSU Central Committee resolution for Kazakhstan notes: "Crude blunders in personnel policy have done great harm to the international education of the workers. In selection and promotion of people to positions of management, the decisive factors often have proved to be not political, business or moral qualities, but nationality, family, and local community ties, together with personal loyalty."

These manifestations were to be seen in Kzyl-Orda Oblast in the recent past, the plenum said, and they have provoked the legitimate indignation of the population. To strengthen all aspects of party, soviet, economic, and social activities on the basis of democratic principles in personnel work through the efforts of politically mature communists—this is what the oblast party organization sees as its task.

Plenum participants noted further that certain changes for the better had taken recently place in the selection of management personnel, in the process of electing them, and in the representation of party and soviet organs, and of social organizations, as well as of economic activities among persons of different nationalities. However, the composition of cadres of skilled workers requires additional improvement. In fact, cadre politics, it was emphasized at the plenum, constitute one of the key factors controlling the climate of international relations. Much hard work needs to be done in this respect. The party committees must free themselves from past tendencies and create a clear-cut, democratic system for establishing a cadre reserve, providing for the promotion of capable persons from the ranks of all nationalities living in the oblast. It is precisely the absence of such a reserve and proper analysis of the distribution of skilled workers that can explain the fact that only representatives of the native nationality make up the party committee staffs in Aralskiy, Terenozekskiy, and Yanykurganskiy rayons.

Some of the committees are only slowly ridding themselves of errors made in the selection and education of skilled workers. Over the past year, it was stated in the official report, 44 managers have been relieved of their duties for having failed to cope with their tasks or for having discredited themselves. Among these ex-managers are A. Teleuov, party secretary at the Kzyl-Orda locomotive works; A. Kipshakbayev, chairman of the Karmakchinskiy Rayon people's control committee; M. Adilbayev, chief of the Kazankinskiy Rayon internal affairs department; Ye. Karpushin, chief of the Aral anti-plague station; and K. Nurmakhanov, director of the Kzyl-Orda city combine.

On this score there was justified criticism at the plenum for the director of the party obkom's department of organizational work, M. Akhmetzhanov. As of now the department lacks a well-thought-out system for dealing with skilled-worker personnel, despite the fact that almost all the party committees have lists of reserve candidates and plans for their studies. Plenum participants demanded that this matter be put in proper order, and that increased attention be given to the selection and training of skilled workers, insuring the participation of workers from all nationalities in the activities of state bodies and public organizations in accordance with the all-party directive. This issue is to be decided not on the basis of which nationality party and economic leaders may belong to, but on political, moral, and business capabilities, making it possible to encourage the fruitful labor of people of diverse nationalities.

The resolution passed by the plenum emphasized that thought and action in keeping with the laws of internationalism and Soviet patriotism must become the norms of every communist. It is to be hoped that the application of this approach will make possible a significant improvement in efforts by the oblast party organization to foster international and patriotic education.

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Prominent Soviet Environmental Issues Detailed
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Article by USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member Andrey Monin: "Stagnant Zones"]

[Text] In the 1930s we amused ourselves with the romantic books of Konstantin Paustovskiy. What I remember especially well is the story "Kara-Bugaz" about that gulf in the Caspian Sea, that miracle of terrestrial nature, that natural factory of mirabilite—a mineral valuable to chemical and glass industry. Mirabilite (from the Latin mirabilis—wonderful) is known as Glauber salt (sodium sulfate). It precipitated out of the waters of the gulf in winter, from November to March, when the water temperature drops below 18 degrees. Breakers swept it to shore, and then it could be literally raked with a shovel (in summer mirabilite dissolves in the warm water).

Paustovskiy writes in his story that Lieutenant Zhrebtsov explored the gulf aboard the corvette "Volga" in 1847. Here is what he said: "Out of my own stupidity I was ready to propose to the government that the narrow inlet into the gulf be blocked by a dike in order to cut it off from the sea. Why?, you ask. Because I was certain that its waters were profoundly harmful, poisoning incalculable schools of Caspian fish. Moreover I interpreted the mysterious shallowing of the sea in those years as being the consequence of the gulf insatiably absorbing the Caspian's water."

But the well known explorer Karelin, who dared to cross the deadly expanses of Asia, talked Zhrebtsov out of "this senseless project": "By plugging up the gulf you would change the properties of the water and curtail formation of Glauber salt. Your assertion that the gulf is responsible for the shallowing of the Caspian Sea, and equally so your sympathy for the dying fish, is exaggerated. It would not take any special effort for me to refute you on all points.... But you have already gone so far as to prepare a project proposal! They're all idiots in Petersburg. Thinking is not something they like to do: They would rather throw caution to the winds—close the gulf for time immemorial, and astound all of Europe. On the other hand if you had ventured the word 'open,' the pundits might have given it some thought, but once you say close it, then let it be so. Closing is a sacred duty to them...."

Later on the geologist Shatskiy offered some additional explanation: "Were you to transform Kara-Bogaz into a lake, it would dry up in 6 years. You can't imagine how quickly things dry out in this area!"

A good century passed, and then some. So what do you think happened? Quite recently, in shall we say the stagnant times, in 1980, Kara-Bogaz was closed. They finally went and cut it off with a dike! Naturally the gulf dried out—in but 3 years; drifting sand began to cover it

over, and the life of the natural mirabilite factory was cut short. The Desertification Institute of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences estimates that the total loss caused by the dike (which itself cost a pretty penny!) was 72 billion rubles. Usually it is not easy to affix blame, to reveal the culprits of such harmful acts that elicit such deep astonishment. But this time it was easier. At least from the standpoint of science, responsibility is born by Academician Ye. K. Fedorov, who represents the Department of Oceanology, Atmospheric Physics and Geography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He signed the USSR Gosplan's expert assessment.

This department, the most "ecological" in the Academy of Sciences, manages the sciences of the atmosphere, water and land. I will be referring to it a few more times yet, and for the sake of brevity I will abbreviate it as the OOFAG, following all the rules of the academy's bureaucratic practices. On one hand one might think that it is wrong to blame the OOFAG in general for the decision to close the Kara-Bogaz: The department was simply "oblivious" to this "project of the century." On the other hand this ignorance itself may be viewed as a grave offense. It was no accident. Even today, the solution is being sought without any thought to science, by groping in the darkness. In 1984 a hole was punched through the Kara-Bogaz dike. This "water regulating facility" did little to solve the problem. The possibility is not excluded that this hole, which is an indirect admission that a colossal, expensive mistake had been made, will have to be amplified to the proportions of a true act of repentance—that is, that the strait will have to be restored to its original appearance.

In 1929 the level of the Caspian Sea, which stood at 26 meters below sea level at that time, began to drop. By 1977 it fell by 3 meters. The sea receded far from its former shores, especially in the north and northeast. Why did this happen? The answer is obvious: The inflow of water into the Caspian in those years (1929-1977) was lower than evaporative losses. A normal oscillation in the climate over the entire watershed was the cause. And after the war, some believed, consumption of water for economic needs was partially to blame as well.

The drop in the Caspian's level seemed so terrifying that in 1979 the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources carried out a feasibility study on the first phase of a project to divert part of the discharge of northern rivers to the Volga (37.7 cubic kilometers per year). An expert subcommission of the USSR Gosplan made a slight adjustment in this project (19-20 cubic kilometers plus a few cubic kilometers resulting from the closing of the Kara-Bogaz).

Diversion of waters from the rivers for economic needs could of course be planned. But can we plan or predict climatic oscillations over the centuries and even within a century with any degree of reliability?

The Water Problems Institute (IVP) of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which is under the OOFAG, developed a procedure based on probability for predicting the level of terminal lakes, including the Caspian Sea. It is referred to as extrapolation of random processes. Even the probability of substantiating such predictions from a purely theoretical standpoint is very low. Moreover the Caspian has revealed a complete reluctance to conform to such predictions on several occasions.

The IVP's procedure was examined by three departments of the USSR Academy of Sciences—first mathematics, then mechanics and control processes, and finally geology, geophysics, geochemistry and mining sciences. All three departments were skeptical of the procedure. "The procedure for predicting the level of the Caspian Sea," reads the statement signed by academicians L. S. Pontryagin and Yu. V. Prokhorov, both mathematicians, "is unsatisfactory, and it cannot be laid at the basis of major national economic projects, particularly ones like the plan for redistributing part of the discharge of northern rivers into the Volga basin."

In the period of stagnation, bureaucratic centralism and ascendance of subjective principles of control, sector science was often given the role of servant to certain powers that be. Is this not the case, for example, with the Soyuzgiprovodkhov, which until recently was referred to as the All-Union State (et cetera, et cetera) Institute for the Diversion and Distribution of Waters of Northern and Siberian Rivers of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources?

It was the Soyuzgiprovodkhov that adopted the unreliable method of extrapolation. A further decrease in the level of the Caspian predicted by this method was in fact the sole (!) justification for the Minvodkhov's costly plans for diverting part of the discharge of northern rivers into the Volga. Nature laughed at this prediction, and the level of the Caspian began rising on its own—and much faster than it had fallen. Since 1978 it has risen 1.24 meters, and Dagestan is already asking for money to fight the invading sea!

So a mistake was made, it would seem. That this is true is documented by a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. So what do we do now, maintain the memory of who it was that erred, and relax? Alas, it is clearly too early to relax. At least one part of the "project of the century"—and a very significant one at that—was not repealed; it has remained in force, and it is proceeding with unprecedented speed.

Construction of a second Volga-Don canal, which will be much larger than the first, has already begun. This is an excavation of Cyclopean proportions. This canal was advertised in the 9 June 1984 issue of the newspaper *VECHERNIY VOLGOGRAD* in an article written by associates of the Soyuzgiprovodkhov titled "The New Volga-Don Canal—A Component of the Grandiose

Project to Divert Northern Rivers to the Country's South." The canal was to solve two problems in one sweep: irrigate an additional million hectares in the Don and Kuban river basins, and concurrently avert salinization of the Sea of Azov. At one time the salinity of the sea did in fact increase, but since the late 1970s its salinity has declined.

It was thought earlier that the canal would be filled with water from north-flowing rivers. Now it is obvious that a significant proportion of the water of the Volga itself, which is supposed to flow into the Caspian Sea, will gush into the gigantic canal. Now a real threat hangs over the Caspian. The destiny of the Aral awaits it.

The situation in the vicinity of the Aral Sea is graphically evident from space. The sea's level began to fall in 1961, and it fell at a rate of 0.45 meters per year. Recall what the geologist Shatskiy said: "...You can't imagine how quickly things dry out in this area!" It is evident from photographs taken from space that the sea has already dried out by a third, it has receded 40-50 kilometers from its old shoreline, and 60-75 kilometers around its bays. Now the Amu-Darya carries only around 3 cubic kilometers of water to the Aral per year, while the Syr-Darya has not been flowing into it for many years now. Desert is forming in the delta: The soil has become saline, and bottomland vegetation and the reed mats have perished.

Tendrils of encroaching dust 200-300 and sometimes even 400-500 kilometers long can be seen on space photographs advancing from the desert toward the oases in the Amu-Darya delta and the pasturelands of Ustyurt Plateau.

Each year up to 75 million tons of saline dust blanket enormous areas of soil and suppress vegetation. This soil, as well as the saline ground water, is poisonous to people and causes epidemics. As an example esophageal cancer is much more prevalent here than anywhere else.

Saturated with mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals (pesticides), runoff from irrigated fields, especially from land maintained by the Tyuya-Muyun Canal, drains into the Sarykamyskaya depression, across which the Amu-Darya flowed into the Caspian Sea thousands of years ago. There it is forming "a new Aral"—Sarykamyskoye and Arnasayskoye lakes. The volume of Sarykamyskoye Lake, which is a salt lake, is growing at a rate of 5 cubic kilometers per year.

Yes, this is a very real large-scale ecological disaster, which was planned and placed into motion consciously. V. Sokolov (*LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, 18 November 1987) recalls the kind of answers the All-Union Planning, Surveying and Scientific Research Institute gave to questions posed in the newspaper in the past: "Nor will reclamation of new agricultural land in the Aral basin cease in the future. The total area will double. Over 70 cubic kilometers of water, rather than the

present 40, will spill over onto the land. The increment of irrigated land promises not only to double the yields of cotton and rice but also to quadruple meat production and enlarge the harvests of vegetables, fruits and grapes" (1962); "The inevitability of the Aral Sea's desiccation is obvious to everyone" (1968).

Thus, they (who are they? we need to name some names!) decided long ago to create prosperity in one region at the expense of disaster in another. The disaster has occurred. But what about the prosperity? V. Sokolov writes:

"The total area of irrigated land in the Aral basin has not doubled—it has only increased by a half; nor have the hypothetical yields of cotton and rice doubled. As far as foodstuffs are concerned, per-capita production in most prosperous Central Asia is 26 percent of the medical dietary norm for meat, 42 percent for milk, 53 percent for fruits and grapes.... What has increased? The use of chemicals. Cotton fields are being inundated with dozens (!) of times more pesticides than the average for the Soviet Union or the USA. What else has increased? Consumption of irrigation water.... What is spilling over 'onto the land' today is not the 70 cubic kilometers required for double the area, but the entire 90! Even the estimated irrigation norms, which are themselves generously inflated, are exceeded in Uzbekistan by 1.6 times, in Turkmenia by 1.7 times, and in Kazakhstan by twice!"

Add to this that use of child labor during cotton harvesting time has increased as well.... No, all of this has not brought happiness to the Soviet people!

Waterlogging and salinization of the land is the terrible scourge of irrigated farming. The Karakum Canal, 1,266 kilometers long (1983), is the pride of Turkmenia. The canal is not a concrete trough—it is simply dug out of the ground, like an irrigation ditch. Its fringes are clearly visible on space photographs owing to seepage of the water. Alas, this is not a cheerful fringe of green. The ground water (which is salty) rises to the surface, lakes form in depressions, they become saline due to evaporation, and salt marshes arise, which are shirked by all living things. Ashkhabad, a city located in the desert, is being saved from waterlogging by 150 extraction wells! Who is responsible for such a project?

Things are even worse in the northern Karakumy, south of the Aral Sea. There is much salty water there—in the ground, close to the surface—on the order of 3-6 meters, and even closer in some places. But were such land to be irrigated without drainage—that is, without removal of the salty water, the latter would emerge on the surface, its salinity would increase due to evaporation, and salt would precipitate out of solution. Saline marshes would form as a result. They are white and readily visible on space photographs. They are already present in the Karakum Canal zone, and there are already very many of them in the northern Karakumy. Nothing can grow on such soil.

In his article "Successes of Land Reclamation in the Turkmen SSR in 60 Years" A. M. Khodzhamuradov (PROBLEMY OSVOYENIYA PUSTYN, No 5, 1984) wrote: "The Turkmen SSR possesses an enormous reserve of land suited to irrigation. Its total area is around 12 million hectares. As of 1 November 1983 only 1,061,400 hectares of agricultural land were being utilized.... Reclamation measures—that is, construction of drains, reconstruction of the water collecting and draining network, flushing, repair, cleaning etc.—are required on 416,032 hectares."

Let us translate these "scientific" phrases to ordinary language: In 1983, 40 percent of the irrigated land was already salinized. Now the figure is even larger. In the northern Karakumy, land reclaimers abandon the rice fields—the check plots—as they become salinized, and move to neighboring plots. Were one to travel by car from Khiva to Tashauz and then to Nukus, one would see a white, lifeless plain from horizon to horizon, looking much like snow-covered steppes.

The truth must be confronted head-on: It would seem that this salinization is permanent.

There has been talk about making our country cotton-independent (grain independence is longed for even more). But clearly it must be achieved by sensible means. This is discussed in the 20 June 1987 CPSU Central Committee decree "On Unsatisfactory Use of the Natural and Economic Potential of the Agroindustrial Complex in the Uzbek SSR, Tajik SSR and Turkmen SSR."

The final question is this: Where have the scientists been through all of this? It would have to be recognized here that the OOFAG must bear the responsibility for the absence of adequate scientific leadership over the efforts to use Central Asia's natural and economic potential. The IVP and the Geography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences are subordinated to it, and A. G. Babayev, director of the Deserts Institute of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, is on its staff as a corresponding member. The OOFAG is sufficiently well informed, but it prefers to avoid examining acute social scientific problems.

The reader is well aware of the arguments in the debate between proponents and opponents of diverting Siberia's great river Ob into Central Asia (see NOVYY MIR, No 7, 1987). The main impression left by those who are for it is as follows. The proponents of the "project of the century" desire to build a canal, no matter what its destination might be: Tyumen, Kustanay, Ural, Aral, Central Asia, Sarykamysh, corn, the coal of Kushmurun, whatever, just as long as a canal is built!

I would like to emphasize that those who spoke out against river diversion also included wide circles of scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Interim Scientific and Technical Expert Commission on

the Problems of Raising the Effectiveness of Land Reclamation (VNTEK) played a great positive role under the chairmanship of USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President A. L. Yanshin. In that same issue of NOVYY MIR the proponents of river diversion write that the VNTEK was organized "without any direction from above, and without any rights of citizenship." That is precisely what is remarkable here, that scientists are examining a state problem and submitting proposals to the government out of a sense of civic duty, on their own initiative. And the government is entertaining these proposals. This is perestroika at work!

Basing itself on materials from the VNTEK, on 29 January 1986 a conference of mathematical scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University resolved: "To support the proposal of Academician L. S. Pontryagin to delete from Section VI of the draft Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development in the 12th Five-Year Plan and in the Period to the Year 2000 the paragraph: 'significantly amplify the scientific grounds for regional redistribution of water resources. Initiate work associated with diverting part of the drainage of northern rivers into the Volga basin and from the Volga to the Don and the Kuban and with construction of the Dniepr-Bug hydraulic power system and the first generation of the Danube-Dniepr canal'."

The buro of the Department of Geology, Geophysics, Geochemistry and Mining Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences supported this proposal and other conclusions of the VNTEK at its 3 July 1986 meeting. The proposal was also supported by the buro of the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the buro of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. According to a statement by Academician G. I. Petrov at a general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences in October 1978, the activities of the IVP were described as an extraordinary event in the Academy of Sciences.

And only one department in the Academy of Sciences went against all of the others—the OOFAG. More precisely, not the department (it never discussed the diversions at its general meetings at that time or anytime later), but its director, Academician-Secretary L. M. Brekhovskikh. Immediately after the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers published their decree on halting the effort to divert part of the discharge of northern and Siberian rivers, he submitted a report to the OOFAG buro on the work of the IVP, and he personally read a draft resolution approving the activities of the IVP in general and objecting to criticism of the IVP in the press. The decree on halting the river diversion efforts was not even mentioned in this draft. The members of the buro declared that they could not adopt the resolution if it did not mention the decree. The draft resolution had to be revised. A reference to the decree was added. A "decisive measure" was adopted: A

decision was made to appoint a commission to comprehensively investigate the activities of the IVP—a commission that should have been appointed according to the academy's plan anyway (in connection with expiration of the director's five-year term).

Under the chairmanship of USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member V. M. Kotlyakov, a year after the above decree was published this commission announced its conclusion on the activities of the IVP. It noted that besides accomplishments, there were shortcomings in the activities of the IVP as well; nonetheless, "the institute was recognized to be the winner of the All-Union Socialist Competition on the basis of the results of 1983, and it was awarded the Perpetual Red Banner of the AUCCTU and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1984 the institute took first place in the socialist competition of Moscow's scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and second place on the basis of the results of 1985." The conclusion contained tepid criticism and restrained recommendations.

Six members of V. M. Kotlyakov's commission—academicians B. N. Laskorin, A. F. Treshnikov and G. S. Golitsyn, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member T. M. Eneyev and doctors of sciences I. S. Koplan- Diks and M. M. Telitchenko—deemed the conclusion to be unsatisfactory, and drew up their own. It states that the principal objective "of the institute was not met: A comprehensive assessment of water resources is absent, and even the problem is not worded correctly; the same can also be said for development of the scientific principles of optimum use of water resources.... The institute did not produce results of a fundamental nature, and it did not develop the necessary scientific conception which could serve as the basis for developing the USSR's water economy.... The problem of so-called scientific substantiation of diversion of part of the discharge of northern and Siberian rivers occupied the most important place in the institute's activities." As a result "the institute lost more and more of its traits as an Academy institution, and essentially became a sector institute of the USSR Minvudkhov within the composition of the USSR Academy of Sciences.... Public displeasure with the results of the institute's work is reflected in numerous publications in newspapers and journals. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of the USSR Academy of Sciences.... The idea that continuous uniform growth of fresh water use is inevitable constantly pervades the works of the institute and the publications of its governing board. Even after world and domestic statistics demonstrated that use of fresh water in developed countries (including the USSR) is decreasing, the IVP of the USSR Academy of Sciences continues to insist on preserving the trend of increasing use of fresh water.... Unjustified growth of the use of fresh water in all sectors of the national economy (especially in irrigated farming) is creating an artificial shortage of water resources in the country's southern regions, and serving

as an excuse for establishing more and more new water sources through territorial redistribution of river discharge."

But here is what is most important: "Absence of a procedure for predicting change in the water table led to unprecedented development of processes of flooding, waterlogging, salinization and alkalization of soil. In the years of large-scale development of irrigation (1966-1985), according to data of the USSR State Statistical Administration more than 3.5 million hectares of irrigated land were rendered unusable." And more: "Without question, the governing board of the Institute of Water Problems should be included among the persons guilty of contaminating unique water basins (Lake Baykal, Lake Ladoga) and named in decrees of the CPSU Central Committee published between 16 May and 29 May 1987.... Absence of a scientifically substantiated conception of reproducing and using water resources, which is something that the Institute of Water Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences had been mandated to develop, is the main reason for their unsatisfactory condition, use, reproduction and protection. The country's water economy is in disarray, it is having a destructive effect on nature and the economy, and it is an object of acute debates and a cause of social tension. A fundamentally erroneous water management policy, archaic water use systems and the absence of adequate scientific and technical progress in water management have led to a dramatic worsening of water quality (and as a consequence, to dramatic worsening of the sanitary and epidemic situation), to loss and reduction of productivity (flooding, partial submergence, salinization, drying, erosion) of millions of hectares of fertile land, partial submergence of cities and other built-up territory (which has already resulted in numerous disasters), and to creation of artificial difficulties in supplying water to a number of the country's regions."

And finally: "Institute director USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member G. V. Voropayev failed to provide scientific and organizational leadership to the effort to carry out the tasks posed to the institute, and he failed to formulate a conception of future development of the institute's scientific research. The institute's leadership needs to be strengthened."

In my opinion it would be unjust to apply the last paragraph just to the director of the IVP. We should not forget those whom he has directly supervised in all of the 10 years of his work in the Academy of Sciences. This is what the authors of numerous articles in newspapers and journals (NOVYY MIR, NASH SOVREMENNİK, KROKODİL, OGONEK and others) are talking about and demanding, but.... The reaction of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been more than strange: A special decision of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources appointed Comrade Voropayev

permanent representative of the Academy to the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources! The wolf has been thrown in among the sheep....

It has now been many long years that Comrade Voropayev has been serving the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources faithfully; together with it, he bears responsibility for the disaster in the Karakalpak ASSR, as a result of which improbably difficult living conditions have been created there, comparable even to the consequences of the accident in Chernobyl; together with the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources he bears responsibility for the Kara-Bogaz, for the diversion project, and so on and so forth. And now the USSR Academy of Sciences (and chiefly the OOFAG) officially blesses and affirms this faulty alliance.

The strategy and means of solving the country's water supply problem on the basis of extensive introduction of effective resource-conserving and nature-protecting procedures were formulated in a recent decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers dated 27 January 1988: "On Priority Measures for Improving the Use of Water Resources in the Country." In particular it once again instructs the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the All-Union Agricultural Academy imeni V. I. Lenin to continue studying the corresponding scientific problems. Let me say openly that it is my hope that the materials presented here would be of assistance in solving this problem correctly.

The Kara-Bogaz and the Aral were spoiled consciously. Many other water basins, while they have not been destroyed, are being spoiled by gradual poisoning of their water.

There is one type of pollutant that has long been unnoticed and unrecognized, but one against which there is practically no defense. It is mineral fertilizers—compounds of phosphorus, nitrogen and potassium that are washed off of agricultural fields by rain and artificial irrigation, and carried into water basins by rivers, streams and subterranean flows. It is almost impossible to intercept all of this discharge; moreover removal of dissolved fertilizers from water is expensive, and its effectiveness is low.

Saturation of water by fertilizers brings about eutrophication. Just like on fertilized fields, in eutrophic waters vegetation grows luxuriantly, and in this case it is not the kind we would ever like. Many agricultural plants can be grown without any soil, with their roots immersed in fertilized water. This method is called hydroponics. But in nature, eutrophic water basins grow algae, chiefly microscopic—so-called phytoplankton. In times of their greatest development (phytoplankton "blooms"), the water comes to resemble pea soup. And then these algae

die out, settle to the bottom and decay, removing oxygen from the water and releasing hydrogen sulfide. The water basin then dies of hydrogen sulfide contamination.

The Black Sea is saturated with hydrogen sulfide for all but its upper 200-meter layer. And in recent years the level of hydrogen sulfide contamination has been rising to 100 meters, 50 meters, and in some places all the way up to the sea surface. The Bulgarian resort of Zolotyie Peski has started dying. The Danube is probably carrying a little too much fertilizer into the Black Sea (no, we mustn't divert the waters of the Danube into our country). The USSR Academy of Sciences Oceanology Institute reported on this problem to the government. Organizational measures have been implemented. As always, the OOFAG has remained on the sidelines.

In our century, hydrogen sulfide contamination began appearing in the depths of the Baltic Sea, in periods when winds failed to drive Atlantic water in. The Baltic Sea is already rather eutrophied: Very large amounts of fertilizers are being washed off from the fields of Sweden. Among the microscopic algae that flourish in eutrophic waters, there are what are known as bluegreen algae. This kind of water makes people sick. This is called gaff disease: The Finns apply the term gaff to narrow bays—fjords, and it is on their shores that this illness has been noticed among people.

Aleksandr Dovzhenko's last unfinished film was devoted to the drama of people resettled from their native villages when the latter were flooded by Kakhovskoye Reservoir. The reservoir itself became the first act of another drama—this was where we first collided with the problem of eutrophication. And then it was found that this was the destiny of all reservoirs. And even of large lakes like Ladoga, out of which the Neva carries eutrophic water into Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland.

The woe is aggravated by the fact that toxic chemicals—insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, defoliants etc.—are washed off of agricultural fields together with fertilizers. These are poisons, and they are not broken down. Poisoning of fields, vegetables, fruits and wine in Moldavia by toxic chemicals has been reported in the press. You'll never find worms in apples and peaches there—the flesh of these fruits is toxic to worms. But only to worms? The preparation DDT is sadly memorable. It is no longer used, but it will be a long time before we can forget it. This poison is very stable—on reaching the World Ocean, it persists in it for centuries. It is being detected in impermissible doses in the milk of nursing mothers, and even in the eggs of Antarctic penguins. Dioxins such as the defoliant Agent Orange used by the Americans to destroy vegetation in Vietnam are much more toxic and persistent. Defoliants have been used to the most recent times on a colossal scale in our country on cotton. It is hard to enumerate all of the consequences of the many years of use of these poisons over vast areas.

Dioxins are carcinogens and mutagens, and they will produce an increasing percentage of congenital deformities in children for several generations to come.

Agricultural chemicals must be made harmless to both people and water basins. And in general, biological methods are the preferable means of controlling pests in agriculture. Once again the ball is in science's court in this regard. This is a matter for active science, and not for quasi-scientific bureaucratic hypocrisy.

Once I was shown a map of the rivers of the European USSR on which rivers from which we could drink the water were marked in blue and those from which we could not drink the water were marked in red. This was the circulatory system of a sick organism: There was much more red than blue. In its article "Waste Water" the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3d edition) states: "Surveillance over discharge of waste water and its treatment or decontamination is maintained by organs of the sanitary-epidemiological service of the USSR Ministry of Public Health as well as by the Basin Inspections of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources." What's wrong, comrades of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, are you powerless, or are you irresponsible?

The history of the pulp-and-paper mill on Lake Baykal is probably one of the clearest illustrations of the antipopular essence of bureaucracy. Once upon a time the Americans trashed their Great Lakes—Erie, Ontario, Huron, Michigan, Superior. Private companies did their business there. But now decisive steps have been taken, and the pollution is declining. But who's doing business in our country? Gosplan? Who needs such profits? The Ministry of Timber, Pulp-and-Paper and Woodworking Industry? Writers wrote, mathematician Academician S. L. Sobolev spoke, a two-part film toured the entire country, and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member G. I. Galaziy risked everything that he had; only the OOFAG remained silent. And the mill was built.

I was visiting Lake Baykal at that time. We descended to its bottom in manned submersibles called "Fish" in honor of one of the constellation and a sign of the zodiac. The name comes from the Latin "piscis." The Americans treat this as an English word—"Pisces." This name, a mixture of Latin and Massachusetts, has become commonplace in our country as well. And our first look at this territory, the floor of the Baykal, revealed the presence of civilization: The first thing we saw there was a beer bottle.

We did not visit the mill on that trip, we only floated by it aboard the vessel "Professor Vereshchagin." It was a clear and sunny day. A large dust cloud hung over the mill. This was a sign that something was being dumped into the atmosphere. Associates of the Limnological (lake science) Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences

at Lake Baykal told us that the mill fires up its treatment plants only during the time that foreigners visit, since their continuous operation would be too expensive.

Perestroika is now under way. Those guilty of locating the pulp-and-paper mill at Lake Baykal have been named. A government commission resolved to convert the mill into a furniture factory. But for some reason this conversion is to be carried out within a five-year period, while this is something that must be done sooner. At any rate it is too early to relax. Someone (if we only knew his name!) came up with the idea of keeping the mill and transporting its liquid wastes from Lake Baykal by pipeline. But that can't be done! This is a seismic area, earthquakes are frequent and strong, and a pipeline would not survive them. What would happen to the liquid wastes then? And some state planning engineer from Leningrad drew up a plan to transform the town of Severobaykalsk, which is situated within the lake's coastal protected zone, into a large industrial city. We can't! Baykal must be preserved. On 2 March of this year LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reported organization of a Baykal movement in our country. Let this article be my announcement of my intention to join this movement.

On Lake Ladoga, from which Leningrad gets its water, there are as many as five enterprises of pulp-and-paper industry, and even dozens more water polluting facilities—Novgorod's Azot Association, Lensekhokhimiya, the Kirishi and Boksitogorsk biochemical plants, the Lesogorsk Synthetic Fiber Plant and so on. Would you say that this is an appropriate backdrop for Leningrad's principal water source?

The pulp plant in Priozersk is polluting Leningrad's water more than others (it seems to have been temporarily shut down). Its liquid wastes, which contain toxic phenols and organic matter that is increasing eutrophication, are being dumped into Lake Ladoga without any serious treatment. Tens of millions of tons every year. The plant is hardly able to take water for itself from the lake any longer: It is too dirty even for it. It was for this reason that two of its water intakes broke down, and the third—the last—is in jeopardy. So here we are, sawing off the branch on which we sit. Amazing!

But this is not the worst of it. Twenty years ago, acting on an idea of the State Institute for the Planning of Enterprises of Pulp, Paper and Hydrolysis Industry, Lake Drozdovo was barricaded off from Lake Ladoga—they decided to sacrifice it as a liquid waste settling pond, "temporarily" of course, until water treatment plants could be built. But we know quite well that there is nothing more permanent in a bureaucracy than temporary facilities. Because a settling pond was there, they never did get around to building the treatment plants. In 20 years—and in even less—Drozdovo rotted in the literal sense, and whenever the winds blow in the direction of Priozersk, it becomes hard for people there to breathe. And the liquid wastes that pass into the Ladoga

through Lake Drozdovo leave it 200 times more toxic than before Lake Drozdovo. Thanks a lot, State Institute for the Planning of Enterprises of Pulp, Paper and Hydrolysis Industry!

In the meantime Lake Ladoga is undergoing swift eutrophication. In the last 25 years the amount of phosphorus entering it has tripled, and it is now 7,000 tons per year. The same harmful bluegreen algae have already propagated there, and it is now dangerous to drink the water from the lakeshore. And all of this goes into the Neva, to Leningrad. And "transformers of nature" are not dozing there either....

In April 1978 the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology appointed me chairman of an expert commission for the engineering aspect of the detail design for a system to protect Leningrad from flooding, submitted by the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the executive committee of the Lenin City Council of Peoples Deputies. Twenty-eight specialists were included in the expert commission.

To protect Leningrad from floods! What comes to mind immediately is A. S. Pushkin, his "Bronze Horseman," the flood of 1824, when the Neva rose to record height—421 centimeters above the zero mark on the Kronstadt depth gauge. A year after this, Bazen, the director of the Railways Institute, proposed barricading Petersburg off from floods by a dike 21 versts long—from Lisiy Nos on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland to Oranienbaum on the southern shore. Now, half a century later, this is where things have come.

From all appearances, this is the way to go. But then, what motivated Academician A. N. Krylov, one of our famous scientists, to declare that "the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, the Neva inlet and the delta are the lungs of Petersburg, and they cannot be plugged with a stopper"? But in the end, the detailed design of the dike was drawn up by the Leningrad department of the Gidroyekt institute of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification. The expert commission acquainted itself with the report written by the project's chief engineer, S. Agalakov. The so-called western variant was selected in the project—a dike 25.4 kilometers long (including 22.2 kilometers over water), from Gorskaya Railroad Station on the north shore of the Gulf of Finland (a little west of Cape Lisiy Nos) to the island of Kotlin, and from this island as far as the city of Lomonosov on the south shore.

It cannot be said that the authors of the project themselves failed to see what danger it carried. The materials of the project mentioned the highly polluted state of waters of the Neva inlet and the grave sanitary-hygienic situation in the area in general. First there is the eutrophication that originates with Lake Ladoga: blooms of nitrophilic chlorococcal algae in the southeastern part of the inlet. Due to eutrophication, the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) of the Neva inlet greatly exceeded the

norm in winter beneath the ice and in calm summer months, even the absence of any kind of dike. Because of a lack of oxygen, in such periods fish saved themselves by abandoning the Neva inlet for the Gulf of Finland. Of course summer and autumn storms drove oxygen-saturated water from the gulf into the inlet, and the BOD approached normal. Such that in the literal sense, a dike would conclusively and irreversibly cut off the Neva inlet's oxygen supply. This is exactly what Aleksey Nikolayevich Krylov was talking about.

Second, due to sewage discharges, the Neva inlet is infected by microorganisms. The coli index—that is, the quantity of *Escherichia coli*—attained millions per liter, the so-called microbial number attained hundreds of thousands of colonies per milliliter, and helminth eggs were detected in 15 percent of the water samples and in over 80 percent of the bottom sediment samples. Bathing was banned on the south shore of the Neva inlet. You can imagine what could happen if all of this were allowed to continue and accumulate.

Third, the Neva inlet is highly polluted by petroleum products and other toxic substances. An oil film covered up to 20 percent of the water surface, the concentration of petroleum products exceeded the BOD by a factor of 1.5-2, and the layer of bunker oil on the bottom in the vicinity of the harbor attained 8 meters in some places. Because of the toxicity of the water, half of the fish caught in Markizovaya Pool had diseases of the integument and visceral organs.

On the whole, most members of the expert commission assessed the "western variant" as being extremely dangerous. All of the economic calculations in the "western" project were not persuasive, and they created the impression that arguments were being fitted to a foregone decision.

The planners also examined an "eastern variant" with dikes along the shoreline, which could be blocked by gates at the mouths of all rivers and by a flood control dam in the upper reaches of the Neva during floods. Its cost was estimated at 896.7 million rubles, almost as much as the "western variant." The "eastern variant" seemed to be ecologically safe. But it was rejected by the Leningrad department of *Gidroproyekt* on the grounds that it would be undesirable to erect a dam in the upper reaches of the Neva. It was said that dikes along the shore would spoil the view of Leningrad from the sea!

In the meantime, after detailed nationwide discussion devoted chiefly to ecological problems, the Netherlands adopted project "Delta" for exactly the same goal of protecting against floods caused by onshore winds (the project was completed in 1987). Dams were erected at the mouths of all of the channels in the Maas and Schelde river deltas. Consisting of gates raised above the water level along their entire length, these dams are lowered to

the bottom whenever flooding is threatened. Incidentally, the debate on the possible ecological damage that may occur when the gates are lowered, even for several hours during a flood, is still going on there.

The expert commission was given letters objecting to the "western variant" from institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad—zoological, botanical and limnological, from the Leningrad Nature Conservation Society and from many specialists. When it became known that I, as chairman of the expert commission, had taken the position that the "western variant" was unacceptable, and when I did not abandon my position in response to outside pressure, V. V. Britchuk, a member of the commission and an associate of the GKNT, who was obviously following someone's instructions, wrote a positive conclusion on the project together with S. Agalakov, and gathered the signatures of most of the commission members by some means or another, and GKNT deputy chairman L. N. Yefremov sent this conclusion to the higher authorities. I have given their names here for the sake of keeping future historians informed. At that time I also wrote a protest to the USSR Gosstroy, the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the Leningrad City Executive Committee. My protest read:

"I do not agree with this conclusion, and I feel that the project should not be approved, since it is ecologically harmful, hydrodynamically unsubstantiated and economically unprofitable. Ecological harm is associated with reduction of water exchange between the Neva inlet and the Gulf of Finland after the inlet is barricaded off from the gulf by a dike. This would result in an ecological disaster in the Neva inlet (on the brink of which it already stands)—eutrophication, as a result of which the inlet will become overgrown by bluegreen algae, duckweed and reeds, and transformed into a rotting swamp. The inlet will then have to be dried out (and the Neva will have to be canalized), which will require billions of rubles."

My opinion was supported by a letter written to USSR Gosstroy on 18 October 1978 by the Section for Earth Sciences of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (once again the OOFAG, it would be easy to guess, remained on the sidelines). But as we know, the decision was a foregone one. And another "building project of the century" began.

The construction was carried on at a forced pace, and at the eve of 1985 the northern half of the dike was completed. "It is not difficult to surmise that a stagnant zone has formed in the north. Neva water, carrying wastes from a large city, started circulating locally. It began to decay, blooms formed, and large quantities of bluegreen algae appeared. As a result the beaches at Lakhty and Lisiy Nos were closed" (from an article by S. Tsvetkov in the journal "ZNANIYE—SILA," No 8, 1987).

And here are some passages excerpted by M. Podgorodnikov on 25 February 1987 from letters in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: "This year it was impossible to swim in the vicinity of the resort zone (Repino, Komarov, Solnechnoye)" (A. Gusev); "While in former times the Baltika Fishing Kolkhoz fulfilled half of its plan in the Neva inlet, and there was fresh smelt for Leningrad's inhabitants in spring, after the dike was built there could be no discussion of any kind of fish" (Yu. Seleznev).

Leningrad's construction executives are gravely at fault for premature completion of the dike. This includes N. Vlasov, the chief hydraulic engineer of the Lenmorzashchita Administration (he allowed himself to address the scientific community in an article titled "Incompetency" in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 25 February 1987).

All of the materials on Leningrad's water economy show that complete treatment of all liquid wastes has the highest priority among the ecological problems of the city, with or without the dike. The task of completely ceasing pollution of Lake Ladoga—the first link in the city's water supply chain—may be treated as a more long-term, but no less important, problem, as was mentioned earlier. We need to ask the city's leaders to inspect Lake Drozdovo, and still better, to get them to spend at least a week on its shore—in this way they would get a better feeling for the condition of Lake Ladoga, and they will see what awaits Leningrad.

S. Tsvetkov, cited above, writes: "In a press conference conducted in Leningrad in June 1986, Professor I. A. Shiklomanov, director of the State Hydrology Institute, exclaimed on being inundated with questions: 'We can't abandon the construction project when 600 million rubles have already been spent!' To which Daniil Granin caustically retorted: 'Just because we've bought the pistol, does this mean we have to shoot ourselves?'"

Let me recall that I. A. Shiklomanov was one of the main persons back in 1978 who helped to fit the arguments to the foregone decision; incidentally, his positions were also similar in regard to the Caspian Sea and diversion of the discharge of northern rivers.

So what should we do next? S. Tsvetkov reminds us that a similar dike built to protect San Francisco from floods was demolished as soon as the eutrophication it caused was discovered.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Fundamental Reorganization of Nature Protection Efforts in the Country" is discussed in the 17 January 1988 issue of PRAVDA. It takes note of the nationwide support to specific measures to protect the Ladoga and Baykal basins from pollution, to halt the work of diverting part of the discharge of northern and Siberian rivers, and to protect unique monuments of nature and culture. The USSR State Committee for Protection of Nature was created together with a system of state committees in the republics and local organs in

order to improve the system for controlling nature protection and regulating the use of natural resources, and it was endowed with far-reaching powers. A public council consisting of scientists, public officials, representatives of councils of peoples deputies and enterprise executives is being formed under the USSR State Committee for Protection of Nature to discuss the major problems of utilizing nature and protecting the environment, and to write recommendations on solving these problems.

It is high time for the USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of sciences of the union republics to begin restructuring their work appropriately as well. Most needful of "fresh water" is the OOFAG—the most "ecological" of all of the departments of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the one that is the most stagnant.

The OOFAG is a tiny and weak department (staffed by 10 academicians). And yet the harm caused by its weakness, its actions and its inactions is enormous. It is unable to handle the major social and ecological problems of nationwide significance. What we need is an extraordinary commission—with vast powers—staffed by the most prominent specialists of the country to deeply analyze such problems, prepare reports to the government and keep the public informed with specific warnings, predictions and recommendations.

As the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers states, the fight for ecological safety on earth must be viewed as one of the most important and noble tasks of the Soviet people.

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Armenian Internal Affairs Official on Applying New Assembly Regulations

18300043a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 9 Sep 88 p 1

[Armenpress report: "The Law in Action"]

[Text] The deputy minister of internal affairs of the Armenian SSR, G. G. Grigoryan, was asked by an Armenpress correspondent to comment on the practical application of requirements contained in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "Procedures for Organizing and Conducting Gatherings, Meetings, Street Marches, and Demonstrations in the USSR" and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "Liability for Violations of Established Procedures for Organizing and Conducting Gatherings, Meetings, Street Marches, and Demonstrations."

"The legislative enactments that you mention," he stated, "serve as a new means of insuring political freedoms for the citizens of the USSR. They also serve

an example of glasnost and democratization in our society. They make it mandatory for state and public organizations, both officials and private citizens, not to obstruct or interfere with mass demonstrations which are conducted in compliance with established regulations. At the same time, responsibility is established by law for violating authorized procedures for organizing and conducting gatherings, meetings, street marches, and public demonstrations. After these legislative acts came into force, their substance and significance were made public by party and soviet social organizations and law enforcement organs with the help of the mass media, together with an appropriate amount of explanatory work. As a result, on the whole throughout the republic, compliance with the regulations established regarding mass events may be observed, and the proper procedures are in force. It should be noted, however, that in a number of instances we have seen infractions of these rules resulting from a lack of responsibility and disrespect for the law. There have been unauthorized public gatherings, for example, in Yerevan, Leninakan, and Abovyan.

"Naturally, such inadmissible behavior could not remain unpunished. The law is the law, and it is mandatory for all. Some time after these ukases came into force therefore, administrative offenses by significant number of violators of these procedures were documented and turned over to the people's courts for their consideration. To deal with them, such measures of administrative action as official warnings, fines, administrative arrest, or the referring of cases to labor collectives for consideration were applied.

"Not long ago a resident of Abovyan, Valeriy Yengibaryan, among others, applied to the ispolkom of the Soviet of People's Deputies in Abovyan for permission to hold a meeting in the city stadium. The application was approved. Despite this arrangement, however, Yengibaryan managed to instigate another mass meeting at a different site—the memorial to Kh. Abovyan. Here, he held a sit-down demonstration. These activities of Yengibaryan, together with two brothers, Kamo and Garik Safaryan, have been documented for delivery to the People's Court. Igor Muradyan, who addressed the meeting, has been fined by decision of the Abovyan People's Court.

"The activities of Avetis Grigoryan are noteworthy. It is surprising that this citizen, who lives in Artashat and works in Yerevan, managed to play an active part in mass meetings not only in these cities but also in Leninakan, where he recently received an official warning.

"Not long ago a notice by the republic MVD was published in the press about an unauthorized meeting held in Theater Square. Let me take the opportunity to

say, in fulfillment of the ministry's promise, that proceedings have been instituted against quite a number of persons who ignored the regulations under discussion. Since I cannot enumerate them all, I will name only a few.

"The following residents of Yerevan have received fines of various amounts pursuant to the provisions of these ukases by order of the people's courts: Bakhshi Avetiye-yan, Armev Sarkiye-yan, Telman Sarkiye-yan, Ambartsum Galstyan, David Ovsepyan, Artur Patvakanyan, Vazgen Manukyan, Samvel Kazaryan, Ashot Manuchar-yan, Stepa Tuhikyan, Khachik Stamboltsyan, Levon Akopyan, and others.

"The task of internal affairs organs in carrying out the requirements of the ukases constitutes a reliable safeguard for the protection of social order in the holding of demonstrations, meetings, street marches, and for protecting the safety of citizens. To do this, in addition to members of the militia and internal troops of the MVD, we are drawing upon the services of the voluntary people's patrols and other social organizations, and with the support of the mass media we are increasing the impact of explanatory work among the population regarding liability for violating the requirements of these legislative acts.

"Our people have on more than one occasion demonstrated their respect for this law. There are therefore sufficient grounds to say that, through the experience gained in holding meetings and demonstrations, we shall all exhibit a high level of awareness and strictly abide by the established body of law governing the organization and conduct of large public events."

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**Armenian Council of Ministers Chairman on
NKAO-ArSSR Joint Development**
18300043b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
14 Sep 88 p 2

[Interview with F. T. Sarkisyan, chairman of the ArSSR Council of Ministers by a correspondent of Armenpress: "A Time for Action and Creativity"]

[Text] The well-known resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on Nagorno-Karabakh, which was adopted on 24 March 1988, opens up a broad perspective leading to the further social and economic development of the autonomous oblast. In the comprehensive program introduced in the resolution, a significant place is given to the ArSSR, which in cooperation with the AzSSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), will participate in resolving problems related to various aspects of life in the oblast.

More than five months have elapsed since the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers was passed. In view of this interval, a correspondent of Armenpress requested F. T. Sarkisyan, chairman of the ArSSR Council of Ministers, to respond to a number of questions about republic efforts during this period to carry out the measures and recommendations in the resolution.

[Question] The resolution outlined measures aimed at a fundamental resolution of social and economic problems in the oblast, including such major initiatives as the achievement of two-way television transmission, the building of roads, and the expansion of construction for social, cultural and everyday needs as well as for residential housing. Specifically, what has been accomplished to date?

[Sarkisyan] First of all let me say that thanks to the installation of three relay stations—in Shusha, Gadрут, and Martuni—Armenian television programs for the first time are being received in almost all areas of the NKAO (by more than 80 percent of the population).

The State Design Institute of the USSR Ministry of Communication is currently engaged in designing a satellite transmission system to permit the interchange of television broadcasts between the three republics of the Caucasus.

A radio broadcasting network in Stepanakert is already receiving transmissions from Armenia. A new postal route has been set up—via Yerevan, Goris, and Stepanakert—that promotes the exchange of mail, parcels, and printed matter. And the number of direct inter-city telephone channels linking Yerevan and Stepanakert with Mardakert, Gadрут, and Askeran have been increased more than three times.

With regard to roads, it is noteworthy that the republic Ministry of Highways has undertaken to complete the reconstruction of the section of hard-surface road linking Goris with the AzSSR trunk road to Lachin and Stepanakert by 1 May 1989, so that it will completely conform to specifications for republic roads of the third technical category.

As decreed by the the USSR Council of Ministers, acting jointly with USSR Gosstroy and the AzSSR and ArSSR councils of ministers, the AzSSR Council of Ministers is charged with drawing up a timetable prior to 1 October 1988 for the capital repair, reconstruction or construction of the highway linking Goris, Lachin, and Stepanakert, scheduled for completion in 1989. The AzSSR Ministry of Highways is instructed to restore traffic on this highway over the Zabukhchay River Bridge as soon as possible.

The USSR Ministry of Transport Construction is instructed to complete a feasibility study in 1988 for building a detour around Lachin, and to expedite the

appointment of a contracting organization to start construction of this road in 1989. USSR Gosplan is instructed to consider the allocations of capital investments required for its design and construction.

At the same time it should be noted that the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on Nagorno-Karabakh has still not been fully complied with either by the union ministries and departments or by republic organizations. Plans for construction and startup of oblast projects during the first half of the year have not been realized. This matter was discussed recently at a meeting in Stepanakert attended by A. Volskiy, the official representative of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in the NKAO, together with leaders of USSR Gosplan and USSR Gosstroy, the AzSSR and ArSSR councils of ministers, the NKAO party obkom, and the ispolkom of the Soviet of People's Deputies in the oblast. Measures were taken for the steady fulfillment of the NKAO capital construction program.

To expedite solution of the oblast housing problem, it was proposed to undertake supplementary measures of assistance. The meeting took into consideration a statement by the ArSSR Council of Ministers that Armenian builders will ship to Stepanakert construction materials for two 9-story apartment buildings during the current year, and that it will assist in their on-site assembly.

It is also planned to allocate for construction in 1989 two complete sets of construction materials for 9-story large-panel dwellings and to arrange for their assembly by ArSSR construction organizations. USSR Gosstroy is under instructions to assist in the manufacture of three sets of forms for poured-concrete dwellings designed by the Scientific Research Institute for construction by ArSSR organizations. With their assistance the construction of these buildings will commence in Stepanakert as early as the first quarter of 1989. Our republic is charged with responsibility for the design and construction of a Palace of Culture, a Young Pioneers House, and a city library in Stepanakert. In addition, there are plans to build and put into operation a physical culture and health complex in Stepanakert by 1990 with the resources of our contract organizations. Provisions are made also for the builders of our republic to produce on oblast territory reinforced concrete units for bridges totaling 2000-3000 cubic meters per year. The ArSSR State Construction Committee is under instructions through its subdivisions to bring the volume of construction assembly operations up to 15-20 million rubles' worth a year, together with achieving a commensurate growth of the supply base and project design capability.

A formidable array of ArSSR departments and organizations are engaged in dealing with problems of accelerating the economic growth of the NKAO. Let me add that the Scientific Research Institute for Economics

under the republic Gosplan will play a part in working out a comprehensive program of social and economic development for the oblast up to the year 2005.

[Question] The well-known resolution on the NKAO calls for carrying out a series of measures to restore historic and cultural monuments in the oblast. Moreover, it was proposed to involve in this work Armenian craftsmen and specialists. What specifically has been done in this respect in this interval? And what, in general, is being done to promote cultural cooperation in the oblast?

[Sarkisyan] The contributions made in this sphere by the cultural institutions and federations of the arts in our republic cannot easily be overestimated. With due respect to them I must say that a high level of awareness, reflective of interest in preserving cultural and historical relics and of the spiritual needs of NKAO residents, is everywhere to be seen. The ArSSR Main Administration for the Preservation and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments has made concrete proposals for its participation and assistance in renovating and restoring monuments on the territory of the NKAO, pledging to carry them out during the period 1988-1995.

Questions concerning the concrete participation of Armenian renovators in these operations have not yet been finally resolved and are presently at the stage of being coordinated with the AzSSR government.

It is understood that in Baku an Armenian theater of dramatic art will be established, and our republic will actively assist this project. The ArSSR Ministry of Culture has expressed its willingness to make preparations for obtaining the necessary directors, actors, and other skilled personnel for this theater. Our VUZes for the arts this year, as in previous years, have taken into consideration the needs of the NKAO. Federations of the arts, institutions of scholarship, and the VUZes are ready to assist institutions of learning and culture in the oblast to raise the level of scholarship and culture in the NKAO. Plans have been made to hold film festivals, days of literature and folk art, and other undertakings. Republic book publishers will help the NKAO in the development of printing. The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade has already dispatched 154 titles, comprising literary, socio-political, pedagogical, and popular science texts as well as works with mass appeal. Special deliveries of books ordered for separate areas of the oblast have also been made.

I should particularly like to point out that for the start of the new academic year the Armenian schools in the NKAO have been provided with textbooks and teaching aids.

[Question] In the program of measures jointly worked out with the AzSSR, a prominent place was assigned to developing and extending the cooperation of Armenia and the NKAO in the field of public education. And this,

of course, is only natural. The Armenian population of the NKAO genuinely feels the need for effective assistance by Soviet Armenia in this sphere. What do you have to say about the measures being taken for this part of the program and how they are being put into effect?

[Sarkisyan] The requirements of the oblast population regarding all phases of the educational process have been thoroughly taken into consideration in the overall program. The ministries of public education in the two republics have jointly worked out measures for the training and retraining of teaching personnel and for achieving a further improvement in the international education of school children. Pedagogical and methodological seminars, as well as other programs, will be carried out in the oblast and other areas of the AzSSR to improve the effectiveness of Armenian language instruction. Similar measures are to be taken in Azerbaijani schools located in the AzSSR. Scientific and practical conferences, together with methodological seminars devoted to the teaching of the native language and literature, history, and geography will be held periodically through the facilities of the teaching institutions. In curriculum planning special emphasis will be given to strengthening the international education of the students.

Institutions of the public education system in the republic will provide comprehensive assistance in the training of teachers in the Armenian schools of the oblast and other areas of the AzSSR. Practical and methodological assistance will also be made available to NKAO pre-school institutions.

Teacher training in the respective institutions of both republics may be regarded as an important initiative. Incidentally, both republics will also be involved with meeting the needs of skilled personnel for Armenian and Azerbaijani schools. From this year on the number of places reserved in the VUZ's and tekhnikums of Armenia for admission of boys and girls from the NKAO is being increased several times over. Help is being given in setting up in Stepanakert a center for education in art appreciation and a children's art museum.

What I have been describing, of course, is only a part of the entire process that we have been called upon to contribute to the program undertaken by the party and the government to accelerate the social and economic development of the NKAO. This program is the daily focus of attention of the party and soviet organs in our republic, and everything is being done to bring it to completion.

The labor collectives are zealously committed to being of practical assistance in resolving the social and economic problems of the NKAO, and they pledge their active participation in fulfilling the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Through the mobilization of their internal reserves and capabilities they are resolved to render assistance to the

NKAO in developing industrial and agricultural production, increasing the scale of construction, providing consumer goods for the population, broadening the scope of trade and domestic services, and improving public health and research facilities.

We are confident that the labor collectives and appropriate organizations in the republic will apply all their efforts towards the steady fulfillment of the measures outlined in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers for the social and economic development of the NKAO.

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KOMMUNIST Coverage of Armenian Situation as of 23 September

Scientists Urge Use of Media

18300044 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 23 Sep 88
p 1

[Armenpress report entitled: "Scientists' Sobering Voice"]

[Text] In the ArSSR Academy of Sciences meeting hall, a meeting of directors, local party secretaries and local union committee chairmen of the system's institutes took place; it discussed the role of scientists in the task of normalizing the difficult situation created in the republic in the aftermath of the latest events in Nagorny Karabakh. It was noted at the meeting that the legitimate demand of the people of the Nagorno-Karabakhskaya Autonomous Oblast to join the ArSSR remains on the agenda. However, until the question is settled, it is necessary to make sure that the July 18, 1988, decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium is carried out and to make every effort to assist in the socio-economic development of the oblast, preserve and restore its historical and national monuments and broaden and strengthen its spiritual ties with the ArSSR.

The participants of the meeting expressed their concern that turgid undercurrents have appeared within the Karabakh movement and that anti-Russian and anti-Soviet slogans have been heard at meetings, as well as irresponsible statements which create uncertainty about the near future and contradict our nation's historical experience and its interests and aspirations.

In this critical for the nation hour, the Academy of Sciences and the republic's scientists have no right to be passive observers or indifferent on-lookers. They are responsible for the fate of the nation and must decisively stop people taking foolish steps, committing thoughtless deeds and resorting to unlawful actions.

Those who spoke at the meeting unanimously noted that strikes cause great harm to the republic and its workers, and cast a shadow on the good name of the Armenian people.

At the same time, the meeting stressed that all too often the cause of excitement and heated passions is the mass media, who often do not provide timely information, thereby creating a favorable climate for the spread of various inventions and rumors.

The task of scientists, especially social scientists, is to study the causes of phenomena and events, to write profoundly analytical articles in the press, to go to labor collectives, to talk to the people, to explain the existing situation, to answer these vitally important questions and to make every effort to assist the republic's administration, whose work is hampered by the existing complex situation and the heavy burden of the past.

At this critical time, scientists should be with the people and help it overcome difficulties, find correct solutions and restore normalcy.

Summarizing the results of the meeting, the ArSSR Academy of Sciences' president Academician Viktor Ambartsumyan once again stressed that strikes harm the interests of the Armenian people and of the republic. There are other means to make the voice of the people heard by the leadership, such as newspapers, television and radio, which should express people's opinions and be open to discussions. Only joint efforts could lead the republic out of the crisis.

Internal Affairs Situation Report

18300044 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 23 Sep 88
p 1

[Unattributed report entitled: "At the ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] In recent days, the events that took place as a result of interethnic clashes in the Nagorno-Karabakhskaya Autonomous Oblast have exacerbated the already tense situation in the republic.

In the city of Yerevan, due to the forcible disruption of the city's transportation system, a considerable number of workers have been unable to report to work. Cancellations of classes by students of colleges, universities, technical and vocational schools, demonstrations where participants number in the thousands and a continuous movement of large masses of people, especially children, on roadways have made the police's task of enforcing public order and ensuring transportation safety extremely difficult and created an explosive situation in the republic's capital and other cities. The situation threatens the life and well-being of everyone in the entire population, of our children, mothers and sisters. All this is a cause for great concern.

The disruption of the city's transportation system not only hampers work schedules but also threatens food supply and delivery of supplies to hospitals, kindergartens and day care centers.

In recent days, at demonstrations that took place in Yerevan, irresponsible, rabble-rousing statements have been made calling for a national strike, civil disobedience, disruption of classes at schools; voices have even been heard calling for extreme actions.

Constitutional rights of people's deputies have been crudely violated: they have been under pressure to introduce a motion calling for an extraordinary session of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet.

Forces of law and order maintaining requisite public order in the republic may be compelled to resort to decisive measures if the situation worsens.

In these circumstances, the ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs will closely monitor strict compliance in the republic with the July 29, 1988, decree of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium "On the Responsibility for Violating Established Procedures for Organizing and Holding Meetings, Gatherings, Street Marches and Demonstrations."

The republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs calls on all citizens to be reasonable, not to fall for provocations, to restore normal work schedules at enterprises, offices and schools, to keep children from foolish actions and not to allow even minor violations of public order.

Events of 21-22 September

18300044 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 23 Sep 88
p 1

[Report by Armenpress: "Events Must Not Be Allowed to Take a Dangerous Turn"]

[Text] The situation in the republic, which has been exacerbated as a result of the latest events in Nagornyy Karabakh, remains extremely tense and explosive.

On September 21, the ArSSR Communist Party's Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet's Presidium and the Council of Ministers issued an appeal to the republic's communists and workers. The people reacted with understanding to the appeal, which was prompted by deeply felt solicitude for the true interests of the working people and concern over the situation in Nagornyy Karabakh. The declaration called upon the people to display vigilance, self-control, restraint and foresight, to grasp the great danger in which our brothers and sisters and our children could find themselves if emotions continued to rise and the people fell under the spell of passions.

Party and soviet entities and social organizations have been using all available political means to normalize the situation as promptly as possible and to restore normal conditions of life and labor. In every rayon, active coordinating committees have been set up to take steps to stabilize the situation in the republic.

But, despite all this, in Yerevan and several other cities and rayons of the republic, employees continue to abstain from work, students boycott classes at high schools, technical schools, colleges and universities and illegal gatherings go on at which irresponsible, politically harmful calls for dangerous actions can be heard.

An unsanctioned demonstration that took place in Yerevan on September 21 was typical in this respect. How crazy must be those who call for "armed struggle." With whom? Against whom? Here, political thoughtlessness, desire to achieve cheap effects and carelessness acquire a new dimension: evil intent. Into whose hands does this play? Does it benefit the Armenian people, who has already shed so much blood? Or our brothers in Nagornyy Karabakh?

Some of those who spoke at the demonstration are trying to sow distrust between children and parents, inciting the latter to strikes and thoughtless actions. It would seem that their ultimate goal is not to resolve the problems of Nagornyy Karabakh itself but to destabilize the situation, to create confusion and dismay in people's minds, to split our ranks and to pit their own interests against the true interests of the Armenian people.

Irresponsible persons are trying to push the social activity of the working people into a politically harmful direction, thereby risking not only the good name of the Armenian people but the ideals for which it has suffered for so many centuries. Those declarations and thoughtless actions have it as their purpose to pit the people of Soviet Armenia against other nationalities of the country, who are watching the events here with great concern. Politically immature persons increasingly resort to unlawful actions, creating considerable difficulties for the functioning of the republic capital. For instance, on the night of September 21, a group of persons blocked exits at parking garages of the city's public transportation network, disrupting its function in order to create artificial impediments to people reporting to work and foster the climate of alarm, fear and anger.

The situation that has arisen in the republic in recent days can trigger unforeseeable consequences, which could set our people back in our achievements, take it down a dead-end path and cause an impasse.

A careful analysis of the existing situation and the possibility that events may take an extremely dangerous turn have required the use of forces of law and order whose responsibility it is to ensure calm and safety of the population and to prevent or stop any illegal actions leading to anarchy and license.

At this difficult, dangerous hour, it is the duty of every resident of the republic to show extreme restraint, concentration and civic responsibility. Rash actions, excesses—even accidental ones—must not be allowed.

Any attempts to violate socialist laws will be stopped decisively. The state can not allow irresponsible persons to endanger the interests of the people and to neglect their responsibilities before the society.

We must be realistic. A catastrophe must be averted.

Media Coverage Faulted

18300044 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 23 Sep 88
p 1

[Article by M. Agababyan, Chairman, Party Commission of the Mashtotskiy Rayon Party Committee: "Restraint and Responsibility"]

[Text] Disturbances are back on the streets of Yerevan. This new explosion of passions is a response to the latest events in Nagornyy Karabakh. Unfortunately, people found out about them at demonstrations, not from our newspapers, television broadcasts or the radio—and the information they got was not reliable. Our mass media must provide full and objective reports about the events in the NKAO to the republic's population on a daily basis. The information provided by central mass media can not satisfy us.

In the past several days, some party and government employees have not acted laudably. Once again we were not ready for a dialogue, a free exchange of opinions or real-life work with people. But, as the proverb goes, there is always someone ready to assume a popular position. Once again, at the head of demonstrations by people concerned with the problems of the NKAO, we see irresponsible people calling for further exacerbation of the situation and strikes. It is as though the events of February and March did not plainly show that strikes are a dead-end path harming the reputation of our people.

This is why I view the appeal by the ArSSR Communist Party's Central Committee and the Council of Ministers to the republic's communists and workers as a very timely action. It was permeated with a sense of great concern and responsibility for the future of the Armenian people and the realization that a great danger would be upon our people if passions continued to rise and our emotions got the better of us. The hope is that the harsh but honest, truthful words of the appeal will touch a cord in the hearts of the people. We are all tired of half-truths.

The authors of the appeal are right that in this difficult, dangerous time every resident of the republic must show extreme restraint and a high sense of responsibility for the fate of the people and its future.

Armenian Diaspora Said To Support Continued Armenian-Russian Union

18300045a Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 24 Sep 88 p 2

[Letter to the editors from Vaagi Davtyan, poet and corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "I Ask for the Floor": "Listen to the Voice of Justice"]

[Text] The continuing disturbances in Yerevan and other cities in the republic, a consequence of the tragic events that occurred in Nagornyy Karabakh, are unfortunately not without foundation, even now. The scarcity of information, its one-sidedness, with not indication of specific culprits, without their names—all this has even further strained the situation and has added to the unrest. Because only vague information is available in this regard, people are waiting for a specific answer to the question: Who were the real instigators, the organizers of the provocations that have taken place in Karabakh village? And, finally, why not talk about the fact that the real reason for these events has been that, up until now, the Sumgait tragedy has not been condemned as it should have been and the defenders of this crime have not been taken to court? And so, one crime that has avoided the censure it deserves is giving rise to a another one.

Marches, protest meetings, and strikes have again rocked Karabakh and Yerevan. Now, even school children are taking part in them. And this cannot but give rise to alarm. I am deeply convinced that their participation in the "Karabakh movement" must not under any circumstances occur to the detriment of their studies in school. Some people think that these events have supposedly awakened the young generation, have turned it into a participant in the struggle. This opinion is mistaken. We have to take into consideration the age characteristics of the child psyche and must not, beginning when they are still young, sow the seeds of hatred and distrust within their souls. Concern about how the life of this generation will develop in the future, about its future, is our primary responsibility.

The strikes that are being called for by the organizers of the meetings are also without justification. It is long since time to understand that all these kinds of calls for extreme measures can lead only to alienation, even to hysteria on the part of certain irresponsible elements. You will agree that the people who gather on Opera Square are not all alike in their attitudes toward and their correct perceptions of one or another piece of information. Young people, the best elements of which have until now demonstrated great virtue, are quick to become inflamed and most easily of all fall victim to their emotions. But ignoring, and sometimes not wanting to listen to the voice of a judicious intelligentsia may produce unforeseen consequences.

I am also convinced that the strikes which accompany the meetings cannot, are not capable of resulting in benefit. The plants which are halting their work, by the same token, are disrupting the working rhythm of a large number of the country's enterprises, at the same time bringing harm to thousands of workers. And this can cause many to take a negative view of our republic, of the justice of the cause which we are pursuing. If we continue to strike, then how will we be able to help our brothers in Karabakh?

Having expressed his concern regarding the events in Karabakh, Viktor Amazaspovich Ambartsumyan said at the same time that it is not by strikes that justice must be achieved. That wise old man Vazgen the First, Catholicos of all Armenia, spoke out against the strikes even earlier. And his words were full of sincerity and could not be a cause of anxiety. Our people have always listened to the voice of its elders. Indeed, they have earned the right to give advice through the sufferings of their experience in life and through deep analysis of events. Let us once again heed them and now proceed sensibly in presenting our protests against injustice and against those reports of the mass information media which do not help to relieve this explosive situation.

It is painful to see military vehicles on the streets of our city, vehicles with the mission of preventing possible disorders. But, evidently, someone would very much like these to occur and to bring our people face-to-face with undeserved catastrophe.

Not long ago, during a trip to America, I had a meeting with fellow countrymen of ours, who live abroad. During my conversation with them, I became convinced that the Armenian intelligentsia in the West stands firmly in favor of a strong union between Armenia and Russia. So why is this easier to understand from the outside than it is for those who are making anti-Soviet statements within the republic itself?

But, we do protest, we do demand justice and truth, and we do turn to the government of Armenia with the request that it carry our voice to the highest organs of state power, that it find a solution to our urgent problems on the basis of the truly democratic principles of restructuring.

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ArSSR: Punishments for Labor Discipline Violators Explained

18300045b Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 25 Sep 88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and the Armenian Council of Trade Unions"]

[Text] In connection with questions from the directors of industrial associations, enterprises, and organizations, as well as from individual citizens, the Armenian SSR State

Committee for Labor and Social Questions and the Armenian Trade Unions Council consider it necessary to explain certain questions of labor legislation.

In conformity with the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Armenian SSR, workers and employees are compensated for their labor in accordance with its quantity and quality. Therefore, in the event they fail to appear for work without valid reason, workers and employees are not paid for the time they are absent. In the Armenian SSR labor code (article 101), it is noted that work stoppages which are the fault of a worker are not subject to the payment of wages.

According to Article 56 of the Fundamental Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, the following measures may also be applied to violators of labor discipline, independently of the application of disciplinary and social penalties:

- denial of awards envisaged by the system of wages;
- denial of awards based on annual work results;
- denial of privileged passes to sanatoria and homes of rest;
- loss of place in line for the receipt of living space;
- for workers enjoying a sliding (flexible) work schedule, denial for a period of up to three months of the right to work according to this schedule.

For workers and employees who are absent (including an absence from work of more than three hours in the course of the working day) without valid reasons, the length of regular leave is reduced by the number of days of absence.

Under conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing, the question of wage payment becomes much more difficult, because in this case the labor collectives must earn their resources themselves.

Nonfulfillment of a production program and nondelivery of products to customers lead to a lack of financial resources on the part of the enterprise-supplier. This makes it more difficult to pay wages and to solve questions concerning social and consumer services.

13032

**Armenian Government Denies Claim that It
Approved 25 September Demonstration**

18300045c Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 25 Sep
88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Armenpress Communiqué"]

[Text] On 24 September, at a unsanctioned meeting in the city of Yerevan, it was announced that the republic leadership allegedly gave its agreement to participate in an unsanctioned meeting which is planned to be held on 25 September of this year.

Armenpress has been authorized to report that this announcement is false. The leadership of the republic cannot take part in meetings which are conducted contrary to the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Procedures for Organizing and Conducting Assemblies, Meetings, Street Processions, and Demonstrations in the USSR" and are illegal.

13032

**Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry Update on
Disturbance-Related Arrests**

18300047a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
27 Sep 88 p 2

[Unattributed report entitled: "From the Armenian SSR MVD"]

[Text] During the period when the Orders of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 28 July, 1988 and of the Presidium of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet dated 29 July, 1988 where in effect, the republic's internal affairs organs identified 118 organizers of unsanctioned meetings: 59 in Yerevan, 29 in Leninakan, 22 in Abovyan, and 2 in Artashat.

Appropriate materials for their indictment have been drawn up and forwarded to the national courts for review.

As of 26 September, 1988, 75 cases had been reviewed. Thirty-three people were fined, 36 received official reprimands, and four were placed under administrative arrest. In the case of one individual, the materials were sent to a labor collective for review.

Gagik Manukovich Manukyan, a resident of Leninakan born in 1962 and a worker at the "Strommashina" Plant, was sentenced by the national court to one month of correctional labor and forfeiture of 20 percent of his wages.

Within the next few days, the national courts will take action against the remaining individuals who have violated established procedures for the organization of meetings, demonstrations and street marches.

Lately, groups of hooligan elements whose objective is to paralyze the smooth functioning of work in the city have attempted to disrupt public transport by taking actions to prevent buses, trolleys, and trams from setting out on their routes, by picketing their routes, and by using violence against the drivers.

The situation which had arisen forced internal affairs organs to take decisive measures to suppress these anti-social activities.

Thirty-one people were detained for malicious disturbance of public order and various administrative actions have been taken against them. In the case of 9 individuals, appropriate materials for indictment have been sent to the national courts.

The Armenian SSR MVD urgently calls upon all citizens to show good judgement and not to tolerate illegal activities.

13254

**ArSSR: Situation Report on Kirovakan
Disturbances**

18300047b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
27 Sep 88 p 3

[KOMSOMOLETS special correspondent reports on Kirovakan disturbances, "What Do This Year's Lessons Require Us To Do?"; under the rubric, "On the Wire From Kirovakan"; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] Last week, passions had not subsided in Kirovakan and stormy meetings and demonstrations were being held there. A special correspondent for "KOMSO-MOLETS" was there during these turbulent days.

Our correspondent met with teachers at the Vardkes Keshishyan Special Vocational and Technical School number 46 in Kirovakan. This is his report.

The residents of Kirovakan have agreed and disagreed in their thinking at meetings, but in one thing, it seems to me, they are united: the children must not miss classes and must continue their studies. But as if in revenge for the many questions left unanswered, students have continued to take to the streets and squares of the city demanding one thing—a strike! They say they will return to school only when their parents stay home from work.

Needless to say, the activism of the school children and the students at the Special Vocational and Technical School does not spring simply from the fact that they have the opportunity to cut classes "under cover" of the events! Adults, it seems, simply underestimated the young people and their impulses, and did not immediately understand that the children could not and cannot remain outside the events taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaydzhan. Understanding

the situation in good time, we would have been able to channel properly the burst of activism of the school children and students of the vocational and technical school

But alas, we must state that more frequently the industrial training experts and teachers stood like a wall at the doors of the schools and the Special Vocational and Technical School, not allowing the children to pass and threatening them with the most terrible "consequences." Once again our method of dealing with children by looking down upon them showed itself to be completely untenable. However, this time the boys and girls did not accept this.

Toward the end of the week, more and more students began to take their places in the classrooms and, to no small degree, this helped us in trying to speak openly with the young people, not from a pseudo-authoritative position but as old comrades. In my opinion, many understood that they could also demonstrate patriotism by getting off the streets voluntarily and taking care of their own immediate business.

At our school, we conducted a meeting of the students, teachers and industrial training experts. They agreed that their own teachers would provide the young people with information of interest to them about the events in Nagorno-Karabakh. They decided to continue to collect books for students their own age from Stepanakert, and to enliven the work of the international friendship club. Classes have resumed and the workshops are noisy once again. But we still have a lot to do, and the main thing, in my opinion, is to succeed in interesting young people in the training process itself. Here we need a fresh look at that to which, in fact, we have not always directed our attention. Nowadays, no single lesson should be like another and they all must be honest. The lessons of the events of this entire year require this of us.

13254

Yerevan's Opera Square Events Viewed by Students in Nearby School

*18300051a Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
29 Sep 88 p 2*

[Report by A. Rafaelyan under the rubric "Topical Reporting": "Be at the Side of the Children"]

[Text] School No. 19 imeni N. Krupskaya is next to Opera Square, and it is impossible from there not to hear and not to feel the beating of its agitated pulse.

Despite all of the calls for boycotting classes, they proceeded as usual at the school, even though one could not call the children passive. Many of them are accustomed to going home through the Square. They are always aware of what is being said there and noisily discuss the events during recess. Some of the students did skip classes, however, and, naturally, I particularly

wanted to hear from them why the children attended the meetings and demonstrations. Class 10b was unanimous in the opinion expressed by David Amiryan:

"The reason for skipping classes were the recent events in Nagorny Karabakh. They showed that the well-known decisions of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet are being implemented very slowly, that the lives of the Armenian population in the NKAO are still threatened and their security is not ensured. How could we indifferently attend classes in that situation? That was our protest, our attempt to show that we share the alarm of our people for the fate of Armenians in Karabakh."

"Unfortunately," Shake Agoyan added, "the mass media did not promptly and efficiently explain the events occurring in the NKAO. And what was reported was so one-sided and nonobjective that it might as well not have been reported. After all, the residents of our nation judge from this information the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and the meetings and demonstrations occurring in Yerevan."

There were many questions, and more than enough indignation as well. Information, as much objective and reliable information as possible is what it amounted to. They need it in order to understand everything being said at Opera Square and which comes to them in the form of rumors and conversations in the transportation system, on the street and at home. They have the right to make these demands, of course. You will agree that if it is not always simple for an adult to understand what is occurring, it is far more difficult for the children, with their eternal urge to get to the truth and their vulnerable, fragile minds, which can be thrown off balance so easily, to understand it all.

Despite this, however, the children decided not to disrupt their classes but to continue their studies. The opinion of the children on this matter was expressed perhaps most clearly by classmate Gayane Isiryan:

"Tomorrow we will be going out into life, with its sometimes unpleasant reality, continuing the restructuring of our society and resolving the problems which have accumulated in it. Without the knowledge acquired in school it would be hard to combat the difficulties and overcome the obstacles. By skipping classes, we would thereby be harming ourselves, and not just ourselves but our entire people, who view us as their worthy successors. We can and must express our solidarity with the people of Nagorny Karabakh, but only after class, without detriment to our studies."

It should be noted, to the honor of the school's teaching staff, that during these difficult days they did not resort to the "traditional" methods: threats of impending trouble, threats of calling the parents to demand that they take their children in hand or standing in the doorways. No, none of this happened. The teachers chose the only

correct way. They talked with the children about the expediency of skipping classes. They did not avoid a single question asked by the students, no matter how unpleasant or complicated—that is, they spoke with the students as with equals. And the children understood that their teachers were not thinking of their own well-being when they talked them into not disrupting their studies but were concerned about the students, about seeing to it that the school graduates enter into life thoroughly equipped with knowledge and can rightly take part in the resolution of all pressing problems.

"The children," school director O. Petrosyan said, "understood the most important thing, that each of them must in his own place do whatever he can today, and only in this way, make his contribution to the resolution of any problem. For our part, we always try to be with them, try not to avoid openly discussing any subject of interest to the children. After all, from whom, if not from us, can they get answers to their questions."

Classes are over at the school, and many of the students are again heading for Opera Square, which draws them like a magnet. The enquiring minds of the children cannot remain on the sideline with respect to the issues troubling the adults. This is the way it has to be if we want our children to be active participants in the changes occurring in the nation. The older people, who can help them correctly to understand everything occurring around them, must always be at their side. After all, they are a part of our life. They are our future.

11499

Official on Work of Voluntary Patrols in Yerevan Disturbances

*18300051b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
29 Sep 88 p 2*

[Interview with Yerevan Komsomol Secretary O. Tsaturyan by KOMSOMOLETS correspondent A. Muradyan under the rubric "Topical Reporting": "Protecting Law and Order—the Operative Voluntary Komsomol Patrol"]

[Text] The meetings and demonstrations held in Yerevan as a result of recent events in Nagornyy Karabakh have posed some difficult problems with respect to maintaining public order. As always, the operative voluntary Komsomol patrols (OKOD) are taking a most active part in measures to maintain law and order. Our correspondent A. Muradyan met with O. Tsaturyan, secretary of the Yerevan Komsomol City Committee, and asked him about the activities of the OKOD members in this difficult situation.

[Muradyan] We are all more or less familiar with the tasks and the objectives of the OKOD. It is obvious that today, when the situation in Yerevan has heated up, some changes would have been made in your duties.

[Komsomol] Not exactly. As always, we have just one mission, that of maintaining public order. It is another matter that we have acquired some new duties as a result of the situation which has developed in the city. For example, members of the operative patrols stand constant duty next to public transportation enterprises, plants and factories to prevent them from being blocked. Mobile groups have been formed from among the Komsomol activists and workers in the Komsomol raykoms to prevent the picketing of motor pools. We also have permanent "patrol" stations: Opera Square, a section of Marshal Bagramyan Avenue and certain other places. In addition, we are now patrolling round-the-clock. The purpose is to frustrate possible attempts to incite riots.

[Muradyan] And are you succeeding?

[Komsomol] Yes, but sometimes at a cost of a great deal of tension and restraint. It is particularly difficult for the young people patrolling near the enterprises and at the terminal transportation stops. If someone decides that he should strike, no one plans to force him to work. At the same time, however, it is not democratic to permit force to be used against those who believe that boycotting the job is no method of struggle. And are attempts to bring city public transportation to a halt not using force on them? Yerevan's topography is such that it is not so difficult to get to the center of the city from the outskirts by foot, but not everyone is capable of making the reverse trip on foot.

[Muradyan] What is the attitude of the people toward the voluntary patrols?

[Komsomol] Positive and understanding. You will agree that it is enough for just one person to make a reckless statement today, in the situation of constant tension in which people find themselves, to result in a conflict or riots. In such cases, the young people politely but insistently ask the person to calm down, to get control of himself. We are helped also by people who just happen to be there, people merely passing by, so that we are always aware that we have support.

[Muradyan] The voluntary patrols ordinarily wear red bands on their sleeves, but I don't seem to see any of them....

[komsomol] The young people are indeed not wearing the bands, and for the simple reason that they irritate a lot of people. These people become excited and initiate noisy and unneeded arguments, which divert us away from our main mission, and additionally create a situation conducive to conflict. I want to stress once again, however, the fact that most of the people regard the actions of the operative patrols with understanding and support them at difficult times.

[Muradyan] And are there such times?

[Komsomol] Anything can happen, and in those cases the intervention of a white-haired old man can have a sobering effect on the overly excited. The respect for the elderly which is a tradition in our city, helps to reduce the tension and avoid conflicts. Through our joint efforts we have been able to maintain law and order on the streets and in the city squares, but the situation in Yerevan is still extremely tense—explosive, I would say. And although the young people are naturally tired after all these days, everyone of us still considers it his duty to continue this work essential to the people.

11499

Armenpress Cites Armenian Diaspora Support for NKAO Solution

*18300053a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
29 Sep 88 p 2*

[Article by Armenpress: "All the Armenians in the World Are Looking at You. . ."]

[Text] The Armenians who live in various countries in the world are following the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Soviet Armenia with alarm, agitation and faith. During the past 8 months, the progressive intelligentsia and well-known public figures, at meetings in the communities and in the pages of the press, have widely commented on the information received from Yerevan and Stepanakert and they have unanimously come out in support of a just solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. These days their homeland—Soviet Armenia—receives from them hundreds of letters and telegrams, whose authors support the just demand of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and at the same time make appeals not to yield to emotions, to show prudence, and not to allow ill-considered steps on this difficult, steps that are fraught with danger.

"Dear sisters and brothers in Armenia," Alek Manukyan, the chairman of the General Armenian Philanthropic Union, writes. "All Armenians abroad today are looking at you and in their heart are with you. . . . "We watched you with admiration when you, maintaining order and discipline, walked in procession through the streets of Yerevan, when you expressed your heartfelt pain through a wise and reasonable word.

"The whole world admired you, was delighted with you because it saw that Armenians know how to try to achieve in a civilized manner the realization of their innermost hopes.

"Today new disturbances have again turned the attention of the world public to the Caucasus and Armenia, and the enemies of the Armenian people are waiting for us to yield to attempts to drive us to distraction, to abandon the road of reason and thus not only to lose Karabakh, but also to jeopardize our little Armenia.

"No, we cannot lose our political and civic wisdom, there is no need to make the enemies of our people happy.

"We should not depart from the road of reason and the road of legality, because otherwise we will lose everything. . . .

"As historical fate has decreed, it is only in the borders of the Soviet Union that the Armenian people has acquired a guaranteed life, and in the Russian people—a friend.

"And Armenians should act only proceeding from these realities in order to solve their problem, in order to rid themselves from their heartfelt pain.

"In legality lies our strength. In fairness lies our strength."

. . . These days many Armenians living abroad are becoming eyewitnesses of the events in Yerevan. A group of representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia from the United States is here at the invitation of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians abroad. Their meetings took place in the committee, cultural, scientific, and medical institutions, the guests made a trip through the republic and appeared on Armenian television.

Representing the guests, the chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad, K. Dalakyan, said that at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee September Plenum in September there was a thorough discussion of the problems of the spyurk. Along with the questions of the native language, the publication of the masterpieces of literature and art, and a thorough discussion of the West-Armenian language, the question was raised about the official proclamation of 24 April as Genocide Day.

Having shared their impressions of the trip, the physician and cardiologist Akop Antabyan, in particular, touched on the further strengthening of the contacts between Armenian cardiologists in the United States and the corresponding center in Yerevan and reciprocal visits of specialists.

Between the intelligentsia of the diaspora and Soviet Armenia, extensive relations have been created in the sphere of the preservation and development of national culture, he said, and I am convinced that in the immediate years ahead the Armenians living abroad will take a more active part in securing the progress and flourishing of their homeland. Having been at the Yerevan demonstrations, I was extremely surprised that such mass demonstrations are held here. Their goal is to solve the Karabakh question, and thus the other slogans which I saw there should not be; these are superfluous slogans. At present we should apply our effort to the solution of

the Karabakh problem. Our general opinion—the opinion of the Armenians abroad—is that demonstrations should be restrained and well thought through, and they should serve the interests of Armenia and Karabakh.

"I came to Armenia for the first time, and the first impressions of Yerevan called forth my admiration: I saw wide avenues, attractive buildings, and lively traffic," said the artist Sharvarsh Manukyan. "I consider it my duty upon returning to Los Angeles to tell about the successes of my homeland, to tell those that still have an erroneous conception because they did not see Armenia and believe only the slanderers. We must show them that they are mistaken, that the fatherland and the spyurk must be a unified whole.

In speaking about the Armenian theater, I would like to note that its basic mission is the struggle for the preservation of the nation, for the preservation of the Armenian language. And we abroad, with the help of the theater, are fighting for the preservation of national distinctiveness. It should be acknowledged that abroad there is no Armenian theater in the true sense of this word because we do not have a state and state support. All that the Armenians abroad are doing are merely attempts to create a theater.

But we should not put a stop to even these small efforts. Our amateur artists are people who are deeply devoted to the idea of the preservation of national distinctiveness and who act wholeheartedly. What we need is for popular artists to come periodically to us from Armenia in order, by appearing with our theater troupes, to impart new impulses, to bring new art and new ideas to the Armenian community abroad, and to inculcate love of the theater in them.

The economic relations of the homeland and the diaspora were touched on by the editor and manager of the weekly newspaper NOR KYANK, Grigor Shenyanyan.

"Important work lies ahead with respect to the acquisition of medical and construction equipment," he said. Utilizing the possibilities presented by the restructuring in the USSR, the desire to take part in the development of the economy of Armenia was expressed not only by Armenian, but also by American businessmen.

Today, regardless of where we are, the main issue is the Karabakh question. When the Karabakh events began, we immediately defined our political approach and published an editorial. In this article we noted that it must be done in such a fashion so as to convince world public opinion of the fairness of our request, and we must not go against the Soviet Union. It is clear that strikes in Armenia harm the economies of other regions of the Soviet Union.

Every Armenian living abroad must make his contribution to the blossoming of his motherland, recognizing that we have no other fatherland, that the native land of

every Armenian is Soviet Armenia. We live, work and create abroad, but we are daily supported by the awareness that we have a motherland: Soviet Armenia.

08970

Armenian Luminary Sos Sarkisyan on Support for Karabakh Movement

*18300053b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
27 Sep 88 p 3*

[Interview with Sos Sarkisyan by S. Arutyunyan: "Point of View. Sos Sarkisyan: 'Perestroyka Is Irreversible. . . .'"]

[Text] . . . The door was opened by an unfamiliar elderly man.

"Is this the apartment of Sos Sarkisyan?"

"Yes, he is here."

I walked to the balcony and found myself to be the involuntary witness of an interesting conversation: The man (the one who opened the door) and a woman were discussing with Sos Sarkisyan the possibility of obtaining in installments a certain sum from the Karabakh Fund for the exchange of their apartment in Sumgait for a private home in Masisskiy Rayon. The matters were soon settled, and the petition-bearers, satisfied, left. We made ourselves comfortable behind a desk on which stood a typewriter with an article that had been started.

. . .

[Arutyunyan] As is apparent you are now completely carried away with public activity. Does it not seem to you that this is in its way a sign of the times which has pushed the intelligentsia into the vanguard of the social movement.

[Sarkisyan] Several years ago I read that Marlon Brando, this outstanding actor, joined the movement of the Indian people of America and even lives with them on the reservation. I was startled because we were taught that everyone must engage in his own business and turn like a small cog in the place allotted to him. The actor famous throughout the world was engaged in a matter which was not directly related to his profession. Yes, to be an actor one must first of all be a citizen, one must be in the thick of all things, one must live through the pain, doubt, and joys of your people, they must become yours, because in the end you bring to the stage this life, these feelings. But the functions of the artist and the intellectual and his obligations are much broader than simply to be involved in their business. For this reason it is appropriate that the "Karabakh movement" is headed up by the intelligentsia. And it is my duty to make my contribution to this cause. When today voices are

heard—they say, let everyone be involved in his business, and then the restructuring will be successful—this, in my conception, is nothing else than a voice from the past, a modernized idea about cogs.

But you see, man is by nature a fighting creature. He exists because primordially the fighting principle is in his genes. And they have deprived us of all of this. And the result of this is known to everyone.

I consider it to be an abnormal situation when the real placing of forces in society relegates the intellectual to a secondary and tertiary roles, and I consider it natural that our intelligentsia is marching in the vanguard of restructuring. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin himself is an intellectual in the highest sense of this word. It is another question how it could happen that unintelligent and uneducated people periodically became the so-called "continuers" of the cause of this highly cultured man, the rulers of the destinies of our revolution? Here, most likely, one recalls also the epoch of the "Stalinshchina" of repressions, which destroyed the best of our fighters for the revolution, the comrades-in-arms of Lenin, and which left on the surface semi-literate and unintelligent people. One can also be puzzled in every possible way as to how Brezhnev could become "a ruler of the Leninist type"—you see, this is such an abyss in the plane of the level of intelligence.

[Arutyunyan] And what helped you hold out during these years of "total compromise?"

[Sarkisyan] I was helped by the fact that I was able not to grow together with the atmosphere, with the life, and with the ethical norms which reigned and up to now still reign in the theater. I preserved my isolation from the influence of the collective, my right to think independently. You know, the influence of the collective is also a terrible thing. We have elevated the collective to a fetish. Personally it was necessary for me to free myself from this although this led to periods when I was professionally idle.

In one way or another, all of this was a link of one tragic chain which today has been broken. The fact that the intelligentsia has moved into the first positions is a fine thing. It must set an example of new, fresh thought, an example of self-sacrifice, democracy, and decency. In this sense, art, as well as our intelligentsia, is entering a stormy time of reinterpretation and reassessment of its existence, its necessity to the people. And the events connected with the Nagorno-Karabakh problem served as the strongest stimulus in the development of this process in our republic.

[Arutyunyan] Yes, for 8 months already this movement has been unfolding and developing before our eyes with our direct or indirect participation. There are no indifferent people. But how do you assess these months?

[Sarkisyan] In my opinion, everything is happening logically and naturally. Everyone, even a person not well versed in jurisprudence, realizes completely: The question has been posed with justification, and there is no way back in our republic. If the Armenian people, which has lived through the most terrible shocks in the 20th century, was compelled to be silent for almost 70 years about its problems for fear of repressions, then, having received the possibility to speak, our people cannot further accept such a situation. In so doing, in my opinion, there is no need to prove that Nagorno-Karabakh, the ancient Artsakh, is part of Armenia, that the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are our Armenian brothers. This is indisputable. The question is not one of territorial claims, but one of the recognition of the rights of the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to self-determination, and thus to reunification with their native Armenia. What is there to prove here? This is the same thing as to prove that my left hand is mine in the same way as my right hand is.

I believe that there is, and there cannot be, a turn in the past in all respects. For this reason there is also no way back with the "Karabakh movement." And if someone very much wants to regard the "Karabakh question" as closed, this appears to me as nothing else than a relapse to the past, where one person could individually decide any questions and rule the destinies of people and whole peoples.

Yes, for all of us, as it were, a new reading of time began in February of this year. Today is already the end of September. What path have we traversed, to what have we come? Why is Yerevan seething today as before?

The situation is very complex. First of all, because we have to decide what is to be done further, what we should do? In my view, no one can give an identical answer now. Because originally we chose the path of open struggle: Meetings, demonstrations and strikes. Here I at once want to define my attitude toward strikes. The latter were not invented by us, but long long ago were taken for a weapon by the proletariat as the most effective method of struggle. And today the proletariat in the capitalist countries makes skillful use of this weapon, which calls forth invariable sympathy in our country. Why do the strikes in Armenia lead us into a blind alley? First of all, because our state is not a state ruled by law, it still lives in the stage when foundations of democratism, glasnost and a legal order for the time being are only slogans. The state lives by an imperfect Constitution, whose individual paragraphs contradict one another. Because of this, the old Russian proverb is still very topical: "The law is a pole, wherever you turn, it has run out." In our country the strike is not prohibited, but by the same token it is not allowed.

Secondly, the strike must have a material basis. When our workers strike, our trade unions do not support them in material terms.

Finally, the economic structure of our state is such that through our strike we, like it or not, set against ourselves all the toilers of the country, whom we "hit" with the ruble, and who, moreover, day after day receive biased information about what is happening in Yerevan. Only by taking into consideration and strictly weighing all of these factors, we can understand what the strike gives us, what is advantageous for us and what does us harm. In other words, one must in fact look realistically and soberly at the situation and at the reality.

I understand that the strike is a cry of despair, a gesture of despair, a response to the flow of unobjective information, at times tendentious and insulting to national sentiments, transmitted by the central information agencies about the events that are happening. Or to take the numerous interviews with workers who appeal to our worker's consciousness and honor. Yes, I am convinced that the majority of those who appear have no idea of the essence of the question and of our demands. It has simply been explained to them that they have it bad because here, in our republic, there is unrest. That is all. There is glasnost for you. And from such chance and uninformed people they demand assessments of a complex situation! This goes beyond any norms of elementary ethics. I am not even talking about open falsehood. Only the truth can save all of us—one truth for all. The truth to which the party is appealing. However, for the time being people go to meetings for the truth.

It is possible that such a line of conduct comes somewhere from the essence of our people: We are emotional, excitable, incapable of dodging and concealing our feelings and our actions. This is how it has been since olden days. Perhaps, this is our tragedy, and perhaps it is thanks to this that we have survived. But the misfortune lies in something else—in the fact that our openness and directness are not estimated at their true worth. No, in this for some reason is seen the trampling of the existing balanced and convenient norms of public conduct. In general we have a mass of questions to which there is one universal answer: It is impossible, not authorized.

However, the history, character and fate of every people—and in our multinational state there are not only a dozen—are not confined in a formula that is universal for all.

The 20th century outraged our people, in which resounds as a tragic note the unceasing pain of the genocide of 1915 and other "black dates" in Armenian history, to which in 1988 Sumgait was added. There is no doubt that this was not a manifestation of hooliganism, but that we are dealing with an organized pogrom. But up to now, no appropriate assessment of this crime has been made, and no condolences to the families of those who died have been expressed at the union level. . . .

Yes, nevertheless we must search for new ways, we must transfer our "Karabakh movement" to a new channel. Since we cannot conceal our thoughts, I also will not hide

now. All the more so because history gives us such "classic" examples as the fate of Nakhichevan, where the "Armenian question" was solved quietly and silently without meetings and demonstrations—the almost 100,000-strong Armenian population of this region was for a number of decades displaced from Nakhichevan, reduced to the minimum, almost to zero. Cases are known where after the establishment of Soviet power in Nakhichevan, Armenian refugees turned to the government of Nakhichevan for permission to return to their homes. Everything was refused to them—already then in the 1920's. We know of appeals and petitions of refugees to the then chairman of the Council of Ministers Kamelev and to Kalinin, which remained without a reply. This is a very well-tested method—displacement. The same thing is now happening in Karabakh. Thousands of Azerbaijani, who have left Armenia (though they had no weighty reasons for this) are settling down in Karabakh. The recent aggravation of the situation in Stepanakert is connected, above all, with this. That is, they want to solve the "Karabakh question" through changing the demographic indicators in Karabakh. It should not be forgotten that soon the next population census will take place.

And here is the very time to recall that hundreds of thousands of people from Karabakh live outside the boundaries of Karabakh. You see, they can return to their homes and hearths. All the more so because about 5,000 houses stand empty. There are villages in which only old men have remained. You see, this is also a method of struggle and one of the ways of solving the problem—in any case, at this stage.

Another aspect is related to the well-known decree on the socio-economic development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Why can the autonomous oblast itself not dispose of the 400 million which have been allotted to Nagorno-Karabakh? Why is everything again going through the republic center, which determines who gets how much? We must fight so that these millions have a single master—the leadership of the oblast, which, knowing its needs and problems better than anyone else, would dispose of them directly and precisely.

Or the question of the participation of Armenia in the implementation of this socio-economic program. It is complicated in every conceivable manner by the lack of a normal road connecting Goris and Stepanakert. Why is there no progress here? Who is responsible for this? . . .

I believe that we could not bring the truth, such as it is, to the Soviet public. I repeat once again that the overwhelming majority does not understand what is happening, who wants what from whom. For this reason, we need for all and everyone individually to raise their voice. We all need to express ourselves and to make use of all possibilities. We need to write, to argue, to inform, and to act. We must, finally, state at the top of our voice

that the "Karabakh movement" is not a group of persons, but the whole people from pupil to pensioner. And this obligation, above all, rests on us, the intelligentsia. We must become consolidated, to develop our own national program, which, along with the "Karabakh question," encompasses a multitude of other problems that have accumulated in the republic.

[Arutyunyan] The last months raised especially sharply in the republic a number of fundamental problems of restructuring, in particular the problem of the interrelations of the people with its spontaneous democratic character and the ruling apparatus, the problem of the repudiation of the administrative-command methods of management typical of the "stagnation period," of the return to the Leninist principles of popular self-government. Well, how is it in actual fact?

[Sarkisyan] Yes, speaking today about popular democracy, we actually have a poor conception of what this is in actual fact, and how to make use of it. In the best way possible, this was reflected in the "Karabakh movement," which became a real school of democracy for the people. As far as the leadership is concerned, I believe that all our misfortune lies in the gap that exists between the people and the leadership, which can lead us to a tragedy. Yes, the new leadership received a difficult legacy. But this is precisely why large-scale reorganizations in the government are needed, why bold and resolute people are needed who go to the people and are able to answer any question. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said that we do not need the government for the people, we need a popular government.

Incidentally, I would like to say that the next mistake is being made now. In our time, we began to build socialism throughout the country in accordance with one model, not taking into account the fact that the peoples who populate our country have their own psychology, their own history and traditions. And now we also regard the most difficult processes of glasnost and democratization on the basis of one model. Although it is obvious that democratization for Estonia and democratization, let us say, for Turkmenistan are different conceptions. They also must have different forms corresponding to their essence. This, by the way, was demonstrated by our neighbors in Azerbaijan. The current events have shown that they are not ready for a new quality of inter-nationality relations, for democratic transformations in the nationality question. The fact that in Azerbaijan they cannot guarantee the safety of citizens of Armenian nationality and cannot provide protection against the attacks of extremist and intensely nationalist elements may serve as corroboration.

And the last thing. The main condition that is necessary for finding the correct path is to look at oneself self-critically from the side. I am not very happy with the fact that sometimes insufficiently-weighted and ill-considered slogans are articulated at the meetings.

We have many things of which we can be proud. But there are also those things of which we must clear ourselves. Perhaps this is not the time to talk about this? But perhaps it is the very time. You see, everything begins with simple truths. Of course, it is a fine thing that the pupils have joined the "Karabakh movement," but it is a bad thing that they are not attending their lessons. It is bad that they are not listening to their parents and their teachers. For us, Armenians, the concepts of Father, Teacher, Patriarch, and Spiritual Father have always been sacred. And under no circumstances is it possible to permit the trampling of these sacred objects. We want to grow up as moral people. In our movement it is impossible to lose one's sacred things, it is impossible to destroy national values—even for the sake of the high goal. If the movement does not lift us spiritually, morally, and organizationally, then it leads us to anarchy, to failure. One cannot build or create anything on anarchy. We must do everything in the name of the future.

8970

Resolution Criticizes Work of Lithuanian Cultural Monuments Society

*18000033a Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
23 Aug 88 pp 1,3*

[Unattributed report entitled: "In the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has adopted a resolution "On Measures for Further Improving the Work of the Lithuanian SSR Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies."

It notes that the Lithuanian SSR Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies has more than 105,000 members. One of the most important areas of its work is regional studies. More than 20,000 society members have been conducting extensive research work, studying, recording and restoring in the people's memory events in the country's history and culture and the revolutionary past.

Some of the society's organizations have been providing active assistance to state agencies in exercising public oversight over the preservation and utilization of historical and cultural landmarks, in identifying, studying and publicizing new landmarks, in enlisting the population in caring for them, and in collecting money.

At the society's initiative, 330 public museums housing more than 234,000 exhibits have been created. Many museums do active work to publicize the historical legacy.

At the same time, the resolution points out that there have been a number of fundamental shortcomings and omissions in the society's work, which have become

especially obvious in the context of glasnost and the democratization of our entire life. The society has been slow to restructure its work, despite the growing interest of people in the people's historical memory. Many of its local organizations do not properly enlist various groups of the population in regional-studies activities. An office-bound administrative form of work and weak contacts with creative unions, ideological institutions and Komsomol have resulted in a decline in the society's prestige among the public, especially among young people, and in the inactivity of many primary organizations. Organizational work by the central council's staff has often been replaced by the holding of unnecessary conferences and the collection of various reports. Insufficient attention has been given to providing practical assistance to primary organizations and city and rayon divisions in accomplishing the tasks set for them and in developing their initiative and self-management. The flow of paper channeled to the lower levels remains practically undiminished. Resolutions by the central council's presidium often are declarative in nature and fail to contain specific recommendations for rectifying the situation. In the drafting of these resolutions and monitoring of their implementation, insufficient use is made of methods commissions and council members, scholars and specialists.

The society's work in organizing the preservation of historical and cultural landmarks has been insufficiently effective. In this area there is no clear-cut coordination of actions among the society, the republic Ministry of Culture and its local agencies, the Lithuanian Culture Fund, and the creative organizations. The society has been unable to enlist the public at large in this work. Some enthusiasts in the movement for the preservation of historical and cultural landmarks, failing to find the proper support, have joined together in various grassroots groups, which often fall under the influence of people who have nothing in common with concern for the preservation of historical and cultural landmarks.

The society's work has also been negatively affected by the very small number of research works on important periods and events in the history of the Lithuanian people and on its cultural legacy. Nor has the development of its work been furthered by the limited possibilities for publishing the results of research that scholarly expeditions have conducted.

The party gorkoms and raykoms and the city and rayon ispolkoms have not been keeping themselves genuinely informed about the work of local society's local divisions and its primary organizations, have failed to take practical steps to enhance their role in preserving and publicizing the historical legacy, have not oriented them toward the accomplishment of specific tasks, and frequently have ignored their opinion on matters pertaining to the preservation and utilization of monuments.

The State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the republic newspapers and magazines, and the local press have not given sufficient attention to covering the society's activities and problems.

The resolution calls attention to the fact that the society's central council lacks normal conditions for its work and is poorly supplied with materials and equipment. For a number of years the Vilnius Gorispolkom has been putting off the capital repair of the building—an architectural landmark—in which the central council's staff is housed. The premises are in a state of collapse and lack central heating.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee demands that the Central Council of the republic Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies (Comrade K. Rachkauskas, chairman) radically restructure the society's work on the basis of the principles of self-management, glasnost, public opinion, the utmost support for the healthy initiatives of primary organizations and enthusiasts, and the development of sociopolitical activeness among the public.

Principal attention is to be given to the development among the public of correct historical consciousness, a sense of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and a responsible attitude toward the cultural and historical heritage of all nationalities and national groups living in the republic. Everything possible is to be done to encourage the participation of various strata of the population, especially young people, in studying and learning about their native region and its culture; in putting together local chronicles and histories of cities, settlements, farms and enterprises; in reviving folk crafts, traditions and customs; and in improving the work of public museums.

In the publicizing of historical and cultural landmarks, landmarks of the revolutionary movement and socialist construction, efforts are to be made to persuasively disclose the continuity of the Soviet people's patriotic, internationalist and labor traditions, to foster the further expansion of ties with the fraternal cultures, and to develop among the public a genuinely Leninist attitude toward national historical and cultural landmarks and a sense of civic responsibility for the preservation and augmentation of the historical and cultural legacy as the property of the entire nation.

The resolution orders that the necessary amendments be made in the society's charter with a view to transferring part of the central agencies' powers to the lower levels; developing democracy and grassroots principles in the work of city and rayon divisions and primary organizations; enhancing the role and responsibility of their members; broadly enlisting prominent representatives of science and culture, workers and young people in the society's work; expanding the society's real rights to monitor the observance of legislation on the preservation of monuments; working jointly with research institutions, public organizations and amateur associations; and giving the utmost support to intelligent initiatives

and assisting in the satisfaction of their healthy requirements. A preliminary discussion of the new charter provisions is to be organized in the press and in labor and student collectives.

It is deemed advisable for the society's city, rayon and primary organizations to be headed by scholars, cultural and educational figures and specialists in the national economy who are enthusiasts in publicizing the republic's history.

It is recommended that the society, together with the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Party History, the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences' institutes of Lithuanian language and literature and history, and higher educational institutions, to draw up, starting in 1989, long-term programs for the study of history, ethnology and folklore and the development of technical thought in the republic, and for providing scientific methodological guidance to regional studies.

Before 1 January 1989, in conjunction with the republic Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Public Education, the Lithuanian Republic Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Leninist Komsomol, and the Lithuanian Culture Fund, measures are to be drawn up that are aimed at the broad enlistment of trade-union and Komsomol organizations, the creative unions and the public in regional-studies work, the establishment of public museums, the implementation of measures that have been outlined for identifying, studying and preserving historical and cultural landmarks, and the organization of the sponsorship of landmarks and memorial sites.

The Vilnius Gorispolkom is instructed to find the possibility for accelerating the performance of capital repairs on the building housing the society's central council.

It is recommended that the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, together with the society's central council, expand the publication, in large-scale print runs, of popular books, albums and brochures pertaining to the preservation, restoration and utilization of historical and cultural landmarks.

The State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the editorial staffs of newspapers and magazines are to give broader coverage to positive experience and problems in the work of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies.

The Central Council of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies, together with the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, is to study the possibilities of establishing a periodical publication.

The gorispolkoms and rayispolkoms must do everything possible to assist the work of local divisions and primary organizations of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments and Regional Studies and to help improve their physical facilities and equipment, must actively support the working people's patriotic movement for the study and preservation of the historical and cultural legacy, and must ensure broad glasnost in discussion of projects for the reconstruction of historically established city centers and individual architectural ensembles and landmarks. Questions of the preservation and practical utilization of historical and cultural landmarks are to be decided with the participation of the society's central council and local divisions.

Party gorkoms and raykoms are ordered to analyze the state of affairs in the society's local divisions and to take specific steps to restructure their work, strengthen their executive personnel, and increase the accountability of Communists working in the society's organizations.

8756

Lithuanian Goskomizdat Official Explains Lack of Language Textbooks, Dictionaries

18000033b Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 10 Aug 88 p 2

[Interview with A. Banyavichus, editor-in-chief of the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, conducted by SOVETSKAYA LITVA correspondent Ts. Matevosyan: "Self-Teaching Books, Phrase Books, and Dictionaries"; first paragraph is unattributed source introduction]

[Text] The editors' mail is diverse. In addition to letters relating various events, it contains those whose authors raise various problems and appeal to the newspaper concerning questions that interest them. One such question pertains to the study of Lithuanian language—or more precisely, to the shortage of textbooks, phrase books and dictionaries in the stores. Last year SOVETSKAYA LITVA twice carried articles raising the question that bothers readers. But to this day the problem has not been solved, and to this day the authors of letters ask for help. At the request of SOVETSKAYA LITVA correspondent Ts. Matevosyan, A. Banyavichus, editor in chief of the Lithuanian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, answers questions raised by our readers:

[Banyavichus] In beginning my discussion I would like to say that our work is organized according to a precisely arranged plan, and that helps us avoid the sort of sporadic campaigns that are undesirable for the success of any undertaking. Taking a look into the past, it is possible to say that back in 1964 we published, in a large-scale press run, a Lithuanian language textbook (authored by E. Orvidene) that sustained three printings.

In 1984 a Lithuanian language textbook prepared by Yu. Aleksandravichyus appeared on store shelves for the first time. Geared to a broad readership—both students and those who would like to study the language independently—this book rapidly became popular. Therefore, it is perfectly natural that the press run of its current, second edition, has doubled—to 60,000. I shall make readers happy: This textbook has already gone on sale.

For those who are interested, yet another meeting awaits, this time with a book that will help them gain a good mastery of the norms of pronunciation and the skills of conversational speech. Two authors—Ya. Karalyunayte and S. Tumenas—are working on this textbook.

As is known, phrase books are a great help in the mastery of language. I would answer the question of how matters stand in this area by saying that publishing houses put out new books almost once every three years. So next year the Russian-Lithuanian phrase book prepared by Doctor of Philological Sciences V. Stashaytene will come out for the seventh time. And in another year, we think, a new book will appear on store shelves—a previously unpublished Lithuanian-Russian phrase book authored by V. Bogushene.

Now with regard to dictionaries. This year a 65,000-word, one-volume Lithuanian-Russian dictionary will come out in a press run of 40,000 copies. Later a Russian-Lithuanian dictionary will be published. The authors of that publication, which will include 100,000 words, are the prominent specialists Kh. Lemken and Y. Matsaytis.

The book "Znayete li vy litovskiy yazyk?" [Do You Know Lithuanian?], whose author is Candidate of Philological Sciences S. Krivitskayte, will unquestionably arouse interest. The many interesting facts collected in it pertaining to the Lithuanian language, its history and the etymology of words will expand the reader's knowledge and arouse a desire to study both Lithuanian history and the people's language in greater depth.

As we know, the school is the foundation of language study. School textbooks play a role of no small importance in this connection. They are accorded a fairly large place in our plans. In recent years Lithuanian language textbooks have come out for the fourth, sixth, seventh, 11th and 12th grades of schools where teaching is done in Russian and Polish.

From the Editors: The interview given by the editor-in-chief of the republic State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, of course, cannot help but attract attention in light of its timeliness: the ranks of those who want to master Lithuanian are numerous. But we think that the person who reads it will to some extent feel the same disappointment as the editors. Unquestionably, the fact that such a long-awaited textbook has appeared on store shelves is gratifying. But that is clearly insufficient. The situation with

regard to dictionaries continues to cause concern, since those that have been promised (the 65,000-word Lithuanian-Russian dictionary, which will come out this year, and the 100,000-word Russian-Lithuanian dictionary, which will come out later) are not, it seems, aimed primarily at those who are just beginning to study the language. No short, so-called "pocket" dictionaries are being published yet, and their publication is not envisioned—at least A. Banyavichus did not report on it. Must one argue the extent of need for a book combining short (3,000- to 4,000-word) Lithuanian-Russian and Russian-Lithuanian dictionaries? We think that it is precisely such a compact book, convenient for use everywhere, that should concern the republic publishers. Especially since this is not the first year that there has been talk of improving the study of Lithuanian, and it has already been responded to by both the organizers of language courses and republic television, which has allocated time for a special program. The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, of course, should also make some sort of changes and additions in its plans, which should in no way serve as a screen for shortcomings in work, especially if these plans have also been drawn up without sufficient thought and without a clear desire to solve a long-standing problem. And this must be perceived not just as some sort of undesirable campaign, but as a serious demand of the times.

8756

Decree on Promoting Teaching of Latvian in Secondary Schools

*18000034a Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
6 Aug 88 p 3*

[Interview by LATINFORM correspondent V. Steshenko with V. A. Bluka, chief of the Section for Cultural-Social Development, Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Affairs Administration: "To Improve Latvian Language Instruction". First paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The republic's Council of Ministers has issued a decree directed at improving the conditions for teaching Latvian in general education schools [secondary schools], professional-technical schools, and special educational institutions where instruction is conducted in Russian. Our LATINFORM correspondent asked the chief of the section for cultural-social development of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Affairs Administration, V. A. Bluka, to comment on this document.

[Bluka] This decree is one of the measures in a series of others aimed at achieving our goal: quality instruction in the Latvian language for the upcoming generation and reinforcement of bilingualism.

The decree states that the 1-10th grades of secondary schools or groups of other educational institutions where instruction is conducted in Russian may be divided into

two groups during Latvian language lessons, if there are 25 or more students and if the material base permits. In fact, this decree establishes equality in the teaching of Latvian as well as Russian in instructional collectives of different nationalities.

This same approach will be implemented starting 1 September also on questions of pay. Salaries for Latvian language teachers in secondary schools and boarding schools of all types and for instructors at professional-technical institutions and secondary special educational institutions where instruction is conducted in Russian and which are located in rural areas and in city settlements will be increased by 15 percent for the hours spent teaching Latvian in classes and groups. Such a position has been in effect since 1983 for Russian language teachers at educational institutions where instruction is conducted in Latvian.

Moreover, this same decree permits the public education sections to hold one additional lesson per week in physical culture in 250 secondary schools for grades 1-11.

In addition, 6 hours of chorus will be introduced at 20 secondary schools.

[Steshenko] Viya Alekseyevna, without belittling the importance of the adopted decisions which are aimed at increasing the physical and musical culture of the upcoming generation, I will ask you to return to the problem of Latvian language instruction. After all, it is no secret that many graduates who have an "A" on their report cards do not know how to speak Latvian.

[Bluka] It is true that the problem of improving the quality of Latvian language instruction in Russian schools is one of the most acute. The decree of the Council of Ministers is directed to a certain measure toward its solution. Everyone must understand that we cannot do without the affirmation of bilingualism.

However, today we are suffering a shortage of Latvian language and literature instructors. Three educational institutions—the university and the Liyepay and Daugavpils Pedagogical Institutes—meet only slightly more than half the demand. Yet now this demand will grow even more rapidly. One in every five Latvian language instructors does not have a higher education.

Today the construction of the pedagogical department of LGU [Latvian State University] imeni P. Stuchka is underway. And, although the plan for the first 6-month period has even been overfulfilled, there are serious concerns that the building will not be submitted for operation on schedule. Judge for yourselves what kind of planning this is. Out of a million rubles for construction and installation, only one-fifth has been assimilated this year.

In order to submit the instructional-laboratory building of the pedagogical faculty for operation, the builders must work very hard. We need this building, like we need air.

It is also necessary to elevate the prestige of teaching Latvian. Here the representatives of the creative intelligentsia can be of great help to us in this matter. There are also many problems with securing personnel, since not all ispolkoms recognize the importance of the work on affirming bilingualism which is currently being conducted.

[Steshenko] Thank you for the interview.

12322

Language Teaching Problems in Latvia's Russian, Latvian Schools Examined

18000034b Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
8 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by V. Smirnov, LATINFORM correspondent:
"Time for Search and Initiative"]

[Text] "The attitude of the parents of our students toward the fact that their children are studying Latvian is very good and interested. Often we had occasion to hear complaints from adults. We would like the children to have a better knowledge of Latvian and to do better in this subject, they would say. Last year it was not easy to respond to such questions. We had our share of difficulties in teaching the language. This year the situation has notably improved. The amount of instructional time for Latvian language lessons has been increased and the classes have been broken down into instructional groups. This improves the quality of instruction..."

This excerpt from the speech of G. M. Yefremova, director of the Riga 40th Secondary School, where Russian is the language of instruction, was characteristic for the conference held at the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, which examined questions of language study in the republic's educational institutions. Officials from a number of ministries and departments, organs of public education, publishing houses, school directors, VUZ instructors, and scientists participated in its work. L. L. Bartkevich, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, presided over the meeting.

Problems of teaching Latvian in Russian schools and Russian in Latvian schools were the focus of attention. This is no accident. Today in our republic the principle of Latvian-Russian bilingualism is being ever more fully realized. It must firmly enter our life, our everyday activities, and the practice of operation of all organizations and institutions. The conference noted that Russian language study has undergone comprehensive development in recent years.

New programs, textbooks, methodological study aids, instructional materials and sound recordings for use in audiolingual labs have been developed. The training of Russian language teachers has improved and increased. Advanced Russian is offered in 9 Riga schools.

This entire complex of measures has borne fruit. The overwhelming majority of graduates of Latvian schools have a good mastery of conversational Russian and the basics of grammar. Of course, there are some difficulties, but these are being resolved in a planned manner.

However today, as Latvian SSR Minister of Public Education A. A. Buylis noted, we must strive to see that the graduates of Russian schools gain an equally good mastery of the Latvian language. The solution to this problem requires that we implement quick and effective measures. Some things have already been done. The number of instructional hours for teaching Latvian have been increased. As we have noted earlier, teachers will work not with the entire class if it numbers 25 or more students, but with only half the class. However, as A. A. Buylis said, there is a the republic is suffering from a catastrophic shortage of instructors qualified to teach Latvian language and literature. The minister also named one of the main reasons for this situation. About 10 years ago, the decision was adopted to create a pedagogical institute in Riga. However, this goal was later rejected. Today we are reaping the rewards of this shortsightedness.

Around 100 more Latvian language teachers are needed in the Russian schools. For this reason, Latvian was not studied at all in a number of classes last year. This school year there is again a great non-uniformity in personnel staffing. As a result, in Riga, for example, it is possible to divide classes into two instructional groups only in 21 schools. In 27 schools this reorganization can be only partially implemented, while in 13 other schools it is still necessary to solve the problem of filling vacant teaching positions.

This problem, of course, is not eternal. The training of Latvian language and literature teachers will be expanded at the pedagogical department of Latvian State University imeni P. Stuchka and in the pedagogical institutes. Yet what can we do today about the shortage of teaching personnel? A. A. Buylis sees a temporary solution to the problem in involving students and retired teachers and in increasing the teacher work load.

A proposal was presented at the conference regarding the involvement in this endeavor of graduates of Latvian secondary schools who have a tendency toward pedagogical activity. Moreover, in a number of schools there are pedagogical classes. However, their graduates are directed today to pre-school institutions. The minister, however, did not support this idea, saying that such a contingent of workers would lower the quality of the teacher's corps in the republic. Practicing pedagogs had a

different point of view: Does a diploma certifying a higher education decide everything? There are many cases when university graduates turn out to be incapable of teaching at a school.

The head of the Riga City Public Education Department, Ya. K. Miyezitis, in turn told noted that in the last school year there were 20 students from the philology and pedagogy departments of LGU working as Latvian language teachers in Russian schools. There is an agreement to involve students in this work in the new school year as well. We cannot refute this direction. We must seek out all possible reserves in order to fully provide schools with the necessary teaching personnel and to reduce the current excessive loads on teachers. Otherwise, it would be difficult to achieve a balance in the study of both languages.

Today, for example, Russian is studied in all grades of all Latvian schools in Riga, (in the 9th grade there are 6 full hours of instruction a week), and the graduates are successfully passing the exams on this subject. In Russian schools there is no final exam in Latvian. There is only a control examination. Its results indicate an extreme non-uniformity in knowledge, particularly in mastery of the conversational language. Many graduates have a poor knowledge of the republic's history, geography and cultural life.

A number of the conference participants believed that one of the reasons for the poor preparation is the 2-year senior level of the Russian secondary school. As we know, in Latvian schools it is a year longer and includes the 11th grade. Today a proposal is being presented to introduce 11 grades in schools where Russian is the language of instruction. There is no other solution, stressed A. A. Buylis. He said that the ministry is developing appropriate plans. However, they still have to poll the parents and determine the public opinion. According to the preliminary data, said the minister, the idea of introducing an 11th grade in Russian schools is not supported by the parents of the students. However, we must perform a more in-depth study of the public opinion and make a final decision on this question.

Be it as it may, one thing is clear. In either case, we must develop at an accelerated rate the instructional-methodological and material base for studying Latvian and create specialized study rooms, of which there are only half as many in Riga as the number of Russian language study rooms. The first two schools with in-depth study of the Latvian language have emerged in the new school year.

All aspects are important in language study—the talent of the teacher, skillfully compiled instructional programs and plans, interesting texts, and various didactic materials. G. A. Vildere, chief methodologist of the Ministry of Public Education, spoke about the state of affairs with the preparation of these materials. Every year new textbooks are published and programs are improved, she

said. This work is also not without its difficulties. The polygraphic base is poor. It is inexpedient for industrial enterprises under conditions of cost accounting to cooperate with the organs of public education. They are interested in large orders and the sale of the products through the trade network. We must find such economic levers which would give the enterprises an interest in producing everything necessary for the education of the students.

The chief methodologist exhibited a number of textbooks for the younger classes published by the "Zvaygzne" publishing house. On the outside they are attractive, bound in bright covers. But it is hard to hold even three of these books in your hand—they are that heavy. How can little school children drag around a bookbag stuffed with such books the weight of bricks! G. A. Vildere lamented—again there would be complaints from parents. There is only one reason for this—thick paper. The question of the paper requires a solution—both in quality and in quantity. For example, there are tens of tons of paper produced each year in the republic, yet Latvian publishing houses must import their paper for publishing their books. Wouldn't it be simpler to provide ourselves with "book" grades of paper, adapting the existing equipment for this purpose?

Another proposal was brought up at the conference. Since the enterprises fulfill the orders of the Ministry of Public Education unwillingly and with low quality, maybe the Ministry should announce a competition for creating a cooperative on the preparation of various instructional aids. Finding the raw material for this, for example scrap paper, would be no problem at all.

Assistant editor-in-chief of the "Zvaygzne" publishing house, V. O. Ozols, acquainted the conference participants with the plans for publication of instructional literature dealing with language study. This year, 35,000 copies of second edition of "A Short Handbook on Latvian Grammar" were printed. One other handbook on grammar is being prepared for press. A self-instruction manual on the Latvian language has gone through several editions, and a new self-instruction manual is being prepared for publication. It will tentatively be titled "Latvian For All." According to the plan, the first copies should appear already in February of next year. The publishing house is also receiving other author's proposals.

It is difficult to list all the planned publications. It is enough to say that they consider the wishes of specialists and readers alike. The guarantee of good quality of future textbooks is the creation of authors' collectives which would also include practicing teachers. However, it is rather difficult to combine intensive work in school with the preparation of a textbook. The conference supported a proposal to give authors a paid work leave.

Sincere interest and constructive wishes for improving the level of language instruction, including native language instruction, resounded in the speeches of writer Ya. T. Baltvilks, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member A. Ya. Blinkena, Dean of the Pedagogical Department of LGU imeni P. Stuchka O. K. Zids, Director of the 3rd Riga Secondary School R. L. Danchauski, and others.

Summarizing the discussion, L. L. Bartkevich once again stressed the importance and need for successful resolution of the examined questions and gave the Ministry of Public Education, working together with interested organizations, one month's time to develop and present to the republic government a proposal on additional measures for improving language instruction and study.

12322

Medical Cooperative Operational in Tashkent
18300005a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Aug 1988 p 3

[Article by V. Klenov entitled: "A Cooperative Makes the Diagnosis"]

[Text] It is no secret that many patients from all corners of our republic, and even from outside its borders, attempt to get themselves accepted for treatment by the medical "luminaries" of Tashkent. But far from all of them succeed. The time of our leading specialists' is committed literally to the minute and patients are frequently unable to obtain the referral document from their facilities for the appropriate analyses. Neither these nor other such obstacles exist with regard to the "Shifokor" consultation-diagnostic cooperative, which has been established at the clinic of the Tashkent Medical Institute. And from the day it opened the cooperative has earned its clients' gratitude.

Take, for example, Urazali Dzhurayev from Surkhandrya. For some years this irrigation worker has suffered constantly from arthritis. The rayon hospital has not been able to find the key to his ailment, nor to establish an exact diagnosis. Having heard of "Shifokor" from someone he knew, he came to the clinic and, without waiting in line at all, was able to see the republic's famous arthritis specialist, T. Saliyev. The necessary tests were performed and he received the medical findings including a precise diagnosis and treatment recommendations. It is important to note that the document he received had full official force.

The advantage of "Shifokor" is that it is a consultation-/diagnostic center associated with a clinic. There is nothing else of the sort in Central Asia. The center is equipped with the newest instrumentation and specialists with the highest qualifications work here. In addition the cooperative's leased equipment is its own property.

In order, for instance, to use apparatus from the Japanese firm "Tochiba" for ultrasound diagnosis one must usually sign up a month and a half ahead of time. "Shifokor" can arrange this without any delay at all.

Of course, this cannot be allowed to hurt the clinic's primary patients. And so the members of the cooperative take patients and perform analysis after their regular working hours.

The cooperative's membership includes candidates (for a doctorate) in science, docents, and physicians in the most highly qualified category. They will undertake to produce a precise diagnosis of cardiological, gastroenterological, arthrological, neuropathological, urological, and other diseases. If the patient does not have the time or there are other extenuating circumstances the consultants will see him at his home.

Here is a ticklish question, how much does all this cost? The answer is no secret—depending on the field of the specialist, a consultation costs 7 to 10 rubles.

9285

Uzbek Media, Officials Battle Over Access To Information

*18300005b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Aug 1988 p 3*

[Article by G. Figlin: "Everything That Was Said Is For Publication: Reflections After Meeting with the Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies"]

[Text] You could still smell the printer's ink on the newspaper issue containing the resolutions of the XIXth All-Union Party Conference when the Editorial Club was visited by D.A. Usatov, the procurator of the republic, S.Y. Yigitaliyev, chairman of the UzSSR Supreme Court, and B.G. Alimdzhanov, the minister of justice of the Uzbek SSR, who had come to meet with journalists. This was not the first press conference held since the procurator, court, legal system, and internal affairs organs were charged with instituting wide-ranging glasnost in their work. But it was the first time that the press conference organizers intentionally relaxed the rigidity of the set "protocol." It was agreed that the predetermined topics and the journalists' previously submitted questions would serve only as a framework, a skeleton which would be fleshed out with a living dialogue. And, if the course the conversation took so required, they were ready to reinforce their general descriptions with statistical data, and their arguments with facts. In addition to the procurator, participants in the meeting included his deputies, who are responsible for various areas of work, K.R. Razikov, and S. M. Mirsafayev. Questions on police operations were answered by T.A. Tokhtayev, the deputy minister of internal affairs of the UzSSR. Responsible officials from the law enforcement agencies sat in the audience, and, like the journalists used microphones placed between the rows of seats.

The press conference lasted two hours. First one, then another journalist would take possession of the microphone, heating it up with their emotions: they argued with the heads of the law enforcement organs and asked them to find out the truth about something personally, check on something else, monitor a third thing.. The variegated impressions thus created have now resolved themselves into a whole mosaic, in which I can clearly discern what, in my view, is the most important point about the meeting. It has convincingly demonstrated to everyone that single joint meetings between members of the law enforcement agencies and journalists are simply not enough. The number of problems is too great—there are too many specific questions that reporters want to ask the law enforcement organs, and the latter in turn wish to put to the journalists—to cover them all in a single session, even in a cursory fashion.

A highly significant detail: in the resolutions of the the XIXth All-Union Party Conference, the mass media are discussed in the "On legal reform" resolution, while the "On glasnost" resolution speaks of the law enforcement organs. In order to exercise the population's right to information, raise the general level of legal culture, and reinforce socialist law and order on the basis of development of the people's power there must be reliable, constant contact between the reader, radio listener, and television viewer and the law enforcement organs by way of the mass media. How will we manage to create such contacts which at present do not exist and why?

At the press conference, the procurator of the republic, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and the minister of justice outlined a circle of problems which are currently of fundamental importance to the law enforcement organs. And it transpired that this circle did not always coincide with the issues the papers, radio and television journalists call attention to. The questions that occupy the foreground in the mirror of the mass media turn out to be in the background or even completely out of the picture for the law enforcement agencies.

D.A. Usatov, the procurator of the Uzbek SSR, spoke in detail of the complexities associated with making the transition from clearing up the negative phenomena of the past to solving the problems of today—intensification of the surveillance activity of the procurator's office, particularly in the sphere of economics. "Why try to hide it, many of our staff members are very badly prepared for this work," said Dmitriy Aleksandrovich. And yet among the abundant critical articles, how many attempts have journalists made to deal with these topics, which the procurator himself sees as fundamental?

In our republic, as throughout the country, there have been heated debates concerning the reorganization of the investigative system. For the time being the disputes have been more theoretical than anything else. But the deputy minister of internal affairs spoke of an experiment which has been going on since the beginning of the year: in a number of oblasts the police removed the

investigative system from the jurisdiction of the internal affairs administration. The journalists' response to this information was a speculative discussion of possible administrative structures, while the concrete results of the experiment were neglected.

B.G. Alimdzhanov, the minister of justice, spoke about the renewal, related to legal reform, which must be allowed to bypass neither decrepit, converted buildings, nor decrepit, outmoded procedures for providing legal services to the population. And again, how frequently do our republic's journalists address the problems that are critical to, for example, a notary?

The reasons for the "blank spots" in the mirror of mass media were revealed when the conversation turned to the topic which has received the most attention. Citizens' complaints concerning the actions of the police, red tape, bureaucratism, failure to comply with the law in investigations and judicial review of criminal and civil cases—there is not a single periodical that has not added articles of its own to the powerful stream of criticism. Why does such a turbulent river flow along this river bed, while other channels contain nothing but slow-moving rivulets? Continuing the metaphor, we need to turn to the source, from which the mass media themselves try to obtain information. The law enforcement agencies provide information to the periodicals primarily about such matters as planned meetings or expanded board membership, in a word, about measures. But, after all, it is vastly more important for the people to know about the actual functioning of our law enforcement agencies, than about what meetings they have and what they discuss. And yet I cannot remember an instance when someone from the Supreme Court, for example, called up to ask us to write about an overturned sentence or lower court decision, so as to prevent repetition of an error made in a case. Or when the Ministry of Justice invited journalists to discuss the reprehensible behavior of a judge. Or when the procurator's office asked newspaper reporters to participate in checking out a single allegation by the paper, so that the journalists could fortify themselves with first-hand impressions.

The staff of the law enforcement agencies do quite a lot of writing themselves. However, in journalists' terms what they write, as a rule, neither catches the eye nor holds the attention. Of course, there have been and will be certain stages in the law enforcement process in which publicity is undesirable. But, even aside from this, far from everything that is decided, said, and done is for publication. And against this background, another source of information must be used. For example, this year PRAVDA VOSTOKA received 11 thousand letters, with one out of four containing a complaint about the law enforcement agencies. These letters cite actual names and positions, and enclose documents with fat sheaves of preceding correspondence in which a multitude of contradictions are all too clear. I have seen such complaints in abundance in the editorial offices of other periodicals as well. Only an insignificant portion of

them, the most characteristic and socially significant, see the light of day on the pages of newspapers and journals, or on the airwaves. But even this is sufficient to make criticism from one source, in one direction appear to be an uninterrupted stream. Every new article leads to a new wave of letters. The mass media supply information to the readers and the readers to the media.

How do the law enforcement agencies react to this critical cycle?

Four years ago when, in an area previously closed to glasnost, when the bursts of critical articles had just begun to increase in frequency, nearly every one was answered with "the facts were confirmed" and a list of the responsible officials who had been punished. How can it be that every critical article in every issue was invariably "a bull's eye"? It would have been a good thing, but how could a generation reared on a steely: "How many copies of your paper go abroad, do you know?" have acquired such mastery of criticism?

They got rid of the steel, and developed the slogan of "reacting properly to criticism." But, undoubtedly, even criticism has some sort of "critical mass." If there are more articles based on credible concrete facts than can be perceived, understood and reacted to at once by those to whom they are addressed; if the deep and the superficial, the well-thought out and the hastily composed, the competent and the amateurish are all poured together into a single stream, then criticism is no longer on the right path, but becomes overwhelming and people are swamped by it. And the responses become increasingly defensive and empty. There are nonprofessional, unsubstantiated calls by journalists to punish the staff of law enforcement agencies on the basis of their articles alone. But, at the same time, the response to these calls contain refutations of the articles, for which, they imply, the authors should be punished, which are also not always objective and substantiated. This absence of good will and mutual understanding only plays into the hands of those who truly fear glasnost.

Not so long ago I was asked to write on the topic of investigative journalism. I refused. In my opinion, given the current state of affairs in the law, it would be frivolous for a journalist to even talk about this. A citizen is legally liable for giving false information to an investigator, or for concealing information. But if a journalist is misled or people refuse to speak to him the only one who is liable is the journalist himself ... he has not succeeded in getting at the truth. What are the consequences of answering a journalist's inquiries in a formal, empty manner, or of ignoring them entirely? In essence, there are none. Well, perhaps there would be a rebuke at the party or social level.

The outside authors who come to our editorial offices with caustic, critical material are surprised at how we check and recheck everything. The newspaper, they say, is a tribunal for pluralistic opinions. No one, however,

has repealed the regulation according to which, not only the author, but the editors as well, are liable in court if someone who has been criticized considers himself offended. And since there is no statute of limitations on such suits, where are the editors, years later, to find the critic who once made use of their tribunal?

As of today, not one single thread has been pulled out of the legal curbs which were imposed on the mass media in the past.

And under these conditions, I am not ashamed to confess, the majority of the serious critical articles on which I worked, would not have appeared, or would have easily been "demolished" after they had seen the light of day, if I had not been aided by people from the People's Control, the procurator's office, the police, judicial agencies and the courts in gathering my material and "testing it for strength" for publication.

Various forms of collaboration were tried out. A legal council was set up for the editorial board in which all the law enforcement agencies participated. The most compelling letters, the most serious complaints received by the editors were given to the heads of these agencies for consideration and comment in the paper. It is true that this system lasted only a short time—not everything worked out as one would have wished. This council turned out to be too cumbersome and difficult to control. But even a negative result is still a result, allowing us to see where errors were made and to try a different route.

Currently special groups have been established in the law enforcement agencies for liaison with the mass media. And yet in the majority of newspaper in our republic there are still no staff members specializing in legal topics. In the past, when this area was closed, one could cope with it fully, in passing, between other tasks. And now? On the eve of legal reform, a desire to specialize seriously in legal topics is no longer foolish, but a real necessity.

9285

Fate of Jews Tied to Fate of All Soviet Nationalities

18300058 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 15 Oct 88 p 6

[Article by Tankred Golenpolskiy, under the rubric "Polemical Notes": "The Time Has Come"]

[Text] Nevertheless, this discussion should take place. Even though, to be honest, many of my friends and acquaintances tried to dissuade me. Our timid attitude toward the printed word has vetoed this topic for too long. But the time has evidently come, and we have evidently reached the age, when it is impossible to remain silent any longer. You get tired explaining to your

friends, you get tired explaining to colleagues, and you get tired trying to defend your point of view to foreigners. And besides—why not admit it?—we've all grown bolder today.

My life turned out in such a way that I came to the Soviet Union in 1947 at the age of 16. After a quarantine, the steamer Smolnyy, which was carrying the children of Soviet citizens who had been living in China, docked at a pier in the port of Nakhodka.

In order to understand the full emotion of that moment for us boys and girls, one must at least for a moment imagine what it was like to grow up abroad as a Soviet citizen during the period of that great prewar idealism when all that was visible over there, abroad, was the dream of centuries being realized. And the films "Volga-Volga," "Radiant Path" and "Tractor Driver" were viewed not as artistic inventions but as documents, facts.

And then there was the war. And all the battles won and lost there, on the field of sacred battle, were repeated in the schoolyard: children from the German and Italian missions, the children of White emigrants, Americans and Scots were in school with us. We would return home bruised. Granted, at the very outset of the war the Yankee kids, in contrast to their government, opened a "second front." Later the Japanese sent those of us who had not managed to be evacuated to concentration camps together with our parents.

We believed in the infallibility of the Homeland, as we believe in it today. Only back then we still believed with an incredible childish fanaticism. No, rumors reached us, too, but then we already somehow distinguished people from the Cause, for we intuitively sensed its irreversibility.

On the pier after a drenching September rain, a man lay dead drunk in a puddle. Another man was passing by. He was walking with an old man's walk, shuffling his feet, wearing some sort of incredible long Jewish overcoat. Stopping, speaking with a terrible local Jewish accent, he said sorrowfully: "What are you doing lying there like a swine in the puddle!" And a sailor standing nearby replied: "He's lying on his own land, but you're walking on someone else's." Thus I first encountered anti-Semitism.

Since that time many years have passed, but I have never ceased to be surprised at how similar the positions of the Black Hundreds and the Zionists were in our historical past and remain today. And that pertains to everything: from mixed marriages to the concept of the Homeland. Fortunately for Russia and Russian Jews, both of them are in the absolute minority here.

In Russia, as in many other countries of the world, anti-Semitism has long since lost its religious roots, becoming an artificial product of a sociopolitical nature. As one of the Nazi leaders said, "if the Jews did not exist,

they would have to be invented." And this usually occurs in transitional periods, times of trouble, when something unsuccessful must be somehow explained. However, it is not just in relation to Jews that this social phenomenon is typical. It is precisely in such times that the arousal of chauvinism and nationalism of all sorts is characteristic on the part of both the national majority and the national minority. Moreover, alas, this is not the sort of manifestation of national character that reflects national pride for the contribution made to the treasury of the multinational family of peoples, but an isolationist, antagonistic position of pitting one people against another. Maybe that is why I am still irritated by the figures cited in our press about the number of Jewish Heroes of the Soviet Union, academicians, deputies, etc. It seems to me that in citing them there is, besides bragging, also a kind of apologetic tone. After all, it is natural that the peoples of the USSR, who have received access to education, would produce scientists from their midst, and that they would defend their home in difficult times for the Homeland, and that having defended it, they would work honorably in it. And the Jews in the USSR are no exceptions in that respect. As for individual manifestations of a negative nature, they have never been the prerogative of a whole people, as national qualities.

In the meanwhile, the "fight against cosmopolitanism," that ideological pogrom whose brunt hid hard against the Jews, died down, and the trial of the "doctor-poisoners" exposed itself for what it was worth. All that was condemned, and totally innocent people were rehabilitated, but... But, in the mind of the ordinary person belonging to a certain milieu, the stereotypes of anti-Semitism had not been erased. It is much more difficult to remove poison from people's minds than it is to remove lies from the printed page.

Unfortunately, it was not just hapless Philistines but people higher up who turned out to have been poisoned. Rumors to the effect that a quota had been set on Jews for admission to higher schools started gradually to spread.

I do not know whether such quotas existed. I entered a higher school and defended a dissertation, and my son also graduated from an institute. And judging from statistics, we were by no means isolated cases. But one thing is obvious: Knowing about those rumors, no official refuted them or condemned them. I will grant that the circulation of those rumors suited some people. And I do not discount a trait that is characteristic of all national minorities—to try to justify or explain any personal failure by blaming one's national origin and some sort of discrimination. Let me note in this connection that, regardless of the "weather," Jews have always occupied a worthy place in our society. Be that as it may, all these processes contributed to the growth of what in my view is an abnormal phenomenon, the name of which is emigration. It was carried out on the pretext (and sometimes on the genuine grounds) of a desire for the

reunification of families separated by the war. Attempts were made to quell that wave by no less abnormal measures—every conceivable taxation based on educational qualifications and similar, relatively ineffective means.

But did Jews who left really rush to their spiritual "homeland" Israel, to their first cousins once removed, whom they had never known and who, for their part, were not particularly anticipating the prospect of having "relatives" as boarders? In the overwhelming majority of the cases, the answer was negative.

I think that if in the past our country had had clear-cut legislation providing the right of Soviet citizens to leave the country, stay abroad and return to the USSR, emigration, with the exception of opponents of socialism and people with an openly consumerist mentality, would never have arisen. And that pertains not just to Jews but to the representatives of all our country's nationalities. The impossibility of the ordinary Soviet person's leaving for a while and returning, and a sense of offense at the lack of the presumption of the innocence of their intentions prompted people to emigrate. Now, when meeting abroad with people who have migrated there, all you hear is: "But I had no other choice; after all, just as I was a Soviet person, I will remain one forever, with or without a passport!" Thank god, now significant changes are taking place with regard to this matter.

However, no sooner had we started to straighten out our visa policies than Secretary of State George Shultz appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee and stated that the United States should be more selective in deciding whether to grant "refugee status." He attributed this to budgetary limitations.

It follows from that statement that the United States does not intend, in the future, to accept all persons who leave the Soviet Union and the East European countries. And Senators Metzenbaum, Grassley and Simpson quite bluntly raised the question of those who emigrate from the USSR and head for the United States simply "in search of a good life," in other words, not for political reasons. Consequently, there is no reason to spend federal money on them. Let those who have invited them take responsibility for their arrival and their loans.

In this connection, the quota on immigrants from the USSR and Eastern Europe has already been reduced by 5,500 persons this year. However, as Shultz stated, the number admitted to the country may be higher, but not all of them will receive money provided for in the "refugee program." And what about the appeal to "let my people go"? Evidently, it was not the result that was important to our "defenders" in the United States, but the process. A process aimed at knocking the heads together of our country's peoples. Unfortunately, people who took that bait have been found in both the United States and the USSR.

However, emigrants have also included Ukrainians, Armenians and Germans who previously inhabited the Volga region, but that has somehow been mentioned only quietly. What the country did know as that "the Jews are fleeing." On the other hand, persons of non-Jewish nationality who felt a lust to taste "the easy life, like in the movies," abroad and had no access to marital contracts with foreigners sought out Jews for that purpose, and the Jews became practically "means of conveyance."

In the meantime, foreign "freedom lovers" or, more accurately, Sovietophobes, held rallies under the Old Testament slogan: "Let my people go!"

For my part, I left on a business trip abroad nearly 40 years later, after enduring nearly six years during which I could not get a regular appointment anywhere. During that time I worked as a nonstaff employee at several jobs, published seven books, translated 10 novels and plays by American authors, and even defended a candidate's dissertation. In general, I had nothing to complain about. Nonetheless.

I remember that the department head at a Moscow technical higher school once offered me hourly work as an instructor in English. At that time a candidate of sciences in our country was receiving a ruble and a half per hour for that. Swallowing my pride, I filled out all the required application forms and took them to the institute. I was asked to wait for half an hour, while the prorektor for instruction took a look at them. After 15 minutes the department head, a nice person and genuine member of the Russian intelligentsia, came out with a downcast face and returned my documents to me, yet he himself did not look me in the eye. I tried to reassure him, and he just kept repeating one word: "Vileness." With difficulty I tried to get him to tell me what had happened. "I was told that if a person with his scholarly degree, publications and knowledge is willing to take hourly work, he is getting ready to clear out to Israel. Only he's not up to us here."

Without a knock and without an invitation, I went in the prorektor's office and for some reason whispered: "I was abroad and came back here because this is my spiritual homeland. But such people as you dream of trips abroad while hating those unfortunate emigrants."

To this day I do not understand why I attacked him that way. He was not the one who had thought that up, although he was the sort of person on whom everything that we so courageously call the period of stagnation was based.

In looking back, I do not condemn those who showed faint-heartedness, succumbed to the attitudes that were current in a certain milieu, and emigrated. It was necessary to be a person of very strong conviction to distinguish what was happening at that time from genuine socialism. And I can say with pride that hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews withstood that trial.

However, there were also some outright opportunists. I recall several such people who told me: "I have a vacancy, but I cannot hire you, otherwise people there (and here he pointed his index figure vaguely upwards) will say that a Jew is hiring 'his own people.' So you understand." And that was also a manifestation of anti-Semitism. For an anti-Semite can also be a Jew who rushes to change his name, his patronymic and his nationality. I know that one can find people who desire to justify them, but I am convinced that a person who is capable of betraying his father can also resort to more frightening betrayal in order to save his skin.

In the United States I was repeatedly reproached for the fact that our passports contain the item "nationality." It was hard for them to understand the obvious idea: if Uzbeks, Yakuts, Udmurts and all our other peoples and nationalities are proud of their nationalities, why should Jews be ashamed? I am convinced that many representatives of national minorities in our country, if given a choice, would insist on retaining that item. But it is perfectly clear that people in some circles in the United States have decided to play the "Jewish card." Yet they have no interest in democracy in its genuine sense.

But why is it precisely America that has taken on the mission of "defending Soviet Jews," seeing its task, in accordance with the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment, as equating Jews with goods exported from the USSR, in exchange for favorable trade terms? I had never before encountered a more shameful attempt to bargain from a country that 200 years ago had proclaimed documents of democracy that were great for their time, and I was very proud when our leadership rejected that offensive deal.

Why is it us, who number 1.8 million people in the country, whom they chose for their exercises? Can it be that Jews are so dear to them? If that is the case, then where were they when, in people's attempt to save themselves from the Hitlerites, ships carrying Jewish refugees came to the United States and were refused the right of asylum? Why didn't people talk about anti-Semitism when the Rosenbergs were sent to the electric chair? Why hasn't anyone to this day rehabilitated the victims of the Macarthyism period, among whom, in addition to Charlie Chaplin, a significant majority were members of the Jewish creative intelligentsia, and why has no one expunged the "black lists," where the names of people who refused to be stool pigeons for the House Un-American Activities Committee still languish posthumously?

So where does this passion come from? The answer to the question is simple and obvious. They needed to play precisely on the base feelings of all sorts of weedlike organizations that have sprung up in our reality under the beneficial rays of democracy, which we have not yet learned how to use. They chose Soviet Jews in order to try to capitalize on the tragic memories of Babi Yar and Dachau, whose death conveyor, incidentally, was

destroyed by Soviet soldiers. I admit that for all my active antipathy for our latter-day Black Hundreds, I can intellectually understand those among them who in such a situation say: "And why is it the Jews whom people in the West are standing up for?" And their conclusion: "There's your proof of the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy!" So our latter-day fighters for racial purity are in harness with the reactionary conspiracy abroad.

Thus, all this noisy uproar and outcry about "letting my people go" is nothing but a perfidious political trick, which many honest Americans, among others, have fallen for out of the goodness of their hearts. But I do not consider myself the representative of a chosen people, and I do not want my children to be chosen either for blessings or for the furnaces of Auschwitz. The destiny of Soviet Jews is inseparably bound up with the destiny of all the Soviet Union's peoples, just as the destiny of American Jews is bound up with the destiny of the United States. And just as American Jews enrich their national culture by drawing on common American culture and enrich, in turn, the culture of the American mainstream, the same thing happens to me in our country.

It is also of interest that, from my numerous meetings in the United States, the fact of a split among the many diverse "human rights" organizations became obvious to me. The fresh air of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow exploded into the stagnant atmosphere of circles that had turned the so-called "situation of Jews in the USSR" into their own small business. "let us seek positive points of contact and cooperation, which would contribute to the enrichment of both traditional Jewish culture and the cultural legacy of the USSR and the United States as a whole," many people told me, proposing perfectly specific measures.

It is another matter whether we are ourselves doing everything for the flourishing of that and other cultures of our peoples. I do not understand, for example, why in the numerous foreign-language courses—paid courses, moreover—it is impossible to teach Hebrew or Yiddish. Just as I do not understand, by the way, why it is impossible to organize the teaching of Armenian or Georgian to the children of Armenians or Georgians living in Moscow. Or why can't cooperatives engage in that?

Yes, we do publish an extremely interesting magazine in Yiddish, and there is a newspaper, but how many people can read them? And just who are we publishing them for? So that the uncles beyond the hill can say that Jews are not denied their own publication? But we are building socialism for ourselves, not for them.

I was and remain a consistent opponent of emigration, and not just because it means a "brain drain," but also because in most cases it is a tragedy for the people who resort to such a step. But do we propagandists work with those who are preparing to take such a step? What are we

doing to remove the problems that arise for such people? After all, that is also a human factor, and with the rare exception of our candid enemies, even there, abroad, most of those who have left remain Soviet people in spirit. For even though a person has left the Homeland, it remains in him. Remains forever. And there is nothing he can do about that.

And another thing. The nationality problem is one of the most complex problems of the present day. And there is no country that can say today that it has solved it. Anti-Semitism in Chicago has reached such dimensions that various United States public organizations have been forced to concern themselves with this problem. Anti-Semitism has reared its head in the FRG. But no other system today possesses such a reserve of spirituality and such great traditions of internationalism as socialism possesses. Traditions that are rooted in the ideas and deeds of the great figures of Russian culture. Suffice it to recall the noble role that the Russian intelligentsia played in the shameful Dreyfus and Beylis trials. That is why I believe, I know, that we are capable of solving the most complex problems today, when the words of the song that we sang with pride in my remote childhood abroad are finally being actually embodied in life. The song about the spring wind that blows over the country, from which it becomes more joyful for all of us to live with every passing day.

8756

Tajik Premier Questioned on Problems of Predraft Training

18010219 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Oct 88 p 2

[Interview with I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, by Lt Col A. Ladin: "On the Path to the Military Formation"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has recently discussed problems of predraft training for the youth of Tajikistan ("Words Cannot Take the Place of Action," 18 Jun 87, and "Break Down the Barrier of Habit," 2 Mar 88). What is the situation in the republic today? A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent interviews I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

[Ladin] Izatullo Khayeyevich, since we have agreed that our interview will be mainly about problems of predraft training for the youth, permit me to begin it with some specific facts. I have before me a report prepared by Tajikistan's Komsomol CC on the state of general education, including initial military training for the students of secondary schools. Let us put it this way. The picture is far from bright. Particularly in certain rayons. The study of the Russian language continues to be an urgent matter. At the same time, the rayons have not been prepared to accept all of the Russian language instructors

applying from various parts of the nation, and more than 300 teachers have indicated in response to the republic's request that they would like to come and help the local schools.

[Khayeyev] You have brought up some difficult problems troubling the republic's leaders today. Briefly stated, many things are being held up primarily by a shortage of schools and housing for the teachers. Incidentally, it was precisely the absence of housing which prevented us from accepting all of the applicants to teach the Russian language of whom you speak.

This year the republic Council of Ministers has taken a number of major steps to accelerate the construction of schools in remote areas of our mountain region. Overloaded educational institutions, obsolete facilities or even a total lack thereof and poorly trained teachers are all typical of the republic's rural school. Until these matters are resolved—thoroughly resolved—it would be difficult to expect any significant changes in the training of predraft students in the general education schools.

With respect to the predraft training of our youth, it should be frankly stated that many local party and soviet leaders need, figuratively speaking, to face up to the matter. This applies also to a number of republic ministries. Some of them speak eloquently from speaker's platforms about the importance of this training but do little to see that the youth are prepared morally and physically to fulfill their military duty in a worthy manner. By the way, this attitude was discussed in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article last year: "Words Cannot Take the Place of Action." It dealt with problems of predraft training for the youth in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. Improvements have taken shape in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, among others, however. A total of 260 athletic centers and obstacle courses and 57 gymnasiums have been built in Tajikistan during the past 3 years. Swimming pools have been built in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and in Pyandzhskiy, Dzhrigatal'skiy and Ayninskiy rayons.

Substantial funds have been allocated for building defense and sports health camps, and 20 camps fully meet the requirements. This summer they received regular students and students from SPTUs [secondary vocational and technical schools]. Advances have also been made in medical support for the youth. While there were 64 medical offices for adolescents 2 years ago, there are now 76. We can already say that we have a functioning specialized medical service in the republic, which makes it possible to detect various illnesses in adolescents in the early stages and therefore to cure them before they are drafted.

I would mention also the gratifying fact that many ministries and departments have stopped economizing on predraft training for the youth and have gone from words to action. The Dushanbe Fittings Plant imeni S.

Ordzhonikidze, for example, has mastered the production of components for athletic centers, and these are urgently needed by the schools, SPTUs, tekhnikums and VUZs.

[Ladin] Izatullo Khayeyevich, out in the forces one still most frequently finds young Tajiks in the military construction units though. There are few in the other units, and they ordinarily do not perform the duties of leading specialists.

[Khayeyev] The situation is clearly not right and needs to be changed. The republic's envoys must be trained to the point that they can serve where the main missions involved in ensuring a high level of combat readiness for the troops and naval forces are performed: at the control panels of the Rocket Troops and Air Defense Forces, around the combat aircraft and ships, in motorized rifle and tank units. What is preventing this? The main causes have already been mentioned: a poor knowledge of the Russian language, gaps in general education and inadequate physical conditioning.

I would mention something else which is no less significant. Many of our youth do not have adequate technical skills, particularly in the field of radio electronics, radio and computer technology. There are more than 2,000 various technical groups in the republic today, including groups with an applied military focus. That is not very many. In any case, there are several times more people with a desire to learn the technology than are accommodated by these groups. The trouble is that the equipment of many of the groups cannot meet any sort of critical test.

The youth are especially interested in electronic computers. Computers are requested by schools and SPTUs, young technicians' centers and youth clubs. We can give them nothing, however, because we have only individual computers in the republic. How many sets of computer equipment for training do you think the nation's enterprises were supposed to provide last year to meet the needs of public education in the republic? A total of 29. We did not receive a single set, however.

In order somehow to deal with this situation, we are setting up mobile demonstration classrooms in buses. One such unit is already operating, and 1,500 students from remote towns and villages have had the opportunity to study in it. With the help of ministries and enterprises we might scrape together the equipment to set up another three or four mobile classrooms. This is a drop in the bucket, however. Technical schools and clubs must be set up in each city and each rayon center, and we are prepared to do that. We do not have enough equipment at this time, however, or the required number of instructors capable of teaching the youth in this field. This is the reality.

[Ladin] It seems to me that the DOSAAF organizations are not doing a thorough job. On average in the nation every third draft-age youth acquires a military specialty in the defense society's training organizations, while only every eighth one does so in Tajikistan. And your republic is among the most youthful with respect to the average age of its residents. It has many heavily populated rayons, but the DOSAAF technical sports clubs are poorly developed there, and there are few DOSAAF schools. Even where they exist, they do not have the proper facilities for normal training of the students.

[Khayeyev] Yes, many of the defense society's rayon, city and oblast organizations do not deserve any praise. We also have important complaints about the leadership of Tajikistan's DOSAAF Central Committee. It is slow in correcting the shortcomings pointed out at a meeting of the republic's party aktiv on improving the military and patriotic indoctrination and the predraft training of the youth. Especially troubling is the fact that a calm and unhurried life not burdened with job pressures and concerns suits some of those in charge. Apparently, some of them have simply reconciled themselves to the shortcomings. And I repeat: There are many of them. Today only a portion of the DOSAAF training organizations located in Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tyube have normal facilities for training specialists for the Armed Forces. The rest have a shortage of dormitories, and the messing of the students is not well organized everywhere.

Far be it from me to reproach the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee alone for all of the problems. A great deal should be done by the local authorities. Furthermore, the mass defense work is not an alien or a secondary matter for the ministries and departments. And we do try to help the republic DOSAAF organizations. This is the problem we face, however. Funds are frequently available for the construction or repair of facilities, while there are not enough allocated materials.

Today it is a matter of making the best and most effective use of available possibilities for working with the youth. One of these is the active involvement of reserve fightingmen in the work, particularly those who have fulfilled their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan. This is a great force, which could universally alter the situation for the better.

[Ladin] Unfortunately, not all of the local leaders share this opinion. I can attest to the fact that letters are still frequently received from fightingmen-and-internationalists complaining about disregard for and indifference to their initiatives on the part of local authorities, republic Komsomol committees and DOSAAF. What can you tell us about this?

[Khayeyev] I would say that things are now improving in this respect. The situation changed perhaps after K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party CC, met with the leaders of patriotic associations and clubs at the beginning of the year. And the reserve

fightingmen themselves, with their inherent persistence, have demonstrated to many of those in charge that they are capable of performing the most complex tasks pertaining to the military and patriotic work and the predraft training of the youth. The Desantnik, a defense sports club, has functioned on a self-financing basis in Dushanbe for several years now. The Alfa-Rubikon, Pogranichnik and Inkidob, teenage military and patriotic associations, are highly popular with the youth. They are directed by fightingmen-and-internationalists. There is no question that the number of associations and clubs will grow. We have an agreement with the command element of the Central Asian Military District on the allocation of military training equipment and athletic gear to the DOSAAF rayon committees for the councils and clubs of the reserve fightingmen.

Here is another gratifying sign of the times. In many places fightingmen-and-internationalists have been elected deputies to village, rayon and city soviets of people's deputies, and Komsomol leaders. All of this is injecting new vigor into the work with the youth.

Since we are on the subject of reserve fightingmen who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan, I want to say that a great deal is being done in the republic to provide them with their rightful benefits and to improve their social and living conditions. The families of disabled and dead servicemen are a special concern of ours. For example, four of 17 disabled individuals needing improved housing or an apartment in Dushanbe received it during the first 6 months. Apartments were also allocated for the families of seven dead fightingmen.

Similar steps have been taken in Kurgan-Tyube, Lenina-bad and Kulyab Oblasts and in rayon directly subordinate to the republic.

[Ladin] Yes, I have heard a great deal about such examples of genuine concern for the fightingmen-and-internationalists and their families. I can also say that I have heard many good things about the republic's Communist Party CC and its government from officers. They and their families can feel the concern and attention of the authorities, particularly with respect to the provision of housing. The fightingmen-and-internationalists frequently encounter indifference and callousness, however. The ordeals of reserve servicemen have already become commonplace at certain republic airports, and Aeroflot officials are not responding to them at all. On the other hand, there is a flourishing of "services" by speculators who have found a common language with the ticket agents of the air transport service. The central press has written about this.

[Khayeyev] The case described in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA made us think seriously about what is happening at our airports. The internal affairs agencies have

been instructed to step up their campaign against every sort of "purveyors" of airline tickets. Those fond of easy profits who set up shop at Aeroflot ticket offices will be held accountable.

The blame for what happened lies with the leadership of the Tajik Civil Aviation Administration. The old habit of not burdening oneself with extra concerns took over. The situation has now been corrected. The management of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation has established the possibility of reserving seats for fightingmen-and-internationalists over and above existing quotas.

Let me tell you my own personal opinion. It always pains and offends me when the fightingmen of our Armed Forces encounter indifference. The army enjoys the love and respect of all the Soviet people, including the people of Tajikistan. We view it not just as our armed defender

but also as a support in our daily life. When we have natural disasters we turn first for assistance to the fightingmen. And they respond immediately.

We try to repay them in kind. The republic leadership feels that no difficulties or adversities are an excuse for reducing our concern for and attention to the fightingmen who have performed the difficult duty of guarding the Soviet State's sacred borders.

The unity of the people and the army is a product of the great friendship existing among the multinational peoples of our entire nation. Our sons, the best representatives of the Soviet youth, serve in the ranks of the army, the navy, the border and internal troops. And we must all work together to see that every young person fulfills his military duty with honor and dignity.

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